JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - In an attempt to defeat the execution of decree dated 2.12.1994 passed by the Civil Judge, Faridkot the objector-petitioner has filed this revision petition impugning the order dated 6.4.2002 passed by the Additional District Judge, Faridkot reversing the order dated 14.6.2001 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridkot. 2. The Civil Judge in his order has accepted the objection of the objector- petitioner on the principal ground that the warrant of possession issued in respect of suit property against judgment debtor-respondent No. 3 had been returned unexecuted with this report supported by detailed report of Kanungo Halqa Jaitu. The Kanungo Halqa Jaitu has submitted in his report that judgment debtor-respondent No. 3 is not in possession of disputed khasra numbers and the objector-petitioner was in possession. It was further reported that mutation No. 4258 sanctioned on the basis of partition dated 24.6.1991 had already been rejected by the Collector, Sub Division, Faridkot vide his order dated 24.2.1992. The contention of the decree holder-respondents No. 1 and 2 that the objector petitioner have got a false report made regarding possession of the objector-petitioner was rejected. Another argument that earlier objections filed by the objector-petitioner were dismissed and these objections filed by him were not maintainable did not find favour with the Civil Judge. 3. On appeal filed by the decree-holder-respondents No. 1 and 2, the Additional District Judge reversed the order on two grounds namely that there is no revenue record which may support the report of Tehsildar and Kanungo Halqa Jaitu. In the absence of any support coming from the revenue record, the Additional District Judge ignored those reports. He further held that the dismissal of earlier objections, filed by the objector-petitioner vide detailed order would bar raising of same objection for the second time. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the objector-petitioner and on perusing the order passed by both the Courts below I am of the considered opinion that this revision petition lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the objector-petitioner and on perusing the order passed by both the Courts below I am of the considered opinion that this revision petition lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. It is true that under order XXI rule 97 of the Code the word any person used has to be given liberal meaning as has been held by the Supreme Court in case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiwal, 1997(3) S.C.C. 694 and the objection raised by a stranger to the decree would be maintainable yet the executing court is competent to decide whether the objector is bound by the decree or not. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd v. Rajiv Trust and another, (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 519 (S.C.) the Supreme Court has further held that adjudication on the objection filed by the objector need not be based on a detailed enquiry or evidence unless it is deemed necessary by the executing court. The observation of their Lordships in Silverline Forums case (supra) reads as under : - "It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions "arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are "relevant to the adjudication of the application." A third party to the decree who offers resistant would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such a transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contentions is based on Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. When a decree holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. When a decree holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication the court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint. The words "all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelope only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resister raised it. The questions which the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101 must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g., if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resister or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code, the execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resister or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section." 5. The other argument raised for dismissing the present petition is that the objection petition filed by the objector-petitioner had already been dismissed and it would also operate as res judicata as has been held by this Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bhora (Dead) and others, 1988 Haryana Rent Reporter 542. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.