Judgment :- The accused in S.T.146/1989 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam is the petitioner in this revision. The petitioner was charged with the offences punishable under Sections 2(1a) (m), 7(1) and (v) and 16(1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. After the trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found the petitioner guilty of the offences and convicted him. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. The petitioner challenged the conviction and sentence by filing Crl. Appeal No.230/91 and the learned IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Ernakulam by the impugned judgment confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence this revision. 2. The prosecution version is as follows: On 23.5.1989, PW1, the Food Inspector, Corporation of Kochi visited the provision shop by name "Samma Rava Centre" belonging to the first accused. After revealing his identity and service of Form VI notice, PW1 purchased 600gms.of corriander powder from the petitioner (second accused) who was attending to sales in the shop. He divided the corriander powder into three equal samples. The sampling was done in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules. One sample was sent to the Public Analyst and the remaining two to the Local Health Authority. On analysis, the Public Analyst reported that the sample did not confirm to the standards prescribed for corriander powder under the P.F.Act and Rules and therefore adulterated. Accordingly, the complaint was filed. Since the first accused in the case was absconding, the case against him was spilt up. The petitioner, who is the second accused denied the charge. 3. In order to prove the guilt of the petitioner, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 4 and marked Exts.P1 to P12. The defence examined three witnesses as DWs.1 to 3 and marked Exts.D1 and D2. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner strongly contended that both the courts below have seriously erred in finding that it was the petitioner who sold the corriander powder to the Food Inspector. According to the learned counsel, in view of the admission made by PW4, the lower courts ought to have found that the petitioner was not the salesman of the shop at the relevant time. According to the learned counsel, in view of the admission made by PW4, the lower courts ought to have found that the petitioner was not the salesman of the shop at the relevant time. He further contended that the courts below should have found that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 2(ia) (m) of the Act. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor supported the order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner and urged that there is no ground for interference. 5. It is not disputed that PW1 visited the shop on 23.5.1989 and purchased 600 gms.of corriander powder. It is also not seriously disputed that the sample sent to the Public Analyst was found to be adulterated on analysis. The dispute is with regard to the person from whom PW1 purchased the corriander powder. According to the prosecution, it was the petitioner who sold the corriander powder to PW1 while according to the petitioner he was not the vendor of the article of food and it was PW4 who sold the adulterated article to the Food Inspector. On a consideration of the evidence brought on record, both the lower courts have found that petitioner was the vendor of the article of food to the Food Inspector. I see no reason to take a different view. The Food Inspector as PW1 has asserted in his evidence that he purchased 600gms.of corriander powder from the petitioner and paid the price. Ext.P2 is the copy of Form No.VI notice issued to the petitioner and Ext.P2(a) is the acknowledgement of receipt of notice. It is also deposed by PW1 that it was the petitioner who issued Ext.P3 Bill after accepting the price. According to PW1 at the time when he visited the shop, the petitioner was in control of the shop and he did not see any other person attending to sales in the shop. He denied the suggestion that he obtained the signatures of the petitioner by representing that he was signing only as a witness. The evidence of PW1 is confirmed and corroborated by the evidence of PW3, the peon, who accompanied the Food Inspector. PW3 has deposed that the article of food was sold to the Food Inspector by the petitioner. He denied the suggestion that it was sold to the Food Inspector by PW4. The evidence of PW1 is confirmed and corroborated by the evidence of PW3, the peon, who accompanied the Food Inspector. PW3 has deposed that the article of food was sold to the Food Inspector by the petitioner. He denied the suggestion that it was sold to the Food Inspector by PW4. Though PWs.1 and 3 were subjected to incisive cross examination, nothing was brought out to discredit their evidence. There is no reason to discard the evidence of PWs.1 and 3. Their evidence is cogent, convincing and trustworthy. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on the evidence of PW4 and Exts.D1 and D2 in support of his contention that it was PW4 who sold the corriander powder to the Food Inspector. No doubt, PW4 has stated in his evidence that it was he who sold the article of food to PW1. According to him, he was in charge of the shop, and he issued the bill. He would say that the petitioner was asked to sign the bill only as a witness. He was declared hostile and cross examined by the Asst. Public Prosecutor. According to me, the version of PW4 in this regard could be accepted only with a pinch of salt. PW4 being an employee of the shop is naturally inclined to support the petitioner. It appears that in his anxiety to save the petitioner he has suppressed the truth before the court. It is relevant to note that at the time when the Food Inspector visited the shop, PW4 was also present in the shop. If PW4 was attending to the sales in the shop, the petitioner would not have accepted Form VI notice and he would not have accepted the price. If the petitioner was not the person who sold the article, the Food Inspector had no reason to falsely implicate him in the case. 7. The learned counsel also placed much reliance on Exts.D1 and D2. Ext.D1 is the acquaintance roll maintained in the shop while Ext.D2 is the register of employment. No doubt, it is gatherable from Exts.D1 and D2 that PW4 was the salesman of the shop. Even if it is assumed that PW4 was the salesman of the shop at the relevant time, if it was the petitioner who sold the coriander powder to the Food Inspector, he cannot escape from the liability. No doubt, it is gatherable from Exts.D1 and D2 that PW4 was the salesman of the shop. Even if it is assumed that PW4 was the salesman of the shop at the relevant time, if it was the petitioner who sold the coriander powder to the Food Inspector, he cannot escape from the liability. In Surgo Prasad v. State of U.P. (1961(3) SCR 324), it has been held that Section 7 of the Act enjoins every one whether an employer or a servant not to sell adulterated food and any one who contravenes this provision is punishable under Section 16 without proof of mensrea. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Haji Moideen v. Food Inspector (1969 KLT 628). In that case, it has been held that for the purpose of conviction under Section 16 read with Section 7 of the Act, it was immaterial whether the second accused who sold the article was the agent or partner of the first accused. Once it is proved that it was he who sold the adulterated article, he is liable to be convicted under Section 16(2) read with Section 7 of the Act. In this connection, it is relevant to note the following observations of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. K.Rajeshwar Rao (AIR 1992 SC 240). “The essential ingredient is sale to the purchaser by the vendor. It is not material to establish the capacity of the person vis-à -vis the owner of the shop to prove his authority to sell the adulterated food exposed for sale in the shop. It is enough for the prosecution to establish that the person who sold the adulterated article of food had sold it to the purchaser (including the Food Inspector) and that Food Inspector purchased the same in strict compliance with the provisions of the Act.� In this case, since there is reliable evidence on record to show that the petitioner was the vendor of the article of food to PW1, it is immaterial whether he was the salesman or servant of the first accused. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even if it is assumed that it was the petitioner who sold the article of food to the Food Inspector, the petitioner is entitled to an acquittal in view of the proviso to Section 2(ia) (m). 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even if it is assumed that it was the petitioner who sold the article of food to the Food Inspector, the petitioner is entitled to an acquittal in view of the proviso to Section 2(ia) (m). I see no force in this contention also. The proviso to Section 2(ia) (m) takes away the adulterated article from its purview if the adulteration is solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency. Ext.P9 is the report of the Public Analyst. There is nothing in Ext.P9 to indicate that adulteration was solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency. Even if it is assumed that the adulteration was due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency, the proviso is attracted only if the article of food is primary food. Primary food has been defined in Section 2 (xiia) of the Act as follows: "Primary food" means any article of food, being a product of agriculture or horticulture in its natural form. No doubt, coriander is a product of agriculture. But coriander powder is distinct and different from coriander. A mechanical process is involved in converting coriander into coriander powder. The coriander powder is therefore not primary food and the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso. 9. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, I see no reason to interfere with the order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner. This revision is groundless and is dismissed.