Judgment KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This suit is filed by the plaintiffs claiming to be the trustees of the trust created under a declaration of Trust dated 1st April, 1951 declared by Kanhayalal J. Poddar grandfather of the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1 and great maternal grand father of plaintiff No. 1. The plaintiff No. 1 is appointed as a trustee of the said trust by a registered deed of appointment dated 10-4-1996. It is stated that the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 are also the trustees and beneficiaries under the said trust. It is further stated that the defendant No. 1 is named as a beneficiary under the said trust and the defendant No. 2 is the wife of the defendant No. 1. This suit has been filed for the following reliefs :- a) that this Hon'ble Court by its order and decree be pleased to declare that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1-4-1951 and have no right, title or interest whatsoever in the trust property and are liable to quit-vacate and deliver to the plaintiffs the vacant and peaceful possession of the said portion to the trust property in the use, occupation and enjoyment of the defendants and/or encroached upon by the defendants more particularly shown in shaded red colour and shaded green colour on the said plan hereto annexed and marked Exhibit "AR" as also the garden, servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property encroached upon by the defendants and that the defendants are not entitled to remain in the trust property or any part thereof. b) that this Hon'ble Court also be pleased to order and decree against the defendants to quit, vacate and deliver to the plaintiffs the vacant and peaceful possession of the said portion in the trust property in the use, occupation and enjoyment of the defendants and/or encroached upon by the defendants more particularly shown in shaded red colour and shaded green Colour on the said plan herein annexed and marked Exhibit "AR" as also the garden, servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property encroached upon by the defendants and that the defendants are not entitled to remain in the trust property or any party thereof. c) that defendants be also ordered and decreed to pay to the plaintiffs the said sum of Rs. 2,87,59,984/- as and by way of compensation and damages for their wrongful and illegal use, occupation and enjoyment of the trust property till the date of the filing of the suit and a further sum of Rs. 79,789/- per month from the date of filing of the suit till the defendants quit and vacate the trust property and every part thereof for their such wrongful and/or illegal use, occupation and enjoyment of the trust property or such other sum or sums as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper. d) that the defendants No. 1 and 2 and each of the them be ordered and decreed to pay jointly and/or severally to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 30/- lacs or such other sums as this Hon'ble Court may deem proper as and by way of damages and losses suffered and/or continued to be suffered by the said trust on account of wrongful and illegal acts of the defendants. e) that this Hon'ble Court will also by its order be pleased to direct that the suits and proceedings filed by defendants No. 1 and or 2 in this Hon'ble Court being Suit No. 1809 of 1982. Suit No. 3244 of 1984, Suit No. 3245 of 1984, Suit No. 2876 of 1996, Suit No. 3688 of 1996, Suit No. 261 of 1997 and Suit No. 3933 of 1998 be consolidated with and be heard, decided and disposed off alongwith this suit herein. f) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the defendants No. 1 and 2 be ordered and directed to deposit in this Hon'ble Court the said sum of Rs. 2,87,59,984/- as stated in Exhibit "AR" hereto and further a sum of Rs. 79,789/- per month or such sum as to this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper as and by way of compensation or damages for their continuous wrongful use, occupation and enjoyment of the trust property as aforesaid with increase therein of 5% every year. 2,87,59,984/- as stated in Exhibit "AR" hereto and further a sum of Rs. 79,789/- per month or such sum as to this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper as and by way of compensation or damages for their continuous wrongful use, occupation and enjoyment of the trust property as aforesaid with increase therein of 5% every year. g) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the Court Receiver High Court, Bombay or some other fit and proper person be appointed as the Receiver of the said portion be appointed as the Receiver of the said portion of the trust property in occupation of defendants more particularly shown in shaded red colour and in shaded green colour on the said plan Exhibit "AR" hereto and the garden, servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property encroached upon by the defendants with all powers under Order 40, Rule 1 (except power of sale). h) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit this Hon'ble Court be also pleased by its order to stay all the said suits being Suit No. 1809 of 1982, Suit No. 3244 of 1984, Suit No. 3245 of 1984, Suit No. 2876 of 1996, Suit No. 3688 of 1996, Suit No. 251 of 1997 and Suit No. 3933 of 1998 and proceedings therein filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 and pending in this Hon'ble Court. i) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the defendants No. 1 and 2 by themselves their servants and agents and all persons claiming through or under them be restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from in any manner whatsoever either directly or indirectly dealing with or disposing of or parting with the possession thereof to any person other than the plaintiffs and/or creating third party rights and/or inducting any third party in the trust property and/or in the said portion of the trust property in their use, occupation and enjoyment in the trust property and/or encroached upon by them more particularly shown in shaded red colour and in shaded green colour on the said plan hereto annexed and marked Exhibit "AR" as also the garden, servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property encroached upon by the defendants and/or the trust property or any part thereof. j) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the defendants No. 1 and 2 themselves their servants and agents and all persons claiming through or under them be restrained by an order of injunction of this Hon'ble Court from in any way or manner and either directly or indirectly interfering with and/or obstructing the management and/or administration of the said trust declared by the said declaration of trust dated 21-4-1951 Exhibit "C" hereto and of the properties of the said trust including the said trust property. k) that pending the hearing and final disposal of this suit the defendants be restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from ion any way or manner either directly or indirectly holding out themselves as the owners/co-lessees of the trust property and/or beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1-4-1951 and/or as having any right, title interest and/or benefit in the trust property or any part thereof. l) ad interim prayers in terms of prayer (f) to (k) above. m) for costs of this suit. n) for such other and further reliefs as to this Hon'ble Court deem proper looking to the nature and circumstances of the case." 2. The defendants have filed their written statement raising several contentions and issues. The defendants have, inter alia, contended that the suit as filed is barred by limitation for which reason the same deserves to be rejected. It is further contended by the defendants that the plaint as presented does not disclose the cause of action against any of the defendants and in any case against the defendant No. 2. Several other contentions have been raised on the basis of which 13 issues came to be framed by my predecessor on 10-4-2001. That order further records that issue Nos. 1 to 4 to be treated as preliminary issues and the case was adjourned for hearing on preliminary issues. Issue Nos. 1 to 4 read thus : "1) Whether the suit is barred by the law of limitation? 2) Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 3) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule I(d), Order II, Rule 7 and Order 7, Rule 1(e) of the C.P.C.? 4) Whether the suit is bad for want of necessary and proper parties, viz. 2) Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 3) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule I(d), Order II, Rule 7 and Order 7, Rule 1(e) of the C.P.C.? 4) Whether the suit is bad for want of necessary and proper parties, viz. the trustees representing the deity Radhagovind Deoji Temple at Mathura?" Later on, two additional issues were framed on 26-11-2001. The same read thus: "a) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected as it does not disclose cause of action against the defendants No. 2? b) Whether suit is not maintainable in view of the dismissal of the Suit No. 3433/1997 filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants?" The suit was placed for hearing on the preliminary issues on 25-2-2002 when the Counsel appearing for the respective parties agreed that issue Nos. 1 to 4 referred to above as well as two additional issues framed on 26-11-2001 be treated as preliminary issues and considered accordingly. The parties were heard on those issues. Besides making oral submissions both the parties have filed written submissions which have been taken on record subsequently. 3. During the hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the defendants fairly pointed out that they were not addressing the Court for the time being in so far as issue Nos. 2, Additional Issue No. (b) above and that they would press those issues to be considered as per Order 14, Rule 23, whereas they were not pressing the Issue No. 4 above at all. In that sense, what survives for consideration of this Court for the present is Issue Nos. 1, 3 and Additional Issue No. 1 referred to above. However, on considering the rival submissions and going through the pleadings, I would consider it appropriate to reframe the said Issue Nos. 1, 3 and Additional Issue No. 1 as following two issues which would arise for consideration at this stage of the proceeding: 1) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure being barred by the law of limitation? 2) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(a) as it does not disclose cause of action against the defendants and in particular as against defendant No. 2? 2) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(a) as it does not disclose cause of action against the defendants and in particular as against defendant No. 2? Both the Counsel agree that these are the proper issues to be considered at this stage on the basis of the pleadings and oral arguments only. Accordingly, I shall confine the consideration of the matter only with reference to the two issues which I have reframed as above. 4. In so far as the first issue is concerned, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs are claiming to be the trustees and, the suit is by the trustees against the beneficiaries essentially for a declaration that they have ceased to be the beneficiaries by reason of their stand in relation to the estate from December, 1968 and for possession of the trust property in their occupation and for damages. The defendants have placed emphasis on the averments in the plaint that the plaintiffs have alleged that in 1968 the defendant No. 1 claimed to be the sole owner of the property and in 1969 he filed suit for declaration of his ownership and, later on gave up that plea in 1982 and claimed to be the co-lessee in the alternative to his claim as beneficiary by executing writing dated 13th April, 1982 and filed Suit No. 1809 of 1982. In the light of these pleading, the suit as presented, according to the defendants, is clearly barred by the law of limitation in as much as the limitation for instituting such a suit is prescribed by Article 58 which provides that the suit for declaration be filed within 3 years when the right to sue "first" accrues. According to the defendants, going by the pleadings in the plaint, the plaintiffs have proceeded on the premise that the defendants have disputed the title of the trust in respect of the suit property in 1968 by claiming to be the sole owner and from time to time thereafter by taking contradictory stands in different proceedings. According to the defendants, going by the pleadings in the plaint, the plaintiffs have proceeded on the premise that the defendants have disputed the title of the trust in respect of the suit property in 1968 by claiming to be the sole owner and from time to time thereafter by taking contradictory stands in different proceedings. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that, therefore, in the facts of the present case, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will have no application which would permit institution of suit simpliciter for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title to be filed within 12 years when the possession of the defendants become adverse to the plaintiffs. The defendants contend that they were not claiming to be in adverse possession and no such stand has been taken by the defendants. On the other hand, whether the plaint can proceed or not and needs to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 will have to be examined strictly on the basis of the averments in the plaint and not with reference to any other document including the stand taken by the defendants in the written statement. Understood thus, according to the defendants, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will have no application to the facts on hands. The defendants further contend that although the plaintiffs have stated in paragraph 47 as it originally stood that, the suit is not barred by law of limitation inter alia for the reason that the impugned acts of the defendants which are prejudicial to the interests of the said trust are continuing. But, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs have failed to set out the circumstances that would show that the cause of action was continuing one and in absence of that, such a plea would be of no avail. The defendants have placed reliance on section 22 of the Act, to buttress their stand. Further, the plaintiffs having realised the drawback in their pleadings, were advised to amend the plaint. However, even after amendment of paragraph 47 of the plaint, there has been no improvement so as to save the plaint from being rejected. On the other hand the problem has been compounded, for the basis of cause of action for institution of the present suit stated therein does not support the case that the cause of action was continuing one. On the other hand the problem has been compounded, for the basis of cause of action for institution of the present suit stated therein does not support the case that the cause of action was continuing one. Reference has been made to the pleadings and relevant proceedings between the parties which were instituted in the past. It further is contended that the plaint has been drafted with such dexterity so as to tailor a gloss of satisfaction of the requirements of Article 58 of the Limitation Act and also to make it possible to contend that the case would fall under Article 65 of the Limitation Act which, however, has no application. 5. Per contra, the plaintiffs' contend that the suit has been instituted essentially for the relief of possession and the relief of declaration is only incidental or ancillary. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs then contends that even if the suit is stated to be for declaration even then the relief in prayer Clause (a) is a composite relief asking for four different prayers and if the plaintiffs succeed in pointing out that the limitation in respect of and cause of action of at least any one or more prayer therein was surviving then the suit cannot be thrown out in its entirety but the Court will be obliged to examine the matter with reference to that relief. According to the plaintiffs, therefore, the suit is one for possession on the basis of title of the trust and in such a case the same would fall within the provisions of Article 65 alone coupled with the fact that the cause of action is continuing one. If that be so, the subject suit is within limitation. He submits that no limitation is prescribed for instituting the suit for possession on the basis of title as such-but in that suit if the defendants take plea of adverse possession only then limitation will have to be counted from the possession of the defendants becoming adverse to the plaintiffs and if it is found that the plea of adverse possession and hostile claim of the defendants relate back to more than 12 years only then the suit can be said to be barred by limitation. Accordingly, the plaintiffs contend that the present plaint will have to be read as a whole and if so read, it was clear that the suit was principally for the relief of possession on the basis of title and involved continuing cause of action; and applying Article 65, the suit as presented was obviously within limitation. 6. Having considered the above submissions, the core question is whether Article 58 or Article 65 will apply to the present case. To examine the rival submissions and to answer the issue of limitation, it will be necessary for us to wade through the pleadings and the frame of the suit as filed before this Court. Before doing that, it would be necessary to advert to the relevant articles, which read thus : "58. To obtain any Three When the right to other declaration. years. sue first accrues. 65. For possession of Twelve When the possession of immovable property or years the defendant becomes any interest therein adverse to the plaintiff." based on title. (Emphasis supplied). 7. Reverting to the averment in the plaint, it is seen that in paragraph No. 1 plaintiffs have stated that they are the trustees of the trust under a declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951 declared by Kanhayalal J. Poddar grand father of plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1 above named and great maternal grandfather of plaintiff No. 1. It is further stated that the plaintiff No. 1 is appointed as a trustee of the said trust by registered deed of appointed dated 10th April, 1996. That the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 are also trustees and beneficiaries and under the said trust. That the defendant No. 1 is named as beneficiary of the said trust and defendant No. 2 is the wife of defendant No. 1. That the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have been and are claiming interest adverse to and inconsistent with the rights of the said trust in an immovable property belonging to the said trust. In paragraph No. 1-A it is averred that the plaintiffs are trustees of the said trust created under a declaration of the trust dated 1st April, 1951. The plaintiffs have filed the present suit in the capacity as trustees. In paragraph No. 1-A it is averred that the plaintiffs are trustees of the said trust created under a declaration of the trust dated 1st April, 1951. The plaintiffs have filed the present suit in the capacity as trustees. The plaintiffs as such, trustees of the said trust and owners have filed the present suit against the defendants inter alia for vacant and peaceful possession of a portion of the trust property which the defendants are not entitled to use, occupy and enjoy. Paragraph No. 2 of the plaint, gives the details regarding the creation of the trust. In para 3, it is pointed as to how one Deviprasad Khandelwal acquired right to grant of lien by Bombay Municipal Corporation of the subject plot and how he transferred that right in favour of Ajaysing Randhirsingh for a consideration. In para 4 it is stated that the subject plot was transferred by an Indenture of lease dated 19-2-1964 in favour of Smt. Shantidevi Jhuria, Smt. Shakuntala Devi S. Kayal, plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and defendants in their capacity as trustees of the said trust and to which said Ajaysingh Randhirsingh was a confirming party. In para 5 it is stated that prior to the said Indenture of lease (dated 19-2-1964) the said Ramniwas K. Poddar pursuant to the powers vested in him, had appointed the plaintiffs and defendants and three others as trustees of the said trust. But, it is further stated that, defendants declined to act as trustees and also did not admit execution of their signatures on the said deed of lease. It is averred that the defendants have all the time declined to act as trustees and to be lessees of the trust property. As a result, the Registrar of Assurances at Bombay by order dated 26-10-1964 refused registration of the said document as regards the defendants only; whereas, registered as regards the other executants. In para 6, it is averred that the construction of residential building on the said plot was undertaken consisting of ground and first floor and the second floor was constructed stagewise. After the ground floor became ready for occupation it was given on leave and licence basis to Rajmata of Rajpipla State Padminikunverbai. In para 8 it is averred that another leave and licence agreement was executed in respect of ground floor in favour of Mrs. After the ground floor became ready for occupation it was given on leave and licence basis to Rajmata of Rajpipla State Padminikunverbai. In para 8 it is averred that another leave and licence agreement was executed in respect of ground floor in favour of Mrs. D.C. Frazer, by said Ramniwas K. Poddar whose signature was attested by the defendant No. 1. In para 9 it is stated that in the year 1968 part of the second floor was let out by the plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 to Adil H. Screwala and the rest of the second floor was earlier let out to B.M. Shah and others as tenants in common. In para 10 it is averred that the defendants by their affidavit declared on 13-4-1982 falsely affirmed that they have adopted, accepted and acted upon the lease dated 19-2-1964 and further expressed their desire to confirm the execution of the said deed of lease. It is then averred that in total contravention of the stand of the said affidavit the defendants have also repeatedly asserted on oath that they have not executed any such deed of lease. It is asserted that the defendants could not and cannot claim to be co-lessees of the trust property by filing such affidavit dated 13-4-1982 and having it registered with Registrar of Assurance. It is further asserted that the defendants have not acquired any right, title and interest in the trust property much less as co-lessees by filing such affidavit or otherwise. That the defendants did not acquire and are not entitled to claim any right, title or interest in the said property under the indenture of lease executed in their favour without consideration de hors the said trust. In para 11 it is averred that although the said plot of land and building constructed thereon belong to the said trust, Income tax, Wealth tax and Estate duty authorities have been and are assessing for Income Tax, Wealth Tax and Estate Duty purposes the said trust property as the property belonging to the said Ramniwas K. Poddar as owner thereof. It is stated that this was disputed and resisted by the said Ramniwas K. Poddar during his life time and thereafter, the trustees. It is stated that this was disputed and resisted by the said Ramniwas K. Poddar during his life time and thereafter, the trustees. It is stated that the plaintiffs have at all times from the inception treated the said property as belonging to the said trust declared by the declaration of trust dated 1-4-1951, to the express knowledge of the said Ramniwas K. Poddar as well as the defendants and that the said trust is the exclusive lessee of the subject plot and owner of the building constructed thereon. The material averments are in para 12 wherein reference is made to various suits filed by defendant No. 1 either singly or through defendant No. 2. According to the plaintiffs those suits are frivolous and vexatious and are filed by the defendants to suit their convenience and purposes for the time being and to torment the plaintiffs so that they relinquish their right under the trust and/or abandon the trust property. The first amongst the several suits is of 1982 and the latest of 1998. It is averred that in most of these proceedings defendants have not only made claims adverse to the said trust and have challenged the said trust and/or its validity but have taken pleas which are mutually destructive and/or contradictory. It is on this premise the plaintiffs claim that the defendants have disentitled themselves to remain as beneficiaries of the trust and have sought declaration that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries because of their stand in relation to the estate of the trust. In paragraph No. 13, it is alleged that the defendant No. 1 adopted several legal proceedings against his sisters and their husbands now deceased and took stand with a view to grab the property by adopting legal proceeding, including criminal proceedings; thereby causing mental agony to the father of defendant No. 1 and his sisters and their husbands now deceased. In paragraph No. 14, once again the plaintiffs allege that the defendant No. 1 has adopted and/or taken inconsistent and mutually destructive stand in respect of the ownership of the trust property consisting of the land and building constructed thereon. Reference has been made to those pleadings and stand taken by defendant No. 1. In paragraph No. 14, once again the plaintiffs allege that the defendant No. 1 has adopted and/or taken inconsistent and mutually destructive stand in respect of the ownership of the trust property consisting of the land and building constructed thereon. Reference has been made to those pleadings and stand taken by defendant No. 1. In Clause (b) of this paragraph reference is made to a letter issued by the defendant No. 1 dated 30-9-1968 addressed to Solicitor denying existence of the trust and that stand has been reiterated in the suit bearing Suit No. 885 of 1968 filed by him before this Hon'ble Court on 19-12-1968. In that suit, the defendant No. 1 is stated to have claimed absolute ownership of the trust property. It is further alleged that in that suit the defendant No. 1 has challenged the validity and existence of the said trust stating the said declaration of the trust dated 1-4-1951 was forged and fabricated document. It is further averred that the defendant No. 2 as a party defendant in the said suit supported the defendant No. 1. In Clause (c) of this paragraph, reference is made to another suit filed by defendant No. 1 in this Hon'ble Court being Suit No. 345 of 1969 claiming for declaration of his exclusive absolute ownership of the trust property. It is, however, further pointed out that the defendant No. 1 amended that plaint and also claimed as a beneficiary under the said trust contrary to his said claim of sole ownership. In Clause (d) of this paragraph reference is made to the contents of the said Suit No. 345 of 1969. It is stated that in the said Suit No. 345 of 1969 defendant No. 1 repeated his challenge to the trust claiming the declaration of trust dated 1-4-1951 to be forged and fabricated document and also claimed that the trust property belonged to him absolutely. In Clause (e) of this paragraph reference is made to the affidavit of defendant No. 1 dated 8-4-1969 which was filed in support of Notice of Motion in Suit No. 345 of 1969. It is alleged that in this affidavit the defendant No. 1 repeated his challenge to the said trust. In Clause (e) of this paragraph reference is made to the affidavit of defendant No. 1 dated 8-4-1969 which was filed in support of Notice of Motion in Suit No. 345 of 1969. It is alleged that in this affidavit the defendant No. 1 repeated his challenge to the said trust. In Clause (f) of this paragraph reference is made to the deposition of the defendant No. 1 dated 18th August, 1969 before the Income tax Officer where he had repeated his challenge to the said trust. In Clause (g) of this paragraph, it is alleged that the defendant No. 1 with a view to escape his liability to pay Income Tax and Wealth tax in respect of the said property, as a consequence of his claim of ownership of the said property and simultaneously to mulct the property with liability of income tax of the said Ram Niwas Poddar, filed Writ Petition No. 382 of 1973 in this Hon'ble Court claiming therein that the said property was his property and cannot be attached for taxes due to tax authorities from the said Ram Niwas Poddar. Once again in Clause (h) of this paragraph reference is made to the stand taken by defendant No. 1 in Misc. Petition No. 1131 of 1973 wherein he has claimed that he was the absolute owner of the said property. Similarly reference is made in Clause (i) of paragraph 14 to the stand taken by the defendant No. 1 in Misc. Petition No. 1039 of 1974 filed by him. In Clause (j) of paragraph 14 reference is made to the contents of the written statement filed by the Income Tax Authorities in the said Suit No. 345 of 1969 claiming that the suit property belonged to deceased Ramniwas K. Poddar and did not belong to defendant No. 1 or the trust. In Clause (k) of this paragraph, reference is made to other proceeding regarding tax matter of the subject property. In Clause (l) of this paragraph 14, it is stated that when the said Suit No. 345 of 1969 reached for hearing, the defendant No. 1 withdrew the suit against the Income Tax Department and thereafter withdrew the entire suit. It is further stated that the defendant No. 1, in doing so, gave up his claim of ownership of the trust property. It is further stated that the defendant No. 1, in doing so, gave up his claim of ownership of the trust property. It is stated that the defendant No. 1 however obtained leave under Order 23, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure to file a fresh suit on the ground that the Suit No. 345 of 1969 was likely to fail on account of failure on the part of the defendant No. 1 as plaintiff to join Charity Commissioner as party defendant representing charity under the said declaration of trust. It is, therefore, alleged that by this act the defendants conceded the position that the suit property belonged to the trust. In Clause (m) of paragraph 14 reference is made to suit filed by defendant No. 1 in this Hon'ble Court claiming his share in income and property as beneficiary under the said trust although he could claim share only in income if at all and further in the alternative he claimed his share in the said property as one of the tenants in common under the said indenture of lease dated 19th February, 1964. In Clause (n) of this paragraph reference is made to Suit No. 1809 of 1982 filed by the defendant No. 1 in this Court. It is alleged that he set up an adverse claim against the said by claiming to be a co-lessee of the trust property de hors the said trust property. In Clause (o), it is stated that in the said Suit No. 1809 of 1982 the defendant No. 1 initially claimed as co-lessee of the trust property in the alternative to his claim as a beneficiary under the said trust. However, it is stated that, in Chamber Summons No. 385 of 1995 the defendant No. 1 had sought amendment of plaint in High Court Suit No. 1809 of 1982 whereby he based his claim under the said indenture of lease as a purported co-lessee and not under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951. It is contended that the said Chamber Summons was made absolute by order dated 21st September, 1956. 8. According to the plaintiffs, the cause of action for instituting the present suit arose after September, 1996 when the defendants amended the pleadings and changed their stand claiming to be co-lessee in respect of the suit property. It is contended that the said Chamber Summons was made absolute by order dated 21st September, 1956. 8. According to the plaintiffs, the cause of action for instituting the present suit arose after September, 1996 when the defendants amended the pleadings and changed their stand claiming to be co-lessee in respect of the suit property. It is not necessary to elaborate the other aspects mentioned thereafter in the plaint. Suffice it to point out that according to the plaintiffs, the defendants kept on changing their stand and lastly they claimed to be co-lessees and not under the declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951, which gave rise to the cause of action for instituting the present suit. This stand can be discerned from the averments in paragraphs 15 wherein it is alleged that the defendant No. 1 has recently made a false claim in respect of portion of the trust property i.e. garden in the trust property to be in his possession since the death of his father Ram Niwas K. Poddar. It is further alleged that the defendant No. 1 at no time before had made such a claim. In paragraph 16 of the plaint, it is alleged that the plaintiffs by their Advocate's letter dated 3rd March, 1997 addressed to defendants No. 1 and 2 called upon them to desist from claiming co-lessees of the said property. Besides, in paragraphs 17 and 18 it is alleged that the defendants were acting in collusion with the tax authorities. However, those allegations may not be relevant for examining the issue of limitation. In paragraph 19, it is alleged that the Municipal tax pertaining to the trust property accumulated on account of various acts of commission and omission of the defendants No. 1 and, the details thereof have been given, which relates back to the stand taken by the defendant No. 1 in the suit filed before the City Civil Court bearing Suit No. 7738 of 1970. In paragraph 20, it is further alleged that the defendants very well knew that the trust property would be put for auction by the Bombay Municipal Corporation for recovery of arrears of property tax and repair cess which was evident from the correspondence exchanged between the defendants and the Corporation. The allegation is that the defendants created obstacle for proper administration of the trust property in one way or the other. The allegation is that the defendants created obstacle for proper administration of the trust property in one way or the other. In paragraph 21 it is alleged that although the defendants claimed themselves to be co-lessees, their actions were intended to cause auction sale of the property either by the tax authorities or by the Municipal authorities to serve their evil purposes. In paragraph 22, it is alleged that the defendants were bent upon to harass the trustees the plaintiffs herein and the details in that regard have been mentioned. To my mind, however, the accusations made therein will not be relevant for deciding the issue of limitation. In paragraph 23 it is alleged that prior to the demise of the father of the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1, defendant No. 1 was occupying two rooms and kitchen in addition to a toilet block in the suit premises as per the allotment made by said Shri Ramniwas K. Poddar pursuant to the powers vested in him under the trust deed. It is stated that the same position is affirmed by the defendant No. 1 in paragraph 51 of his affidavit dated 16th October, 1969 in Suit No. 345 of 1969. It is further alleged that, however, soon after the demise of the said Ram Niwas K. Poddar, defendant No. 1 and his hooligans indulged in rioting and forcibly took possession of half the portion of the hall on the first floor, a garage and a servant quarter on the ground floor allotted to the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 under the aforesaid rules for administration and allotment dated 1st July, 1967 and till then in possession of the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3. It is further stated that several police complaints were filed with regard to the nuisance caused by the defendants. However, eventually with the view to bring peace, as an interim arrangement pending the said Suit No. 855 of 1968, defendant No. 1 was allowed to occupy two rooms and kitchen with toilet block and half portion of the hall on the first floor of the said property. Whereas, plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 occupied and are occupying remaining portion on the first floor of the trust property as per the consent terms dated 21st December, 1970. Whereas, plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 occupied and are occupying remaining portion on the first floor of the trust property as per the consent terms dated 21st December, 1970. It is alleged that the defendants have wrongfully encroached upon the servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property and encroached upon the trust property and which fact is established from the affidavit of defendant No. 1 dated 16th October, 1969. The fact remains that this alleged encroachment has been caused by the defendants soon after the demise of Ramniwas K. Poddar in the year 1970. In paragraph 24 it is alleged that the defendants No. 1 and 2 have also encroached upon the garden in the said trust property, even when the Court Receiver of this Hon'ble Court was in possession of the said trust property. I would think it necessary to reproduce paragraph Nos. 25 to 28 in its entirety and portion of paragraph 29, as according to me, the averments in those paragraphs will have material bearing for deciding the issue of limitation. The same read thus : "25. In the premise, stated above the plaintiffs say and submit that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had no, have no right title or interest and are not entitled to claim any right title or interest in the trust property as such co-lessees and/or owners. The plaintiffs further state and submit that claim of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 of defendant No. 1 being the sole owner of the trust property is wholly false, frivolous and baseless which claim as stated above has been consciously knowingly and willingly renounced and/or abandoned by defendant No. 1. 26. The plaintiffs say and submit that in the premises stated above the said contradictory and mutually destructive claim of defendants No. 1 and 2 de hors the said trust amounts to disowning and challenging the said trust. The plaintiffs says and submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 in the said several suits and proceedings set up and reiterated their said adverse claims against the said trust and thereby have continously defeated said trust. The plaintiffs say and submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 have done so with full and notice of the existence of the said trust and its ownership of the said property. The plaintiffs say and submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 have done so with full and notice of the existence of the said trust and its ownership of the said property. The plaintiffs say and submit that her defendants No. 1 and 2 have consciously and knowingly renounced or and deemed to have renounced their interest as beneficiaries under the said trust or have forfeited or in any event are liable to forfeit all their interest, rights and benefits under the said trust as beneficiaries on account of their having set up adverse and prejudicial claims against the said trust and the trust property as also acting against the interest of the trust with full knowledge and notice and admissions about the said trust being the owner of the trust property. The defendants No. 1 and 2 are not entitled to claim any interest in the trust property. 27. The defendant No. 1 however with a view to continue to hold on to his wrongful possession of the portion of the property has been deceitfully claiming to be a beneficiary under the said trust lost his such occupation in the trust property be not termed wrongful and as trespassers. The claim of defendants No. 1 and 2 as beneficiaries is merely an eyewash in as much as defendants No. 1 and 2 have all throughout claimed the property to be their absolute property either as owners or as co-lessee de hors the said trust and have deliberately conducted themselves and acted against the interest of the said trust. 28. The plaintiffs, further say and submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 having forfeited their right as beneficiaries of the said trust the occupation by the defendants No. 1 and 2 of the said portion of the trust property on the first floor, servant quarter, a garage and garden as stated above is wrongful and illegal and as rank trespassers. In fact the defendants No. 1 and 2 are liable to vacate every portion of the trust property in their occupation. 29. The plaintiffs in the premises submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 have thus renounced or are deemed to have renounced their interest and/or rights as beneficiaries under the said trust. The defendants No. 1 and 2 have ceased to be beneficiaries under the said trust. 29. The plaintiffs in the premises submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 have thus renounced or are deemed to have renounced their interest and/or rights as beneficiaries under the said trust. The defendants No. 1 and 2 have ceased to be beneficiaries under the said trust. The plaintiffs submits that in the premises the defendants No. 1 and 2 have become trespassers in the trust property and they are liable to vacate the proportion of the trust property in their occupation and till such time are liable to pay compensation or damages to the plaintiffs for their wrongful occupation of the premises. The plaintiffs state and submit that the defendants No. 1 and 2 are liable to pay compensation or damages for such wrongful occupation since the date of their wrongful claim as aforesaid. The plaintiffs state that the defendants No. 1 and 2 are thus liable to pay a sum of Rs. 2,87,59,984/- being the total amount of compensation or damages accrued till the date of filing of this suit." It will be useful to reproduce paragraphs No. 32 and 33 which read thus : "32. In the premises stated the plaintiffs say and submit that this Hon'ble Court by its order and decree be pleased to declare that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951 and have no right, title or interest whatsoever in the trust property and are liable to quit, vacate and deliver to the plaintiffs the vacant and peaceful possession of the said portion in the trust property in their use, occupation and enjoyment of the defendants and/or encroached upon by the defendants more particularly shown in shaded red colour and shaded green colour on her said plan hereto annexed and marked Exhibit "AR" as also the garden, servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property encroached upon by the defendants and that the defendants are not entitled to remain in the trust property or any part thereof. 33. 33. In the premises stated above the plaintiffs say and submit that this Hon'ble Court will also be pleased to order and decree against the defendants to quit vacate and deliver to the plaintiffs the vacant and peaceful possession for the said portion in the trust property in the use, occupation and enjoyment of the defendants and/or encroached upon by the defendants more particularly shown in shaded red colour and shaded green colour on the said plan hereto annexed and marked Exhibit "AR" as also the garden, servant quarter and enclosed garage in the trust property encroached upon by the defendants and that the defendants are not entitled to remain in the trust property any part thereof." 9. The crucial averments with regard to limitation would appear in paragraph 47 of the plaint. Paragraph 47 as amended reads thus : "47. The suit is not barred by law of limitation enterally for the reason that the impugned acts of the defendants which are prejudicial to the interest for the said trust are continuing. The plaintiffs say that as stated in paragraph 14 herein above between 1968 to 1969 the defendants 1 and/or 2 claimed that defendant No. 1 was the absolute/exclusive owner of the said property. Thereafter, on or about 10th December, 1969 by amendment to the plaint in the said Suit No. 345 of 1969 the defendant No. 1 admitted in the alternative the trust as the owner of the suit property and claimed consequential reliefs as beneficiary. On or about 18th August, 1980 the defendant No. 1 abandoned his claim or absolute ownership of suit property and accepted his claim of trust as owner of the suit property and confined his claim as one of the beneficiaries, on or about 14th April, 1982 defendant No. 1 again changed his stand and claimed as co-lessee in the alternative to his claim as beneficiary under the trust and continued his such claim till September, 1996. The defendant No. 1 however, in September 1996 amended the plaint in the said Suit No. 1809 of 1982 whereby the defendants No. 1 and 2 for the first time claimed as co-lessee of the suit property independently of the trust defendant No. 2 has filed a suit in this Honb'le Court being Suit No. 36898 of 1996 for declaration of her title and title of her husband defendant No. 1 as co-lessee of the suit property independent of the trust. Thus, since 1996 defendants No. 1 and 2 have been claiming co-lessees independent of plaintiff's trust totally denying the right of plaintiff's trust to the suit property. The suit therefore is not barred by law of limitation." 10. After having analyzed the plaint as a whole, to my mind, there can be no reason to accept the stand taken by the plaintiffs that the suit is not for declaration but simpliciter for the relief of possession. That submission is completely devoid of merits. On the other hand, on analyzing the plaint as a whole, at least at more than one place the plaintiffs have conceded the position that the defendants have been challenging the title of the trust which relates back to 1968. No doubt, the plaintiffs may be right in contending that, the defendants have been taking contradictory and mutually inconsistent or destructive stand, but the fact remains that the defendants have been challenging the trust and as also the title of the trust in respect of the suit property since 1968. In any case, the claim that the defendant No. 1 was co-lessee has been clearly set up by the defendant No. 1 in the affidavit dated 14th April, 1982. Once this position is conceded then, it necessarily follows that the defendants are claiming to be in possession of the suit property in their own rights, and that so long as plaintiffs do not succeed in obtaining the declaration as is sought in prayer Clause (a) of the plaint that they (defendants) have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951, the relief of possession against them cannot be entertained. In other words, it is only when the plaintiffs would succeed in obtaining relief of declaration that the Court would proceed to consider the relief of possession. In other words, it is only when the plaintiffs would succeed in obtaining relief of declaration that the Court would proceed to consider the relief of possession. It is not possible to accept the submission of the plaintiffs that the relief of possession is the principal relief and the declaration sought is an ancillary one. No doubt, the plaintiffs are claiming that the suit property belongs to the trust and, therefore, suit can be said to be one on the basis of title-but nevertheless in the fact situation of the present case, the plaintiffs accept the position that the defendants were also taken as trustees. Besides, the defendants having taken a clear stand on affidavit and have admitted the execution of the indenture. At least from that date, the defendants can legitimately be in occupation of the suit premises in their own rights. If this be so, then unless the Court of competent jurisdiction was to declare that they (defendants) have ceased to be the beneficiaries as alleged by the plaintiffs, it is not possible to examine the relief of possession. In that sense, prayer Clause (a) which is reproduced above, containing the relief of declaration was crucial and without which the relief of possession cannot be granted. This is so because the defendants can be ordered to deliver possession only after declaring that they have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the declaration of the trust dated 1st April, 1951. Accordingly, since the other reliefs were dependent on the former and, if the suit was to fail on the ground of limitation with regard to the relief of declaration, then, necessarily, suit for other reliefs would also fail as there would be no cause to examine the same. On close scrutiny of the plaint, as a whole and having regard to the frame of the plaint, it would be seen that the plaintiffs are seeking declaration that the defendants No. 1 and 2 have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951, because of the stand taken by them from time to time in relation to the estate. If this be so, it will be necessary to first examine as to whether the principal declaration sought by the plaintiffs that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951 can be said to be within limitation. 11. As observed earlier, if it is a suit for declaration then the provisions of Article 58 will squarely apply. As per Article 58, suit for declaration should necessarily be filed within three years when the right to sue "first" accrues. This article postulates that three years would commence from the right to sue "first" accrues. Going by the plaint, as well as this provision, it will not be possible to take the view so as to permit the plaintiffs to contend that it is because of the amendment and the stand taken by the defendants in September, 1996 that the cause of action to institute the present suit for the relief of declaration has arisen. Whereas, the plaintiffs have clearly accepted on more than one occasion in the plaint that in the year 1968 to 1969 the defendants claimed that the defendants No. 1 was the absolute and exclusive owner of the said property. If this be so, then the cause of action for seeking the relief of declaration as is sought in the present suit first accrued in 1968 and the suit ought to have been filed within three years therefrom. No doubt, the defendant No. 1 had caused amended to the plaint filed by him in the year 1969 and admitted in the alternative that the trust is the owner of the suit property and also claimed consequential relief as beneficiary. Assuming that it is possible for the plaintiffs to contend that because of this change the defendants conceded that the owner of the suit property was the trust and claimed consequential relief as beneficiary and for which reason it was no longer necessary for the plaintiffs to pursue the remedy of declaration sought herein. But the fact remains that the plaintiffs have further alleged that on or about 18th August, 1980 the defendant No. 1 abandoned his claim of absolute owner and whereas accepted the trust as the owner of the trust property and confined his claim as being the beneficiary. But the fact remains that the plaintiffs have further alleged that on or about 18th August, 1980 the defendant No. 1 abandoned his claim of absolute owner and whereas accepted the trust as the owner of the trust property and confined his claim as being the beneficiary. However, according to the plaintiffs, once again on or about 14th April, 1982 defendant No. 1 changed his stand and claimed as co-lessee of the trust property in the alternative to his claim as the beneficiary under the said trust and maintained such claim till September, 1996. Atleast with this change of stand in April, 1982, it can be said that the cause of action to seek declaration as is sought in the present suit had arisen. To my mind, on careful examination of the frame of the subject plaint, it will be seen that the present suit is not founded only on the development taken place in September 1996 but the plaintiffs are relying on the inconsistent and contradictory stand taken by the defendants all throughout since 1968. This is evident from the contents of paragraphs 25 26 where the plaintiffs have relied upon the earlier averments in the plaint, which includes the event of 1968, to submit that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have no right, title or interest and are not entitled to claim any right title or interest in the trust property as co-lessee and/or owners. The plaintiffs have further alleged that the claim of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that the defendant No. 1 was the sole owner of the trust property is wholly false, frivolous and baseless which claim has been consciously, knowingly and willingly renounced and/or abandoned by defendant No. 1. Again in paragraph 26, it is alleged that because of the contradictory and mutually destructive claims of defendants No. 1 and 2 de hors the said trust amounts to disowning and challenging the said trust. To my mind, therefore, the cause of action for instituting the suit for declaration that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries in the first place arose in the year 1968 and, in any case, after presentation of the affidavit by the defendants in the year 1982 claiming to be co-lessees. To my mind, therefore, the cause of action for instituting the suit for declaration that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries in the first place arose in the year 1968 and, in any case, after presentation of the affidavit by the defendants in the year 1982 claiming to be co-lessees. There was no reason for the plaintiffs to wait thereafter because by that time the defendants had already taken contradictory and mutually destructive claims de hors the said trust which amounted to disowning and challenging the said trust. Moreover, it is alleged that the defendants also took over forcible possession of the suit property soon after the demise of Ram Niwas Poddar in 1970 and caused encroachment on the suit property. In this background, I have no hesitation to hold that since the plaintiffs have claimed relief of declaration against the defendants that they have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951, such a suit would be governed by Article 58 and as the first cause of action arose more than 3 years prior to the institution of the present suit, this suit is clearly barred by limitation. 12. To counter this position the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1984(2) Bombay Case Reporter page 50 in (Ghanshyamdas Vallabhdas Gujrathi v. M/s. Brijraman Rasiklal)1, to contend that the relief of declaration though claimed was not the main relief and it was an ancillary relief to the relief of possession. I have already held that in the present case, it is not possible to take that view. In as much as, unless the declaration sought by the plaintiffs that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the trust was to be granted, the plaintiffs cannot succeed in getting the relief of possession. In the case of Ghanshyamdas (supra), the defendant by several letters had assured the plaintiff that he could take possession of the suit property out of Court at any time. That fact indicates that the defendant had no hostile animus and never asserted title hostile to the plaintiff. In the case of Ghanshyamdas (supra), the defendant by several letters had assured the plaintiff that he could take possession of the suit property out of Court at any time. That fact indicates that the defendant had no hostile animus and never asserted title hostile to the plaintiff. The Court has further observed in paragraph 5 that possession of the defendant was never adverse to the plaintiff at least till 1975 when the plaintiff requested him to attorn the tenants to it and he failed to do so. The Court went on to observe that the suit was instituted in the year 1978, viz., well within 12 years from the day when the defendant failed to comply with the request of the plaintiff to attorn the tenants to it. In that context, this Court has held that the main relief was one of possession and not of declaration and for which reason Article 65 would apply because the suit was for possession on the basis of title. In the present case, however, the fact situation is entirely different. In this case, the defendants have not only challenged the trust but also the title of the trust in respect of the suit property. Accordingly, this decision is of no avail to the plaintiffs. 13. The next decision relied is one reported in A.I.R. 1960 Calcutta Page 484 (Ajit K. Saha v. Nagendra N. Saha and another)2. In that case, it is held that ............ "In a case where there is a joinder of causes of action and a decree is bound to be passed in respect of one or more of the causes of action, a plea by way of demurrer cannot be taken. A plea by way of demurrer can only be taken when by reason of the plea the plaintiff is wholly non-suited." This decision will have no bearing on the facts at hand. I have already observed that in so far as prayer Clause (a) is concerned, assuming that the plaintiffs have sought more than one declaration but the remaining declarations can be examined only when the plaintiffs would succeed to get declaration that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries of the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the suit as presented with regard to said declaration can be said to be within limitation. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the suit as presented with regard to said declaration can be said to be within limitation. As I have already answered this aspect in the negative and against the plaintiffs, it necessarily follows that the other declarations would be inconsequential and the suit cannot be continued, whereas the plaintiffs will have to be non suited in toto. 14. The next decision relied by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs is reported in A.I.R. 1991 Madhya Pradesh page 368 in (Bharat Singh v. Kunwar Singh and another)3, to contend that in a suit for declaration of title with injunction, the starting point for limitation should be counted not from the date of mere denial or of innocuous threat to plaintiff's right but would commence only on clear and unequivocal threat to plaintiff's right. In that case, the Court has observed that in the written statement the defendants raised a bald plea that the suit was barred, without pleading any other fact as to how it was barred and as to when the cause of action had arisen or would be deemed to have arisen to the plaintiffs. In the present case, however, we are examining the case in the context of requirement of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case, the Court will be mainly guided by the pleadings in the plaint only. No doubt, the plaint will have to be read as whole. As already discussed above, on reading the plaint as a whole, it is amply clear that the plaintiffs have accepted the position that the defendants have not only denied the existence of the trust but also denied the title of the trust in respect of the suit property. Moreover, the defendants, besides the stand taken in the various proceedings, have actually exercised the right of enjoyment of the suit property and, therefore, have interfered with the plaintiffs' right. Therefore, this authority would be of no avail to the plaintiffs. 15. The next authority relied is reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 335 in (Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others)4. This authority is in the context of existing Article 113 of the Limitation Act. This decision has been relied upon in the earlier decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. 15. The next authority relied is reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 335 in (Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others)4. This authority is in the context of existing Article 113 of the Limitation Act. This decision has been relied upon in the earlier decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Even the Apex Court has observed that there can be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement. The Apex Court further observed that successive denials of right, right to sue under Article 120 (presently Article 113) would accrue when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. The Apex Court further observed that every threat by a party to such a right however ineffective and innocuous may be cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel to file a suit. In the present case, however, going by the pleadings of the plaintiffs, it is seen that the defendants have clearly threatened the rights of the plaintiffs not only by denying the trust as well as title of the trust in respect of the suit property but also entering upon the property and are enjoying the same claiming right having accrued to them under the declaration of trust. Understood thus, it is not possible to accept that the cause of action arose for instituting the present suit for the first time only in September, 1996 as contended by the plaintiffs. 16. The next authority relief by the plaintiffs is reported in 1990(1) Bom.C.R. 23 : A.I.R. 1990 Bombay page 98 in (Mrs. Indira Bhalchandra Gokhale (deceased by L.Rs. v. Union of India and another)5. In that case the Court has held that the suit was primarily one for possession and mesne profits and in that context the Court proceeded to observe that declaration sought was not necessary. However, in the present it is not possible to take that view in as much as in absence of declaration that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951, the other reliefs cannot be granted against the defendants. Accordingly, this decision would be of no avail to the plaintiffs. 17. However, in the present it is not possible to take that view in as much as in absence of declaration that the defendants have ceased to be the beneficiaries under the said declaration of trust dated 1st April, 1951, the other reliefs cannot be granted against the defendants. Accordingly, this decision would be of no avail to the plaintiffs. 17. The next decision relied by the plaintiffs is reported in 2000(3) S.C. Cases page 708, in (Roop Singh v. Ram Singh)6, to contend that there would be no limitation for suit filed for possession based on title and the limitation will have to be counted only when the possession of the defendants become adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. This decision would be of no avail because I have already taken the view that present case will be covered by Article 58 of the Limitation Act because of the nature of declarations sought by the plaintiffs and it is only after that declaration the question of considering the relief of possession would arise. To my mind, therefore, this decision would be of no avail to the plaintiffs. 18. During the course of arguments reference was made by the Counsel for the defendants to the order passed by Smt. Justice K.K. Baam on 11th December, 2001 dismissing the chamber summons taken out by the plaintiffs for amendment of the plaint. Reference was made to the proposed amendment which reads thus: "I) After the words under the said declaration of trust dated 1-5-1951 and "that they either as beneficiaries and/or as co-lessees or otherwise." It was, therefore, contended by the defendants that the fact that the plaintiffs have moved amendment to the above effect would establish the position that the suit is one for declaration and it cannot be gainsaid that the principal relief in the suit is only possession and relief of declaration is an ancillary one. It was brought to my notice by the Counsel for the plaintiffs that said decision was under challenge before the Division Bench of this Court, being Appeal No. 137 of 2002. In the said appeal the plaintiffs requested the Division Bench of this Court to permit them to withdraw the said chamber summons, which was initially filed for amendment of the plaint, as according to them there was sufficient pleadings in the plaint as presented and that amendment was not necessary. In the said appeal the plaintiffs requested the Division Bench of this Court to permit them to withdraw the said chamber summons, which was initially filed for amendment of the plaint, as according to them there was sufficient pleadings in the plaint as presented and that amendment was not necessary. Pursuant to the said request the Division Bench of this Court by order dated April 22, 2002 has set aside the order passed by the Single Judge referred to above dated 11th December, 2001 and allowed the plaintiffs to withdraw the chamber summons. Since the said chamber summons has been allowed to be withdrawn, it will not be necessary for me to elaborate this aspect of the matter. 19. Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the defendants on the order passed by Justice Palkar dated March 30, 2001 in Suit No. 3433 of 1997 between the parties to contend that the suit has been dismissed being barred by law of limitation holding that the cause of action arose in April, 1982 after the presentation of the affidavit by the defendants taking stand that they were co-lessees under the indenture. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs however contends that the order cannot be relied upon as a binding precedent because the matter is res sub-judice. To buttress this contention reliance is placed on (Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar)7, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1332. According to the plaintiffs the order of Justice Palkar is subject matter of appeal and therefore has not attained finality. It is not necessary for me to go into the wider questions raised in this behalf. Suffice it to mention that on reading the plaint as a whole, I have independently found that the suit as presented was barred by limitation. 20. Be that as it may, on analyzing the plaint as a whole, I have already taken the view that the relief of declaration cannot be said as an ancillary relief, but is the main relief on which the other reliefs were dependent. Therefore, for the purpose of limitation, Article 58 will be attracted; and on examination of the averments in the plaint, it unfailingly establishes that the cause of action for instituting the suit for that relief first arose much prior to 3 years preceding the date of institution of the suit. Therefore, for the purpose of limitation, Article 58 will be attracted; and on examination of the averments in the plaint, it unfailingly establishes that the cause of action for instituting the suit for that relief first arose much prior to 3 years preceding the date of institution of the suit. Accordingly, the issue of limitation will have to be answered against the plaintiffs and for which reason the plaint as presented will have to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure being barred by the Law of Limitation. 21. Coming to the second issue namely as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it does not disclose the cause of action against the defendants and in any case as against defendant No. 2. We have already analyzed the plaint as a whole. To my mind, there is distinction between non-existence of cause of action and failure to state in the plaint about the particulars of the cause of action. The existence of cause of action can be spelt out from the bundle of facts disclosed in the plaint. Whereas, in the latter case the Court can always permit an amendment of the plaint so as to enable the plaintiffs to provide necessary details, instead of rejecting the plaint. In the present case, while dealing with the issue of limitation, I have already pointed out as to when the cause of action first arose which presupposes the existence of the cause of action. In that sense, from reading the plaint as a whole, it is possible to take the view that cause of action has been disclosed in the plaint, albeit without expressly stating the fact which would constitute the cause of action and when it arose. Paragraph 47 of the plaint no doubt refers to the dates when the cause of action arose. On reading the plaint as a whole it gives an impression that it has been drafted with dexterity so as to avoid the possibility of being thrown out at the threshold being barred by limitation. Paragraph 47 of the plaint no doubt refers to the dates when the cause of action arose. On reading the plaint as a whole it gives an impression that it has been drafted with dexterity so as to avoid the possibility of being thrown out at the threshold being barred by limitation. May be, it is only for that purpose no specific statement has been made as to when the cause of action first arose, but only general assertion is made that suit is not barred by limitation; and that the cause of action was continuing one. As rightly contended by the defendants that no claim has been set up in the plaint, as required under section 22 of the Limitation Act, so as to make out the case of continuing breach or continuing cause of action. Understood thus, it is not possible to take the view that the plaint as presented does not disclose cause of action at all so as to reject the same by taking recourse to Order 7, Rule 11(a) of Code of Civil Procedure. That issue, therefore, will have to be answered in favour of the plaintiffs. 22. Accordingly, the plaint is rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure being barred by limitation with costs. -----