RAVEENDRAN, J. ( 1 ) IN these petitions (PIL), the petitioners have sought quashing of Circular No. HCE 727/1994 dated 28-3-1998 (as amended by circular No. HCE 272/1994 dated 30-3-1998), issued by the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Karnataka. The said amended circular reads as follows: "hce 727/94 high Court of Karnataka bangalore dated 28-3-1998 c I R C U L A R"in enclosing herewith an extract of paras 13 and 16 and the order portion in the order passed in Criminal Petition Nos. 2720 and 2789/1995 disposed on 26-2-1998 (reported in 1998 (3) Kant LJ 517), the Section Officer, Receiving and Scrutiny Branch of this office is directed to act upon the directions issued in the above criminal petitions under S. 482 of Cr. P. C. in respect of the matters indicated therein. 'further, not to receive any such petition filed under S. 482, Cr. P. C. henceforth. " ( 2 ) THE relevant portion of the order of the learned Judge (Kamalanjanmamma v. State of Karnataka Cr. P. C. No. 2720 and 2789/1995 decided on 26-2-1998) (reported in 1998 (3) Kant LJ 517) in compliance of which the said circulars been issued, reads as follows (paras 13 and 14) : the object and purpose of Section 482, Cr. P. C. is to prevent the abuse of process of Court and where there is no other alternative or efficacious remedy available, it cannot be resorted to if they are to stifle a legitimate prosecution. . . . . . . The trial Court is not barred from entertaining arguments in regard to the merits of the case or the bar contained under any provision of law, any further proceedings of the case or any other legal contention which the accused persons desire to raise at the preliminary stage itself. Therefore, this Court cannot go into the question directly, by-passing the jurisdiction of the trial Court. Further, by entertaining such petitions, instead of preventing the abuse of process of Court, it is being encouraged leading to the abuse of process of Court as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent. . . . . . . . Instead of putting an end to the multiplicity of proceedings, the same is being encouraged by entertaining the proceedings under S. 482, Cr. P. C. though the same contentions could be urged before the trial Court. . . . . . . . Instead of putting an end to the multiplicity of proceedings, the same is being encouraged by entertaining the proceedings under S. 482, Cr. P. C. though the same contentions could be urged before the trial Court. Their Lordships have held that only in rarest of rare cases, the petition can be entertained. It is the experience of this Court that it has become a regular feature of approaching this Court directly without even appearing before the trial Court. The complainant does not get equal treatment. On the other hand, I am of the considered view that he is dragged to the High Court for having approached the trial Court for redressing his grievance. . . . . . . . (16) The Division Bench of this Court held in Cr. P. No. 1997/1995 c/w Cr. P. No. 1998/1995, DD on 4-12-1997, (reported in 1998 (2) Kant LJ 1, para 18), has held, we are of the opinion that under normal circumstances, an accused person should not be liberally permitted to approach this Court for exercise of jurisdiction either under S. 397 or 482 of the Cr. P. C. The aggrieved person be insisted upon to first approach the Magistrate or the Court where the proceedings are pending for discharging him under S. 245 (2) or dropping the proceedings under Section 258 of the Cr. P. C. Such a course would be beneficial and convenient both to the accused and the complainant. In that event, this Court will also be in a better position to appreciate the rival contentions in the light of the adjudication made by the Magistrate or the Court. In this way, the object of the Code for minimising the litigation and avoiding the delay could also be achieved. Despite this order, it is observed that the accused persons approach this Court directly without appearing before the trial Court. Under those circumstances, it is just and necessary that the Registry may be directed not to register the criminal proceedings to quash the proceedings unless they approach the trial Court and all the contentions are raised and the trial Court given a finding thereon. " (Emphasis supplied) the learned Judge has been persuaded to give such a drastic direction for three reasons : (i) The grounds urged in a petition under S. 482, Cr. " (Emphasis supplied) the learned Judge has been persuaded to give such a drastic direction for three reasons : (i) The grounds urged in a petition under S. 482, Cr. P. C. can as well be urged before the trial Court for discharge. (ii) By filing such petitions (under Sec. 482), the trial in criminal proceedings is delayed by two to three years, leading to harassment and hardship to complainant and dilution/disappearance of evidence. (iii) This Court is flooded with petitions under S. 482 even though 95% of petitions filed under S. 482 are dismissed as frivolous and meritless. ( 3 ) PETITIONERS submit that the effect of the Circular is to curtail the inherent power of the Court statutorily recognised and to take away the right conferred on citizens to approach the High Court under S. 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. While they concede that the Court considering a petition under S. 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing a proceeding, can on the facts and circumstances, direct that the petitioner to approach the Court where the criminal proceedings are pending, for discharge, the Registry cannot shut out a litigant at the threshold by refusing to receive a petition filed under S. 482, Cr. P. C. on the ground that the aggrieved party has not first approached the trial Court for discharging him or for dropping the proceedings. It is pointed out that none of the decisions referred to and relied on by the learned Judge contemplate imposing a threshold bar on any accused approaching the High Court under S. 482, Cr. P. C. if he had not approached the Court where the proceedings are pending, with similar grounds praying for discharge. The petitioners concede that accused should not routinely approach the High Court invoking its inherent jurisdiction under S. 482, Cr. P. C. that the aggrieved persons should normally approach the trial Court for discharge under S. 245 (2) or to stop the proceedings under S. 258 of Cr. P. C. and that though the jurisdiction under S. 482 is vide in its scope, in practice, it should only be exercised in exceptional and rarest of rare cases. P. C. that the aggrieved persons should normally approach the trial Court for discharge under S. 245 (2) or to stop the proceedings under S. 258 of Cr. P. C. and that though the jurisdiction under S. 482 is vide in its scope, in practice, it should only be exercised in exceptional and rarest of rare cases. But the petitioners contend that those principles cannot lead to the extreme step of barring an aggrieved person approaching this Court under S. 482 for quashing a criminal proceeding unless he had first approached the Trial Court raising the contentions urged in the petition under S. 482. It is contended that the inherent power of the High Court is a cherished and valuable power recognised and preserved under S. 482, Cr. P. C. and it cannot be withheld by a judicial direction to the High Court Registry not to register any criminal petition under S. 482 unless the trial Court has been approached first. The petitioners submit that cutting the nose is not remedy to prevent a cold. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, the learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that the direction has been issued to prevent misuse and abuse of S. 482. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji v. Asst. Customs Collector, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1639 : (1967 Cri LJ 1576) and K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 2206 : (1992 Cri LJ 3779), it is contended that High Court can, by framing Rules regulate exercise of inherent Power, and in the absence of such Rules, the learned Judge could lay down a reasonable guideline in regard to exercise of power under S. 432 by requiring that an accused should approach the Trial Court for dropping the proceeding, before approaching the High Court to exercise its power under S. 482. 4. 1. In Ratilal Bhanji, ( AIR 1967 SC 1639 : (1967 Cri LJ 1576) the Supreme Court referring to Article 225 of the Constitution and Section 561-A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to S. 482 of the new Code) observed thus : ". . . . . . The Constitution confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its power to make Rules. . . . . . The Constitution confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its power to make Rules. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court which previously existed, that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted law. . . . . The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by law within the meaning of Art. 21. The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution. " (Emphasis supplied)4. 2. In K. M. Mathew's case ( AIR 1992 SC 2206 : 1992 Cri LJ 3779), the Supreme Court observed : "it is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused. " ( 5 ) EVERY High Court as the highest Court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing ends of justice. Section 482 recognises and preserves the powers which the High Court inherently possesses, lest it be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of the Code vide Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964 Cri LJ 1) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 549 ). Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964 Cri LJ 1) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 549 ). The principles in regard to exercise of the inherent power by the High Court under S. 482, Cr. P. C. are now well settled. 5. 1. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978 Cri LJ 165), laid down the following guidelines : (i) The power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (ii) It should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (iii) It should not be exercised as against the express bar of the law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. "5. 2. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527), the Supreme Court listed the following categories of cases (illustratively and not exhaustive) where a High Court may, in exercise of powers under Art. 226 or under S. 482 of Cr. P. C. may interfere, sparingly and in rarest of rare cases, in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice :-1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under S. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of an Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 5. 3. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128 : (1998 Cri LJ 1), the Supreme Court observed thus: no doubt a Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under S. 482 of the Code or Art. 227 of the Constitution to have the proceedings quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of criminal trial. . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)5. 4. In S. N. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 241 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2960 : 2001 Cri LJ 4765, Paras 25 and 27) the Supreme Court observed : ". . . . . . No doubt, exercise of inherent power under Section 482, Cr. . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)5. 4. In S. N. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 241 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2960 : 2001 Cri LJ 4765, Paras 25 and 27) the Supreme Court observed : ". . . . . . No doubt, exercise of inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. by the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions but in a case where ingredients of alleged offences are not satisfied, even prima facie, it cannot be said that power under S. 482, Cr. P. C. should not be exercised to quash the process issued by a Magistrate. . . . . " ". . . . . . . While exercising power under S. 482, Cr. P. C. the High Court has to look at the object and purpose for which such power is conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under Cr. P. C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under S. 482, Cr. P. C. should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of Court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under S. 482, Cr. P. C. to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 6 ) THE question is whether the Learned Judge, having correctly stated the principles and having referred to the ground realities could have gone to the extent of barring petitions under S. 482 for quashing a criminal proceedings unless the petitioner had approached the Court where the proceedings are pending for relief on the same grounds. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 6 ) THE question is whether the Learned Judge, having correctly stated the principles and having referred to the ground realities could have gone to the extent of barring petitions under S. 482 for quashing a criminal proceedings unless the petitioner had approached the Court where the proceedings are pending for relief on the same grounds. There can be no doubt that the power under S. 482 should be sparingly used and in the rarest of rare cases. There is also no doubt that it should not normally be exercised when there is a specific provision in the Code for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But, the power under S. 482 can still be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court or to secure ends of justice. When a petition under S. 482 is presented, it is for this Court to find out whether the matter is an exceptional case where the circumstances necessitates the aggrieved person to approach the High Court under S. 482 without first approaching the Court where the proceedings are pending. Any direction by the Registry which prevents or denies the right of an aggrieved person to approach this Court to quash a proceeding pending before a criminal Court would amount to restricting the inherent right of this Court. ( 7 ) WE may now refer to the three reasons which persuaded the learned Judge to give such a direction to the Registry. 7. 1. The first is that the accused can effectively urge all contentions raised the petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the criminal proceedings, before the trial Court where such proceedings are pending. In view of the series of decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and the categorical declaration in PEPSI's case that mere fact that the Magistrate can discharge the accused, does not mean that the accused cannot in any circumstances approach the High Court under Section 482, the first reason cannot be sustained. 7. 2 The second ground is that filing of a petition under Section 482 will prolong the criminal proceedings before the trial Court causing hardship to the complainant and also result in dilution/disappearance of evidence. It is true that several petitions may be filed under Section 482 with the object of delaying the criminal proceedings. 7. 2 The second ground is that filing of a petition under Section 482 will prolong the criminal proceedings before the trial Court causing hardship to the complainant and also result in dilution/disappearance of evidence. It is true that several petitions may be filed under Section 482 with the object of delaying the criminal proceedings. But then it is for the High Court to be vigilant and strict and not admit the petitions under Section 482, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. The fact that several persons may file petitions under Section 482 with ulterior motive, is not a ground to bar all persons including those having bona fide grievances, from approaching the High Court. 7. 3 The third ground, that is 95% of the petitions filed under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing criminal proceedings are ultimately dismissed and therefore there is a need to restrict the filing of such petitions can never be a ground to do away with the right of a person to directly approach this Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , for quashing a criminal proceeding, without first approaching the Court where such proceedings are pending. Can the fact that 95% of criminal cases before the sessions Courts are ending in acquittal or discharge of the accused, be a ground to take a view that there is no point in proceeding with trials in any sessions case? Can the fact that 95% of the criminal cases end in acquittal before Courts can be a ground for the Investigating Agencies to close shop and do away with the investigations as being fruitless? Can the fact that 95% of the conciliations attempted in matrimonial cases fail can be a ground to do away the conciliation? The fact that inherent power under Section 482 is invoked wrongly or with ulterior motives in 95% of the cases cannot be a ground for this Court not to come to the aid of the 5% of the cases where the petitioners have a genuine and bona fide grievance. ( 8 ) WE may also refer to yet another aspect. The fact that inherent power under Section 482 is invoked wrongly or with ulterior motives in 95% of the cases cannot be a ground for this Court not to come to the aid of the 5% of the cases where the petitioners have a genuine and bona fide grievance. ( 8 ) WE may also refer to yet another aspect. If an accused moves the trial Court where the criminal proceeding is pending for discharge or for stopping of the proceedings and the trial Court rejects the request, then the aggrieved person cannot approach this Court under Section 482, as his remedy would be to file a revision petition under Section 397 of Cr. P. C. , challenging the order of the trial Court. Thus, once the trial Court decides the question one way or the other, in normal course, there is no question of an aggrieved person approaching this Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. If an accused directly approaches this Court under Section 482, the circular is a bar to such a petition. If an accused approached the trial Court for discharge, thereafter his remedy is under Section 397 and not under Section 482. In other words, the effect of the direction in the impugned circular would be that under no circumstances, a petition can be filed under Section 482 by an accused for quashing a criminal proceeding initiated against him. To that extent the power under Section 482 would stand curtailed and High Court is prevented from doing justice even in deserving cases. That is contrary to the spirit and object of Section 482 and the law enunciated by the Supreme Court with reference to S. 482. ( 9 ) WHEN a petition under Section 482 is presented and placed before the Court for admission, this Court may refuse to entertain it, if there are no special grounds to deviate from the general rule that an accused should normally apply to the trial Court for discharge. But, the Registry cannot refuse to receive petitions on the ground that the aggrieved party has not approached the Court where the criminal proceedings are pending, for relief on the same grounds. It should be remembered that the inherent power is intended to be exercised in unforeseen circumstances and extraordinary circumstances. It should also be remembered that only the highest Court exercising criminal jurisdiction in the State has inherent power. It should be remembered that the inherent power is intended to be exercised in unforeseen circumstances and extraordinary circumstances. It should also be remembered that only the highest Court exercising criminal jurisdiction in the State has inherent power. Neither the Court of Sessions nor the Magistrates have such power. It is assumed that the High Court will exercise the power under Section 482 responsibly and only in exceptional cases. Inherent power under Section 482, statutorily recognized and jealously safeguarded, should not be truncated or restricted merely on an apprehension that the power likely to be invoked unnecessarily. ( 10 ) IN view of above, we allow these petitions. While we uphold the principle laid down by the learned single Judge that normally aggrieved person should approach the Court where the matter is pending for discharge and a petition under Section 482 for quashing a criminal proceeding will be entertained only in the rarest of rare cases, we cannot agree with the direction issued to the Registry. We accordingly quash the circular dated 28-3-1998 (as amended by circular dated 30-8-1998) issued by the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Karnataka. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .