Judgment ( 1. ) INVOKING the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court the petitioner who at the relevant time was working as Sub-Registrar in the office of the Registrar, Gwalior has filed the instant petition. Being aggrieved by certain observations/strictures passed against him in the order dated 18-1-99 Annexure P-1 by the Court of Vth Additional Distt. Judge to the Court of Distt. Judge, Gwalior. By the aforesaid order it has been directed that entries be made in the service book of the petitioner to the effect that in spite of the directions he has not carried out the same as per the Courts order. ( 2. ) THE facts which are relevant for disposing off the petition are that the respondent No. 1 had filed Civil Suit No. 83-A/84 against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 pertaining to specific performance of the contract. The prayer made in the suit was with regard to execution of sale-deed. The matter was decided and judgment and decree was passed in favour of respondent No. 1 by the Court of Vth Additional Distt. Judge to the Court of Distt. Judge, Gwalior. Subsequently execution proceedings were instituted in Case No. 83-A/84. After execution of sale-deed a letter was sent vide Annexure P-3 to the office of the Registrar, Gwalior wherein it was directed that the sale-deed in question be registered. After notice was received from the Court for registration, the petitioner who was working as Sub-Registrar issued a letter on 17-11-98 (Annexure P-4) inviting the attention of the Court to the provisions of Sections 26, 28 and 42 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. A clarification was sought for with regard, to applicability of the provisions of Ceiling Act before registering the document. ( 3. ) IT seems that the Court below instead of considering the queries raised by the petitioner initiated proceedings for contempt against him. The petitioner submitted his unconditional apology and in the reply Annexure P-6 pointed out that as the registration of documents has to be done after complying with various statutory provisions he had only sought instructions and brought to he notice of the Court the fact that provisions of Ceiling Act have to be complied with before registration can be done. It was submitted by him that there is no malafide intention or deliberate violation of the Courts order. ( 4. It was submitted by him that there is no malafide intention or deliberate violation of the Courts order. ( 4. ) IT is the case of the petitioner that in spite of the aforesaid without there being any justification the impugned observations have been made and the direction to record the same in the service book will adversely affect the carrier of the petitioner. It is putforth by Shri D. K. Katare, learned Counsel for the petitioner that in the facts and circumstances of the case passing of the observations and strictures was uncalled for as there was no deliberate or malafide intention. ( 5. ) PER contra Shri N. K. Gupta on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have contended that the petitioner has deliberately refused to register the documents. His intention was to harass the respondent and as there had been inordinate delay in implementing the Courts order the strictures were rightly passed. ( 6. ) I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. The question which requires determination is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Vth Additional Judge was right in passing the observation and strictures against the petitioner. ( 7. ) THE petitioner as Sub-Registrar for registration of documents has to discharge certain statutory duties. His functions are statutory in nature and while registering a document he is required to comply with the provisions of various laws. Transfer of land at the relevant time was subject to control and restrictions enumerated in the Urban Land Ceiling Act of 1976. Accordingly before registration of a sale-deed it is the statutory duty of the petitioner to see that necessary clearance are available as required under law. Section 26 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act provides that no land shall be transferred except after giving a written notice of intention to transfer to the competent authority. Section 28 deals with regulations with regard to registration of documents in certain cases. Similarly Section 42 of the Act gives over-riding effect to the Ceiling Act over other Act. The provisions of Section 42 clearly provides that the Ceiling Act shall have over-riding effect and even in the case of agreement, decree or order of the Court the provisions of Ceiling Act have to be complied with. Similarly Section 42 of the Act gives over-riding effect to the Ceiling Act over other Act. The provisions of Section 42 clearly provides that the Ceiling Act shall have over-riding effect and even in the case of agreement, decree or order of the Court the provisions of Ceiling Act have to be complied with. It is in the aforesaid background that the petitioner when he received the direction for registration of the sale-deed enquired from the Court as to whether clearance is to be obtained and action has to be taken. ( 8. ) A perusal of the letter Annexure P-4 clearly indicates that the petitioner had only brought to the notice of the Court the statutory requirements which are to be complied with before registration of the documents. In spite of this the Court below threatened the petitioner with action for contempt and directed for his personal appearance on 17-11-98 and submit his reply. The petitioner immediately appeared tendered his unconditional apology and explained the circumstances which compelled him to write the letter. The said reply of the petitioner is on record as Annexure P-6. A perusal of the aforesaid clearly indicates that the petitioner at no point of time had intentionally or deliberately tried to disobey the directions of the Court, as he was discharging, statutory duties, he had only in furtherance of the statutory provisions had intimated the Court about the same. Before contempt proceedings were initiated against him he immediately registered the documents. From the documents on record there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner had any intention to flout the orders passed by the Additional Distt. Judge. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of S. P. Goel v. Collector of Stamps, AIR 1996 SC 839 , considered the question with regard to complaints made against Registering Officer under the Registration Act of 1908 and after considering the provisions of Section 86 had observed that when the Registering Officer does think in a bona fide manner he gets protection of Section 86 of the Act and the immunity provided under Section 86 will be available to him. Section 86 of the Registration Act reads as under :- "registering Officer not liable for thing bona fide one or refused in his official capacity. Section 86 of the Registration Act reads as under :- "registering Officer not liable for thing bona fide one or refused in his official capacity. No registering officer shall be liable to any suit, claim or demand by reason of anything in good faith done or refused in his official capacity. " The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case in Para 41 has observed as under:-"this section provides complete protection to the Registering Officer for things done "bona fide" by him under the Act. It is obvious that action which is not bona fide or which is malicious will not be protected. " ( 9. ) FROM the aforesaid it is clear that if the authority has acted bonafidely without any malice he gets protection of the aforesaid provision. ( 10. ) IN the instant case there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner had not acted bonafidely or that he had malafide intention in not registering the sale- deed in question. On the contrary the conduct exhibited from the material on record indicates that the petitioner was acting in furtherance for the discharge of his statutory duties and there is nothing to indicate that he was misusing his authority or had acted malafidely. This Court concludes that the petitioner was acting bonafidely and was discharging his statutory duties and it cannot be said that he was acting contrary to any statutory provisions or that there was any malafide intention in the matter. ( 11. ) THE Court while passing the strictures and directions ignored this aspect of the matter completely and it seems that the Court was carrying away by the fact that the directions were not being complied with by the petitioner forthwith. The fact with regard to compliance with the statutory requirements and the genuine queries raised by the petitioner were lost sight of by the Court. ( 12. ) THE Supreme Court in the matter of K. A. Judicial Officer, (2001) 3 SCC 54 , had dealt in details the facts with regard to making remarks and expression of opinion by Superior Courts to the conduct of subordinates. The Court observed that even though the Superior Court had got power to express its opinion and make observations and criticise the conduct of Subordinate Judicial Officer but the impelling question is with regard to justification and propriety in making such a mark. The Court observed that even though the Superior Court had got power to express its opinion and make observations and criticise the conduct of Subordinate Judicial Officer but the impelling question is with regard to justification and propriety in making such a mark. After referring to various other judgments in this regard, the Supreme Court in paras 10 to 14 observed as under:-10. (24) It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold that the adverse remarks made against the appellant were neither justified nor called for. (25) Having regard to the limited controversy in the appeal to the High Courts and the hearsay nature of evidence of the appellant it was not at all necessary for the appellant Judge to have animadverted on the conduct of the appellant for the purpose of allowing the appeal of the first respondent. Even assuming that a serious evaluation of the evidence of the appellant was really called for in the appeal the remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of Courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be. " "11. A Subordinate Judge faced with disparaging and undeserving remarks made by a Court of superior jurisdiction is not without any remedy. He may approach the High Court invoking its inherent jurisdiction seeking expunction of objectionable remarks which jurisdiction vests in the High Court by virtue of its being a Court of record and possessing inherent powers as also the power of superintendence. The view is settled by the law laid down in Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar. However, if a similar relief is sought for against remarks or observations contained in judgment or order of the High Court the aggrieved judicial officer can, in exceptional cases, approach this Court also invoking its jurisdiction under Articles 136 and/or 142 of the Constitution. With the law laid down by this Court in Dr. Raghubir Saran and the State of U. P. v. Mohd. With the law laid down by this Court in Dr. Raghubir Saran and the State of U. P. v. Mohd. Naim, it is well settled that the power to expunge remarks exists for redressing a kind of grievance for which the law does not provide any other remedy in express terms though it is an extra-ordinary power. Any passage from an order or judgment may be expugned or directed to be expugned subject to satisfying the following tests : (i) that the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable; (ii) that its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the persons to whom it refers; (iii) that its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order. " "12. Though the power to make remarks or observations is there but on being questioned, the exercise of power must withstand judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of following tests : (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. The overall test is that the criticism or observation must be judicial in nature and should not formally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. " "13. It was so said by a Special Bench of three Judges presided over by Tekchand, J. , in Philip William Ravanshawe Hardless v. Gladys Isabel Hardless (AIR Headnote): "a passage which is not necessary to the conclusion of the Judge nor even necessary to his argument and is likely to militate seriously against partys earning a living in his profession should be expunged from the judgment". " "14. In A. M. Mathur v. Promod Kumar Gupta, this Court sounded a note of caution emphasising a general principle of highest importance to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct and said (SCC pp. 538-39, Para 13) : "13. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. 538-39, Para 13) : "13. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be constant theme of our Judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as well to other coordinate branches of the State, the executive and the legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the Judges has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the Judges nor for the judicial process". " ( 13. ) FROM the aforesaid it is clear that observations and strictures in exercise of power of superintendence should be made only when the situation warrants or the conduct of the person concerned from the records exhibits justification of such a remark. It is further to be seen whether making such a remark is absolutely necessary for decision of the case being an integral part thereof. These are some of the factors which according to the Supreme Court have to be kept in mind while making observations against an officer of the Subordinate Court. ( 14. ) VIEWED in the light of the aforesaid guiding principles, I am of the considered view that the remarks made in the instant case were wholly unwarranted and not at all necessary. The conduct of the petitioner, the nature of the queries raised by him and the steps taken by him docs not indicate that he was deliberately trying to mis-use his power or was devising means for not implicating the Courts order but nothing of this sort seems to be as motive in making queries from the Courts. ( 15. ) UNDER these circumstances the observation made by the Court below in the order dated 8-1-99 Annexure P-1 are uncalled for, unwarranted and have to be expugned. ( 16. ) ACCORDINGLY the petition is allowed. ( 15. ) UNDER these circumstances the observation made by the Court below in the order dated 8-1-99 Annexure P-1 are uncalled for, unwarranted and have to be expugned. ( 16. ) ACCORDINGLY the petition is allowed. The order dated 18-1-99 issued by the Court of Fifth Additional Judge to the District Judge, Gwalior as contained in Annexure P-l are quashed so far as it relates to making observation against the petitioner and the consequential direction with regard to entry of the same in the service book of the petitioner are quashed. The portion to this effect be deleted from the order. The petition to the extent as indicated hereinabove is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.