JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J. : This order shall dispose of the above noted two revision petitions under Section 24(5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short : the Rent Act) against the order dated 16.1.1998 of the learned Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge), Shimla. 2. The petitioners in Civil Revision No.64 of 1999 are the legal heirs of the original landlord petitioner Shri Tarlok Chand and hereinafter are referred to as landlord. Respondent No.l is the tenant while proforma respondent No.2 to 4 are the co-owners of the tenanted premises comprising of three rooms, verandah, kitchen and latrine on the first floor of the building bearing municipal No.65, in Lower Bazar, Shimla. 3. The landlord filed a petition under Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Rent act seeking ejectment of the tenant from the tenatned premises on the ground of bonafide requirement for self use and occupation. 4. The tenant while resisting the petition pleaded that the tenanted premises and a shop on the ground floor were let out to him by creating a single tenancy. The tenanted premises being non- residential, the ground of bonafide requirement for self use and occupation is not available. The bonafide requirement of the landlord was denied. Objections were also raised to the effect that the petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and as to the maintainability of the petition by pleading that the costs imposed by the court while withdrawing the earlier petition with liberty to file a fresh petition had not been deposited. 5. On the pleading of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller (2), Shimla :- 1. Whether the petitioner requires the premises in dispute bonafide for use and occupation by him and his family members? OP 2. Whether the petition is not competent unless cost Rs.1000/- is paid? OPR 3. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary p[parties ? OPR 4. Whether the petition is neither competent, nor maintainable? OPR. 5. Whether the premises are residential? OPP. 6. Relief. 6. The learned Rent Controller on the basis of the evidence led before him by the parties answered issue No. 1 against the landlord. Issues No.2 to 4 were found against the tenant and issue No.5 in favour of the landlord. Whether the petition is neither competent, nor maintainable? OPR. 5. Whether the premises are residential? OPP. 6. Relief. 6. The learned Rent Controller on the basis of the evidence led before him by the parties answered issue No. 1 against the landlord. Issues No.2 to 4 were found against the tenant and issue No.5 in favour of the landlord. Consequent upon the findings recorded under issue No.l, the eviction petition preferred by the landlord was dismissed by the learned Rent controller vide order dated 19.9.1994. 7. Feeling aggrieved, both the parties went up in appeal before the learned Appellate Authority under the Rent Act, while the landlord assailed the findings of the learned Rent Controller under issue No. 1 resulting into the dismissal of the eviction petition, the tenant assailed the findings of the learned Rent Controller under issues No.2 to 5. The learned Appellate Authority affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues. Resultantly, both the appeals were dismissed by a common order dated 16.1.1998. Hence, the present two revision petitions. Civil Revision No.64 of 1999 is by the landlord assailing the findings of the two forums below holding that the requirement of the landlord was not bonafide. Civil Revision No.317 of 1998 is by the tenant assailing the findings of the two forums below on issue No.2 to 5 holding the tenanted premises to be residential; the petition to be maintainable and competent, and that the revision was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 9. Civil Revision No.640 of 1999. The two forums below have concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is not bonafide. Such concurrent findings are purely on a question of fact. 10. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 9. Civil Revision No.640 of 1999. The two forums below have concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is not bonafide. Such concurrent findings are purely on a question of fact. 10. At the very out set, an objection has been raised on behalf of the tenant - respondent to the effect that the powers of this court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act is limited in seeing whether any illegality or impropriety has been committed by the two forums below in exercise of the powers under the Rent Act and that in exercise of such limited revisional powers this court cannot re-appreciate and re-assess the evidence in order to disturb the concurrent findings of the two forums below on a question of fact. 11. The apex Court in M/s. Shalimur Tar Products Lid. v. H.C. Sharma & Ors. 1988 (1) SCC 70 while dealing with the extent of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the provisions of which are similar to the provisions contained in Section 24(5) of the Rent Act in the present case) has held that the questions whether there was a sub-tenant and whether the written consent of the landlord had been obtained, were questions of fact. Concurrent Findings on such questions cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. 12. Again in Fatima Bee (Smt.) v. Mahamood Siddiqui 1996 (9) SCC 450 it has been held by the Apex Court that the High Courts power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact under the Rent Act would be limited and if there is no misreading of evidence by the two courts below, it is not open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and reverse the findings recorded by the Courts below in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 13. Mr Patel Valmik Himatlal & Ors. v. Patel Mohan Lai Mutjibhai 1998 (7) SCC 383 the trial Court as" well as the appellate court had concurrently found sub-letting as proved. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, after re-appreciating the evidence, held that it was not a case of sub-letting but a case of partnership. 13. Mr Patel Valmik Himatlal & Ors. v. Patel Mohan Lai Mutjibhai 1998 (7) SCC 383 the trial Court as" well as the appellate court had concurrently found sub-letting as proved. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, after re-appreciating the evidence, held that it was not a case of sub-letting but a case of partnership. The Honble Supreme Court observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence, which it could not do. It was held that mere fact that a different view was possible on reappreciation of evidence was no ground for the High Court to substitute its own finding in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 14. In Chaman Prakash Puri v. Ishwar Dass Rajpur & Anr. 1995 (Supp.) 4 SCC 445 and in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance company Ltd., 1999 (1) R.C.J. 158, it has been held that it is not permissible for the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the two courts below, on the facts of the case, are so unreasonable that no court could have reached such a finding on the material available 15. Dealing with the similar provision contained in Section 21(5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (as then in force) which provision is pan materia to Section 24(5) of the present Rent Act, the Honble Supreme Court in Dr. Gyari Parkash v. Som Nath & Ors. 1996 (1) R.C.R., 342 (SC) has held that on questions of fact, the findings recorded by the authorities below must be accepted and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such finding in exercise of limited scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Act. The High Court is not exercising the powers of a court of Appeal and, as such, is not expected to re-appreciate the entire evidence coming on record and to come to a contrary finding. 16. In Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh 1995 (4) SCC 201 the Honble Supreme Court considered the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity. It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity. The two jurisdiction (appellate and revisional) are different from each other in scope and content. The use of the expression "legality or propriety of such orders or proceedings" makes the revisional powers of the High Court wider than powers under Section 115 of the code of Civil Procedure, nonetheless it is not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb findings of fact arrived at by the courts below without recording a finding that the conclusions arrived at were perverse or based on "no evidence" or were arrived at on a superficial or perfunctory approach. It was further observed:- "If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concrete findings of fact ignoring the above mentioned well recognised principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision." 17. In the present case, on the basis of the evidict coming on the record, the two forums below have arrived at a concurrent findings that the requirement/need of the landlord - petitioner is not bonafide. Such concurrent findings are purely on question of fact. I have gone through the evidence coming on the record and it can be safely held that there has bee no misreading or mis-appreciation of evidence by the two forums below. 18. The only conclusion which can be arrived at on the basis of the evidence coming on the record is the one arrived at by the two forums below, Therefore, the concurrent findings of the two courts below cannot be interfered with in the present revision petition. Such findings are affirmed. 19. Civil Revision No.640 of 1999. As stated above, the tenant feeling aggrieved by the findings of the learned Rent Controller recorded under issues No.2 to 5, though the final order dated 19.9.1994 under Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act, was in his favour had preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority assailing such findings. Such appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide the impugned order dated 16.1.1998. Such appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide the impugned order dated 16.1.1998. Hence the tenant is before this court by way of the present revision petition. 20. The learned counsel for the landlord has contended that neither the appeal by the tenant before the learned Appellate Authority was maintainable nor the present revision petition against the appellate order would be maintainable. 21. Section 24 of the Rent Act which deals with appeals against the orders of the Rent Controller, in so far as it is material and relevant for the purpose of the present case reads :- (1) (a) The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such officers and authorities, as it thinks fit, the powers of Appellate Authorities for1 the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller, except the orders for the recovery of possession made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 16, may, within fifteen days from the date of such order or such longer period as the Appellate Authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. (In computing the period of fifteen days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded)" 22. Relying upon the provision contained in Section 24(1)(b) above, it was contended by the learned counsel for the tenant that every order passed by the Rent Controller is appealable and as such the appeal by the tenant before the learned Appellate Authority was competent and maintainable and accordingly the present revision petition under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act would be competent and maintainable. 23. The question thus arising for determination is whether all orders of the Rent Controller are appealable under Section 14(l)(b) of the Rent Act, and, if not, what are the orders against which an appeal would lie under the said section. 24. In Niddre v. Nanneh 1960 PLR 451, in a case arising under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 a question arose whether the order passed by the Rent Controller substituting legal representatives of a deceased tenant was appealable. 24. In Niddre v. Nanneh 1960 PLR 451, in a case arising under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 a question arose whether the order passed by the Rent Controller substituting legal representatives of a deceased tenant was appealable. It was held that since such an order could not be said to have been made under the Act, therefore, it was not appealable. 25. In Lakhi Ram v. Sugar Chanel 1963 PLR 691, a case arising out of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the provisions of which are analogous to the provisions of the Rent Act, an ex-parte order of ejectment was passed against the tenant by the Rent Controller. The tenant sought the setting aside the exparte order against him by approaching the Rent Controller by moving an application. The Rent Controller on the basis of evidence led before him reached to the conclusion that there were no sufficient grounds for setting aside the exparte order. He, therefore dismissed the application of the tenant. Aggrieved by this order, the tenant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority.^ The appeal was allowed by the Appellate Authority and exparte order was set aside. The landlord went up in revision before the Punjab High Court. A contention was raised that the Appellate Authority did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from an order of the Rent Controller dismissing the application for setting aside the exparte order of ejectment. It was further contended that the right of appeal provided by Section 15 of East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (corresponding to Section 24 of the Rent Act) is restricted as under its clause (a) of sub-section (1), the State Government is empowered "by a general or special order, by notification" to confer "on such officers and authorities, as they think fit, the powers of the Appellate Authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order." The notification issued by the State Government powers of Appellate Authorities were conferred on all the District and Sessions Judges to be exercised by them in respect of the urban areas in their respective existing jurisdiction with regard to the orders made by the Rent Controller under Sections 4,10,1.2 and 13 of the said Act. 26. 26. Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (Corresponding to Section 4 of the Rent Act) deals with the determination of fair rent. Section 10 of the said Act (corresponding to Section 4 of the Rent Act) deals with the determination of fair rent. Section 10 of the said Act (corresponding to Section 11 of the Rent Act) lays an embargo on the landlord to interfere with the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Section 12 (corresponding to Section 13 of the Rent Act) empowers the Rent Controller to make an order for necessary repairs on the failure of the landlord to do so, while Section 13 (corresponding to Section 14) of the Rent Act) deals with the eviction of tenants. 27. It was held that the appeals are provided only against the orders of the Rent Controller, under one of the aforesaid four sections. Therefore, the appeal against the order dismissing the application for setting aside the exparte order of ejectment was held to the not maintainable. The same view was reiterated in Bikramjit Singh v. Jaswant Singh 1976 PLR 16. 28. In Gurcharan Singh v. Madan Lal 1968 PLR 955, the order passed by the Rent Controller refusing to stay the proceedings under Section 10, Code of Civil Procedure, was held to be not an order passed either under Section 4, or under Section 10, or under Section 12, or under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and as such not appealable. To the similar effect it has been held in Sunder Singh v. Budh Dev 1971 PLR 12 (SN). 29. Again in Guranditta Ram v. Murari Lal & Anr. 1974 RCJ 351, a case arising under East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the Rent Controller had permitted the landlord to produce evidence in rebuttal after the conclusion of evidence of the tenant inspite of the fact that the burden of proof of all the issues framed in the case was on the landlord. The tenant preferred a revision petition before the High Court against the order of the Rent Controller. It was contended by the landlord that the revision was not maintainable since an appeal lay against such order under Section 15(l)(b) of the Act. The tenant preferred a revision petition before the High Court against the order of the Rent Controller. It was contended by the landlord that the revision was not maintainable since an appeal lay against such order under Section 15(l)(b) of the Act. Repelling the contention of the landlord, it was held that an appeal is a creation of a statute and there is no inherent power in an Appellate Authority to entertain an appeal which is not expressly provided by law. It was further held that an appeal was maintainable only against an order passed under Sections 4,10,12 and 13 of the Act. The order permitting the landlord to lead evidence in rebuttal did not fall under any of the said sections and as such was not appealable. 30. A similar question also arose before a learned .single Judge of this Court in Mrs. Balbir Kochhar & Ors. S.V. Bhandari & Ors. 1989 S.L.J. 494. In this case an application, made by the landlord for production of certain documents at the very threshold pf the case, was rejected by the Rent Controller. The landlord came up before this court by way of a revision petition. An objection was raised as to the maintainability of the revision petition on the ground that such an order was appealable under Section 24( 1 )(b) of the Rent Act. It was held:- "Under Section 24(1), clause (a) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the State Government is autholrised to confer on such officers and authorities, as it thinks fit, the powers of the Appellate Authority, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. It has been stated at the bar that the Notification attributable to Section 24(1), which is under operation, is the one which was initially issued in exercise of the powers under Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Clause (4) of the Notification says that the powers of the Appellate Authority was to be exercised by all District and Sessions Judges with regard to the orders made by the Rent Controllers under Section 4,10,12 and 13 of the said Act. It is not in dispute that the order, which is under challenge in the present revision, is not of the nature contemplated by the aforesaid provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act." 31. It is not in dispute that the order, which is under challenge in the present revision, is not of the nature contemplated by the aforesaid provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act." 31. In the present case the final order passed under Section 14 of the Rent Act is in favour of the tenant. He is, therefore, not a person aggrieved by such order within the meaning of Section 24(1)(b) of the Rent Act. The findings recorded under Issues No. 2 to 5 against the tenant cannot be termed as order against which an appeal would lie under Section 24(1 )(b) of the Rent Act read with the Notification issued by the State Government under Section 24(1 )(a) of the rent Act conferring powers of Appellate Authorities on all the district/Additional Sessions Judge to hear the appeals against the orders passed by the Rent Controller under Sections 4,10,12 and 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 corresponding to Sections 4,11,13 and 14oftheRent Act. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the tenant before the Appellate Authority was not maintainable. Resultantly, the present revision petition against the order of the Appellate Authority would not be maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone. 32. A contention was raised on behalf of the tenant that since the findings recorded under Issues No.2 to 5 are likely to operate as res-judicata against the tenant in he subsequent proceedings which may take place between the parties, he cannot be rendered remedyless. 33. The Honble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra v. Shiv Charan Dass & Ors. AIR 1991 SC 264 has held that one of the tests to ascertain if a finding operates as res-judicata, is whether the party aggrieved could challenge it. 34. Hence, where the decree or order is absolutely in favour of a party but some issues are found against him, he has no right of appeal against such Findings for two reasons, namely: (a) he is not adversely affected thereby; and (b) such findings are not embodied in and do not form part of the decree or order. 35. Such findings therefore, would not operate as res-judicata against him in subsequent proceedings. 36. For the foregoing reasons, both the revision petitions fail and are dismissed accordingly, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.