JUDGMENT M. PAPANNA, J. — Petitioner, Kailash Chandra Nanda, seeking the following reliefs such as : (i) Issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order under Annexure-2; (ii) Directing the Collector, Khurda, opposite party No. 2 to receive rent for the suit land from the petitioner; and (iii) Issue of a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties not to intervene with his possession and enjoyment of the said land and also to pay him compensation for having suffered harassment and incurred heavy expenses; brought before this Court the present writ petition under Arti¬cles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner’s case in the writ petition is that he is the son of one Bengabati Dibya, who since 1942 was in posses¬sion of the case land after it was leased out in her favour by the ex-intermediary, Chakradhar Mohapatra of Alishabazar, Cut¬tack,for which she was paying rent and though the ex-intermediary issued her “Hata Patta” dated 17.2.1942 for the said land which was in her physical cultivating possession (Nija Chas), yet it was recorded wrongly as Rakhit “Abadajogya Anabadi” during the settle¬ment operation in 1974 for which Bengabati Dibya moved a petition under Section 8(1) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act before the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar (opposite party No.3), who initiated Misc. Case No. 92 of 1980 and on consideration of the “Hata Patta” dated 17.2.1942, rent receipts granted by the ex-intermediary and above all her physical cultivating possession over the said land, came to hold that the land in question does not come within the purview of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and thus no settle¬ment under Section 8(1) of the said Act is necessary and that being so he directed to correct the existing entry in the R.O.R. in favour of Bengabati Dibya by his order dated 30.8.1980 vide Annexure-1 which was challenged by opposite party No. 2 in Revision Case No. 22 of 1992 under Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act before the Member, Board of Revenue,Orissa, who in turn set aside the order of the Tahasildar-cum-O.E.A. Collector, Bhubaneswar (opposite party No. 3) with a direction to correct the finally published R.O.R. incorporating possession of the peti¬tioner over certain extent of land only by his order dated 1.10.1993 which was challenged by Bengabati Dibya by filing a writ petition in O.J.C. No. 8192 of 1992 before this Court who adjudicated the matter holding that the order of opposite party No. 3 having been not passed under the O.E.A. Act, it could not have been corrected by the Member, Board of Revenue and accordingly, while quashing the said order, this Court further observed that the parties may agitate before the competent forum in accordance with law in case the dispute, if any, regarding the claim of tenancy arises in future. Being aggrieved by this order, the Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa and others including the Collec¬tor, Puri preferred Special Leave Petition to appeal vide (Civil) No. 3698 of 1998 before the Supreme Court, who ultimately dis¬missed the same with the observation that the parties may ap¬proach the competent forum to get their claim of tenancy or title decided, in case any dispute arises in this regard without being influenced by any of the observations made by the Tahasildar.We quote the order of the Apex Court thus : “After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order in this petition. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. We, however, consider it appropriate to clarify that in case any dispute is raised regarding the claim of tenancy or title by the parties in an appropriate competent forum that forum may decide that dispute on its own merits uninfluenced by any of the observations made by the Tahasildar.” 3. Besides indisputable facts as stated above, the most pertinent fact relevant and necessary for appreciation of claims of the parties is that the State of Orissa (opposite party No.1) moved a petition under Rule 42(A) of the Orissa Survey and Set¬tlement Rules before opposite party No. 2 to set aside order dated 30.8.1980 passed by opposite party No. 3. Though the petitioner filed his show cause calling in question, the jurisdiction as well as legality and propriety of the order passed by opposite party No. 2 in entertaining the said petition in view of the observations of this Court as well as the Supreme Court, yet opposite party No. 2 by his order dated 24.11.2000 set aside the order of opposite party No. 3 with a direction to maintain the case land as it was in 1974 settlement. Hence, the present writ petition filed by the peti¬tioner seeking the aforesaid reliefs. 4. Opposite party No. 1 while denying all the material allega¬tions of fact made in the writ petition by filing his counter affidavit, questioned the maintainability of the said writ peti¬tion filed by the petitioner. According to him, opposite party No. 2 under the provisions of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules, 1992 is the appropriate forum and is competent to revise the order passed by the Tahasildar (opposite party No. 3) under Rule 34 of the said Rules. It is further contented by opposite party No. 1 that the order of opposite party No. 3 is without jurisdiction and suffers from material irregularities in procedure and misrepre¬sentation of facts. Only to set aside an irregular order under Annexure-1 passed under Rule 34 of the said Rules, 1992, opposite party No. 1 preferred the Revision before opposite party No. 2, but not to get his title nor tenancy decided in the said revision. His further contention is that the suit land is the land of the Government who is its absolute owner and that being so, opposite party No. 3 dated beyond his jurisdiction by passing order dated 30.8.1980 vide Annexure-1. His further contention is that the suit land is the land of the Government who is its absolute owner and that being so, opposite party No. 3 dated beyond his jurisdiction by passing order dated 30.8.1980 vide Annexure-1. Above all, opposite party No. 1 ques¬tioned the genuineness of the “Hata Patta” in the absence of supporting documents for which the order of opposite party No. 2 does not call for any interference by this Court. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that opposite party No. 2 who was party to the earlier proceeding, as stated above, lacks jurisdiction to exercise revisional powers under Rule 42(A) of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules. That apart, he has contended that the impugned order of opposite party No. 2 is hit by the principle of res judicata as this Court as well as the Supreme Court already decided the matter and held that the order of the Tahasildar is right and legal. Above all, opposite party No. 2 has no jurisdiction to reopen the matter himself. 6. On the other hand, the impugned order passed by opposite party No. 2 has been supported by the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties. 7. In view of the above contentions advanced on behalf of both the parties, we are called upon to examine the legality or propriety of the impugned order as well as the question of juris¬diction of a opposite party No. 2 in passing the said order setting aside the order of the Tahasildar (opposite party No. 3) under Annexure-1. 8. A perusal of the pleadings of the parties indicates that the order under Annexure-1 is the subject matter of the dispute between the parties who have been in litigating terms centering round the said order. On a perusal of Annexure-1, we have found that the case land was leased out in favour of Benga¬bati Dibya by the Ex-intermediary as long back as on 17.2.1942 and thereby entitling her to become a tenant under the said intermediary. On a perusal of Annexure-1, we have found that the case land was leased out in favour of Benga¬bati Dibya by the Ex-intermediary as long back as on 17.2.1942 and thereby entitling her to become a tenant under the said intermediary. This shows that Bengabati Dibya became a tenant under the Ex-intermediary before the date of vesting of the Estate in the State Government in 1948 and that being so, she continued to be the tenant under the State Government from the date of such vesting with the same right subject to some restric¬tions and liabilities as she was entitled before the date of vesting as contemplated under Section 8(1) of the O.E.A.Act. It is also revealed from Annexure-1 that opposite party No. 3 who called for objections from the general public passed the said order under Rule 34 of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962, when no objection within the period stipulated was received from any quarter. Moreover, the said order is based on the report of the concerned Revenue Inspector, which indicates that Bengabati Dibya had khas cultivating possession and enjoyment of the case land in respect of which the “Hata Patta” dated 17.2.1942 was granted in her favour by the Ex-intermediary corroborated by the rent receipts showing payment of rent for the said land upto 1957. This shows that Bengabati Dibya, basing on the rent paid by her for the land in question as well as by virtue of her khas cultivating possession over the same claimed right of tenancy in respect of the said land. As such she was held to have acquired the tenancy right under the Ex-intermediary much before the date of vesting of the Estate in the State Government. Therefore, the order of opposite party No. 3 holding her to be a tenant under the State Government from the date of vesting with the same rights and subject to some restrictions and liabilities as she was entitled immediately before the date of vesting, is right and proper. Though the concerned Tahasildar felt it unnecessary to settle the land in her favour as it does not come under the purview of Section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act, but however, he felt it desirable to issue direction for correction of the existing entry in the R.O.R. in her name as contemplated under Rule 34 of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962, 9. It is contended on behalf of the opposite parties that opposite party No. 2 has exercised his revisional jurisdiction under Rule 42-A of O.S.S. (Amendment) Rules, 1992, to regularise the procedural irregularity committed by the Tahasildar (opposite . party No. 3) by passing the order under Annexure-1. It is further contended that opposite party No. 3 has acted beyond his jurisdiction in passing the order dated 30.8.1980 for which opposite party No. 2 exercised his revisional jurisdiction to set aside the said order. 10. Now question arises whether opposite party No. 2 has him¬self got the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order setting aside Annexure-1. Admittedly, opposite party No. 2 was a party in O.J.C. No. 8192 of 1993 before this Court and also a party in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 3698 of 1998 before the Supreme Court and both the Courts while refusing to interfere with the order of the Tahasildar observed that in case any dispute arises regarding the claim of tenancy or title by the parties, it is open to them to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law. opposite party No. 2 having been unsuccessful in both the Courts ought not to have exercised revisional jurisdiction under Rule 42-A of O.S.S. Rules, in spite of the said directions to agitate in the compe¬tent forum whenever dispute regarding right of tenancy or title of the parties arises and as such opposite party No. 1 should have approached a competent Civil Court for adjudication regarding right of tenancy or title of the parties over the case land. In the counter affidavit it has been admitted that opposite party No. 2 is not the competent forum to decide the dispute regarding tenan¬cy or title of the parties over the case land. In such a view of the matter, opposite party No. 2 is held to have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and accordingly, the revision peti¬tion filed by opposite party No. 1 before opposite party No. 2 is not maintainable ab initio in the eye of law. Moreover, opposite party No. 2 being a party to earlier proceedings he cannot be a Judge of his own cause and accordingly his action in passing the im¬pugned order setting aside the order of the Tahasildar, opposite party No. 3, is barred by the principle of res judicata. Moreover, opposite party No. 2 being a party to earlier proceedings he cannot be a Judge of his own cause and accordingly his action in passing the im¬pugned order setting aside the order of the Tahasildar, opposite party No. 3, is barred by the principle of res judicata. In view of that, the impugned order is set aside being illegal and with¬out jurisdiction. 11. Admittedly, because of litigating terms between the petitioner and the opposite parties, rent for the case land has not been received by the latter, as a result of which rent has accumulated over a period of twenty years or more. Though the petitioner filed a Misc. Case before opposite party No. 3 to accept rent for the land in question, but his prayer was rejected as at that time S.L.P. preferred by the opposite parties was subjudice before the Supreme Court, vide Annexure-3. Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner sought for appropriate direction from the Court regarding payment of rent also. 12. In the result, for the reasons indicated above, we allow the writ petition with the following directions : (a) The impugned order of the Collector, Khurda opposite party No. 2, under Annexure-2 is hereby quashed. (b) Opp.party No. 2 is directed to receive rent from the peti¬tioner for the suit land by easy instalments, and (c) The opposite parties are directed not to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the case land by the peti¬tioner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are to bear their own costs. CH. P. K. MISRA, J. I agree. Petition allowed.