JUDGMENT B. PANIGRAHI, J. — These Civil Appeals arise out of a common order dated 26.7.2000 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack in Civil Proceeding Nos. 88 and 385 of 1995. Civil Appeal Nos. 44 and 45 of 2000 have been filed by the appellant-husband against the order allowing Civil Proceeding No. 385/95 whereby the appellant has been directed to pay Rs. 200/-per month towards maintenance of the minor son and against dismissal of Civil Proceeding No. 88/95 filed by the appellant under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act”). Civil Appeal No. 50/2000 has been filed by the minor son of both parties represented through the mother guardian-respond¬ent for modification of the order passed in Civil Proceeding No. 385/95 by enhancing the amount of maintenance to Rs. 1000/- per month for the minor son. 2. The factual matrix leading to these appeals is as follows : The husband-appellant as petitioner filed an applica¬tion against the wife-respondent for annulment of the marriage which was solemnised between them on 10.6.94 in the village of the respondent in accordance with the Hindu customary rites. Prior to solemnisation of marriage the relations and well-wishers of the parties had arranged for the marriage. After the marriage the respondent-wife had joined in the matrimonial house of the appellant and the marriage was accordingly consummated. But it is alleged in the application filed by the appellant before th learned Judge, Family Court that since the respondent had commit¬ted fraud in suppressing her age before the marriage and immedi¬ately after fraud was detected on 17.12.94 it was found that the bride was about 12 years elder to the appellant. 3. The appellant is employed since June 1992 as a defence personnel and posted outside the State of Orissa leaving his par¬ents and relatives in village Shapur within Jajpur district where¬as the respondent has been working in a private firm from 1989 at Bhubaneswar. It is, inter alia, alleged by the appellant that in the year 1994 he came on annual leave. The marriage proposal was negotiated while the appellant was on leave in his village. The well-wishers and relatives of the appellant before such marriage had seen the respondent and an impression was given that the respondent was earning Rs. 2500/-. The appellant was led to believe the statement of the respondent from a private firm. The marriage proposal was negotiated while the appellant was on leave in his village. The well-wishers and relatives of the appellant before such marriage had seen the respondent and an impression was given that the respondent was earning Rs. 2500/-. The appellant was led to believe the statement of the respondent from a private firm. Thereafter there was exchange of letters between both the parties. After both parties came closer, the date of marriage was fixed on 10th June, 1994 whereupon it was solemnised and the bride joined her matrimonial house. Accordingly they lived as husband wife. After some time the appellant left for his job and he applied for a quarters so that he could take the respondent to the place of his posting, but the authorities made certain queries as regards the age of the bride and also the other details. The appellant made several correspondences with the respondent for supplying those dates, but she avoided on some plea or the other. Ultimately she sent a letter on 24.6.94 in which she disclosed her date of birth as 9.12.1969. The appellant has taken a further plea that by the time the respondent joined him she had already conceived. There¬fore, within a few months of such marriage a male child was born on 8.3.95. Thus the appellant filed an application under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act on the ground of fraud having been committed by the respondent at the time of their marriage. 4. The respondent in her written statement had, however, admitted the marriage which took place between them on 10.6.94 and that she was working at Bhubaneswar from 1989. After consumma¬tion of marriage it is stated that she became pregnant and after the normal gestation period she given birth to a male child. There was no suppression of age before marriage, but after having full knowledge that the respondent was elder to him, by seeing her qualification and also the social status the appellant mar¬ried her. It has been further claimed that under Section 5 of the Act no criteria has been fixed by the legislature as to what would be the difference in age between the bride and the bridegroom. But all it has been stated is that at the time of marriage the bride should be 18 years of age whereas the bridegroom must have completed 21 years. But all it has been stated is that at the time of marriage the bride should be 18 years of age whereas the bridegroom must have completed 21 years. Thus, even there may be some difference in age between the bride and the bridegroom, but that by itself would not render the marriage voidable. The learned Judge, Family Court, however, granted litigation expenses of Rs. 750/- to the respondent and Rs. 200/- for the maintenance of the minor child with effect from May, 1998. 5. Both parties do not dispute that the marriage between the spouses was solemnised according to Hindu rites on 10.6.94. It is also not in dispute that a male child was born one year after the marriage of the parties. The only question that has emerged before the learned Judge, Family Court was that whether the appellant was entitled to get a decree of annulment of the marriage on the ground of fraud alleged to have been practised on him relating to the age of the respondent. The learned Judge, Family Court has accepted the evidence of the appellant and held that the marriage was consummated on the 4th day of marriage. It was an arranged marriage. Prior to such negotiation there was exchange of letters between the parties. The respondent had unequivocally stated all the details in her letters to the appel¬lant which have been marked as Exhibits ‘X’ series on behalf of the appellant. Prescriptions were filed by the appellant to show that she was under treatment during the period of pregnancy. The appellant wrote a letter on 13.12.94 by expressing his desire that in no circumstances he could leave the respondent. From the contents of the letter it would further reflect that due to some previous incident he repented and assured the respondent that he would not repeat the same. From Ext.3. dated 18th January, 1995 he made an unqualified admission that throughout the life he could not forsake the respondent under any circumstance. It is true that the date of birth of the respondent in the Board of Second¬ary Education Certificate has been described as 6th February, 1957 but that is not sufficient to annul the marriage in case no fraud has committed at the time of marriage. It is true that the date of birth of the respondent in the Board of Second¬ary Education Certificate has been described as 6th February, 1957 but that is not sufficient to annul the marriage in case no fraud has committed at the time of marriage. On a close study of the evidence of P.W.1, who is uncle of the appellant and had gone to select the respondent for the purpose of marriage, it has transpired that they had seen the respondent and selected her for marriage with the appellant. One year after such marriage he claims to have gone to the school for obtaining information about respondent’s age at the request of the appel¬lant and from there it appeared that the date of birth of the respondent as noted in the School Certificate was 6.2.1957. Although he has claimed not to have seen the certificate or any document regarding the age of the respondent prior to marriage, but such statement seems to be improbable inasmuch as the age of both the parties must have been discussed before performance of marriage. The parties led their conjugal life for about 8 months after their marriage and during such time the respondent con¬ceived through the petitioner. It is reasonably expected that the appellant and his relations must have referred to the educational profile of the respondent prior to marriage particularly when she was a working lady. P.W.2, the appellant himself had although filed the certificate showing his date of birth, but, no evidence was led that fraud was perpetrated at the time of marriage. It has been brought out in cross-examination that since 17.9.94. the appellant withdrew from the association of the respondent. He has admitted the contents of Exts. A and B to be in his hand-writing. Even from Exts. A and B it is quite apparent that he wanted to keep relationship with the respondent as his wife. It is still enigmatic as to what propelled the appellant to file application for annulling the marriage. 6. A piquant situation has emerged in this case that even assuming that the bride is elder to the bride-groom can it be said that the marriage is invalid ? The appellant has relied on the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act which reads as follows : “12. Voidable marriage. 6. A piquant situation has emerged in this case that even assuming that the bride is elder to the bride-groom can it be said that the marriage is invalid ? The appellant has relied on the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act which reads as follows : “12. Voidable marriage. - (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely : xxxx xxxx xxxx (c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner was required under Section 5 as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978 (2 of 1978) the consent of such guardian was obtained by force or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circum¬stance concerning the respondent.” (the underlinings are mine). The words “force” and “fraud” are not defined in the Act. Such expressions are only amplified and defined in Section 17 of the Contract Act. The term “fraud” used in this Act cannot be the same as in Section 17 of the Contract Act. A person who freely con¬sents to the solemnisation of marriage with other party in ac¬cordance with the customary ceremonies, the consenting spouse later on cannot turn round and say that fraud was committed on him. The marriage negotiation precedes the actual marriage. During the period of negotiation there must be proposal and acceptance. In this case the proposal was offered much prior to the marriage and the appellant has accepted such proposal and thereafter the marriage was solemnised and subsequently it was consummated. 7. Section 12(1)(c) of the Act shall have application only if the fraud continues on the date of marriage. In this case there has been no evidence whatsoever adduced by the appellant that he made a query regarding the respondent’s age which she suppressed. Rather it is piquant to note that the appellant-husband though claimed to be younger than the respondent yet there is no credible evidence besides, the certificate to estab¬lish such fact in this case. In this case there has been no evidence whatsoever adduced by the appellant that he made a query regarding the respondent’s age which she suppressed. Rather it is piquant to note that the appellant-husband though claimed to be younger than the respondent yet there is no credible evidence besides, the certificate to estab¬lish such fact in this case. Therefore, there has been no ques¬tion of any concealment of fraud with regard to the age of the respondent-wife and thus it is not legitimate for the appellant to take aid of Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act for annulment of the marriage which took place on 10.6.94. 8. The appellant relied upon a judgment reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1534 (Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane). But on a careful cogitation of the judgment we are of the firm opinion that such decision does not help in any manner to the appellant as the facts of that case are quite distinguishable and has no nexus with the present fact situation. 9. Learned Advocate for the respondent has relied on a judgment reported in I (1977) DMC 285 (A. Premchand v. V. Padma¬priya) of a Division Bench of Madras High Court in which it has been held : “.......the consent obtained by way of fraud must be prior to the marriage and the same was very well subsisting on the date of the marriage. xx xx xx To put it very briefly, Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act will apply only if the fraud subsists on the date of the marriage. In this case the evidence adduced on the side of the respondent clearly shows that the appellant was aware of the correct date of birth well in advance, hence there is no question of any concealment or fraud with regard to the age of the wife and it is not possible for the appellant to seek and aid of Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act for annulment of the marriage which took place on 8.3.1987. xx xx xx If any marriage solemnised may be annulled on the ground that the ‘consent’ was obtained by fraud the consent must have been to such solemnization. Normally parties agree upon the marriage proposal prior to the solemnization ceremony. There would be proposal and acceptance and it is after such acceptance that the parties agree upon a date and time for the marriage ceremony. Normally parties agree upon the marriage proposal prior to the solemnization ceremony. There would be proposal and acceptance and it is after such acceptance that the parties agree upon a date and time for the marriage ceremony. Therefore, even prior to the solemnization there is a stage at which consent is given by one party to the other may be there is fraudulent misrepresentation at that stage. That may be with regard to the status of the party, educational quali¬fication, financial situation, state of health, or even virgini¬ty. But at the time when solemnisation takes place pursuant to such consent there is no question of any misrepresentation on any of the above grounds. There could be fraud or there could be force in the matter of solemnisation, independent of these mat¬ters. To these cases Section 12(1) (c) will be attracted but not to a case where though there is no fraud or force in the solemni¬sation of the marriage there is fraud or misrepresentation for obtaining consent to the proposal for the marriage.” In the aforesaid judgment the Madras High Court has carefully considered A.I.R. 1968 Patna 190 (Babul Panmoto v. Ram Agya Singh) and A.I.R. 1986 Punjab and Haryana 191 (Som Dutta v. Smt.Raj Kumari) and did not agree with the reasonings of the above cases. 10. From our common experience it can very well be visua¬lised that before marriage there must be a negotiation and in the negotiation the proposal must have been given by one of the spouses and it is accepted by the other. At that stage assuming that some fraud alleged to have been committed, but there must be clear, cogent and credible evidence that such fraud continued till the solemnisation of marriage between the spouses. From the wording of Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act the legislature was very careful by prescribing that fraud must have perpetrated at the time of marriage. In this case the marriage was consummated after the solemnisation. Both parties thereafter lived in the matrimo¬nial house as husband and wife and out of their union a male child was born. The appellant thereafter had assured to take care of the wife-respondent. Any marriage solemnised may be annulled on the ground that consent was obtained by fraud. Normally the parties agree upon the marriage proposal prior to the solemnisa¬tion ceremony. The appellant thereafter had assured to take care of the wife-respondent. Any marriage solemnised may be annulled on the ground that consent was obtained by fraud. Normally the parties agree upon the marriage proposal prior to the solemnisa¬tion ceremony. Therefore, even prior to the solemnisation there is a stage at which the consent is given by one party to the other. May be, there is fraudulent representation at that stage. But at the time of marriage when there is no question of force or fraud regarding status, educational qualification or age, then in those cases Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act will not be attracted. On factual analysis of the case we find that the appellant has significantly failed to establish that fraud was committed on him by the respondent by giving fraudulent impression of age at the solemnisation of the marriage between the parties. Therefore, Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act shall not have any application. 11. Learned trial Court has granted only Rs. 200/- to the minor son for his maintenance. Within such nominal amount it is difficult to comprehend that the maintenance and educational expenses of the child can be met. Accordingly, we direct the respondent to pay at least Rs. 800/- (Rupees Eight hundred) per month for the purpose of maintenance of the child. In so far as maintenance of the respondent is concerned, it would depend upon her independent income. Since both parties have not led any evidence with regard to the independent income of the respondent,it is difficult to assess the amount payable to the respondent. It is open to the respondent to file an application before the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack claiming mainte¬nance from the appellant if she has no income from other source. 12. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2000 is allowed and the order of granting maintenance to the minor son is modi¬fied to the extent indicated above. Civil Appeal Nos. 44 and 45 of 2000 are dismissed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. CH. P. K. MISRA, J. I agree. One appeal allowed and two dismissed.