ORDER Arun Mishra, J. The petition has been filed for quashing the first information report lodged at Police Station Timarni, District-Hoshangabad at present in District, Harda vide Crime No. 95/83 for alleged offences under sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 13 of M.P. Vinirdishtha Bhrashta Aacharan Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1982 and sections 120B, 409, 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code and u/s 5(1)(c) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 read with section 13(1)(c) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Charge sheet has been filed on 5-4-2002 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. The first information report of which quashment is sought was lodged on 8-12-1983 mentioning the fact that Commissioner wrote to Supdt. of Police, Hoshangabad to enquire into the irregularities committed by the Executive Engineer V.A. Khan; preliminary enquiry was done; it was found that in the construction work of drainage no work was done and Government was defrauded; a sum of Rs. 18 Lacs was obtained by criminal conspiracy by the accused persons. It was found that Rs. 18 Lacs were usurped without doing any construction work on the spot and forged bill, agreement, work order and forged muster rolls, measurement books, bills, etc. were prepared; cheque books were also seized; it was found that they were all forged. After filing of the charge sheet, case is pending before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. It is contended that charge sheet deserves to be quashed as it has been filed after 19 years of the date of incident; sanction to prosecute has been obtained against six persons only, namely, S/Shri V.K. Khan, P.N. Nambiar, S.R. Garg, M.D. Sharma, B.K. Shroti and S.R. Garg not against the other accused persons. There was no direction to the police to investigate the offence under M.P. Vinirdishtha Bhrastha Aacharan Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1982. The sanction to prosecute was granted against six persons on 9-6-1994; charge sheet has been filed after eight years. Thus, same deserves to be quashed. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri S.C. Datt for petitioners submits that after 19 years charge sheet could, not be filed. He has placed reliance on Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc., , Raj Deo Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar, . Thus, same deserves to be quashed. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri S.C. Datt for petitioners submits that after 19 years charge sheet could, not be filed. He has placed reliance on Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc., , Raj Deo Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar, . It has also been contended that the Magistrate before whom the challan has been filed is not competent to take cognizance, thus, the charge sheet deserves to be quashed. Sanction has been obtained against six persons not against all of the accused of the State Government. The primary submission raised by learned counsel for petitioners is about the delay. In P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court has laid down that guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay's case holds the field; they are not exhaustive but only illustrative and are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a straight-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The decision which has been referred to in the case of Raj Deo Sharma (supra) and relied on by the learned counsel for petitioners has been specifically overruled by the Apex Court in P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka (supra). It has been held by the Apex Court that "Common Cause" - a registered society, espousing public causes in A Registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India and others, (1996) 4 SCC 32 and Raj Deo Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar, and Raj Deo Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar, could not have prescribed or drawn the directions made and were held not to be good law. The time limits cannot and will not themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to the further continuance of trial or proceedings and is mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same to discharge the accused. Their Lordships also considered the right to speedy trial. The Apex Court deleted the bar of limitation on twin grounds that it amounts to judicial legislation which is not permissible and a binding precedent. Their Lordships also considered the right to speedy trial. The Apex Court deleted the bar of limitation on twin grounds that it amounts to judicial legislation which is not permissible and a binding precedent. In A.R. Antulay's case (supra) it was laid down that fair, just and reasonable, process implicit in Article 21 creates a right in accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stages of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. Right to speedy trial of the accused has to be seen on the point of view of the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. Accused should not be subjected to un-necessary or unduly incarceration prior to his conviction. The worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation inquiry or trial should be minimal. It was further laid down that undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. Delay is a known defence tactic. Delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of the witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right of speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be answered is - who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. Frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying tactics cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. Undue delay must be viewed in the backdrop of all attending circumstances including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local condition and so on. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused; some delay may indeed work to his advantage. Undue delay must be viewed in the backdrop of all attending circumstances including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local condition and so on. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused; some delay may indeed work to his advantage. In the instant case, in my opinion, in view of decision of A.R. Antulay's case which is equally applicable to the investigation stage and the principles of which can be applied to the investigation stages also. As per test laid down in A.R. Antulay's case it cannot be said that the proceedings are liable to be quashed only on the ground that charge sheet has been filed after 19 years. The facts in the instant case are such that no construction work, as a matter of fact, carried out and the amount of Rs. 18 Lacs was usurped. Thus, merely on ground of delay, in my opinion, charge sheet is not liable to be quashed considering the serious nature of allegations and it has not been shown that how the prejudice would occasion to the petitioners in case the trial is held. Learned counsel has submitted that charge sheet has been filed before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class who is not competent to try the offence. As such charge sheet be quashed. This question was considered by the Apex Court in State by Central Bureau of Investigation vs. S. Bangarappa (2001)1 SCC 369 . It was held that even if City Civil Judge before whom the charge sheet was filed is not empowered to try a particular criminal case, that could not be a ground, to quash the proceedings. It was held that proceedings could be kept in abeyance till the Government issued notification conferring such powers on any other Court. In the instant case, such an objection has to be raised before the concerned Magistrate first; Magistrate has to decide it and in case he finds that charge sheet has been wrongly presented, the same can be asked to be presented before the competent court. Charge is of criminal conspiracy also u/s 120B of Indian Penal Code and it was held by the Apex Court in State of Kerala Vs. Charge is of criminal conspiracy also u/s 120B of Indian Penal Code and it was held by the Apex Court in State of Kerala Vs. V. Padmnabhan Nair, that when a charge against a Government servant is u/s 406 read with section 120B Indian Penal Code, obtaining of sanction u/s 197 of Criminal Procedure Code is not a condition precedent for launching the prosecution. The decision of the Apex Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli Vs. The State of Bombay, was followed. Against six accused persons, the sanction has been granted by the State Government. Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code requires sanction to be granted by the Government only with respect to those public servants who are not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the State Government. Section 19(3)(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that any error or omission or irregularity in the sanction required cannot be made a ground to alter a finding sentence or order passed, by a Special Judge; it was held in CBI vs. V.K. Sehgal AIR 1999 SCW 3742 as under:- 17. It is a further inroad into the powers of the appellate Court over and above the trammel contained in section 465 of the Code which has been dealt with supra. u/s 19(3)(a) no order of conviction and sentence can be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal or revision even "on the ground of the absence of sanction" unless in the opinion of that Court a failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. By adding the explanation the said embargo is further widened to the effect that even if the sanction was granted by an authority who was not strictly competent to accord such sanction, then also the appellate as well as revisional Courts are debarred from interfering with the conviction and sentence merely on that ground. Thus the legal position to be followed, while dealing with the appeal filed against the conviction and sentence of any offence mentioned in 1947 Act, is that no such conviction and sentence shall be altered or reversed merely on the ground of absence of sanction, muchless on the ground of want of competency of the authority who granted the sanction. No doubt the observation was made about dealing with the appeals which is not the situation in the instant case. No doubt the observation was made about dealing with the appeals which is not the situation in the instant case. It was held that no such conviction and sentence shall be altered or reversed merely on the ground of absence of sanction, muchless on the ground of want of competency of the authority who granted sanction. In the instant case sanction which has been granted with respect to six persons has not been assailed on any ground and the pleadings do not indicate that Government sanction was required in case of Sub-Engineer and Upper Division Clerks. With respect to Executive Engineer, S.D.O and other officers of the similar rank sanction has been granted. In the instant case with respect to Sub-Engineers, Upper Division Clerks sanction has not been obtained, it has not been averred that they cannot be removed without sanction of the Government. Thus, the petitioners have failed to justify that sanction was required to be obtained with respect to Sub-Engineers and Upper-Division Clerks of the State Government. In case of Mahendra Lal Das Vs. State of Bihar and Others, proceedings were quashed as the State was not satisfied with the merits of the case and was of the opinion that despite sanction trial would be mere formality and exercise in futility which is not the case here. Charge sheet has been filed; the Government has found a prima facie case of fraud of a serious nature. Thus, in my opinion, no case has been made out to make an interference in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The writ petition is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed