P. VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 19th/23rd February, 2001, a copy of which has been produced as annexure-C passed by the 2nd respondent, wherein the claim of the petitioner for appointment in the 1st respondent-North Western Karnataka road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') on compassionate ground came to be rejected. Few facts, which may be relevant for the disposal of this petition, may be briefly stated as hereunder: ( 2 ) THE father of the petitioner, one Sri Hanumanthagouda Mallanagouda patil was working as Conductor in the services of the Corporation. However, he came to be dismissed from the service by the corporation on the ground that he had committed certain misconduct. In the dispute raised by him, the Labour Court, by means of its award dated 21st January, 1998 upheld the decision of the Corporation dismissing him from service on the ground that the misconduct alleged against him was proved. However, the said award passed by the Labour court was challenged before this Court in W. P. No. 22834 of 1998. However, this Court, while holding that the finding of the Labour Court that the misconduct alleged against the father of the petitioner was proved, set aside the order of dismissal made against him on the ground that it was excessive and directed award of 50% of back wages from 30th may, 1988 to 21st January, 1995 with a direction to give continuity of service from 1988 to 1995 for the purpose of terminal benefits. Subsequent to the order passed by this Court in the said writ petition, the petitioner made an application seeking appointment in the Corporation on compassionate ground. As noticed by me earlier, the claim of the petitioner came to be rejected by the Corporation by means of its Order/endorsement, annexure-C, dated 19th/23rd February, 2001. ( 3 ) SRI R. A. Shiraguppi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner challenging the correctness of the impugned order made two submissions. Firstly, he submitted that since the order of dismissal passed against father of the petitioner was set aside by this Court in the writ petition referred to above, it must be held that the father of the petitioner expired when he was in service and as such the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground in the respondent Corporation. Firstly, he submitted that since the order of dismissal passed against father of the petitioner was set aside by this Court in the writ petition referred to above, it must be held that the father of the petitioner expired when he was in service and as such the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground in the respondent Corporation. Secondly, he urged that the grounds assigned in the Order/endorsement, Annexure- crejecting the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground is erroneous in law. Elaborating this, he pointed out that the claim of the petitioner has been rejected in order/endorsement, Annexure-C solely on the ground that this Court in the writ petition referred to above had not made any order directing the corporation to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground; and this court has only directed for payment of back wages with continuity of service for the purpose of terminal benefits. It is his submission that since the only question that had arisen for consideration before this court was with regard to the legality of the order of dismissal made against the father of the petitioner and also the legality of the award passed by the Labour Court, this Court had no occasion to consider the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground. Therefore, he submits that the impugned order is liable to be quashed and a direction is required to be issued to the respondent-Corporation to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, Smt. Indumathi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents strongly resisted the claim of the petitioner. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that since this court has affirmed the finding of the Labour Court that the misconduct alleged against the father of the petitioner was proved, the petitioner is not entitled to seek appointment on compassionate ground. It is also pointed out that since the order of the Labour Court was set aside by this Court subsequent to the date of death of the father of the petitioner, the petitioner is not entitled to seek appointment on compassionate ground. She also, further submitted that the respondent-Corporation was fully justified in taking the view in Order/endorsement, Annexure C that since there is no direction given by this Court, the petitioner is not entitled to seek appointment on compassionate ground. She also, further submitted that the respondent-Corporation was fully justified in taking the view in Order/endorsement, Annexure C that since there is no direction given by this Court, the petitioner is not entitled to seek appointment on compassionate ground. ( 5 ) IN the light of the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, the only question that would arise for consideration in this petition is as to whether the impugned Order/endorsement, annexure-C is liable to be quashed? ( 6 ) THE facts set-out above would show that the father of the petitioner was dismissed from service and this Court in the writ petition referred to above while affirming the finding of the Labour Court that the misconduct committed by him. was proved, set aside the order of dismissal made against him. No doubt, before this Court made the order in the writ petition referred to above, the father of the petitioner had expired and it is only the petitioner and his mother who challenged the order passed by the Labour Court. This Court has set aside the order of dismissal as it could be seen from the observation made by this Court in the course of its order on the ground that the punishment imposed was excessive. Therefore, if the father of the petitioner were to be alive, he would have been entitled for reinstatement and would have been entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation. Therefore, the father of the petitioner must be deemed to have been in service and died in harness. This view of mine is also supported by the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Food corporation of India Workers' Union v Food Corporation of India, relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as thus:". . . . The stand of the respondents is that the policy changed after 7-8-1989 and, therefore, there was necessity for this Court to give directions as regards those persons who have died prior to 7-8-1989. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as thus:". . . . The stand of the respondents is that the policy changed after 7-8-1989 and, therefore, there was necessity for this Court to give directions as regards those persons who have died prior to 7-8-1989. The stand of the respondents is that the circular dated 7-8-1989 applies only to DPS workers who have died in harness and as such it is imperative that the said workman should have been actually working when he died but the applicability of the circular dated 7-8-1989 and, therefore, contended that the cases of persons who were not actually reinstated and who died prior to reinstatement cannot be considered for appointment on compassionate grounds. This stand of the respondent is plainly unacceptable because legally retrenched workmen were directed to be but had not been though entitled to be reinstated. Therefore, what is to be considered is the cases of those persons who had been directed to be reinstated and have not been reinstated and such persons must be deemed to be in service and died in harness for the purpose of this order and applicability of the circular dated 7-8-1989. . . ". This Court while setting aside the order of dismissal has granted 50% of the back wages from the date of dismissal, i. e. , from 30th May, 1988 to 21st January, 1995 on which date, the father of the petitioner had expired. Once the order of disposal is set aside, it must be held that the relationship of master and servant, i. e. , between the Corporation and the father of the petitioner revives and the father of the petitioner would be entitled for all the benefits in terms of regulations/rules framed by the Corporation governing service conditions of its employees. The observation made by this Court that the continuity of service benefit was given from 1988 to 1995 for the purpose of terminal benefits only, cannot be construed to take the view that all other benefits for which the legal heirs of late Hanumanthagouda Mallanagouda Patil would be entitled in terms of the regulations/rules of the Corporation is denied to them. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the only question that had arisen for consideration in the said writ petition was whether the dismissal of late Hanumanthagouda Mallanagouda patil from service was illegal and requires to be set aside by this Court. In that background, the claim was examined by this Court in the said writ petition and this Court had set aside the order of dismissal and directed payment of 50% of back wages with continuity of service. As noticed by me earlier, it is not possible to take the view that the other benefits to which the legal heirs of late Hanumanthagouda Mallanagouda patil would be entitled consequent upon the setting aside of the order of dismissal could be denied to his legal heirs. The Corporation, in my view, is required to consider the claim of the legal heirs of late hanumanthagouda Mallanagouda Patil in terms of regulations/rules of the Corporation on the basis that the order of dismissal passed against him was set aside by this Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has not been able to place any regulations/rules which deprives the legal heirs of the deceased employee to seek employment on compassionate ground on the ground that the charges of misconduct alleged against the deceased employee was proved. The circular dated 9th October, 1991 in No. KST:co:adm:rules:46 (l):3634:374:91-92, placed before me by the learned Counsel for the respondents does not provide for any provision which would deny the legal heirs of the deceased employee, against whom the finding of misconduct is recorded. On the other hand, the terms of the regulations make it clear that the legal heirs of the deceased employee are entitled to seek appointment on compassionate ground if they satisfy the conditions set-out in the said circular. It is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner does not satisfy the conditions imposed in the said circular to issue him an order of appointment on compassionate ground. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the only ground at which the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment came to be rejected is that this Court in the writ petition referred to above has not made an order directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the only ground at which the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment came to be rejected is that this Court in the writ petition referred to above has not made an order directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground. This is clear from the Order/endorsement, Annexure-C. Therefore, I am of the view that the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment is required to be considered by the respondents on merits. ( 7 ) IN the light of the discussion made above, I make the following: order 1. The Order/endorsement, Annexure-C, dated 19th/23rd February, 2001, issued by the 2nd respondent is hereby quashed. 2. Respondents are directed to consider the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds in terms of the circular issued by the Corporation and also in the light of the observation made above. 3. The respondents are given three months' time from today to , comply with the direction given above. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, this petition is allowed. Rule issued is made absolute. However, no order is made as to costs. --- *** --- .