G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THIS intra-Court appeal involves certain constitutional issues of farreaching consequences. By the impugned order, the learned Single judge has declined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 vested in this Court on the ground that the petitioner-institution should seek the desired relief before its jurisdictional High Court (Madras High Court) though the original order (Annexure-C), which created the Us, was passed at Bangalore by the 3rd respondent-Southern Regional Committee, National Council for Teacher Education (in short the 'regional Committee' ). ( 2 ) LET us have resume of relevant facts. The appellant-institution claims to be situated at Veeravanallur in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is claimed to have been established by E. Managayarkarasi alias Grace dorris Hannah and his wife. The institution intended to offer course of training in teacher education. As such, it made an application to the regional Committee on 9-2-1996 seeking recognition under the National council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (in short the 'ncte Act') as a new institution. The said application was rejected by the Regional Committee by its order dated 28-4-1999 (Annexure-C) solely on the ground that the Government of Tamil Nadu under its order dated 14-10-1997 has refused to grant "no Objection Certificate". ( 3 ) THE above order was assailed by the appellant-institution in a statutory appeal preferred under Section 18 of the NCTE Act before the national Council for Teacher Education (in short the 'council' ). The council by its order dated 9-10-2000 (Annexure-N) confirmed the order of the Regional Committee. Aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate Authority, the institution filed writ petition in which the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge. For declining to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the learned Single Judge has formulated the following five principles, which, according to him, are well-settled and well-recognised. Aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate Authority, the institution filed writ petition in which the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge. For declining to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the learned Single Judge has formulated the following five principles, which, according to him, are well-settled and well-recognised. (A) That except for the territorial limitation placed upon a High court by the Constitution, there is really'no limit upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue prerogative writs, except selfimposed limitations; (B) The jurisdiction under Article 226 being an extraordinary original jurisdiction, issue of writs is purely discretionary and no petitioner can claim the relief under Article 226 as a matter of right; (C) Where there is adequate jurisdiction in another High Court to deal satisfactorily with a case, a High Court may, in appropriate cases, refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226, and leave the petitioner to pursue his remedy in the other High Court. (D) Irrespective of the relief sought, the High Court may mould the relief to be granted to meet the peculiar or special circumstances of a case. (E) Where the order passed by a Statutory Authority situated within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court merges in the order of the Appellate Authority which is situated outside its jurisdiction, unless there is any other factor giving rise to any cause of action within its territories, such High Court will not entertain a writ petitioner, merely on the ground the original authority is located within its territorial jurisdiction. ( 4 ) AFTER formulating the above principles, the learned Single Judge has taken the view that since the petitioner-institution is situated in the state of Tamil Nadu and it does not carry on any activity in the State of karnataka, therefore, the Madras High Court is the only "jurisdictional high Court" for the appellant. The learned Single Judge was also of the view that since the order passed by the Council at Bangalore has merged with the order of the Appellate Authority i. e. , Council at Delhi and which is the only surviving order, the same cannot be questioned before this Court because no part of cause of action in relation to the appellate order had arisen within the territory limits of this Court. ( 5 ) THE learned Single Judge on having noticed that there is a conflict between the judicial view taken by the Madras High Court arid the karnataka High Court regarding imperativeness of having "no Objection Certificate" from the concerned State Government for grant of recognition, the institution situated in the State of Tamil Nadu should be relegated to its jurisdictionai High Court (Madras High Court) to avoid conflicting decisions and judicial conundrum'. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing, Shri Narasimha Murthy, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant-institution and Shri Devdas, learned standing Counsel for the respondent-Regional Committee and the Council, in our opinion, the following questions need to be addressed by us. (I) Whether the Constitution of India recognises any concept like that of "jurisdictional High Court" based on the ground of residence or location of a person or institution? (II) Whether writ petition filed by the appellant-institution was maintainable before the Karnataka High Court on the premises that part of cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction? (III) If the writ petition is found to be maintainable before this high Court, then can this High Court refuse to entertain the same on the ground that some other High Court also had the jurisdiction to entertain the same? (IV) Whether, on merger of original order passed within the territorial limits of the High Court with the appellate order passed outside its jurisdictional limits, no part of cause of action survives for entertaining the petition filed under Article 226 questioning the validity of the appellate order by the said High Court? (V) Whether the respondents-Regional Committee and the National Council are bound by the stand taken by them before this court relating to production of'no Objection Certificate' and the consequent declaration of law by this Court? ( 7 ) RE: Questions (i) to (iv ). For seeking answers to the above questions, we need to have a closer view of Article 226 of the Constitution with its successive amendments and the interpretation given to it by the Supreme Court as regards jurisdictional limitations of the High court to issue prerogative writs and directions thereunder. ( 8 ) ARTICLE 226 of the Constitution as it stood originally was as under. "article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. ( 8 ) ARTICLE 226 of the Constitution as it stood originally was as under. "article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32". ( 9 ) IN the case of Election Commission, India v Saka Venkata, Rao the Supreme Court was faced with the question as to whether in view of the enabling powers in Article 226, as it stood originally, the High Court of Madras had the jurisdiction to issue writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission having its office permanently located at New delhi which is beyond the territorial limits of the High Court. ( 10 ) IN the above case, in order to support the jurisdiction of the madras High Court the respondent raised the plea that the decision of the Election Commission related to the respondents' right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly at Madras and the parties to dispute also resided in the State of Madras, therefore, Madras High Court should be held to have the jurisdiction to issue writ/directions against the Election commission though it may have its permanent office outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said High Court. It was also claimed that the position was analogous to the Court exercising jurisdiction over persons outside the limits of its jurisdiction, provided the cause of action arose within those limits. The Supreme Court repelled the contention by holding that. "the rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority "within the territories" in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction". "the rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority "within the territories" in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction". ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court ultimately held that the Madras High Court was not competent under Article 226 to issue any prerogative writ to the election Commission and quashed the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court which was appealed against. Following the above decision of the Constitution Bench, the Supreme Court in the case of K. S. Rashid and Son v Income-tax Investigation Commission and others , restricted the same by pronouncing that. "there are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; one is that the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs "must be within those territories" and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. It is with reference to these two conditions thus mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is to be determined". ( 12 ) THE Parliament having felt that the above limitations carved out by the Supreme Court on the exercise of jurisdictions by the High Courts under Article 226 may lead to hardships to the persons seeking prer ogative writs against the Central Government or the authorities having seats outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 inserted clause (1-a), after clause (1) of Article 226, which was subsequently renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. This reads as under. "article 226 (2 ). This reads as under. "article 226 (2 ). The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories". ( 13 ) THE object for which clause (2) was inserted in Article 226 has been traced by the Supreme Court in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia V State of Maharashtra and. Others, wherein it has been held that. "the object of the amendment by inserting clause (2) in the Article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election commission's case, supra and to restore the view held by the High courts in the decisions cited above. Thus, the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which "the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts". ( 14 ) THE provisions as contained in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 now as they stand and the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the said provisions makes it clear that the High Courts can now exercise the jurisdiction of issuing writs or directions not only to the authorities or persons residing or located within the territorial jurisdiction of the high Court but also against those located or residing outside the territorial jurisdiction, if it finds that the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. But, Article 226 does not permit the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction if neither of these two conditions are fulfilled. But, Article 226 does not permit the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction if neither of these two conditions are fulfilled. ( 15 ) ANOTHER important aspect of Article 226 is that mere place of residence of a person or having office within the territorial limits of the high Court does not permit the High Court to exercise jurisdiction to issue direction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh muslim University and Another v Vinay Engineering Enterprises (Private) Limited and Another, by holding that. "merely because, the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the high Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable". ( 16 ) SIMILAR view had been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of oil and Natural Gas Commission v Utpal Kumar Basu and Others, by holding that. "therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta high Court". ( 17 ) IN the case of M/s. Trishala Shoes (Private) Limited v Union of india and Others1, the petitioner-company before this Court was carrying on business in Karnataka. It imported certain goods from outside the country which were received at Bombay and customs duty was levied upon it. ( 17 ) IN the case of M/s. Trishala Shoes (Private) Limited v Union of india and Others1, the petitioner-company before this Court was carrying on business in Karnataka. It imported certain goods from outside the country which were received at Bombay and customs duty was levied upon it. The petitioner questioned the levy and sought refund by approaching the authorities at Bombay. Having failed to get the relief, he preferred statutory appeal, which was also decided outside the State of Karnataka. Under these circumstances, this Court after referring to the judgments in the cases of Shiv Shanker Lal Gupta v The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay and Others, M/s. Asiatic Labour Corporation u Union of India and Others, In the matter of Bharat Sugar Mills limited and Another and State of Rajasthan and Others v M/s. Swaika properties and Another, has held that. "the fact that the petitioner-company is located within this State has no relevancy at all to constitute 'cause of action' to challenge the levy of customs duty at Bombay. The 'cause of action' arose entirely outside Karnataka. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the Central Government has to be accepted". ( 18 ) ON the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for the Central government has sought to rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Haji Esmail Noor Mohammad and Company v Competent Officer, Lucknow and Others, to support the view of the learned single Judge that since the appellate order has been passed by the respondent-Council at Delhi and therefore this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. In our opinion, this judgment cannot be of any help for deciding the jurisdiction of this Court as it stood before the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and therefore the Supreme Court had no occassion to examine the purpose, intent, and effect of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution as inserted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act. In our opinion, this judgment cannot be of any help for deciding the jurisdiction of this Court as it stood before the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and therefore the Supreme Court had no occassion to examine the purpose, intent, and effect of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution as inserted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act. ( 19 ) COMING to the present case, the learned Single Judge has taken the view that even if it is held that part of cause of action of the writ petition arises within the jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court on account of office of the 3rd respondent-Regional Committee being located at Bangalore, still, jurisdictional High Court for the petitioner will be madras High Court and therefore this Court will not entertain writ petition and the petitioner has to seek relief before the Madras High court only. ( 20 ) IN view of the provisions contained in Article 226 and as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this Court the said Article does not comprehend any concept of jurisdictional High Court based on residence or location of the office of the person seeking relief under Article 226. As of law, as noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim university, supra, place of residence or location of office of the petitioner seeking relief under Article 226 is wholly irrelevant for determining the jurisdiction of the High Court. As already noticed, the jurisdiction of the high Court has to be based merely on residence or location of the respondents against whom any writ or direction sought for or the cause of action arising wholly or partly within the territorial jurisdiction of the high Court. Therefore, with all respects, we cannot uphold the view taken by the learned Single Judge in this regard. In our opinion, it is impermissible to hold that only because the appellant-institution is situated within the territory of Tamil Nadu, the Madras High Court is the only jurisdictional High Court for it. ( 21 ) NOW, coming to the question as to whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, we have to find out that any part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court or not. ( 21 ) NOW, coming to the question as to whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, we have to find out that any part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court or not. No doubt, the appellant intends to run institution at Chennai, but for that purpose it was required to make application for recognition to the respondent-Regional committee having its office at Bangalore as provided under Section 14 of the Act. Under sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act, on receiving the application, it is the Regional Committee, which was required to take decision on the application either granting or refusing recognition. In the present case, the application was rejected only on the ground that the appellant had failed to obtain 'no Objection Certificate' from the tamil Nadu State Government. This order, on appeal, has been confirmed by the Council having its office at Delhi. Therefore, the appellant had approached this Court with two grievances, namely, (i) that the respondent-Regional Committee had acted illegally in rejecting its application for recognition on a ground not permissible in law and without entering into the merits; and (ii) the Council had erred in law in confirming the order of the Regional Committee. The appellant in the writ petition had sought for quashing the orders of both the statutory authorities with a direction to the respondent-Regional Committee, Bangalore, to pass appropriate orders on merits. Therefore, at least, a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court notwithstanding the fact that the order of the Regional Committee had merged with the order of the Appellate Authority. Therefore, in view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the writ petition is maintainable before this Court. ( 22 ) APART from the above aspect, it is also to be borne in mind that in the present case, if the impugned orders passed by the two authorities are found to be bad in law on the ground that the respondent-Regional committee has failed to discharge its statutory functions in accordance with law then direction will be necessitated against the said respondentregional committee to pass appropriate order on the application of the appellant in accordance with law. Under clause (1) of Article 226 of the constitution, this Court has certainly jurisdiction to issue such direction to the respondent-Regional Committee. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellant is maintainable before this Court under clause (1) of article 226 as well. ( 23 ) IN the case of Nasiruddin v State Transport Appellate Tribunal, it has been held that "the litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises". This doctrine of dominus litis is therefore very much within the right of the appellant to choose its forum as this Court for ventilation of its grievance and this Court cannot say that since its remedy lies before some other High Court, therefore it can refuse to exercise its discretion. No doubt, the remedy under Article 226 is discretional remedy but the discretion has to be exercised objectively and judiciously. If the concept of discretion as understood in the context of maintaining a writ petition is to be understood in the sense of non-exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court having competence to exercise the same, the other High Courts also can take the same plea causing untold inconvenience to the litigants and virtually making them remediless. For the said reasons, we record our disagreement with the learned single Judge and hold that the writ petition filed by the appellant in this court was not only maintainable but it had right to have its grievance heard by this Court. ( 24 ) RE: Question No. (v ). The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. East India Commercial Company Limited, Calcutta and Another v collector of Customs, Calcutta, has held that. "this raises the question whether an Administrative Tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the high Court binding on subordinate Courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding". ( 25 ) IN the case of National Council for Teacher Education, Southern regional Committee, Bangalore and Another v Dr. Sri Jachani Rastriya scva Pcetha, Bangalore and Another, which had arisen out of the intracourt appeal preferred by the respondent-Council, this Court, after taking into account the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal medical Educational and Charitable Trust v State of Tamil Nadu and jay a. Gokul Educational Trust v Commissioner and Secretary to Government Higher Education Department, Thiruvananthapuram, has held that. "in response to our repeated questioning of the Counsel for the council, he states that the Act does not provide for throwing out of an application in the event of failure to provide no objection certificate by an institution. "in response to our repeated questioning of the Counsel for the council, he states that the Act does not provide for throwing out of an application in the event of failure to provide no objection certificate by an institution. On the other hand, the Counsel rightly in our opinion concedes that even in the absence of the same, the council shall consider such application in terms of Section 14 (3) (b) and pass orders against which an appeal also lies under the Act. We are of the view that taking into consideration the scheme of the Act the duty cast on the Council and the power conferred under Section 32, Regulation 5 (e) has to be read down as only providing for seeking a view from the State Government by way of no objection certificate or as an input for proper consideration of planned and co-ordinated development of teacher education. If the regulation so read it cannot be struck down as being in excess of the statutory power granted to the Council under the Act. The council has neither surrendered or abdicated its function in the light of our finding that the no objection certificate from the State government is nothing but an input or view for proper guaranteed development". ( 26 ) THE stand taken by the Council in the above case and consequent laying down of law by this Court certainly binds the respondents- council and the Regional Committee, having its office at Bangalore, as has been declared by the Supreme Court in East India Commercial company Limited's case, supra. ( 27 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders passed by the respondents-Regional Committee and Council are quashed with a. direction to the respondent-Regional Committee to reconsider the application filed by the appellant on merits and pass appropriate orders within three months from today. ( 28 ) IN the result, the writ appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .