ORDER Rajendra Menon, J. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner Corporation challenging the order Annexure P-1 dated 12-7-1996 passed by the Industrial Court, Gwalior directing for reinstatement of the respondent employee with 50% backwages. The respondent No. 1 was an employee working as Conductor with the petitioner Corporation while performing his duties on 11-5-1988 as a Conductor in a bus going from Mungeli to Bilaspur. It was found that 45 passengers were travelling in the bus. The checking staff found 5 passengers with forged tickets and 4 persons were found to have been travelling without entry in this regard made in the trip sheet. On the five forged tickets it was indicated that the passengers were travelling from Mungeli to Takhatpur but in fact the five passengers were travelling from Mungeli to Bilaspur. For this a chargesheet was issued to the respondent employee and on the basis of the finding of guilty recorded against him in the departmental enquiry vide order dated 31-10-1993, he was dismissed from services. The respondent employee filed an application u/s 31 read with sections 61 and 62 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act 1960 challenging the directions. The Labour Court vide its order dated 7-2-1996 Annexure P-4 dismissed the application filed by the respondent No. 1 employee. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 1 employee preferred an appeal u/s 65 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act 1960 before the Industrial Court, Gwalior and by the impugned order dated 12-7'-1996 Annexure P-1, the Industrial Court has allowed the appeal and directed for reinstatement of the petitioner with 50% backwages. It is this order which is assailed in this petition. During the pendency of the petition in view of the provisions of section 65 as only payment of backwages was stayed, the respondent employee was taken back on duty and on attaining the age of superannuation on 28-2-1998, he was retired from service. After the respondent No. 1 employee was retired from service and his pensionary benefits were not paid to him, he filed a writ petition No. 1199/99 before this court claiming retiral benefit. The petition was disposed of vide order dated 31-8-1999 and it was ordered that the retiral dues of the petitioner be paid in five equal instalments along with interest as mentioned in the order dated 31-8-1999. The petition was disposed of vide order dated 31-8-1999 and it was ordered that the retiral dues of the petitioner be paid in five equal instalments along with interest as mentioned in the order dated 31-8-1999. When the aforesaid order was passed, the fact with regard to pendency of this petition was not brought to the notice of this Court. Subsequently after petition bearing No. 1199/99 was disposed on the Contempt Petition No. 1/01 under Article 215 was filed which is also listed along with the present petition. In the Contempt Petition the grievance made is that the full wages of the petitioner have not been granted to him. It is stated in the Contempt Petition that all benefits arising out of order dated 31-8-1999 have not been paid and therefore action be taken against the respondents. A preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel appearing for the respondent contending that as the respondent employee had retired on attaining the age of superannuation and as the Corporation accepted for payment of all dues in W.P. No. 1199/99, the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of rejudication. It is argued by learned Counsel for the respondent employee that once the respondent employee was retired on attaining the age of superannuation and when the respondent Corporation themselves prayed for, action had been taken for settlement of his pensionary dues when W.P. No. 1199/99 was disposed of, they cannot challenge the order impugned now. As the present petition was pending on 31-8-1999 when W.P. No. 1199/99 was disposed of, it is to be presumed that the petitioner Corporation gave up their claim for challenging the order of the Industrial Court and accordingly on this ground alone the petition has to be dismissed. Shri A.K. Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation submits that in the order dated 31-8-1999, the direction was to pay the amount legally due to the employee and the Corporation has only granted him 50% back wages and the remaining amount were not paid to him and principles of rejudice will not be applicable. Shri A.K. Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation submits that in the order dated 31-8-1999, the direction was to pay the amount legally due to the employee and the Corporation has only granted him 50% back wages and the remaining amount were not paid to him and principles of rejudice will not be applicable. It is noted that in the Contempt Petition claim for back wages is being made the very fact that the Corporation had only paid 50% back wages is indicative of the fact that the Corporation were liable to pay the amount because of section 65(3) of M.P.I.R. Act and merely because the respondent was directed to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, that does not mean that the present petition is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted by him that in case the present petition is allowed, the Corporation is entitled to recover the entire dues from the employee. At this stage, I am not inclined to go into this question as I propose to take up adjudication of the present petition on merit because the question of considering the preliminary objection may be of no consequence in case there is no merit in the petition. The charges against the respondent employee were that he was on duty on 11-5-1989 in the bus going from Mungeli to Bilaspur and when the bus was checked by the checking staff 15 km away from Mungeli, 45 passengers were found travelling out of which 5 passengers were having forged tickets and with regard to 4 passengers no entry in the trip sheet was made. On the forged tickets, it was endorsed that they were issued tickets from Mungeli to Takhatpur while the passengers were travelling from Mungeli to Bilaspur. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the Labour Court framed six issues. A preliminary issue was framed with regard to the validity of the Departmental enquiry conducted by the employer and finding was recorded that the departmental enquiry conducted by the Management was legal and proper. However, after answering these issues, the Labour Court considered the question of punishment and by holding that the punishment is proper rejected the application filed by the respondent employee. However, after answering these issues, the Labour Court considered the question of punishment and by holding that the punishment is proper rejected the application filed by the respondent employee. After having held that the departmental enquiry was legal and proper, the order dated 7-2-1996 Annexure P-4 passed by the Labour Court does not indicate that it has considered the propriety of the finding of the guilt recorded against the respondent employee in as much as the perversity in the finding of the enquiry, if any, is not being taken into consideration. Because of this that the Industrial Court in its order has considered the evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry and after discussing the evidence in the departmental enquiry had come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the respondent employee are not proved. Shri A. K. Shrivastava learned Counsel appearing for Petitioner Corporation had argued that the Labour Court having rejected the application, the Industrial Court had no power to interfere with the punishment and as the passengers were travelling up to Bilaspur, the Industrial Court failed to consider the fact that tickets were issued only from Mungeli to Takhatpur and passengers were travelling without ticket and therefore no relief can be granted to the employee concerned. He had relied on the following judgments in support of his contention, M.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Purshottam Bhargava and others, 2001 (91) FLR 1972, M.P.S.R.T.C. and Others Vs. Satish Suryavanshi and Others, , M. P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Nandan Singh Yadav and others, 2001 (89) FLR 263, Ram Sahai Yadav vs. M.P.S.R.T. Corporation and others, 1998 (78) FLR 494, State of Haryana and Another Vs. Rattan Singh, and U.P. SRTC v. Basudeo Chaudhary, (1997) 11 SCC 370 . I have perused the aforesaid judgments relied upon by Shri A. K. Shrivastava. All the aforesaid cases are cases wherein on the basis of proved misconduct, the question of propriety in examining punishment, quantum of punishment, interference by the Court and other aspects of the matter have been dealt with. The aforesaid judgments would be applicable only in a case when it has been held that the charges levelled against the employee concerned are proved. However, in the present case the position is otherwise. The aforesaid judgments would be applicable only in a case when it has been held that the charges levelled against the employee concerned are proved. However, in the present case the position is otherwise. The Industrial Court after analysing the entire evidence as produced in the departmental enquiry in para 4 of its judgment has held that according to the documents produced only 45 passengers were travelling in the bus. This fact is also admitted by the Corporation and in para 5B of the petition it has been clearly mentioned that at the time of checking of the bus only 45 passengers were found travelling. Accordingly, the Industrial Court on documents available on record indicated that tickets to 44 of these passengers were issued by the booking office and entries in this regard have been made in form H issued vide Annexure P/14. From the aforesaid documents, the Industrial Court has given a finding that 44 passengers were issued tickets from the booking office of the Bilaspur Bus Station and one passenger was a member of the staff. This account for 45 passengers travelling in the bus if for all the 44 passengers, tickets were issued by the Bilaspur 600, Ring office, the allegation against the petitioner that he had issued 5 forged tickets has been held not proved. Again in para 4 it has been held that as far as non entry of 4 passengers is concerned, in the trip sheet, the Industrial Court has found that when 44 passengers were issued tickets there is nothing on record to indicate that respondent employee has issued any ticket. In fact a perusal of para 4 of the order passed by the Industrial Court goes to indicate that the Industrial Court on the basis of the material on record has come to the conclusion that the evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry is not sufficient to hold that the respondent employee is guilty of the charges levelled against him and therefore a finding has been recorded that the charges are not proved. As already indicated hereinabove, the Labour Court did not consider this aspect of the matter and therefore the Industrial Court had gone into the question of the misconduct being committed on the basis of the material on record. The Industrial Court having found that the misconduct is not proved on this basis of evidence available on record. As already indicated hereinabove, the Labour Court did not consider this aspect of the matter and therefore the Industrial Court had gone into the question of the misconduct being committed on the basis of the material on record. The Industrial Court having found that the misconduct is not proved on this basis of evidence available on record. This Court again cannot reconsider the evidence and come to a different conclusion until and unless it is established that the finding in this regard is perverse without evidence and contrary to the material on record, which is not the case as made out from the record. It is not the case of the petitioner Corporation that the finding recorded by the Industrial Court is without any evidence. On the contrary learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment and once it is established that passengers are found travelling without tickets, no interference is called for. As already indicated hereinabove, the said submission is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case because the question that requires determination in the present case is as to whether this Court in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution can upset the finding of fact recorded by the Industrial Court in para 4 of its order holding that the respondent employee is not guilty of the charges levelled against him. Shri. S. B. Mishra, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for respondent employer inviting attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni, Etc., and in the case of S.J. Ebenezer Vs. Velayudhan and Others, has categorically submitted that finding of fact cannot be interfered by this court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has clearly held that this court cannot sit as an appellate authority over finding of fact recorded by the Tribunals. Judicial review of orders passed by inferior Tribunal cannot be scrutinised by this court as an appellate court. This court cannot reappreciate the finding and come to a different conclusion. It can only see as to whether the Tribunal or the Labour Court has considered the material on record properly. Judicial review of orders passed by inferior Tribunal cannot be scrutinised by this court as an appellate court. This court cannot reappreciate the finding and come to a different conclusion. It can only see as to whether the Tribunal or the Labour Court has considered the material on record properly. A perusal of the order passed by the Industrial Court in this case indicates that the Industrial Court on appreciating the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the basis of the evidence produced in departmental enquiry came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the respondent employee are not proved. Admittedly, this is finding of fact recorded by the Industrial Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and therefore this court cannot re-examine the same and come to a different conclusion. Industrial Court having held that the misconduct levelled against the respondent No. 2 is not proved. The submissions and judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner Corporation cannot be sustained and therefore the arguments made by him with regard to the same has to be rejected. It is to be held that the order passed by the Industrial Court holding that the respondent employee is not guilty of the charges levelled against him has to be upheld. Placing reliance on the judgment of this court in the case of Purshottam Bhargava (supra) and by taking me through the order of termination as contended in Annexure P/1A, it is indicated by Shri Shrivastava that as per provisions of Clause 12(3)(c) of the Standard Standing Order, the past conduct of the employee was also considered before imposing the punishment upon him. It is argued by him that the Industrial Court has not considered this aspect of the matter. The said argument of Shri Shrivastava is of no consequence. Once it has been held that the respondent employee is not guilty of the charges levelled against him, the question of consideration of past misconduct is of no consequence. Past misconduct is considered only for the purpose of inflicting punishment at an employee who is guilty of committing some misconduct. In the instant case, the Industrial Court having held that the respondent employee has not committed any misconduct, the question of past conduct does not arise. Past misconduct is considered only for the purpose of inflicting punishment at an employee who is guilty of committing some misconduct. In the instant case, the Industrial Court having held that the respondent employee has not committed any misconduct, the question of past conduct does not arise. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that the order passed by the Industrial Court does call for any interference in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and therefore the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Final Result : Dismissed