JAYANT PATEL, J. ( 1 ) THE short facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed in the service of the Market Committee with effect from 1. 8. 1961 as per order dated 15. 7. 1961. The petitioner continued in service upto the age of 58 years. The service regulations of the Market Committee provided that the services of an employee of the Market Committee can be also extended for a period until the employee concerned attains the age of 60 years. The petitioner reached the age of 58 years on 1. 4. 1996 and the Market Committee passed a resolution on 19. 12. 1995 for considering the case of the petitioner for extension in service for a period of two years, i. e. from 1. 4. 1996 to 1. 4. 1998. Since the approval from the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance was required, the proposal was forwarded by the Market Committee to the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance who is respondent No. 1 herein. The proposal was considered by the respondent No. 1 and the order, dated 25-26/7/96 came to be passed (annexure "a") by the respondent No. 1 whereby the approval was not granted and it was ordered that the services of the petitioner be terminated. The matter was considered by the body of the Market Committee in its meeting dated 8. 8. 96 and ultimately it was resolved to act upon the order of the respondent No. 1 and as a consequence thereof the order dated 8. 8. 96 came to be passed by the Chairman of the Market Committee whereby the services of the petitioner as the Secretary was terminated. The aforesaid order of the respondent No. 1 dated 26. 7. 96 and the consequential order dated 8. 8. 96 of the Market Committee are under challenge in this petition. ( 2 ) MR. JANI appearing for the petitioner has fairly submitted that after 8. 8. 96 the petitioner has actually not worked as the Secretary of the Market Committee. However, he submitted that the petitioner, in any case, has worked as the Secretary of the Market Committee upto 8. 8. 96 and therefore in any case the petitioner would be entitled to consequential retiral benefits for the purpose of counting gratuity, pension etc. Mr. 8. 96 the petitioner has actually not worked as the Secretary of the Market Committee. However, he submitted that the petitioner, in any case, has worked as the Secretary of the Market Committee upto 8. 8. 96 and therefore in any case the petitioner would be entitled to consequential retiral benefits for the purpose of counting gratuity, pension etc. Mr. Jani submitted that in Civil Application No. 1894/00 the petitioner has stated that on account of pendency of this petition, all the retiral benefits are not paid and the petitioner is only paid gratuity amount of Rs. 1 lac as against the claim of Rs. 2,67,255/and in the submission of Mr. Jani the petitioner is also entitled to other consequential benefits which are not paid by the Market Committee to the petitioner as prayed in the said application. Mr. Jani, therefore, submitted that, in any case, if the court finds that the order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance refusing to grant approval does not require to be interfered with, then also the claim of the petitioner may be considered for the purpose of his entitlement for the retiral benefits for the period upto 8. 8. 96. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the Market Committee, Mr. Divyesher appearing for Mr. Zaveri has submitted that since the petitioner himself did work as the Secretary of the Market Committee, he was aware about the proposal already forwarded for the approval. He submitted that the petitioner, in capacity of Secretary, was also aware that the extension is granted subject to the approval from the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance, and when the approval is not granted, no grievance can be raised by the petitioner. He submitted that on the eve of election the outgoing body has made a favour to the petitioner by granting extension in service, otherwise, as such his services were not required nor the Market Committee was able to bear the financial burden of the petitioner. He submitted that the order passed by the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance is legal and the same is not required to be interfered with. ( 4 ) MR. H. C. PATEL, Ld. AGP has also supported the order passed by the Director, Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance of not granting the approval. He submitted that the order passed by the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance is legal and the same is not required to be interfered with. ( 4 ) MR. H. C. PATEL, Ld. AGP has also supported the order passed by the Director, Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance of not granting the approval. ( 5 ) AS a matter of fact, on account of refusal of interim relief the petition could have been disposed of as having become infructuous since by afflux of time the period for which the petitioner was to be given the extension was over and the same, in any case, expired on 1. 4. 98. Mr. Jani, however, submitted that pursuant to the extension granted to the petitioner, in any case, the petitioner has continued to discharge his duties as Secretary upto 8. 8. 96 and therefore the petitioner in any case would be desirous of getting the matter adjudicated for the purpose of claiming his right for the period upto which he continued in service, hence, the matter is examined on merits accordingly. ( 6 ) CONSIDERING the above and, more particularly, the submission made by Mr. Jani that the petitioner is claiming his entitlement to retiral benefits for the period until the petitioner was actually in service i. e. upto 8. 8. 96, the matter is required to be examined from that angle also. It is true that no employee can, as a matter of right, insist for his extension in service nor any right can be said to have vested with employee for extension even if the service regulations provide for enabling the employer to grant extension in service. In the present case, the Market Committee on the basis of existing service regulations had considered the matter and had thought it fit to grant extension to the petitioner. However, the respondent No. 1 has not granted approval and as a consequence thereof the services of the petitioner came to be terminated. In the present case, the Market Committee on the basis of existing service regulations had considered the matter and had thought it fit to grant extension to the petitioner. However, the respondent No. 1 has not granted approval and as a consequence thereof the services of the petitioner came to be terminated. It may not be lost sight of that the question of granting approval in service which might result into termination of service of the petitioner was to be considered by the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance and, therefore, the Director should have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing an order granting or refusing approval to the proposal of the Market Committee since the petitioner in any case was directly affected by the outcome of the decision. In the present case, it is an admitted position that no opportunity of hearing has been given by the respondent No. 1 before passing the order dated 26/7/96 and similarly no opportunity of hearing was also given by the Market Committee to the petitioner before passing the order dated 8. 8. 96. It is true that the stand of the Market Committee is that they have acted upon the order passed by the respondent No. 1, but at the same time, the relationship of the petitioner with the Market Committee is that of employer and employee. May be that the functioning of the market committee is under the control of and supervision of the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance, who is the respondent No. 1 herein, but that does not mean that before passing the order which results into civil consequences the employee of the marketing committee is not required to be given opportunity of hearing. The fact remains that the market committee has passed the order without giving opportunity of hearing and therefore the orders passed by the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance and the Market Committee terminating the services of the petitioner can not stand in the eye of law since the same have been passed in breach of principles of natural justice. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, at the same time, it can not be ignored that the petitioners services have been terminated from 8. 8. 96 or, in any case, the petitioner has not discharged his duties as Secretary after 8. 8. 96. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, at the same time, it can not be ignored that the petitioners services have been terminated from 8. 8. 96 or, in any case, the petitioner has not discharged his duties as Secretary after 8. 8. 96. Therefore, while considering the question of granting consequential relief, the petitioner would not be entitled to any benefit for the period after 8. 8. 96 on the principle of "no work no pay". On the same basis, the petitioner can not insist that his services ought to have been continued upto 1. 4. 98 because the petitioner has not actually worked upto the said period and he has actually only worked upto 8. 8. 96. The petitioner, legally, would be justified in claiming for the period upto 8. 8. 96 because actually he has rendered his services as Secretary of the Market Committee and the Market Committee also continued to take the benefit of his services upto 8. 8. 96. ( 8 ) THEREFORE, I am of the view that even if the order passed by both the respondent No. 1 and the Market Committee are set aside on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice, normally, the course which the court would adopt could be to remand the matter for the purpose of giving hearing to the petitioner and to give liberty to the authority to pass order. However, since such order of remand would be ineffective, because even if the hearing is made the period for which the petitioners period of extension, in any case, has expired and therefore no fruitful purpose would be served in remanding the matter for the purpose of giving hearing to the petitioner. At the same time, since the petitioner has actually worked as Secretary of the Market Committee for the period upto 8. 8. 96 I find it proper that the said period should be treated as the period for continuation of service of the petitioner, and the petitioner, as a consequence thereof, should also be entitled to retiral benefits. ( 9 ) MR. JANI has also prayed for appropriate direction to the Market committee to disburse the amount as prayed for in the Civil Application, I am of the view that the same is outside the scope of this petition. ( 9 ) MR. JANI has also prayed for appropriate direction to the Market committee to disburse the amount as prayed for in the Civil Application, I am of the view that the same is outside the scope of this petition. The scope of this petition is the challenge to the orders passed by the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance and the Market Committee terminating the services of the petitioner and at the most it would be restricted to the period upto which the petitioner remained in service by way of extension. What will be the retiral benefits and its amount etc would be the exercise to be undertaken by the market committee and, in any case, since there was no dispute at the relevant point of time about the retiral benefits, the said aspect is not examined keeping the right of the petitioner open to ventilate his grievance, if any, in future. ( 10 ) IN view of the above, the orders passed by the respondent No. 1, dated 26. 7. 96 and passed by the Market Committee dated 8. 8. 96 are quashed on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice and it is further directed that the Market committee shall consider the length of the service of the petitioner upto 8. 8. 96 and shall pay the consequential retiral benefits minus the amount which is already paid in accordance with law preferrably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of writ of this court. ( 11 ) PETITION is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. .