JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the orders dated February 7, 1987 and July 7, 1987 passed by the Small Causes Court at Bombay in Appeal No. 414 of 1986 and in Misc. Notice No. 204 of 1987 in R.A.E. Suit No. 3043 of 1983, respectively. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioners are the landlords in respect of the premises being Room No. 2, Ground Floor, Harihar Nivas, Dr. B.A. Road, Dadar, Bombay- 400 014. The husband of the respondent No. 1 herein was the monthly tenant in the said premises. After his demise, his wife-respondent No. 1 herein continued to occupy the suit premises. According to the petitioners, since the respondent No. 1 had shifted to Jabalpur and was keeping the demised premises closed, a suit for eviction under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Bombay Rent Act") came to be filed against the respondent No. 1 being R.A.E. Suit No. 3043 of 1983 on the grounds of non-user, acquisition of suitable residence and also bona fide requirement. The said suit was filed on 29th July, 1983. The Rent Court issued summons to the respondent No. 1 regarding the hearing of that suit, which was not only attempted to be served on the suit premises at Bombay but also on the last known address of the respondent No. 1 at Jabalpur. However, the packet sent through Court containing the suit summons by R.P.A.D. was returned with an endorsement dated 24-8-1983 as "Refused. I am not the L.R. of Mr. Morrie Chatterji". Since the said service could not be effected, another attempt through the Court Bailiff to serve on the respondent No. 1 on the suit premises on 14th October, 1983 and 16th October, 1983 were made and on both the occasions the premises were found locked. The bailiff, accordingly, made his report in that behalf. In these peculiar circumstances, the petitioners made application to the Court for substituted service. The Rent Court although allowed the said application, by order dated 21st October, 1983, out of abundant precaution also directed the petitioners to serve the respondent No. 1 by R.P.A.D. as well as under certificate of posting. The bailiff, accordingly, made his report in that behalf. In these peculiar circumstances, the petitioners made application to the Court for substituted service. The Rent Court although allowed the said application, by order dated 21st October, 1983, out of abundant precaution also directed the petitioners to serve the respondent No. 1 by R.P.A.D. as well as under certificate of posting. The order passed by the trial Court is "service is prayed if it could not be served on the defendant and alia once again by R.P.A.D. and certificate of posting at Jabalpur address". Pursuant to the directions given by the Rent Court, the summons through R.P.A.D. as well as under certificate of posting was sent to the respondent No. 1 at her Jabalpur address. The summons sent by R.P.A.D. was however returned with endorsement dated 18-11-1983 as: "Refused. The undersigned is not the wife of Shri Morrie Chatterji". It is relevant to note that on both the postal remarks, referred to above, the signature of one "M. Chatterji" has been put. Besides, the service by R.P.A.D. and certificate of posting, even the substituted service was effected and the summons was posted by the bailiff on the suit premises and the report in that behalf was submitted to the Court dated 28th November, 1983. The suit was placed for hearing before the Rent Court on 15th December, 1984 on which date, once again none appeared for respondent No. 1. The trial Court, in the circumstances recorded that the suit summons was duly served and the matter be posted for ex parte decree on 21st December 1984 when the petitioners led evidence and on analysing the pleadings and evidence on record, the trial Court proceeded to pass ex parte decree of possession of the grounds stated in the plaint. That decree was executed by the petitioners on 13th February, 1985. Only after the decree was executed and the petitioners had also obtained the possession. Mr. Ramraj Nahata, claiming to be the son-in-law of respondent No. 1, filed Special Misc. Notice No. 160 of 1985 on 16th February, 1985 for setting aside the ex parte decree. That decree was executed by the petitioners on 13th February, 1985. Only after the decree was executed and the petitioners had also obtained the possession. Mr. Ramraj Nahata, claiming to be the son-in-law of respondent No. 1, filed Special Misc. Notice No. 160 of 1985 on 16th February, 1985 for setting aside the ex parte decree. In the affidavit filed in support of that application by said Ramraj Nahata it is averred that the summons sent to the respondent No. 1 on her Jabalpur address was never attempted to be served on her nor at any point of time, the respondent No. 1 refused to accept the service of that summons or made endorsement which appears to have been initialled as "M. Chatterji" on the packets which were returned. After being served with the notice, the appellants filed affidavit in reply dated 18th October, 1985. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 caused to file the affidavit of her daughter Leela Ramraj Nahata, more or less reiterating the stand which was taken in previous affidavit of Ramraj Nahata. The affidavit of Ramraj Nahata clearly mentions that he was making the averments in the affidavit on the basis of telephonic instructions obtained from respondent No. 1 on 14-2-1985. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 sworn her own affidavit on 17th January, 1986. However, the Court permitted her to tender that affidavit at the time of hearing of the application. In the circumstances, that affidavit came to be tendered on record on 25-3-1986 when the Misc. notice was taken up for hearing. Even this affidavit takes a specific plea that at no point of time, the suit summons was attempted to be served on respondent No. 1 at Jabalpur or that she had ever refused to accept that notice or for that matter made any endorsement as appears on the envelope returned back by post with remarks, as referred to above. The petitioners further filed affidavit on 7-3-1986 controverting the allegations made in the affidavit filed by Mrs. Leela Ramraj Nahata. It is relevant to note that no oral evidence was adduced by either party. In the circumstances, the trial Court proceeded to examine the matter on the basis of the pleadings and the affidavits filed by both the sides. The petitioners further filed affidavit on 7-3-1986 controverting the allegations made in the affidavit filed by Mrs. Leela Ramraj Nahata. It is relevant to note that no oral evidence was adduced by either party. In the circumstances, the trial Court proceeded to examine the matter on the basis of the pleadings and the affidavits filed by both the sides. The trial Court, after examining the records, took the view that the plea taken by the respondent No. 1 appears to be false and belied by the endorsement on the envelopes received back from the post. The trial Court has neatly summed up the position in paras 10 to 12 of the judgment to reject the stand taken by the respondent No. 1 that no attempt was ever made to serve the special suit summons on her at Jabalpur or that she had never refused or for that matter had never made endorsement which appeared on the returned envelops back by the post. The trial Court also proceeded to examine the admitted signatures of the respondent No. 1 and, the signatures which appeared on the returned envelopes of the post having been refused by the respondent No. 1 and, formed its opinion that there was material similarity in these signatures. Taking overall view of the matter, the trial Court held that no sufficient cause was shown by the respondent No. 1 for setting aside the ex parte decree passed against her. 3. Being aggrieved, the respondent No. 1 took the matter in appeal before the Appellate Court Bench of the Small Causes Court in Bombay vide Appeal No. 414 of 1986. The Appellate Bench by the impugned judgment order dated 7th February, 1987 was pleased to allow the appeal. According to the Appellate Bench, there was a sinister motive of the petitioner in mentioning incorrect spelling of "Morrie Chatterjee" in the title of the plaint. According to the Appellate Court, that was done with purpose. The Appellate Court further observed that on the other the respondent No. 1 by making endorsements on the envelopes sent at Jabalpur address, tried her level best to clarify the position in clear cut terms and in spite of that, the petitioners did not carry out the necessary correction so as to take undue advantage of that. The Appellate Court further observed that on the other the respondent No. 1 by making endorsements on the envelopes sent at Jabalpur address, tried her level best to clarify the position in clear cut terms and in spite of that, the petitioners did not carry out the necessary correction so as to take undue advantage of that. The Appellate Court eventually proceeded to allow the appeal on the ground of wrong description of the name of the tenant as "Morrie Chatterjee" instead of "Moni Chatterjee" which according to it was the cause for the unfortunate situation that the respondent No. 1 could not pursue the matter and that the same was sufficient reason to set aside the ex parte decree passed against her. It is relevant to note that when this appeal was allowed, the Counsel for the petitioners did not remain present at the time of hearing as is noted in para 4 of the judgment. However, the petitioners immediately filed application bearing Misc. Notice No. 204 of 1987 before the Appellate Bench to recall the order and decide the appeal after hearing them. However, that application has been rejected by the Appellate Bench on July 7, 1987. 4. Accordingly, this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed taking exception to both the abovesaid orders passed by the Appellate Bench. This writ petition was listed for hearing on 11th June, 2002 when none appeared for the respondents, although the names of the concerned Advocates was notified on the board issued by the Registry of this Court. With a view to given an opportunity to the respondent No. 1, the Counsel for the petitioners was asked to inform the Advocate for the respondent that the petition would be taken up for hearing in the next week. Pusuant to the said liberty given by this Court, Mr. Abhyankar sent intimation to Mrs. Meena Fulbandhe, Advocate for the respondent by letter dated 13-6-2002 which has been duly served. Accordingly, the matter was placed for hearing yesterday. Even yesterday, the board notified the names of the concerned Advocates, but none appeared for the respondents when the matter was called on for hearing. The matter, however, remained overnight part-heard. The matter however, was accordingly shown today as overnight part-heard. When the matter was called out none appeared for the respondent No. 1. Even yesterday, the board notified the names of the concerned Advocates, but none appeared for the respondents when the matter was called on for hearing. The matter, however, remained overnight part-heard. The matter however, was accordingly shown today as overnight part-heard. When the matter was called out none appeared for the respondent No. 1. However, when the Court started dictating this judgment and had substantially dictated the judgment Mrs. Meena Fulbandhe, who is Advocate on record for respondent No. 1 appeared and conceded that she has received the notice which mentions that the petition will be placed on the board in the week commencing from 17th June for final hearing and to remain present in the Court, if she so desires. She however states that she does not have the complete papers of the petition. Therefore, this Court showed indulgence that the matter will be heard at 2.45 p.m., but there was no question of granting any adjournment as the matter was over night part-heard. Instead of availing that opportunity, the learned Counsel stated that, in that case, the Court may proceed to dictate the remaining judgment. Accordingly, this Court proceeded to dictate the remaining judgment in open Court in the presence of the said Counsel. 5. Mr. Abhyankar appearing for the petitioners contended that the Appellate Court has completely misdirected itself in allowing the appal on the basis of the reasons which cannot be supported by the materials on record and, in fact, the inference drawn by the Appellate Court is completely contrary to the plea taken by the respondent No. 1 in the affidavits filed before the Court. It is further contended that the Appellate Court has committed manifest error in concluding that the mistake appearing in the name of "Morrie Chatterjee" in place of "Moni Chatterjee" was done with purpose. According to the petitioners, there was no such pleading nor any evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and in absence of pleading and proof, the finding recording by the Appellate Court was nothing but surmises and conjectures and unsustainable. Accordingly, the judgment given by the Appellate Court is criticised and it is submitted that the reasons recorded by the trial Court, particularly in paras 10 11 is correct and is supported with the materials on record. The orders passed by the trial Court, therefore, deserves to be restored. Accordingly, the judgment given by the Appellate Court is criticised and it is submitted that the reasons recorded by the trial Court, particularly in paras 10 11 is correct and is supported with the materials on record. The orders passed by the trial Court, therefore, deserves to be restored. In substance, it is contended that there being no sufficient cause shown by the respondent No. 1 for setting aside the ex parte decree and if that be so, the application filed for and on behalf of the respondent No. 1 had to be inevitably dismissed. 6. After considering the above submissions, I have no hesitation in accepting the submissions of the petitioners that the Appellate Court has completely gone overboard in proceeding on the assumption that the mistake in the plaint regarding the name of "Moni Chattrjee" as "Morrie Chatterjee" was done with purpose or for that matter was the cause for the ex parte decree passed against the respondent No. 1. The Appellate Court has completely overlooked the specific plea taken on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in all the three affidavits that, the suit summons was never attempted to be served on her including at Jabalpur and at no point of time she had refused service thereof; and more so that she has not made any endorsements on the envelopes or put her initials on the envelopes which have been returned by post. The question, therefore, is: if the respondent No. 1 is right in her plan then, surely, it would be a case of-in fact, no service effected on the respondent and, that she had absolute no knowledge of the proceedings initiated against her and, that would, therefore, be a sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte decree. However, if the respondent No. 1 fails to establish the specific case set up by her and the Court were to legitimately proceed to draw an inference that the endorsements on the envelopes received by the post were at her instance and were signed by her, then it is not possible to countenance that the respondent No. 1 has shown sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte decree but it would necessarily follow that the defence as taken is false and dishonest to her own knowledge and only to gain undue advantage of some fortuitous circumstances to sub-serve her interest. In that situation, however, the Court would legitimately draw a legal presumption that the respondent No. 1 had knowledge of the proceedings and obviously the conduct of returning the envelopes was to take advantage of the mistake or error in the name spelt on the said envelopes as "Morrie Chatterjee" instead of "Moni Chatterjee". If this be so, then the respondent No. 1 cannot be allowed to take advantage of her own wrong. It is well-settled that no man can take advantage of his own wrong (NULLUS COMMODUM CAPERE POTEST DE INJURIA SUA PROPRIA). If the respondent No. 1 was so conscious about the mistake or irregularity in the name on the envelopes sent through Court but she took no efforts to get the mistake corrected or explained, it would obviously be a case to draw legal presumption about her knowledge of proceedings and of further acquiescence into that mistake. The acquiescence of a party who might take advantage of an error obviates its effect. (CONSENSUS TOLLIT ERROREM). This doctrine is also long established and well known. Understood thus, the matter will have to be examined in this perspective. 7. As observed earlier, there is nothing on record to show that the respondent No. 1 has ever pleaded that the mistake in the name of "Moni Chatterjee" as "Morrie Chatterjee" was done with purpose. There is no pleading nor any proof in that behalf. The fact that mistake was deliberate attempt cannot be readily inferred. But it will have not only to be pleaded but also proved in evidence. Since this is lacking in the present case, there was no legal basis for the Appellate Court to draw presumption or return a finding that the mistake in the name was deliberate to take advantage of the situation. Besides the Appellate Court proceeds to hold that the respondent No. 1 made her level best to clarify the position in clear cut terms about the mistake in the name as she was not the wife of "Morrie Chatterjee". However, this view clearly overlooks that it would be contrary to the specific plea taken by the respondent No. 1 inasmuch as, the respondent No. 1 pleads that she was never served with the suit summons by post or otherwise and in particular at Jabalpur. However, this view clearly overlooks that it would be contrary to the specific plea taken by the respondent No. 1 inasmuch as, the respondent No. 1 pleads that she was never served with the suit summons by post or otherwise and in particular at Jabalpur. If this be so, the reason recorded by the Appellate Court is palpably contrary to the materials on record and manifestly wrong. The assumptions drawn by the Appellate Court are obviously perverse. 8. Reverting back to the reasons recorded by the trial Court in the context of the specific plea taken by the respondent No. 1, on considering the materials on record of the rival parties, has rejected that plea. Once that plea stands rejected, it necessarily follows that the respondent No. 1 has herself refused to accept the suit summons. It is relevant to note that besides sending the suit summons by post on the last known address of the respondent No. 1 at Jabalpur, the same was pasted on the suit premises and that the daughter and son-in-law of the respondent No. 1 who have later on prosecuted this matter were staying in the same building. The mistake in the name would then be of no consequence. To my mind, the trial Court has analysed the entire matter in its proper perspective in paragraphs 10 11. It would be appropriate to reproduce the said two paragraphs in this judgment, I have no hesitation in approving the said reasons stated by the trial Court in toto. The same read as under: "10. The next point that arises for my consideration is whether there was a due service of the suit summons on the defendant. On this aspect of the case, I have in the earlier part of the judgment quoted the name and the description of the defendant as given in the plaint and also the name and the description repeated on the two registered packets sent by post. It may be mentioned that a person service of the summons at the address of the suit premises as mentioned in the plaint was not possible or practicable because admittedly during the relevant period from prior to the date of the filing of the suit till the ex parte decree was passed, the defendant was residing out of Bombay and she was at Jabalpur. Apparently Jabalpur address of the defendant must have been acquired by the plaintiffs on some inquiry made for facilitating service, the summons in the suit be registered post and, therefore, again it does not appear that the plaintiffs merely attempted some bogus or formal attempt of the personal service of and applied for substituted service, by pasting the summons or sending it, by post on the last known address of the defendant. It appears that some attempts for service by post at Jabalpur had been made much earlier to the application for substituted service. The summons of the suit was once sent at the instance of the plaintiff by R.P. and was returned with the remarks "Refused". I am not legal representative of Mr. Morrie Chatterji", There are reports of the bailiffs about their attempts of the personal service of the summons on the defendants before the application was made for substituted service. The learned Judge had not only granted the prayer of the substituted service by pasting, but further directed alias summons once again by registered post and under the certificate of posting at "Jabalpur address". It is pursuant to this that the summon with the same name and descriptions quoted above was sent once more by registered post and the certificate of posting at the Jabalpur address of the defendant quoted above, and again the last packet sent by registered post was returned with remarks: "Refused. The undersigned is not the wife of Shri. Morrie Chatterji". It is then signed by the addressee and dated as 8-11-1986. Ultimately, the postal authorities also endorsed the remark of refusal on the packet and returned to the sender and it is this service of the refusal on the packet sent by the registered post, which is sought to be relied upon in justification of the instituted service. 11. As against this, it is the case of the defendant, and her son-in-law and also her constituted attorney that no packet containing the summons was tendered to the defendant nor did she refused to accept the same. Therefore, according to the defendant, there was no service of the summons on the defendant. 11. As against this, it is the case of the defendant, and her son-in-law and also her constituted attorney that no packet containing the summons was tendered to the defendant nor did she refused to accept the same. Therefore, according to the defendant, there was no service of the summons on the defendant. It may be noted that in the first affidavit made on the telephonic instructions of the defendant- Ramraj Nahata stated that the defendant had also instructed him to state that she had no disclaimed to be the wife of or the heir and legal representative of Mr. Morrie Chatterji, as described on the packet. Therefore, it would be clear that before making the affidavit, Ramraj Nahata had seen the packet returned the remarks refused and the other remarks quoted above and taken the telephonic instructions from the defendant even before making the first application. Under these circumstances what is significant on this aspect of the case is that in none of the affidavits made either by Ramraj Nahata or by the C.A. of the defendant or belatedly by the defendant, the signature on the packets purporting to be that of Mr. S.N. Chatterji was disputed. In none of the these affidavits was stated that the signatures purporting to be of Mrs. M. Chatterji on the packets on 24-8-1983 and 8-11-1983 was not that of the defendant. In my opinion the absence of dispute signatures on the packets under the remarks of the refusal has got some significance on the aspect of the case. It is in this view that I had on the last date of the hearing of the notice, inquired with the learned Advocate of the parties whether they had perused the original record of the suit and had any comments to make and both the learned Advocates had stated that they had not done so. Today before dictating the orders I again invited the comments of both the learned Advocates of the parties of the endorsement on the two packets. According to the learned Advocate for the defendant, the endorsement was not that of the defendant and that there was some doubt about this made of writing in the purported signatures on the packets, where according to the plaintiffs, the signature was that of the defendant because the defendant refused to accept the postal packet containing the summons of the suit. In my opinion the contention of the defendant in this regard should not be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, it may be mentioned that the packet contained the name and the description of the defendant. The name was described as Mrs. M. Chatterji, about which there is no dispute because she also signed as describing her name as Mrs. M. Chatterjee. Therefore, about her name being Mrs. M. Chatterji, there does not appear to be any dispute. There appears to be some dispute concerning the description of the defendants husband. It was written on the packet the name of the name of defendant as Mrs. M. Chatterji, the heir and legal representative of the deceased Mr. Morrie Chatterji, it is significant to note that the description on the packet did not described Mrs. M. Chatterji as the wife of Mr. Morrie Chatterji. It merely described her as the heir and legal representative of the deceased Mr. Morrie Chatterji. The endorsement on the first packet reads as under: "Refused. I am not the legal representatives of Mr. Morrie Chatterji". The endorsement on the second pocket reads as under "Refused. The undersigned is not the wife of Shri Morrie Chatterji. It will also be seen that while writing the endorsements on the postal packets, the person signing or writing the endorsement has not described her full name. Apparently, the name of the tenant and the husband of the defendant was "Mr. Mani Chatterji". Therefore, there appears to be some sort of a mere quibbling by the addressee to refuse to accept the packet because of some mistake in description. But the same was technical defect of description. At the same time, the addressee has taken is not describing her full and correct name. Besides when the addressee said she was not "wife of Mr. Morrie Chatterji" it is quite clear that no one except the defendant could be the person who had made such endorsement. Therefore, in my opinion, the two endorsements as are purported to be signed by the addressee, it was possible that the defendant was merely making some technical advantage of the mis-description of the defendants husbands name, added in latter part of description. Therefore, I have no doubt that the two packets were tendered to the defendant who refused to accept the same." 9. Therefore, I have no doubt that the two packets were tendered to the defendant who refused to accept the same." 9. Once this position is reached that the respondent No. 1 herself refused to accept the suit summons, then it necessarily follows that the respondent No. 1 has been duly served with the same and, therefore, the ex parte decree passed in the circumstances was legitimate. As such, the subject decree has been passed and later on executed by the petitioners, by following due process of law. To my mind, it is established on record that the respondent No. 1 has taken a false and dishonest plea before the Court. And that plea having failed rather rejected, the Court would justified in assuming that the refusal of service by the respondent No. 1 was deliberate. In such a case, the Court ought to reject the application at the instance of such litigant as a whole, for she cannot be permitted to take advantage of her own wrong relying on some technical pleas. 10. Besides, the manner in which the matter has proceeded in this Court, leaves a lingering doubt in my mind that the respondent No. 1 refused to accept the suit summons with purpose. It is not unknown in the city such as Bombay, when persons are hard pressed for premises and regard being had to the value of properties, recourse is taken to all possible means so as to protract the delivery of possession. In the present case, no doubt the petitioners got the ex parte decree and also executed the same but were required to restore the possession to the respondent No. 1 after the decision of the Appellate Court in 1987. The petitioners have thus been denied the fruits of the decree which was legitimately passed in their favour. Because of the notoriety of long pendency of matters. Some unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to take recourse to such dilatory tactics. The petitioners have thus been denied the fruits of the decree which was legitimately passed in their favour. Because of the notoriety of long pendency of matters. Some unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to take recourse to such dilatory tactics. Even the Apex Court has taken judicial notice of judicial tardiness in (Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava)1, reported in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. (S.C.)581 by observing in para 15 of that decision that: "The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, a malady afflicting the system." If the Court were to show indulgence to the respondent No. 1 in spite of her false and dishonest plea and restore the suit as has been ordered by the Appellate Court it would only entail in granting undue premium to an undeserving litigant. The consequence of restoration of the suit would require the plaintiffs to undergo the rigmarole of de novo trial right from the first Court, of a suit instituted by them as back as in 1983 on the stated grounds, inter alia, of bona fide and reasonable requirement. I may not be understood to having interfered with the impugned order singularly on account of the likelihood of untold hardship and manifest injustice that will be caused to the plaintiffs. However, I have founded my decision to reverse the impugned order of the Appellate Court essentially because I have restored the findings and conclusions reached by the first Court to the effect that the plea taken by the respondent No. 1 was patently false and belied from the materials on record. In such a situation, there would be no occasion for the Court to countenance the plea of sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte decree passed against the respondent No. 1. 11. Accordingly, I have no hesitation in setting aside the orders passed by the Appellate Court dated 7-2-1987 and 7-7-1987 respectively and instead restore the order passed by the trial Court dated 4th April, 1986 discharging the Misc. Notice No. 160 of 1985. Needless to mention that, as a consequence of this order, the ex parte decree passed against the respondent No. 1 dated 21-12-1984 gets restored and it would be open to the petitioners to get it executed in accordance with law. 12. Notice No. 160 of 1985. Needless to mention that, as a consequence of this order, the ex parte decree passed against the respondent No. 1 dated 21-12-1984 gets restored and it would be open to the petitioners to get it executed in accordance with law. 12. It appears that Civil Applications bearing Nos. 7131 of 1992, 7302 of 1998 7305 of 1998 have been filed by the petitioners complaining that the respondent No. 1 has violated the undertaking given before this Court. Those applications will be decided independently. 13. Needless to observe that since the order passed by the Appellate Bench in Appeal No. 414 of 1986 on 7th February, 1987 has been set aside on merits, it is not necessary to go into the correctness of the approach of the Appellate Bench in rejecting the notice taken out by the petitioners for restoration of the appeal which came to be rejected on 7th July, 1987. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition succeeds with costs throughout. Rule made absolute in the above terms. Petition succeeds. -----