M. H. S. ANSARI, J. ( 1 ) M. H. S. Ansari, J.-Petitioner has, in the instant writ application, questioned the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner by a charge sheet issued under memo dated September 9, 1998, order passed by the disciplinary authority dated November 1, 1999 and the order of the appellate authority dated May 31, 2000 being annexure P-3, P-10 and P-12 respectively. Consequential directions have been prayed for reinstating the petitioner in service and awarding of all consequential benefits. ( 2 ) PETITIONER was issued a charge sheet wherein as many as 7 charges had been framed against the petitioner. Along with the charge sheet, the list of documents on which the charges were proposed to be sustained as also the list of witnesses was furnished. The enquiry officer by his report annexure P-7 came to the conclusion that all the 7 charges stand proved. The disciplinary authority agreeing with the report of the enquiry officer while forwarding the report of the enquiry officer proposed the punishment of dismissal from service and afforded the petitioner an opportunity to make his representation. Thereafter by his impugned order being annexure P-10 the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service and the appellate authority by its impugned order being annexure P-12 confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal. ( 3 ) INSTANT writ application is filed questioning the aforesaid proceedings. ( 4 ) MR. D. Saha Roy appearing along with Mr. Partha Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the impugned proceedings are vitiated on the ground that the same are founded on closed, biased and prejudiced mind. The enquiry officer has not taken into consideration the arguments in defence and the disciplinary authority has mechanically concurred with the conclusions of the enquiry officer. Likewise the appellate authority has mechanically and without application of mind confirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Mr. D. Saha Roy elaborated his aforesaid submission with respect to the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer by contending that the same are contrary to record and suffer from the vice of perversity. The enquiry officer has based his conclusions on irrelevant materials excluding to take into account relevant materials and thereby erroneously held the petitioner guilty of charges. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Mr. The enquiry officer has based his conclusions on irrelevant materials excluding to take into account relevant materials and thereby erroneously held the petitioner guilty of charges. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Bhaskar Mitra, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that there is no warrant to interfere with the impugned proceedings. The enquiry was conducted in accordance with law and in compliance with principles of natural justice, reasoned speaking order has been passed by the respondent authorities and the impugned proceedings do not suffer from any legal infirmity of the kind that warrant interference by a writ Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of judicial review. ( 6 ) HEARD learned counsel for the respective parties and also perused the relevant documents upon which reliance has been placed in support of the respective contentions. However, before dealing elaborately with rival contentions in respect of the several charges framed against the petitioner it would be convenient to briefly examine the scope and ambit of a writ Court in exercise of its power of judicial review in the matter of departmental proceedings. ( 7 ) IT is well settled that judicial review, generally speaking, is not directed against a decision but is directed against the decision making process. A writ Court did not act as an appellate authority. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in 1995 6 SCC 749 the majority judgment was to the following effect:when an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/tribunal in its power of judicial review did not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964)4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964)1 LLJ 38 this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. ( 8 ) BRIEFLY summarized the three heads of grounds on which action of departmental authority is subject to control by judicial review are (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, (iii) procedural impropriety. ( 8 ) BRIEFLY summarized the three heads of grounds on which action of departmental authority is subject to control by judicial review are (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, (iii) procedural impropriety. ( 9 ) THUS, interference with the decision of departmental authority can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the modes of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion. ( 10 ) IT is in the light of the above well settled principles that the rival contentions need to be considered. It would be convenient to deal with several contentions with respect to the charges in seriatim. ( 11 ) CHARGE No. I is in respect of submission of a false report by the delinquent officer to wit non-performance of duty. The imputation was to the effect that a false report was submitted by the delinquent regarding disposal of pending applications and pending electric connections. The delinquent officer submitted two reports (exhibit-7 and exhibit-8 ). In report exhibit-7 dated January 8, 1996 petitioner sated that number of pending cases was nil under domestic and commercial category and only 9 in industrial category. In the report exhibit-8 dated February 7, 1996 the total pending connections as on January 1, 1996 were shown as 140 domestic, 42 commercial and 115 industry. The case of the delinquent was that 106 applications were cancelled after service of notices. Enquiry officer observed that no such record was found in the application and service connection register (exhibit-19 ). Reliance was also placed by the enquiry officer upon the evidence of PW9, senior Assistant Officer of the office that there was no such record of cancellation in the register. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the register (exhibit-19) is not genuine as because it does not contain the signature of the Station Superintendent or any office stamp on any of the pages. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the register (exhibit-19) is not genuine as because it does not contain the signature of the Station Superintendent or any office stamp on any of the pages. It was further contended that the two reports, exhibit 7 and exhibit 8 were meant for different purposes and were prepared and submitted for different objects. It was further contended that the stand of the petitioner has been corroborated by the evidence of PW15 who admitted in cross-examination that exhibit-7 and exhibit-8 the formats are different. ( 13 ) THE enquiry officer has relied upon the evidence of PW-9, Senior Assistant, who maintained the register. He stated in his evidence that all entries in the register have been made in his handwriting and further stated that there is no record of such cancellation, had there been such record it would have been mentioned in the register. ( 14 ) JUDGED in the light of the principles of judicial review the conclusion arrived at cannot be said to be perverse. There is evidence and material on record to arrive at the conclusion to which the enquiry officer did. ( 15 ) CHARGE No. II is regarding unauthorized absence of the delinquent. The enquiry officer has taken note of the defence contention that leave was sanctioned at a later state all his absence has been regularized and no action be taken against him. However, this contention was rejected on the mere ground that the leave sanctioned subsequently does not condone the offence committed. ( 16 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner is correct in his submission that in view of the admitted position as can be sent from evidence of PW1 and as noticed by the enquiry officer the period of absence was subsequently regularized by granting leave. Once leave was granted the absence stands regularized and therefore the charge cannot stand. The conclusion of the enquiry officer with respect to charge No. II is thus exposed to the vice of error apparent from the fact of the record. ( 17 ) CHARGE No. III is regarding the delinquent directly writing letter to the District Magistrate seeking his intervention with regard to withholding of salary for certain period on the ground that the petitioner returned to headquarters much beyond the specified date. ( 17 ) CHARGE No. III is regarding the delinquent directly writing letter to the District Magistrate seeking his intervention with regard to withholding of salary for certain period on the ground that the petitioner returned to headquarters much beyond the specified date. The imputation is that such conduct of approaching a Government officer is improper and that the District Magistrate has no control over the employees of the Board. Reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer on Regulation 52, which reads as under:an employee shall not approach any member of the Board, Government or Legislature for any question personally or generally relating to service matters nor seek interview with them except by previous appointment and through proper channel. ( 18 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no misconduct has been established as there has been no violation of Regulation 52. The only bar to approaching Government is without previous appointment and through proper channel. The charge is not that the petitioner did not obtain previous appointment with the District Magistrate or that the same was not through proper channel. Learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to show nor has any material been brought on record to show that the petitioner obtained any previous appointment with the Government Officer (District Magistrate) nor has it been established that the same was not through proper channel nor as to what was the proper channel to have been flowed in the case on hand. There is no complaint made on this aspect by the District Magistrate. ( 19 ) IN my view, therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer in respect of charge No. III cannot be sustained as it suffers from the vice of error apparent from the face of record. ( 20 ) CHARGE No. IV is regarding non-performance of duties namely, delinquent did not remit the cash collected in his office as required under statutory rules and did not take any action for maintenance of the Cash Book and did not sign it for days together. The enquiry officer held the charge proved on the basis of the evidence of PW-2, PW-7 and PW-9. As also on the ground that the cash in the wall coffer (cash chest) embedded in the wall was verified and the amount noted in the Cash Book (exhibit-21 ). The enquiry officer held the charge proved on the basis of the evidence of PW-2, PW-7 and PW-9. As also on the ground that the cash in the wall coffer (cash chest) embedded in the wall was verified and the amount noted in the Cash Book (exhibit-21 ). The defence to the said charge has been noticed by the enquiry officer which is to the effect that there was no cashier and the said defence was rejected on the ground that the Assistant Engineer had deputed a cashier from Assistant Engineer's (A. E. 's) office who helped the delinquent in cash work. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer in holding the charge proved is perverse. There was no cashier at the office, the cashier deputed from A. E. 's office to handle cash and it was therefore his responsibility to maintain the Cash Book in proper order. ( 22 ) LEARNED counsel has relied upon the evidence of PW-10 the cashier from A. E. 's office. Mr. Saha has drawn pointed reference to evidence of PW-10 wherein it is stated that the said cashier used to assist in cash collection work, he wrote the Cash Book but he did not sign the Cash Book as he was not given the charge of cash of the office. PW-10 has also admitted that it is the duty of the cashier to go to the Bank to deposit the cash that has been collected on the previous day. It was thereupon contended by Mr. Saha Roy that for the failure of the deputed cashier to maintain the Cash Book, petitioner cannot be found guilty of misconduct. It was contended that as the deputed cashier had not signed the Cash Book the question of the delinquent signing the Cash Book does not arise nor dies the question of the delinquent depositing the case collection in the Bank arise as it is the duty of the cashier. I am inclined to sustain the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of the admitted position that there was no cashier and in view of the statement of the person deputed to maintain the Cash Book the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer is perverse. I am inclined to sustain the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of the admitted position that there was no cashier and in view of the statement of the person deputed to maintain the Cash Book the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer is perverse. The enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority failed to take into account the relevant material on record. Such conclusion of the respondent authorities cannot therefore, be sustained. ( 23 ) CHARGE No. V is regarding the petitioner's refusal to hand over charge consequent upon his transfer diverting the petitioner from Mathabhanga Gr. E/s officer to Coochbehar Divisional office. The petitioner had not made over the charge as in his opinion the said order was invalid. ( 24 ) CHARGE No. VI is regarding an incident which occurred in the Divisional Engineer's office. Petitioner is charged with misbehaviour with a Superior Officer and also for lodging an FIR. ( 25 ) CHARGE No. VII is regarding an incident in the Canteen within the Campus of the Divisional Engineer's office, Coochbehar. The imputation is that petitioner made some slanderous remark and engaged in a heated exchange of words with violent gestures with certain employees. ( 26 ) THE respondent authorities held the said charges V to VII proved. Several contentions were advanced by Mr. D. Saha Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner, assailing the said findings and conclusions arrived at by the respondent authorities. However, keeping in view the well settled principles of judicial review, as noticed supra, no case has been made out for warranting interference with the said conclusions. It cannot be said that based upon the evidence and material on record the conclusions arrived at in respect of the said charges is such as no reasonable person would have reached that conclusion. The aforesaid conclusions on the evidence on record reached by the respondent authorities cannot be characterized either as perverse or suffering from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all. ( 27 ) MR. D. Saha Roy thereupon contended that the punishment of dismissal from service is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges held proved. Reliance has been placed by Mr. D. Saha Roy upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors. ( 27 ) MR. D. Saha Roy thereupon contended that the punishment of dismissal from service is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges held proved. Reliance has been placed by Mr. D. Saha Roy upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 1987 (4) SCC 611 , B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 1995 6 SCC 749 , Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahesh Kumar Misra, reported in 2000 (3) SCC 450 and Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, reported in (1997)7 SCC 463 . ( 28 ) IT is by now well settled that in exercise of power of judicial review writ Court can only go into the matter as a secondary reviewing Court to find out if the executive in their primary roles have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them in the light of the Wednesday's test. The said Wednesday's test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker on the material before him and within the frame work of the law would have arrived at. In the matter of penalty imposed in a disciplinary case, unless the Court is of the view that the punishment imposed, on the material on record was irrational according to Wednesday's norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. ( 29 ) THE above are the principles discernible from the judgment of the Supreme Court in G. Ganayatham's case [ 1997 (7) SCC 463 ]. Reference has been made in that judgment to several decisions of the Supreme Court including Ranjit Thakur's case and B. C. Chaturvedi's case. It is, therefore, not necessary to further dilate on this aspect of the matter. Suffice it here to state that if the punishment that has been imposed is permissible under the rules governing the service of the petitioner, it would not be open to the Court to interfere with the same unless it can be said to be irrational or such as to shock the conscience of the Court. ( 30 ) MR. D. Saha Roy thereupon contended that the punishment imposed in the case on hand was on the assumption that all the seven charges as framed have been proved. ( 30 ) MR. D. Saha Roy thereupon contended that the punishment imposed in the case on hand was on the assumption that all the seven charges as framed have been proved. If the conclusions in respect of some of the charges cannot be sustained then contends Mr. Saha Roy, the punishment of dismissal imposed is not warranted and would require reconsideration and, therefore, warrants interference by this Court. ( 31 ) MR. D. Saha Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Regulation 62 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board Service Regulation which deals withe the various types of punishment that can be imposed, also lays down that: ?the punishment will not only depend on the findings in the case under review, but also on his record. . . . ? ( 32 ) RELYING upon J. N. Ganatara v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi, 1996 (9) SCC 495 , it is contended that where statute prescribes the manner in which the power has to be exercised, the power must be exercised in that manner alone. Elaborating the said submission, it was contended that the petitioner has an unblemished career of long service in the respondent organization. Therefore, the same was required to be taken into consideration before such drastic punishment as dismissal was imposed upon the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, it is contended, has failed to take note of the past service record of the petitioner. ( 33 ) THE said contention, in my view, is misplaced. As noticed supra, the judicial opinion is that in a case in which an order of penalty on the employer is impugned, Court is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. In other words, for the charges framed against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority is empowered to impose any of the punishments permissible under the rules, it would not be open to the writ Court to interfere with the same, unless it can be said to be irrational or such as to shock the conscience of the Court. ( 34 ) THE instant case is not one where the punishment imposed is based upon the previous misconduct. ( 34 ) THE instant case is not one where the punishment imposed is based upon the previous misconduct. In State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, AIR 1964 SC 506 , Supreme Court in the context of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution considered the question as regards the imposition of punishment based upon previous misconduct, which was not disclosed to the petitioner either at or before the disciplinary enquiry or by any notice issued by the disciplinary authority before imposition of the said punishment. It was, inter alia, observed by the Supreme Court as under:if the proposed punishment was mainly based upon the previous record of a Government servant and that was not disclosed in the notice, it would mean that the main reason for the proposed punishment was withheld from the knowledge of the Government servant. ( 35 ) A Division Bench of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation v. Panchanan Manna, 1998 (2) CLT 511 (HC) considered the matter in the light of the standing order Clause 20 (v) (g) whereof was in the following terms:in awarding punishment of dismissal under these standing orders, the disciplinary/appellate authority shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record of service, if any, of the workman concerned and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. The Division Bench held as under:the disciplinary authority could always take into consideration the past record of the delinquent without giving hearing in the facts of this case and particularly in the context of the 'standing orders'. The finding of the learned single Judge that the punishment imposed should be set aside on this ground could not be accepted. ( 36 ) THE case directly in point, however, is the State of Orissa and Ors. v. Vidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 , wherein it was held as under:if the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were ?unassailable?, the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determine the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justifiable. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer of the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question. ( 37 ) THE Court thus has merely to see whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. ( 38 ) JUDGED in the light of the above, it is to be noticed that the charges Nos. 1, 5, and 6 are serious in nature. The same have been established along with the charge No. 7. This Court, however, has found that the charges Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are not established for the reasons already stated supra. The said charges are serious in nature. The disciplinary authority while imposing the punishment as it did of dismissal from service, was conscious of the fact that all 7 charges have been established when it observed in annexure P-8 that ?the charges established against him are of serious in nature and warrant severe punishment? and in his final order annexure P-10, the disciplinary authority has observed ?. . . . . . . . . I find no extenuating circumstances which warrant a review of the punishment proposed in the second show cause notice. ? Had all the 7 charges stood established, there would be no ground to warrant interference with the impugned punishment. As in the case on hand as many as three serious charges have been found to be unsustainable, the punishment imposed, in my view, is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges established. In my view, it is one of those cases where interference is warranted imposing a lesser punishment than the impugned punishment. Two courses are open to this Court. In my view, it is one of those cases where interference is warranted imposing a lesser punishment than the impugned punishment. Two courses are open to this Court. To remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority/appellate authority for reconsideration of the imposition of punishment. The other course would be to mould the relief with a view to shorten the litigation. Resort to the latter option is to be had in exceptional and rare cases. As noticed sura, as many as three serious charges have not been sustained. Therefore, to cut short the litigation, I am of the view that one of the lesser punishments specified in Regulation 62, can and need to be imposed by this Court. Accordingly, instead of impugned punishment of dismissal, the punishment of removal from service is hereby imposed upon the petitioner for the charges held established against the petitioner. In the result, the writ application is allowed in part altering and/or modifying the punishment to the extent indicated above. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment and order be furnished to the appearing parties, if applied for, on priority basis. 30. 7. 2002 after the judgment was pronounced: it is brought to the notice of this Court by the learned advocate for the petitioner that there was a direction of Court dated 7. 9. 2000 for payment of all benefits to the petitioner which according to the respondents are payable to the petitioner in accordance with law and such payments were directed to be made within time framed therein. It appears that the Zonal Manager, Midnapore (D) Zone, by his office order No. 234 dated 3. 10. 2000 has also directed release of certain payments towards leave salary. Accordingly, all such payments as are or may be due in accordance with law if not already made to the petitioner, shall be made within a period of two months from the date of communication of a copy of this order. Application allowed.