JUDGMENT 1. - This present writ petition is directed against the order dated 28.11.1995 passed by the Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan by which a penalty of withholding one increment without cumulative effect has been inflicted upon the petitioner. Memorandum of Chargesheet dated 29.11.1991 (Annx.-2) was issued to the petitioner and the same was received by the petitioner on 16.1.1992. The memorandum of chargesheet was answered by the petitioner vide its reply dated 3.2.1992 (Annex.-3). After giving opportunity and considering the reply submitted by the petitioner the Inquiry officer has submitted his report on 28.6.1995 and copy of the inquiry report was also sent to the petitioner on 17.7.1995. In the month of September 1995 the representation against the finding given by the Inquiry Officer was submitted by the petitioner alongwith the written argument in support of his contention. After hearing the petitioner and appreciating the reply as well as the written argument the Disciplinary Authority vide its order dated 28.11.1995 imposed a penalty upon the petitioner for withholding one grade increment without cumulative effect. The writ petition was admitted on 2.4.1996 by this Court. The petitioner has assailing the order dated 25.11.1995 on the ground that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner itself is erroneous in as much as the mis-conduct alleged against the petitioner is unsustainable and the petitioner is not guilty of committing any mis-conduct whatsoever. And on the basis of the memorandum of chargesheet was served upon the petitioner. Charges levelled against the petitioner are not proved by the Disciplinary Authority itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. G.K. Garg gave much emphasis to the Annex.1 dated 28.11.1995 order of the penalty by which the penalty of stoppage of one grade increment without cumulative effect has been inflicted upon the petitioner. He referred certain portion of the order dated 28.11.1995 wherein the Disciplinary Authority itself has held that it is not mandatory requirement that two Government employees are always be accompanied as witness in trap cases. Para 4 simply provides that independent witnesses should be selected to inspire confidence in all concerned including the Trial Court. In appropriate cases the trap laying officer in his discretion may include two public servants to witness the transaction. Para 4 simply provides that independent witnesses should be selected to inspire confidence in all concerned including the Trial Court. In appropriate cases the trap laying officer in his discretion may include two public servants to witness the transaction. Thus para 4 of Chapter-IX of Manual emphasises on independent witnesses and subsequently a circular dated 18.4.1970 has clearly indicated that in case a requisition is sent to send Government employees as witnesses in trap cases the employee should made available. Mr. Garg also submits that as per the Schedule A appended alongwith the writ petition and the order sheet drawn by the petitioner clearly indicates that the petitioner has tried his level best to summon two independent witnesses. He further submits that on this count alone in the memorandum of chargesheet no charges made out against the petitioner. Mr. Garg further assailed the order dated 28.11.1995 on the ground that Inquiry Officer has not given any reason in support of his finding as to how the petitioner is responsible for misconduct. In view of the Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 penalties can only be imposed for good and sufficient reasons which shall be recorded by the Inquiry Officer. In reply to the charges that the petitioner deliberately not recorded the statement and proceeded in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Chapter IX of the trap cases (Annex.8). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that by bare perusal of the evidence as stated in the F.I.R. reveals and establishes that the petitioner had taken all possible measures which may be reasonable and prudent officer thereof taken for laying trap. Since no case is made out against the petitioner, therefore, the order dated 28.11.1995 (Annex. 1) resisted to be quashed and set aside. 2. In support of the argument learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. G.K. Garg placed reliance on the judgment in the case of S.C. Das Chhabra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 1999 (1) RLR 104 and also submits that the inquiry was initiated after two years of the incident and the Inquiry Officer was also appointed after lapse of two years thereafter. Since four years have been lapsed and on the ground of delay in initiating of the inquiry against the petitioner should be dropped, as held in these judgments Yasin Khan & Anr. Since four years have been lapsed and on the ground of delay in initiating of the inquiry against the petitioner should be dropped, as held in these judgments Yasin Khan & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1999 RLR (1) 146 and Rajbir Singh Gill v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 1999 (7) SLR 422 .Learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Satish Bijarnia submits that this writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has not availed the alternative efficacious remedy which was available to him. This writ petition should be dismissed only on this count alone that the petitioner has not availed alternative efficacious remedy by way of submitting the review before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan. Mr. S. Bijarnia referred Rule 33 and 34 of the CCA Rules. Rule 33 reads as under: 3. Review of orders in disciplinary cases against members of State Services: The Government may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the records or the case in which an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14 has been made against a member of the State services, review any order passed in such a case and after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary; (a) Confirm, modify or set aside the orders; (b) imposed any penalty or set aside, reduce or enhance the penalty imposed by it. Provided that an order enhancing a penalty shall not be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty: Provided further that no action under this rule shall be initiated more than three months after the date of the order to be reviewed. Note.- This rule shall not apply in the case of a member of the Rajasthan judicial Service against whom an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 14, except the penalty of removal or dismissal from service is made by the Administrative Judge or a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court or when an order is made by the Committee of the Court in appeal. The petitioner should have preferred a review petition before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan prior to approach this Court. Mr. The petitioner should have preferred a review petition before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan prior to approach this Court. Mr. Bijarnia in support of his argument placed reliance on the judgment in the cases of M/s Pankaj Food Industries, Bhilwara v. The District Level Screening Committee, Bhilwara & Anr. reported in 2001 (1) WLC 594 and Girdhari Lal & 2 Ors. v. State of Rajasthan Etc. reported in 2001 (1) WLC 248 . 4. Mr. Bijarnia further submits that under Art. 226 this Court cannot interfere in the finding given by the Inquiry Officer and also cannot re-appreciate the evidence as laid before the Inquiry Officer. This Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court to re-appreciate this evidence and the evidence recorded before the Disciplinary Authority. In support of this argument Mr. Bijarnia placed reliance on the judgment in the cases of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora reported in (1997) 3 SCC 72 and Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority & Ors. reported in 1997 (4) SCC 565 Head Note E and U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors. v. Har Narain Singh & Ors. Reported in 1998 (7) JT 437 . This Court cannot re-appreciate and interfere in the finding given by the Disciplinary Authority. This Court cannot judicially review the matter while exercising the power under Art. 226. For that he placed reliance on the judgment in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1995 (5) SLR 778 , Head Note E. In reply to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that since the respondents initiated the inquiry at belated stage and also appointed Inquiry Officer after 2 years, only on this delay the inquiry itself is vitiated. Mr. Bijarnia submits that since he has taken this ground first time in the oral argument, he cannot raise this issue at this stage. In support of his contention Mr. Bijarnia placed reliance on the judgment in the cases of Sohan Lal Kansal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in RLR 2002 (1) 410 and Bajinder Kumar Chopra v. The Food Corporation of India reported in 1998 (3) SLR 268 . 5. In the rejoinder Mr. In support of his contention Mr. Bijarnia placed reliance on the judgment in the cases of Sohan Lal Kansal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in RLR 2002 (1) 410 and Bajinder Kumar Chopra v. The Food Corporation of India reported in 1998 (3) SLR 268 . 5. In the rejoinder Mr. Garg submitted that the review is not an alternative efficacious remedy and the petitioner can approach this Court by way of invoking Art. 226 as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment of V. Vellaswamy v. Inspector General of Police Tamil Nadu, Madras and Anr. reported in 1981 (4) SCC 247 , and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Broji Nath Ganguly and Anr reported in 1986 (3) SCC 156 and also placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora reported in 1997 (3) SCC 72 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that under Art. 226 the High Court can interfere in the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Garg further submits that it is not necessary to invoke the alternative remedy by way of filing the review petition before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan. It is not efficacious remedy and the petitioner can approach directly to the High Court under Art. 226 being an efficacious remedy. In support of his argument he placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Firdosh Khan v. State or Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2000 (3) RLW 1544 . 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the orders as well as finding of the inquiry and document annexed alongwith the writ petition and reply as well as oral argument advanced before the Court. 7. After carefully examination of the finding of the Inquiry Officer as well as the memorandum of notices under Rule 16 were issued but after examination the penalty was imposed under Rule 17 of CCA Rules by way of stoppage of one grade increment without cumulative effect and also perused the judgment referred by Mr. Garg in the case of H.C. Das Chabra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Garg in the case of H.C. Das Chabra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 1999 (1) RLR 104 wherein this Court has laid down the test of the misconduct and held that ground for quashing the disciplinary proceedings is that as would be crystal clear from a bare reading of the impugned charge memo dated 29.1.1990, there is no allegation against the petitioner of having acted negligently with ulterior motive or ill- intention. This Court further observed that the charges in case of the petitioner in other words related to his inefficiency and besides negligence the charges refer to lack of qualities, foresight, indecisiveness. Failure to come up to the highest expectations of and officer holding a responsible post or lack of aptitude or qualities of leadership would not constitute misconduct or as failure to maintain devotion to duty unless lack of integrity is alleged and proved entailing penalty. Learned Judge has considered the view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed reported in 1979 (2) SCC 286 . 8. On the ground of delay the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Rajbir Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Anr. (Supra) has held that initiation of departmental proceedings after 11 year from occurrence of incident- Held, the initiation of departmental proceedings in the instant case after the lapse of a period of 11 years was clearly arbitrary-Incident came to the knowledge and notice of competent authorities immediately on occurrence-Departmental enquiry at such a belated stage would deprive the petitioner of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as with the passage of time he would have certainly forgotten various vital issues connected with the incident-Charge-sheet quashed being contrary to Rule 2.2((b) of Punjab Civil Services Rules. , 9. I have also perused the judgment in the case of Sohan Lal Kansas v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , 9. I have also perused the judgment in the case of Sohan Lal Kansas v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Supra) Head Note B relied upon by the respondent on the point of delay wherein this Court has held that whether enquiry into charges should be allowed to be held or not after certain amount of delay-Principles deduced-In this case, charge sheet served after about 15 years (charges relating to period 1970-71 for which charge sheet issue in 1996)-Joint enquiry-Ample material to explain delay in holding enquiry-Charges not minor of non-serious-Petitioner-appellant raised objection of delay first time when he filed representation against enquiry report-Held, cumulative effect of all these factors is that the enquiry proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of delay-However, observations made that it is in the interest of purity of administration and fairness to delinquent employee that enquiry proceedings are not only initiated within reasonable time but should also be completed with utmost promptitude. Learned counsel for the respondent on this point further placed reliance on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Bajinder Kumar Chopra v. The Food Corporation of India reported in 1998 (3) SLR 268 , Head Note C wherein this Court has held that Delay of 5 years in initiation of disciplinary proceedings from the date of incident-No prejudice caused nor any service conditions adversely affected-Proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. 10. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and ratio decided by the judgment referred hereinabove and as held in the case of Sohan Lal Kansal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. I agree with the ratio decided in the case of S.C. Das Chabra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Supra) on the ground that the case is related to incident was of 1987 and the preliminary inquiry was initiated thereafter and the memorandum of chargesheet was issued on 29.11.1991 and reply was submitted by the petitioner on 3.2.1992. Thereafter, the inquiry report was submitted on 28.6.1995. AS held in the aforesaid judgment the three years delay in appointing the Inquiry Officer, in the instant case is not considered to be delay and only on this count, the charges of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect cannot be set aside. Thereafter, the inquiry report was submitted on 28.6.1995. AS held in the aforesaid judgment the three years delay in appointing the Inquiry Officer, in the instant case is not considered to be delay and only on this count, the charges of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect cannot be set aside. As regards the misconduct as laid down in the judgment of S.C. Das Chhabra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Supra) is concerned, the facts and circumstances of the individual's case are altogether different and the cases referred before me are not applicable in the instant case. 11. I also perused Rule 33 and 34 of CCA Rules that the petitioner has alternative efficacious remedy, he should have availed the alternative efficacious remedy prior to approaching this High Court by way of invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 as held in the judgment of Girdhari Lal & 2 Ors. v. State of Rajasthan Etc. (Supra) wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that alternative remedy available before Tribunal-Merely because petitions have been pending since 1985 cannot be ground to ignore bar of alternative remedy-Petitioners directed to approach Tribunal within one month. Similarly in the case of M/s Pankaj Food Industries, Bhilwara v. The District Level Screening Committee, Bhilwara & Anr. (Supra) wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that no universal rule that after admission of writ petition and after reply and rejoinder filed thereto petition cannot be dismissed on ground of availability of alternative remedy. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. G.K. Garg referred the case of V. Vellaswamy v. Inspector General of Police Tamil Nadu, Madras and Anr. (Supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that alternative remedy-existence of a right to review held no bar-Hence, High Court not justified in dismissing a writ petition solely on the ground that a review petition under rule 15-A of T.N. Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 was open to the petitioner-Labour and Services. 13. In the case of Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority & Ors. (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the appreciation of evidence-Enquiry Officer elaborately discussing each charge and giving reasons which were considered by disciplinary and appellate authorities before coming to conclusion that the charges were proved-Held, departmental authorities were not like civil courts-petitioner's objection that reasons were lacking, held, unsustainable. (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the appreciation of evidence-Enquiry Officer elaborately discussing each charge and giving reasons which were considered by disciplinary and appellate authorities before coming to conclusion that the charges were proved-Held, departmental authorities were not like civil courts-petitioner's objection that reasons were lacking, held, unsustainable. 14. In the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors. v. Har Narain Singh & Ors. (Supra) the argument which was raised that under Art. 226 the jurisdiction of High Court reappreciated the evidence led in the enquiry and quashed the order passed by the Tribunal as also the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so because the High Court was not sitting in appeal over the findings given by the disciplinary authority. The re-examination of the evidence led in the disciplinary proceedings was not warranted. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Judicial Review/Writ Jurisdiction-Court not to re- appraise the evidence of disciplinary proceedings-Strict proof of legal evidence and findings on the evidence are not relevant-Scope of power to interfere in disciplinary inquiry explained. 15. I fully agree with the ratio decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases discussed hereinabove and this Court is not sitting as an Appellate Court and cannot appreciate, the evidence and re-appreciate the evidence adduced before the Inquiry Officer. Scope of judicial review is also limited under Art. 226. But so far as the observation made by the Inquiry Officer in the order of penalty dated 28.11.1995 by which one grade increment was stopped without cumulative effect is also not in- consistent. Be that as it may be. 16. I do not find any good reason to interfere in the finding given by the Inquiry officer and in view of the aforementioned discussions I also do not want to express my opinion on the merit but I deem it proper to give the liberty to the petitioner to file review petition before the reviewing authority under Rule 33/34 before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan raising all the grounds and allegations which are taken in the writ petition within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.With these observations the writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******