JUDGMENT In both these writ petitions, the petitioners have prayed for orders from this Court directing the Respondent Regional Transport Authority, Bankura to revoke and cancel the permanent stage carriage permit granted by the said authority to the private respondents Smt. Soma Samanta and Sri Saikat Jana to ply a vehicle in the route from Sarenga in Bankura district to Midnapore. 2. The petitioners claim themselves to be bus operators plying buses on the route from Midnapore to Sarenga under permanent stage carriage permits issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore. 3. The petitioners contend that since the route covers a distance of approximately 70 Kms. of which only 10 kms. fall in Bankura district and about 60 Kms. in Midnapore district (Paschim Midnapore after the bifurcation of Midnapore district), the appropriate authority to grant a permit on the said route at the material time was the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore and not the Regional Transport Authority, Bankura in view of Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 4. Section 69 of the said Act is set out hereinbelow :– “Section 69 General provision as to applications for permits– (1) Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles: Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal, to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles. Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal places of business. Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal places of business. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the sub-section (1), the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in the case of any vehicle or vehicles proposed to be used in two or more regions lying in different States, the application under that subsection shall be made to be State Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business." 5. The Regional Transport Authority, Bankura has, however, granted a permanent stage carriage permit to the private Respondents, to ply a vehicle bearing the Registration No. WB 672909, on the aforesaid route. The fact that only a small portion of the route falls in Bankura district is not in dispute. The petitioners have contended that the Regional Transport Authority, Bankura, had no jurisdiction to issue any permit in respect of the route in question. 6. The petitioners have also contended that the time table granted to the private respondents is not in accordance with the permit. No particulars have, however, been furnished as to how the time table is not in accordance with permit. Nor is there any reference in the writ petition to any provision of law, which has according to the petitioner been contravened by the Respondent Regional Transport Authority, Bankura in fixing the time table for running the said vehicle covered by the permit. 7. The petitioners are purportedly aggrieved by the action of the Respondent Regional Transport Authority, Bankura in permitting the said vehicle covered by the impugned permit to make four trips a day. There does not, however, appear to be any provision of statute or any statutory rule or even any notification or circular or guideline which restricts the number of trips that a vehicle covered by a permit can make. 8. The petitioners have failed to show any apparent error or illegality in the time table granted to the private Respondents for plying their vehicle. 8. The petitioners have failed to show any apparent error or illegality in the time table granted to the private Respondents for plying their vehicle. Disputes with regard to the number of trips that a vehicle should be allowed to make, the time of departure or arrival of vehicles, whether vehicles should ply at a time gap of ten minutes or five minutes or with no gap at all cannot be resolved by the writ Court on affidavits. These are matters for the consideration of the concerned transport authorities. 9. The petitioners allege that a representation made by them to the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore to take steps to stop the private Respondents from operating their vehicle in Midnapore district yielded no result. Having failed to mobilize the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore, the petitioners have now approached this Court. 10. The private Respondents have seriously questioned the locus standi of the petitioners who are existing operators on the same route to initiate proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the grant of permits to the private respondents since no vested legal right of their has been infringed. 11. Reliance has been placed by the private Respondents on two Division Bench judgments of this Court the first being F.M.A.T. No. 2902 of 1996 (Secretary, Route No. 56 Bus Association & Ors. v. Champadanga Dakshineswar Bus Association & Ors.) and the second being A.P.O.T. No. 604 of 1999 Sagar Chatterjee v. Shambhu Basu. 12. In the case of Secretary, Route No. 56 Bus Association & Ors. v. Champadanga Dakshineswar Bus Association & Ors. (supra) the Division Bench inter alia held as follows :– “The question of locus standi will have to be determined with reference to the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. If the Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on existing operators of a route to object to the creation of a route, then they have no legal right which can be said to have been subjected to or threatened with injury as a result of the grant of the permit in favour of a third person. Merely because a person's business is likely to be adversely affected will not give such person the locus standi to challenge under Article 226 unless such contravention infringes a vested right [Vide Rice & Flour Mills Ltd. v. N.T. Gowda (supra), See also J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar (supra), M.S. Jain v. State of Haryana (supra)]. Relying on this principles the Supreme Court in the decision of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India (supra) examined the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and came to the conclusion that there was no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to enjoyment of any right of existing stage carriage operators to carryon their occupation of transport operators if new operators come into the field as competitors. It was, therefore, said that the existing stage carriage operators had no locus standi to invoke the special jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India to raise the issue. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… In the case before us the complaint in the writ petition was that the route in question was a new one and that the appellants had been illegally permitted to ply on that route. The complaint that the appellants were given the new route in violation of the permits already granted to the appellants relates only to the method of grant of the permit to ply along a new route. The issue raised thus clearly falls within the embargo envisaged in Mithilesh Gang. The distinction sought to be drawn between post permit and pre-permits complaints is in the circumstances specious and is rejected.” 13. In Sagar Chatterjee’s case (supra) the Division Bench following its earlier judgment in the case of Secretary, Route No. 56 Bus Association (supra) inter alia held as follows : “On the question of locus standi a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (Ruma Pal, J.) was a party in F.M.A.T. No. 2902 of 1996 (Secretary, Route No. 56, Bus Association & Ors. v. Champadanga Dakshineswar Bus Association & Ors.) held that merely because of a person's business was likely to be adversely affected, it would not give such person a locus standi to initiate a challenge under Article 226 unless such contravention infringes a vested right. v. Champadanga Dakshineswar Bus Association & Ors.) held that merely because of a person's business was likely to be adversely affected, it would not give such person a locus standi to initiate a challenge under Article 226 unless such contravention infringes a vested right. The decision relied on by the learned Single Judge in Howrah Bus Syndicate v. R.T.H., Howrah was noted and it was found that the question of locus standi though raised was not decided by the learned Single Judge. Relying upon the clear enunciation of law in Mithilesh Garg's case, this Court held that a writ application was not maintainable at the instance of existing operators. This unreported decision does not appear to have been drawn to the notice of the learned Single Judge and that is the reason the learned Single Judge differed from the decision already taken.” 14. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India reported in AIR 1992 SC 443 wherein the Supreme Court approved its earlier decision in the case of Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar reported in AIR 1976 SC 578 and held that existing operators whose right to carryon business had not been threatened, could not maintain a writ application challenging the grant of permits to the new operators. 15. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) is extracted hereinbelow :– “In any case the transport system in a state is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The police to grant permits liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal. The petitioners who are already in the business want to keep the fresh entrants out of it and as such eliminate the healthy competition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the trade. This Court in Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 SCR 58 : AIR 1976 SC 578 posed the following questions for its determination. The petitioners who are already in the business want to keep the fresh entrants out of it and as such eliminate the healthy competition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the trade. This Court in Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 SCR 58 : AIR 1976 SC 578 posed the following questions for its determination. (Para 1): “Whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematography films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a ‘No-Objection Certificate’, granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short, the Rules) by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction, is the Principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave.” 16. Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court answered the question in the following words (paras 47, 49, 50 and 51 of AIR): “In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on.... While a procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the Court should not interfere at the instance of a ‘stranger’ unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interest. Assuming that the appellant is a ‘stranger’, and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. Assuming that the appellant is a ‘stranger’, and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondent Nos.1 and 2, which they have under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carryon trade or business subject to 'reasonably restrictions' imposed by law. The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this Court's decision in Rice and Flour Mills N.T. Gowda ( AIR 1971 SC 246 ), wherein it was held a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8 (3) (e) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958–because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special situation. Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment in the negative. We, therefore, see no justification for the petitioners to complain against the liberalized policy for grant of permits under the Act.” 17. In the instant case, the grant of permits to the private respondents does not affect any vested right of the petitioners. Such grant can at best have an adverse effect on the business of the petitioners. The petitioners have not been conferred with any right under the said act or any rules framed thereunder to object to the grant of permit to a third person. 18. In view of the aforesaid judgments of the Division Bench of this Court as also the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, I cannot but hold that the petitioners as existing operators have no locus standi to question the grant of permits to the private respondents even if there was any error in exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Transport Authority, Bankura. 19. 19. In any event, there is a difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction, which goes to the root of the jurisdiction or competence of the authority concerned to at all issue a permit and irregular exercise of jurisdiction, objection to which is really regarded as technical. 20. The Regional Transport Authority has undoubtedly jurisdiction to issue permits. There is also no dispute that a part of the route falls within Bankura district, no matter how small the portion of the route may be. Moreover, as stated in the Affidavit-in-Opposition affirmed on behalf of the private respondents the vehicle in question is kept within Bankura district. 21. A Regional Transport Authority is constituted by notification under Section 68 of the said Act and derives its jurisdiction and powers from the said section. Under Section 68 of the said Act the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to exercise jurisdiction in the areas specified in the notification by which it is constituted. 22. Section 69 provides that every application for permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles. There can be no dispute that the vehicle was proposed to be used and is in fact used in Bankura distlict within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Bankura, no matter how small the portion of the route falling in Bankura might be. A permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which any part of the route falls cannot be said to be inherently without jurisdiction. 23. The entertaining of an application for permit in disregard of the first proviso to Section 69, which provides that if it is proposed to use the vehicle in two or more regions lying within the State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, is at best an irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and/or procedural irregularity. A procedural irregularity is not fatal to the grant of a permit. 24. My attention has been drawn to a judgment of this Court dated 19th August, 1998 in C.O. No. 19288 (W) of 1995 (Kailash Kumar Jaiswal v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) passed by His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. A procedural irregularity is not fatal to the grant of a permit. 24. My attention has been drawn to a judgment of this Court dated 19th August, 1998 in C.O. No. 19288 (W) of 1995 (Kailash Kumar Jaiswal v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) passed by His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha (As His Lordship then was) on which reliance had been placed by the petitioners in their representation to the concerned authorities. 25. In that case, this Court was concerned with the refusal of a transport authority to entertain an application for grant of permit on the ground that the major part of the route did not fall within its jurisdiction. In the context of the facts of that case, the Court held that the power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be exercised to compel a Regional Transport Authority to entertain and allow an application when such application should in fact have been made before some other transport authority. The aforesaid decision has no manner of application in facts and circumstances of the instant case. 26. Significantly, the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore has admittedly not responded to the representation made by the petitioners for redressal of their purported grievances. The Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore has by its conduct acquiesced to the grant of a permit to the private respondents for plying their bus. 27. In view of the law as it stands today, the grant of a permit is the rule and its refusal an exception. There being no notification under Section 67 of the said Act in the Official gazette restricting the number of vehicles on the route in question, the private respondents were entitled to a permit for plying a vehicle on the route as a matter of course, subject of course, to their fulfilling the requisite financial and other eligibility criteria. 28. In that view of the matter, the only point of controversy is whether the permit should have been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bankura or the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore. As already observed above, the Regional Transport Authority has already acquiesced to the grant of a permit in question by its conduct. There is no reason why this Court should interfere with the permit. 29. As already observed above, the Regional Transport Authority has already acquiesced to the grant of a permit in question by its conduct. There is no reason why this Court should interfere with the permit. 29. An objection on the ground of irregular exercise of jurisdiction cannot be taken unless there has been substantial failure of justice. In the instant case, there has been no failure of justice by reason of grant of permit in favour of the private respondents. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being discretionary, this Court has the power to refuse a writ, when there has been no failure of justice. Moreover existing operators do not have any right whatsoever to question the grant of a permit to a new operator. 30. The instant petition appears to be a motivated attempt to the part of a group of existing operators to shut out competition and is clearly not maintainable in view of the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court as also the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.