JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.--The Appellant before us is the son of one Shrimathi Heggadthi. The Appellant had filed Writ Petition No. 35363 of 1996 on 19.12.1996 assailing an Order of the Tribunal dated 12.8.1986. The Tribunal had granted occupancy rights to the Respondent-3 Yuvaraja Poovani in respect of several pieces of land situated at Marne Village. Though there is a serious dispute with regard to many other aspects of the case, one factor which emerges predominant is that the lands that are in dispute were held by Sri Chandranatha Swamy Devaru Madhura Patna, Basadi (Basti), hereinafter referred to as the "temple". It appears that the parties are followers of the Jain faith and that under certain circumstances, as often happens, large areas of lands which include these lands had effectively vested in the temple. The third Respondent had filed Form No. 7 before the Tribunal claiming occupancy rights in respect of these nine pieces of land and on the first occasion, his application came to be rejected. The rejection Order was ultimately set aside by the High Court and the proceeding was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. It was on the second occasion, that the Tribunal passed the impugned Order on 12.8.1986 granting occupancy rights in favour of the third Respondent. We may briefly record here that the Tribunal has passed a very short Order wherein it records the fact that the tenancy of the third Respondent had been conceded on behalf of the temple and the other observation made is that the Village records have been verified and that the Tribunal has accordingly granted the occupancy rights. On the face of it, since the Order indicates that the tenancy rights were virtually conceded, the matter rested there. In the year 1991, the present Appellant's mother Shrimathi Heggadthi who claims to be one of the devotees of the temple filed a Civil Petition before the High Court challenging the Order of the Tribunal. At that point of time, since the appellate authority under the Land Reforms Act had been abolished, it was customary to file a Civil Petition requesting the High Court to call for the records in respect of the appeals that had been filed and to treat the same as a Writ Petition and to hear and dispose of the case on merits. The Civil Petition appears to have been taken up for hearing before the High Court in the year 1995 at which time, it was pointed out to the High Court that the Civil Petition would be maintainable provided an appeal had been preferred against the original Order of the Tribunal and that since the Petitioner before the High Court had not filed any such appeal, that the Civil Petition was not maintainable. It transpires that the Petitioner's mother Shrimathi Heggadthi withdrew the Civil Petition. In out considered view, since it does transpire that no appeal had been filed by her against the original Order, whether the Civil Petition was dismissed or whether it was withdrawn, would make very little difference. The only rider which we need to add is that Shrimathi Heggadthi was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal and consequently, whether at all she would have had the locus to file an appeal is debatable. However, we shall deal with that aspect of the law presently. 2. On 19.12.1996, the present Appellant filed Writ Petition No. 35363 of 1996 assailing the original Order of the Tribunal dated 12.8.1986. Admittedly, there was a delay of 11 years and the Appellant had given certain reasons for the delay which have been gone into by the learned Single Judge who has examined the law on the point very carefully and has come to the conclusion that on the facts of the present case, the delay is not liable to be condoned and that the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The learned Single Judge has however, proceeded to observe that since the Order is an appealable Order, that he is also examining the case on merits, which he has done and he has recorded the finding that no interference is warranted as far as the Tribunal's Order is concerned. This appeal has been directed against the Order of the learned Single Judge. 3. Mr. This appeal has been directed against the Order of the learned Single Judge. 3. Mr. Krishna Bhat, learned Counsel who represents the Appellant has in the first instance advanced the submission before us, that according to him, a total fraud was played on the Tribunal in this case, and he pre-fixes this submission of his with the charge that the third Respondent who had claimed the tenancy rights was the son of Sri Lingappa Hegde who was originally shown as the fourth Respondent to this appeal but, came to be deleted since he passed away some time back. Mr. Bhat submitted that Lingappa Hegde according to the Tribunal had represented that he was the Administrator or Trustee or Moktesar of the temple in question and that he was therefore authorised to represent the Institution. Mr. Bhat submits that this was nothing more than an attempt to defraud the Institution by facilitating the grant of occupancy rights to none other than the own son of the Administrator and that on the face of it, it is totally unbelievable that the lease rights or tenancy rights could have been conferred on Lingappa's son. In other words, his main charge is to the effect that the filing of the Form No. 7 in respect of those lands was by way of a scheme to which the father and son were parties for purposes of alienating the temple lands and that this was a fraudulent exercise. Next, Mr. Bhat heavily relies on the finding of the learned Single Judge that Lingappa was not the Moktesar at the relevant point of time, but that one Dharmaraja Kattada was the Moktesar. Learned Counsel, therefore, submits that taking advantage of the fact that this was a collusive proceeding and that there was nobody to scrutinise the correctness of whatever false statements were made before the Tribunal, that the son made the application and the father conceded it by misleading the Tribunal to the effect that he had the authority to do so. What Mr. Bhat points out is that in order to further ensure that the lands in question were granted to the son, that Kattada has also made a statement before the Tribunal conceding the third Respondents claim by creating the wrong impression on the Tribunal that he was in fact the Moktesar at the relevant point of time. On the basis of these facts, Mr. On the basis of these facts, Mr. Bhat submitted that a clear fraud was played on the Tribunal and that it is well settled law that fraud vitiates the order and in this background, even if such an Order which is vitiated in law is challenged after a considerable degree of delay, that the Court must still uphold the challenge if the fraud is established. The learned Counsel has in this regard drawn our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 wherein the Supreme Court held that a decree obtained through fraud is vitiated in law and his submission was that this being the position, that the Appellant irrespective of the delay of 11 years was still justified in presenting the challenge through the writ petition. 4. On facts, Sri Ariga, learned Counsel who represents the contesting Respondents showed us the various parts of the record and some of the earlier statements on the basis of which he submitted that Lingappa Hegde was in fact the Moktesar for several years, almost until his death and that consequently, the charge to the effect that he had misrepresented his position to the Tribunal is false. Secondly, what the learned Counsel brings to our notice is that Sri Kattada has clearly pointed out to the Tribunal that Lingappa could not remain present due to ill-health and that he had been fully authorised through a letter which is on record, to represent the temple and make the necessary statement. On facts, we find that since the allegation has come from the Appellant's side, that it was incumbent upon the Appellant to have established that Lingappa and kattada had in fact acted without authority. A mere allegation has been made which has not been substantiated and a careful scrutiny of the relevant parts of the record which we have done with the able assistance of the learned Counsel very clearly indicates that Lingappa was in-charge of the management of the temple for a considerable period of time which includes the time relevant as far as the present case is concerned and that consequently, he was competent to depose on behalf of the temple. There is also no dispute about the fact that Kattada, who has corroborated him, was duly authorised by him and that he has supported the version put forward by Lingappa. Fraud is a serious charge even in civil law and it is well settled that the allegation is required to be fully substantiated before the Court upholds it and this is a case in which we do not find the Appellant having discharged this burden whereas on the other hand, the Respondents have satisfied the Court that the charge does not appear to be true. In this background, the only right conclusion which the Court can arrive at is that the charge of fraud has not been established and if this charge fails, then Mr. Bhat's subsidiary argument that since the Order itself is vitiated in law, that a belated challenge should not be struck down, also becomes untenable. 5. There was a serious challenge from the Respondents as far as the locus of the Appellant is concerned and we need to briefly record this submission because, it is one of considerable consequence. What was contended was that neither the Appellant nor his mother Shrimathi Heggadthi were parties to the original proceeding and that prima facie, he would have no authority or locus to challenge it. On this point, Mr. Bhat has placed strong reliance on a Division Bench decision reported in ILR 1994 Kar 1053 wherein the Division Bench had upheld the position that in a situation where the property has vested in the deity and it was demonstrated that the trustee was negligent or had wrongfully alienated the property, in breach of such Trust, or where a fraud is established or where there was no proper representation on behalf of the temple that it was certainly open to any one of the worshippers who had an interest in the Institution and its welfare to challenge the Order. While we have no quarrel with the general proposition of law we do need to add a rider that the Courts would be slow in entertaining challenges from all and sundry who claim to be worshippers or having some remote interest in the Institution because these are aspects that are almost impossible to verify and secondly, because it would open the flood gates to an unending number of litigations possibly spread over a century because many of the religious Institutions do hold vast properties, disputes are common, funds are available and it would be extremely dangerous to grant blank liberty on the ground of such locus-standi. In our considered view therefore, it would be necessary for such an outsider who is seeking to challenge the action to demonstrate some degree of verifiable nexus, to demonstrate that there is a genuine interest involved and that the challenge is not only out of personal motivation and that it is not being presented by a total stranger or busy body. 6. In this case however, there is a slightly different aspect which has surfaced and which the learned Government Advocate has heavily relied on. The angle presented by him is that the challenge which is now being put forward by the present Appellant is effectively a refiling of the earlier challenge which was presented by his mother and what is pointed out to the Court is that when it was pointed out to the High Court that she had not filed any appeal, that she was disqualified in law from proceeding with the Civil Petition and that therefore she withdrew it. The learned Counsel has made a two-fold submission, the first being that the Appellant's mother having withdrawn the Civil Petition that it is virtually an end to the challenge and that it was wholly and totally impermissible for her son to have refiled the proceeding in his individual name when the challenge had been given up or in other words, the finality and correctness of the Order had been conceded. The second limb of the argument is more important where the learned Government Advocate submitted that if, as is now argued by learned Counsel Mr. The second limb of the argument is more important where the learned Government Advocate submitted that if, as is now argued by learned Counsel Mr. Bhat, that a challenge to the Order was permissible on the grounds that he has argued that it was open to Shrimathi Heggadthi to have advanced this argument before the High Court and sustained her writ petition on this ground regardless of having not filed the appeal and not having done this, that it was then not permissible for her son to re-start the litigation in his individual name. What we need to point out here is that there were vast properties and that a partition has taken place in the year 1935 under which the present Appellant and his mother are holders in respect of certain other lands. Mr. Bhat's submission is that in respect of a portion of the lands ear-marked for the temple, that the Appellant and his mother did have a subsisting interest in ensuring that these lands were not wrongfully alienated, that they are also worshippers and that consequently they do not come within the category of "strangers". We are prepared to assume this position in favour of the Appellant and his mother but, we still find that where the charge of fraud has gone unsubstantiated insofar as no case has been made out under this head, that the very maintainability of the writ petition and the appeal itself would be in doubt. 7. Regardless of the findings of the learned Single Judge on the point of delay, he has proceeded to examine the case on merits. He was not obliged to do so but, he has recorded his findings on merits and since the learned Counsel before us have advanced their submissions also with regard to the merits of the case, we need to briefly deal with them. 8. The first major head of challenge which has been advanced by Mr. Bhat is that the Land Reforms Act and the Rules framed thereunder have defined the manner in which the proceeding has to be conducted insofar as the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry and to record its findings and those findings are required to be recorded in the form of a speaking Order. Mr. Bhat was severely critical of the Tribunal's Order which virtually runs into a half page and consists of hardly three small paragraphs. Mr. Bhat was severely critical of the Tribunal's Order which virtually runs into a half page and consists of hardly three small paragraphs. His submission is that there is no reasoning and no conclusions recorded and that on this ground alone, the Order will have to be quashed and the Tribunal be directed to redecide the case and pass an appropriate Order according to law. The first part of the argument advanced is almost indefensible. Mr. Bhat is right when he submits that even though the Tribunals were not required to record elaborate judgments, that it is still a requirement of law that the Tribunal must substantiate its conclusions through adequate reasoning and findings. Mr. Ariga who appears on the other side was quick to point out to us that there are two significant aspects in this case which do not require any elaborate reasoning or findings because there was no contest at all. Factually, he seems to be right because the two persons who represented the temple had conceded the claim of the tenant to the grant of occupancy rights which is borne out from their statements on record and in this background, the Tribunal was not required to go into any elaborate reasoning or findings because, the claim was admitted. The second submission advanced by Mr. Ariga was that de hors the aforesaid position, the applicant had done his duty by fully substantiating his claim through documents, the most important being a series of revenue records and other supportive documents which fully establish the claim of the tenant and that in this background, the Tribunal having accepted this material, there was hardly and scope for any elaborate discussion or recording of findings. There is some substance in these submissions though the learned Government Advocate did submit that the Tribunal would have been better off if the quality of the Order were to have been improved insofar as the Order is rather cryptic. 9. The interesting point of law that arises in this context is the question as to whether, assuming on technicalities the Order is found wanting in its form or content, whether on that ground the High Court is obliged to ipso facto quash it and direct a remand. 9. The interesting point of law that arises in this context is the question as to whether, assuming on technicalities the Order is found wanting in its form or content, whether on that ground the High Court is obliged to ipso facto quash it and direct a remand. Undoubtedly the facts of each case would provide an answer but, we need to point out here that if the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is correct and can still be justified from the record, that the High Court would then not direct a remand because it is equally well settled law that the conclusion is still sustainable on better and superior reasoning which can come from the Higher Court. This is an important aspect of the law which needs to be borne in mind because there are numerous instances where the Tribunal has been wanting or even careless in the matter of drafting out a well reasoned and logical Order but, the verdict is perfectly and fully sustainable on facts and in law from the records and in such instances, merely on a technicality, a remand would be unjustified. This is one such case as we shall presently illustrate. 10. Mr. Ariga has taken us through the Tribunal's record and what he has demonstrated to us from that record is that the revenue entries are quite consistent right from the year 1968 upto the appointed date and even thereafter, wherein they showed the owner of the lands as being the temple and the cultivator is shown as Respondent-3. These are not some stray entries that could have been manipulated or that appear for only one year but, we find that the record is clear, consistent and that there is really no ground on which this record can be called into question. The next head of documents which the learned Counsel relies on is the set of hand-written rent receipts because the Respondent-3 had contended that the rent was six muras of rice and we find that the rent receipts over a period of time fully establish the correctness of this contention. There is a third set of documents viz., the tax receipts which are again spread over a number of years during this period and which in terms establish that it was the Respondent-3 who was paying the assessment. There is a third set of documents viz., the tax receipts which are again spread over a number of years during this period and which in terms establish that it was the Respondent-3 who was paying the assessment. The last document which the learned Counsel has brought to our attention and which again heavily supports the case of the Respondent-3 is a survey record drawn up during the relevant period by the survey authority which in terms establishes that it was the Respondent-3 who was in possession and cultivation. The reason why we have referred to this head of evidence is in order to satisfy ourselves that quite apart from the grounds on which the present Appellant gets disqualified, that in actual fact, there is no unfairness or anything wrong with regard to the verdict of the Tribunal. Had we ourselves entertained the slightest doubt with regard to the honesty of genuineness of the transaction, it would have been well within our powers to have straight away directed a re-enquiry but, what this Court needs to bear in mind as far as the land reforms cases are concerned, is that it is a totally wrong and incorrect practice that has grown over the years to direct remands and dilations of the litigation merely because of some hypertechnicality that is pointed out years after the proceeding has been decided, because apart from the waste of human resources and time and expenditure and above all, the judicial time of the Courts and the Tribunals that it is important to consider the trauma that the opposite party is exposed to whenever such technical pleas are upheld. The High Court is therefore duty-bound to do an appraisal when it hears the case and ask itself the question as to whether on the basis of the record the verdict of the Tribunal ought to have been different and only if the answer is in the affirmative, would a remand be justified. It is this principle which is required to be highlighted in order to prune the number of remands that are indiscriminately taking place. We do not dispute that if the case has gone by default, if the parties have been precluded from adducing their evidence or if the decision is manifestly wrong that there are well settled principles wherein a remand may be justified provided those factors are present. 11. We do not dispute that if the case has gone by default, if the parties have been precluded from adducing their evidence or if the decision is manifestly wrong that there are well settled principles wherein a remand may be justified provided those factors are present. 11. Having recorded the conclusion that the challenge to the Order both on facts and in law is not only groundless but was totally and completely unjustified, the last question that we put to the Appellant's learned Advocate is as to why the Appellant should not be saddled with exemplary costs in the special facts and circumstances of this case for having not only filed not one but, two proceedings before the learned Single Judge, the first by his mother, the second by himself and to have thereafter persisted with an appeal. Mr. Bhat's reply was that the Appellant has acted in good faith and that he genuinely and bonafide believed that the contentions raised by him were valid and that they would be upheld by the Court. We have elaborately dealt with the case both on facts and in law and it would be a little difficult to uphold the submission but, at the same time having regard to what the learned Counsel has submitted before us because, he even proceeded to point out that at all times his client genuinely believed that a fraud has taken place, we refrain from awarding exemplary costs against the Appellant. 12. The appeal however fails on merits and stands dismissed with costs. Interim Order, if any to stand.