JUDGMENT Arunabha Barua, J.: This revisional application is one under section 401 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is for the purpose of quashing the proceeding being Case No. C/1688 of 2001 under sections 193/34 of the Indian Penal Code pending in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Calcutta. 2. The petitioner No.1 is National Stock Exchange of India Limited and the petitioner No.2 is National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited. Petitioner No.1 is a Company duly incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner No.2 is wholly owned subsidiary of the petitioner No.1. 3. Upon a purported complaint alleged to have been made by one Surendra Kumar Jain, who is the opposite party No.1 in this revisional application has allegedly claimed himself to be a Director of Rusoday Securities Ltd., against the accused/petitioner above named and others purportedly under sections 193/34 I.P.C. in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, cognizance was taken by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and process was issued. 4. A further probe into the factual aspect of the matter constituting the allegations that has led to the controversy between the parties and which, I believe, is sufficient for a decision thereof in disposing of this revisional application may be stated as follows: 5. The two petitioners mentioned above are two companies and each of them is a Stock Exchange in Bombay having its office there. The complainant is a share-broker. The complainant-company was and is a member of the petitioner No.1, the National Stock Exchange and had been trading in its Exchange until the said trading facilities were withdrawn for non-fulfilment of its obligation. From the computerised daily obligation statement, it appeared that there was an outstanding amount of Rs. 87,42,770/- which the complainant failed to pay. Because of such outstanding amount, the trading facility stood automatically withdrawn. The complainant company not only failed to clear the outstanding amount but as alleged, went on mischievously making requisitions as regards trading till 13th October, 1997 after which date the trading facility got automatically disabled by virtue of computerised programme of the petitioner No.1. On 20th October, 1997 the complainant filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble Court in the Vacation Bench and obtained an ex parte interim order whereby the complainant was required to pay a sum of Rs. On 20th October, 1997 the complainant filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble Court in the Vacation Bench and obtained an ex parte interim order whereby the complainant was required to pay a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- in favour of the National Stock Exchange. The complainant filed a contempt petition against the National Stock Exchange and its officers on almost the same allegation as made in the criminal complaint. The complainant also filed a civil suit in the Hon'ble Court. Having failed to obtain any effective relief in any of the said proceedings and having failed to get any effective order against National Stock Exchange in the contempt matter, it is alleged, the complainant as a matter of last resort, took recourse to the instant criminal proceedings. In the complaint in the criminal case, it was alleged that the complainant had made a representation against National Stock Exchange, complaining against its conduct to the Chairman, SEBI, by its letter dt. 21.12.98. As against the said letter of representation, SEBI sought parawise comments from National Stock Exchange. National Stock Exchange by its letter dt. 5.3.99 gave their comments on the allegation made by the complainant. SEBI forwarded the said comments to the complainant by its letter dt. 28.4.99. It is alleged that the said statement by way of parawise comments were false statement and as such, amounted to an offence under section 193 I.P.C. It has been alleged in the complaint that a communication dt. 28.4.99 sent by NSCCL the parawise comments contained therein being annexure "B" to the petition of complaint are totally false and false to the knowledge of the accused and the same amounted to an offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. It was further alleged at para-16 of the petition of complaint that the statement made before the Chairman, SEBI, being a public servant, amounted to giving false evidence with the purpose of influencing him not to take any steps pursuant to the complaint filed by the complainant. 6. From what has been thus stated, the focal point of the controversy seems to have emerged clear:- (1) Whether the aforesaid statements by way of parawise comments were false statement or in other words giving false evidence and if so, whether that amounted to an offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. From what has been thus stated, the focal point of the controversy seems to have emerged clear:- (1) Whether the aforesaid statements by way of parawise comments were false statement or in other words giving false evidence and if so, whether that amounted to an offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) Whether the statements made before the Chairman, SEBI, being a public servant, amounted to fabricating false evidence with the purpose of influencing him not to take any step pursuant to the complaint filed by the complainant. 7. Section 191 I.P.C. deals with giving false evidence. Section 192 I.P.C. deals with fabricating false evidence. Section 193 I.P.C. provides for punishment for intentionally giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence. 8. The ingredients of section 191 I.P.C. (giving false evidence) are as follows: (1) The accused was bound legally by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth or make a declaration upon any subject. (2) He made such a statement or declaration. (3) He made it intentionally. (4) The statement or declaration made was false. (5) He knew or believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true. (6) It must be made in a judicial proceeding at any stage. 9. The ingredients of section 192 I.P.C. (fabricating false evidence are as follows: 1. (a) causing any circumstance to exist; or, (b) making any false entry in a book or record electronic record; or (c) making a document or electronic record containing a false statement. 2. Such circumstance, false entry or false statement must have been intended to appear in evidence in- (i) a judicial proceeding; or (ii) a proceeding taken by law before a public servant or an arbitrator. 3. Such circumstance, so appearing in evidence might cause any person, who in such proceeding, is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion. 4. Such opinion must touch any of material point. 10. 3. Such circumstance, so appearing in evidence might cause any person, who in such proceeding, is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion. 4. Such opinion must touch any of material point. 10. Penal provision contained in section 193 I.P.C, is this: "Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any state of a judicial proceedings, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine." 11. On the basis of the main factual aspect and the material points of law involved, the main submissions made by the learned senior advocates of both sides may be summed up as follows:- 12. The substance of the main submission on the side of the accused/petitioners is this. 13. In this application under section 482 Cr.P.C. the main issue is whether the proceeding in question should be quashed for the ends of justice and/or prevent an abuse of the process of the Court following the well-settled principles of the exercise of the said power by the Hon'ble Court. The principles which govern the exercise of power by the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. have been well settled in the celebrated decision of the Supreme Court in Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. Out of the seven categories of situations, three have been highlighted as follows:- (a) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (b) Where the allegation made in the First Information Report or the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (b) Where the allegation made in the First Information Report or the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (c) Where criminal proceeding manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Bhajan Lal's case has been followed in a series of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. 14. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in S.N. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960 , the Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows:- "Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under the Cr. P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under section 482, Cr. P.C. should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of the frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of Court may not be allowed to be utilised for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the power with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred". 15. Reference may be made to the recent decision of the Apex Court in Alsix Finance Limited vs. P. Sadasivan, AIR 2001 SC 1226 . The Hon'ble Court referred to the State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal and relied on its principles laid down therein. In addition to Bhajanlal's case reliance was also placed on two well-known decisions, one of which MADHAVRAO JIWAJIRAO vs. SAMBHAJIRAO CHANDRAJIRAO ANGRE & ORS., AIR 1988 SCC 692 . The Hon'ble Court referred to the State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal and relied on its principles laid down therein. In addition to Bhajanlal's case reliance was also placed on two well-known decisions, one of which MADHAVRAO JIWAJIRAO vs. SAMBHAJIRAO CHANDRAJIRAO ANGRE & ORS., AIR 1988 SCC 692 . In Scindia's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows: "When a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special feature which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient that in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage". 16. The other judgment relied on was Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna, 1976 (3) SCC 736 . In Smt. Nagawwa's case the Hon'ble Court had laid down certain principles to be applied for quashing a criminal case. These principles are, inter alia, as follows: (a) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused. (b) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (c) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible. 17. (c) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible. 17. It would thus appear from the above that the basic principles of quashing of a criminal case at an early stage remain more or less the same and has been apply summed up in Bhajanlal's case which are being followed till today. Necessarily, if upon an examination of the petition of complaint ex facie, the ingredients of the offence are not made out, a proceeding has to be quashed. A proceeding should also be quashed if the allegation appears to be patently absurd and inherently improbable or if from the surrounding circumstances, it appears that the proceeding has been initiated with an ulterior motive in order to fulfil an oblique purpose and/or is mala fide. In the background of the aforesaid legal principle, the present case may be examined. 18. With regard to section 191 I.P.C., it must be shown that before a person can be proceeded with under the provisions of section 191, it must be shown that such person was legally bound by an oath or by an express provisions of law to state the truth; or it must be a declaration which is bound by law to make and which statement is false. It is also imperative that he must also known or believe that such statement or declaration are false or does not believe it to be true. If there is no compulsion to make any declaration as required by law, section 191 I.P.C. shall have no application. Here, the information given by the petitioners are not on oath, nor they were bound to give such information under any provision of law. To attract section 191, it must be a declaration which having been made is afterwards receivable as evidence of the fact declared. It is necessary that it must be admissible in evidence as proof of the fact declared under any law in consequence of which the Court is bound or authorised to receive it as such. The information in this case is also not in the nature of an affidavit or a sworn statement. It is necessary that it must be admissible in evidence as proof of the fact declared under any law in consequence of which the Court is bound or authorised to receive it as such. The information in this case is also not in the nature of an affidavit or a sworn statement. It is only an information on the basis of the events that had taken place in this Hon'ble Court, namely the writ application, the contempt proceeding, which the present petitioners merely narrated in their communication to SEBI. In this connection reference is made to the following decisions: AIR 1930 Cal 638 : 1988 (2) CHN 423 ; 1977 CHN 777; 1987 Cr.L.J. 1994. Reference has also been made to a passage as appearing in Penal Law of India by Dr. Gour at page 1612, para-21 under the captioned "Bound by any express provision of law". The learned author had made the following comments. "21. Besides persons bound by an oath, there are whose who are 'legally bound by any express provision of law to state the truth' in which case the sanction of an oath is not necessary to place a person under a legal obligation to state the truth, for such obligation is created by an express provision of law. The provision of law must be 'express' that is to say, it must be a provision which must state that a person making a declaration shall declare therein nothing but what he knows or believes to be true, and nothing that he does not believe to be true. This would be necessarily implied where a document is directed to be 'verified', for the 'verification of a document implies a declaration that it contains a statement of facts which is true' ". 19. It is thus clear that no offence under section 191 I.P.C can be said to have been committed by the accused person even assuming that the statements in the said letter were false. 20. The next part of the submission made by the learned advocate for the petitioners relates to section 192 I.P.C. which defines the offence of fabricating false evidence, the ingredients of which have already been stated. It is argued that in order to bring this within the ambit of section 192 I.P.C., it has come within the scope of expression "makes any document containing a false statement, intending that such ........................ It is argued that in order to bring this within the ambit of section 192 I.P.C., it has come within the scope of expression "makes any document containing a false statement, intending that such ........................ false statement may appear in evidence..........................". 21. Even assuming though not admitting that the contents of the said comments were false, even then the same would not come within the ambit of fabrication of evidence. It is plainly evident that the expression that the fabrication of evidence must refer to fabrication of what can be translated in law into evidence. In other words, something that is of evidentiary material. It must necessarily exclude unverified pleadings, unverified complaint and unverified statement because those cannot be used in evidence. One's own statement in writing in support of his own case or one's defence cannot be "evidence" in law at all, because unless it is on affidavit, such statement has no evidentiary value. It is not even admissible in evidence under ordinary circumstances. In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions of Securities Exchange Board of India, 1992. Section 11(3) of the said Act, authorises the SEBI Board to use all the powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit, including the power of summoning and enforcing the attendance of person and examining them on oath and inspection of any books, registers and other documents of any person referred to in section 12. 22. Necessarily, if any proceedings were to commence in future in the said proceeding while books of records may be made Exhibit, unverified parawise comments of one of the disputant parties could not be itself be admitted into evidence. It is wholly misconceived in law to regard the said parawise comments as a document in the nature of evidence so as to come within the ambit of section 192. If any records were to be forged, any book was forged or any independent document was created and kept aside for the purpose of being used as documentary evidence in support of the stand taken by the party, then that could come within the mischief of section 192 but what the party openly puts forward as his own case or its own stand or defence howsoever false the same may be, would not come within the ambit of section 192 at all. 23. 23. The matter can be looked at from another, point of view. Section 191 and section 192 has to be harmoniously read and understood. If a person in his own statement even though false, did not come within the mischief of section 191 would it not be in incongruous to say that the same unverified statement would come within the mischief of section 192 ? If such interpretation is put then the requirement of oath or legal requirement to speak truth under section 191 would become redundant. The two provisions viz. sections 191 and 192 have to be harmoniously construed. 24. The next part of the submission on behalf of the revisional applicants, relates to making a distinction between section 191 I.P.C. and section 192 I.P.C. In fact, the real distinction between sections 191 and 192 is that, in section 191 the maker of false statement comes directly before the court and makes it either in course of giving evidence on oath or making a declaration on oath or making a declaration in terms of the legal requirement to speak the truth. He may do so either before the court of law or before a public servant authorised to hear the matter. But when it comes to section 192 the offence is something to be done behind the back of the Court. It is done in secrecy so that the court would not be aware of it when it is done. It is done for the purpose of making use of it at a subsequent stage in support of the case of the maker. The fabricator fabricates so that the document will appear to be a genuine one and be used in evidence as a third party document. But when the fabricator openly puts forward his own case even if it is false, it cannot be said to be fabrication of evidence in the sense in which the expression is used in section 192. 25. The difference between the two provisions, namely, section 191 I.P.C. and section 192 I.P.C. would be illustrated by the case reported in AIR 1966 SC 523 , Dr. S. Dutt vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. Here the witness gave evidence as an expert and also made use of a forged certificate to justify his claim as an expert. 25. The difference between the two provisions, namely, section 191 I.P.C. and section 192 I.P.C. would be illustrated by the case reported in AIR 1966 SC 523 , Dr. S. Dutt vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. Here the witness gave evidence as an expert and also made use of a forged certificate to justify his claim as an expert. The oral evidence that he gave falsely claiming himself to be an expert amounted to offence under section 191. The certificate that he fabricated in support of that claim amounted to an offence under section 192. It has to be remembered that his own statement which gave from the witness box was the offence of giving false evidence but the certificate was purportedly issued by an authority. He had forged the certificate to give it was appearance as a genuine one as if it were one issued by the authority. He had done this behind the back of the court with intention that it would be used in evidence, to support his oral testimony. 26. To put it differently, the false statement within the meaning of section 191 is the statement of the maker himself which he makes on oath or under a legal requirement and thereby it becomes evidence by itself. On the other hand, section 192 deals with something which is fabricated not on the face of the Court but behind the back of the Court and as a document which can be made an exhibit or documentary evidence or can be translated into evidence at a subsequent stage. Necessarily it purports to be a statement not of the maker himself but of something impersonal or of someone else other than maker in something in the nature of an intrinsic evidence from a neutral source. One's own written statement or the statement in defence advancing argument cannot at all be a documentary evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act. The aforesaid parawise comments in question must, therefore, be necessarily excluded from the purview of section 192 I.P.C. It is further argued that another sine qua non for attracting the aforesaid provision is that there can be no fabrication if it is not even admissible in evidence, for unless it is so admitted it is not an offence, much less material evidence which the section requires. 27. 27. The next part of the submission on behalf of the petitioners pertains to a larger issue on social impact of the matter. It is thus submitted that if the aforesaid comments because of any alleged falsehood in it exposes the maker of the said comments to a prosecution under section 192 at the instance of the aggrieved person, it would lead to an alarming situation. Anyone who writes a letter to a public authority which is not acceptable to and the person would easily be taken to court on the ground of fabricating evidence. For example, if anyone makes complaint against his neighbour to the Municipal Commissioner, Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the said Municipal Commissioner seeks the comment of other persons against whom the complaint has been made and that person denies all allegations in the complaint and defends himself and the Municipal Commissioner refuses to take any action, the complainant would immediately be able to start a case under section 192 for fabricating false evidence against his neighbours. Such an interpretation would really expose every honest citizen to the hazard of being prosecuted at the instance of any cunning and scheming litigant. Surely that is not then the intention of legislature in framing section 192 I.P.C. One own comments in a letter cannot come within the mischief of that provision. 28. The next part of the submission by the petitioners relate to the question of patent absurdity, inherent improbability and the mala fide of the complainant in making the complaint for oblique purpose/with ulterior motive. It is thus submitted that the question is whether the National Stock Exchange falsely reported to SEBI that in terms of the order of the Hon'ble Court, the complainant was not entitled to restoration of trading facility. If the allegation in the complaint were really of any credence, surely the Hon'ble Writ Court would have immediately drawn up proceedings for contempt and/or made further interim order for the protection of the complainant. On the other hand, it appears that the complainant could not get any favourable order from the Hon'ble High Court. 29. The complainant failed to get any relief either in the Writ Court or in the Civil Court. Having failed in all the available fore the complainant initiated criminal proceedings as an exercise in despair. On the other hand, it appears that the complainant could not get any favourable order from the Hon'ble High Court. 29. The complainant failed to get any relief either in the Writ Court or in the Civil Court. Having failed in all the available fore the complainant initiated criminal proceedings as an exercise in despair. With the object of putting pressure on the petitioners herein so as to compel them to withdraw disciplinary action. Having regard to the fact that SEBI is also a party respondent in the writ petition as also in the Civil Court and that the complainant is making allegation of fabricating evidence against National Stock Exchange which is an institution of national importance in the economy and which has disciplinary control over the complainant in its business as a stock broker, and the fact that the complainant has not been able to get any order in the contempt matter nor any further interim order, the allegations in the complaint appears to be patently absurd and inherently improbable. It also appears that the criminal prosecution has been initiated in the instant case, manifestly attended with mala fide. Undoubtedly the proceeding has been maliciously instituted with an oblique motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused with view to spite them due to the grudge of the complainant. 30. In view of the above, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners/accused that it is fit and proper that the proceeding in question should be quashed. 31. The sum and substance of the submission placed on behalf of the opposite party No.1, Surendra Kumar Jain, may be stated as follows: 32. According to the opposite party No.1 the petitioners could be legally prosecuted and penalised under section 193 I.P.C. for the offence of giving false evidence and fabricating false evidence under sections 191 and 192 of the Indian Penal Code. It is maintained that the accused/petitioners are bound by law (i.e. SEBI Act, 1992) to make averments before the Chairman, SEBI when sought for. The accused persons have made deliberate, false and contrary statements in a proceeding by the Chairman, SEBI, who is public servant under SEBI Act, 1992. Such a statement dissuaded Chairman, SEBI to take any action against the accused. The accused persons have made deliberate, false and contrary statements in a proceeding by the Chairman, SEBI, who is public servant under SEBI Act, 1992. Such a statement dissuaded Chairman, SEBI to take any action against the accused. It is further submitted that it is not correct to say that a communication by way of a letter is not covered under section 193 I.P.C. because proceedings before a public servant commences with the calling for informations under the law i.e. under SEBI Act, 1992 in the instant case. It is further argued that 'proceeding' includes official records or things and so the accused persons are liable to be tried under section 193 I.P.C. in view of the Chairman, SEBI being a public servant under section 22 of the SEBI Act. It is also clear that false evidence in a proceeding was taken by law (SEBI Act) before a public servant. Because of the acts of the accused, powers and functions of the Board could not be implemented, it is argued. It is further submitted that fabrication of false evidence is a matter to be decided by the learned Trial Court in the course of trial and is a matter of evidence and so at this stage proceedings in question cannot be quashed. It is further submitted that the petition of complaint and deposition by the complainant would clearly show that there was a prima facie case made out against all the accused persons as discussed by the learned Magistrate before issuance of the process. 33. It is further submitted that foundation of the offences punishable under section 193 I.P.C. have been made out and there is absolutely no reason why the proceeding in question should be quashed and, therefore, the revisional application should be dismissed. 34. Now, having followed the main points of controversy highlighted by both sides, I am of the considered view that this revisional application under section 482 Cr. P. C. has plenty of merits. It is true that in exercising jurisdiction under section 482 Cr. P.C. the Court should be cautious and circumspect and even apply it in the rarest of rare cases (Bhajanlal supra) but in that case itself, Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, certain guidelines have also been laid down as already mentioned above, which show when the power under section 482 Cr. P.C. needs to be applied. P.C. the Court should be cautious and circumspect and even apply it in the rarest of rare cases (Bhajanlal supra) but in that case itself, Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, certain guidelines have also been laid down as already mentioned above, which show when the power under section 482 Cr. P.C. needs to be applied. The essence of it all is––that the High Court under section 482 Cr. P.C. is entitled to quash the proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings are to be quashed. 35. Now, evidently, the bone of contention is the parawise bald statement or comments, which is nothing but a sort of a show-cause to SEBI, Chairman by way of a defence, pure and simple, to combat a complaint by the opposite party/complainant. It was not required to be given on oath, nor by any affidavit to guarantee its sanctity. And it was not done. Yet, so much of an exercise was done to pass it for a criminal offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code as though it was a piece of "false evidence" and "fabricating false evidence". In agreement with the broad lines of reasoning given on the side of the petitioners/accused as discussed above, I am of the view, it was not either of the two. In my considered opinion, the said parawise statement or comments in question has not satisfied the ingredients of the offences under sections 191 and 192 of the Indian Penal Code as discussed earlier and the petitioners-accused cannot be penalised under section 193 I.P.C. as sought for. The difference between the two provisions, section 191 I.P.C. and section 192 I.P.C., have been amply illustrated in Dr. S. Dutt vs. State or U.P., AIR 1966 SC 523 , since discussed above. This, together with other instances in support of the submissions on behalf of the petitioners only fortifies their contentions and effectively negative those laid out by the complainant opposite party. 36. S. Dutt vs. State or U.P., AIR 1966 SC 523 , since discussed above. This, together with other instances in support of the submissions on behalf of the petitioners only fortifies their contentions and effectively negative those laid out by the complainant opposite party. 36. It is no good saying as the complainant does that giving false evidence or fabrication of false evidence is a matter to be decided by the learned Trial Judge and is a matter of detailed evidence to be taken so that the proceedings are not quashed at this stage. In the first place, as I have said, the statements or comments in question do not at all constitute an offence of giving false evidence or of fabricating false evidence. In the next, the oblique motive part in calling it false evidence or fabricating false evidence and thereby dragging this flimsy issue into the fray for making it a suitable launching-pad for an unnecessary criminal action is not far to seek. It is that––and there is no disputing this––the trading facilities were withdrawn from the complainant for non-fulfilment of certain obligations. That also smacks of lack of bona rides on the part of the complainant in bringing about a criminal case. 37. I fully support the submission made on behalf of the petitioners and I am of the view that no useful purpose is likely to be served either by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue. Top of it all, the allegations taken at their face value do not make out any case against the petitioners/accused to be proceeded with, essentially because the legal imperatives of section 191 I.P.C. and section 192 I.P.C. to attract the penal provision of section 193 I.P.C. are distinctly missing. 38. To my mind, allowing the proceeding in question to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court and ends of justice indeed demands that the proceeding should be quashed. 39. Accordingly, the revisional application under section 482 Cr. P.C. is hereby allowed and the criminal proceeding in question being Case No. C/1688 of 2001 before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, stands quashed. Let a copy of this order together with the LCR be sent down to the learned Court below at once. 40. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order be supplied to the parties, if applied for. Revisional application allowed.