TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) CONSTITUTIONAL validity of the Karnataka Stamp and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act 2001 (Act No. 6 of 2001) has been assailed in the present writ petitions in so far as the same has omitted proviso (1) to Article 20 of the Karnataka Stamp Act 1957 and inserted a proviso at the end of Section 38 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. The vires of S. 45-A (5) of the said Act and Rule 9 of the Karnataka Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules 1977 has also been assailed in so far as and to the extent the same prescribe a pre-deposit of 50% of the stamp duty determined for filing of an appeal against any order made by the District Registrar or the Deputy Commissioner concerned. ( 2 ) IN terms of the proviso to Article 20 (1) of the Karnataka Stamp Act 1957, stamp duty is chargeable on the amount or value of consideration set forth in the conveyance executed by House Building Co-operative Societies registered under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. In cases where the housing societies execute a lease-cum-sale agreement, a sum of Rs. 10 or difference of the duty payable on the conveyance and the agreement earlier executive whichever is greater alone was payable. By the impugned Act, the Legislature has deleted the first proviso to Article 20. The net effect, therefore, is that the concession available to the instruments transferring buildings or sites in favour of members of co-operative societies stands withdrawn. In other words, such instruments would like others attract stamp duty in the manner and to the extent otherwise prescribed under Article 20 (1) (i ). ( 3 ) THE solitary ground on which the deletion of the provision is assailed in the present writ petitions is that the benefit earlier enjoyed by the societies and their members could not have been withdrawn by the Legislature. There is, in my opinion, no merit in that contention. Whether or not any class or category of transfers should enjoy any concession in so far as payment of stamp duty is concerned is a matter which rests entirely with the Legislature. There is, in my opinion, no merit in that contention. Whether or not any class or category of transfers should enjoy any concession in so far as payment of stamp duty is concerned is a matter which rests entirely with the Legislature. It is true that till the omission of the first proviso to Article 20 (1), a concession was enjoyed by instruments of transfers executed by the societies in favour of their members yet the same could not possibly mean that the Legislature was denuded of its power to suitably amend the provision of even delete the same altogether. The deletion of the proviso signifies that in the opinion of the Legislature, the concession earlier enjoyed was no longer required to be continued. The Legislature enjoys considerable latitude in enacting fiscal legislation. It is for the Legislature to determine the extent of burden that should fall on a class or category of tax payers. It is also for the Legislature to determine whether any classification need be made and if so, the extent or nature of concession that need be given or preferential treatment extended on the basis of such a classification. Suffice it to say that so long as the amending Act does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution and so, long as the Legislature did not lack the requisite legislative competence to enact the same, the question of striking down the amendment or restoring the deleted provision to the statute book does not arise. ( 4 ) THE only other aspect that remains to be considered is whether the provision of Section 45-A (5) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 and Rule 9 of the Karnataka Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules 1977 in so far as the same prescribe a pre-deposit of 50% for the maintainability of an appeal suffer from any vice of unconstitutionality. The argument on behalf of the petitioner was that a pre-deposit would render the right of appeal nugatory and could not therefore be legally supported. There is, in my opinion, no merit in that contention either. A right of appeal is neither a fundamental right nor an unqualified legal right. It is enjoyable only in the manner and to the extent the statute creates the same. There is, in my opinion, no merit in that contention either. A right of appeal is neither a fundamental right nor an unqualified legal right. It is enjoyable only in the manner and to the extent the statute creates the same. It is not unusual in fiscal legislation to provide for a right of appeal subject to the appellant depositing a part of the amount demanded from him. Such pre-deposits qualify the right of appeal and do not totally abrogate the same. Even if one were to say that a pre-deposit tantamounts to, altogether denying the right of appeal, no fault could be found with the same having regard to the fact that a right of appeal is not inherent in a party to any adjudicatory process. There is, therefore, nothing unconstitutional, arbitrary or discriminatory about the provision prescribing a pre-deposit for the maintainability of an appeal. ( 5 ) RELIANCE upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Chellaram N. Kripalani v. Deputy Commissioner, (Writ Appeal No. 3509/2000 dated 30-5-2000) is, in my opinion, misplaced. In that case, the question was whether a pre-deposit could be insisted upon even in a situation where on the date of passing of the order challenged in the appeal, no pre-deposit was prescribed under the Act. This Court held that since on the date the District Registrar passed the order under challenge, a pre-deposit was not essential for filing of an appeal, such a pre-deposit could not be demanded merely because it had been subsequently prescribed. That is not however the position in the instant case. ( 6 ) THERE is no merit in these writ petitions which fail and are hereby dismissed. Petitions dismissed. --- *** --- .