S. R. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner seeks for recalling the order dated 06-02-2002 passed in Crl. R. C. No. 712 of 2001. ( 2 ) THIS Court has passed the order on 06-02-2002 in criminal revision petition stating that "the revision is dismissed for non-prosecution. " ( 3 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutor hasopposed the petition on the ground that the inherent powers of the court cannot be exercised for reviewing the order or for recalling the order. Learned Public Prosecutor has placed reliance on a catena of decisions of the supreme Court viz. . 1. R. Sarala v. T. S. Velu 2. State of Orissa v. Rant Chander; 3. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal; 4. Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh bajwa; 5. T. H. Hussain v. M. P. Mondkar; 6. Motilal v. State of M. P. ( 4 ) IN R. Sarala s case, the supreme Court held as follows: a young bride committed suicide in her nuptial home within seven months of her marriage. An enquiry under section 174 (3) Cr. P. C. was held. The sub-Divisional Magistrate conducted the inquiry and submitted a report holding that it was conclusively proved that due to mental restlessness shehad committed suicide and no one is responsible and hence it was informed that her death was not due to dowry harassment. However, the police continued with the investigation and submitted a challan against deceased s husband and his mother for the offences under Sec. 304-B and 498-A I. P. C. Deceased s father-the first respondent was not satisfied with the Challan as the Deceased s husband s sister, the appellant and her father were not arraigned as accused. Hence he moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. A Single Judge of the High court disposed of the petition under section 482 directing that the papers be placed before the Public Prosecutor "as it is without any further investigation and he shall render an impartial opinion on the matter and thereafter an amended charge-sheet shall be filed in the. concerned court. "the appellant s father filed a petition before the Single Judge for recalling it on the main ground that neither he nor his daughter (appellant) was heard nor were they made parties in the proceedings. But the Single Judge dismissed the petition on the main premise that Section 362 Cr. concerned court. "the appellant s father filed a petition before the Single Judge for recalling it on the main ground that neither he nor his daughter (appellant) was heard nor were they made parties in the proceedings. But the Single Judge dismissed the petition on the main premise that Section 362 Cr. P. C contains a bar against recalling any order passed under the Code. Hence the appellant filed the person appeal to challenge both the orders. Allowing the appeals, the supreme Court held as follows: though, no endeavour was made before the Supreme Court to canvass against the correctness of the view adopted by the Single Judge that the order could not be recalled by him due to the bar contained in Section 362 of the code, but even assuming it be so, that does not bar the Supreme court in considering the legality of that orderin the present appeal. In this case, the High court has committed an illegality in directing the final report to be taken back and to file a fresh report incorporating the opinion of the Public prosecutor. Such an order cannot stand legal scrutiny. The formation of the opinion, whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial, should be that of the officer in charge of the police station and none else. There is no stage during which the investigating officer is legally obliged to take the opinion of a Public prosecutor or any authority, except the superior police officer in the rank as envisaged in Section 36 of the Code. A public Prosecutor is appointed, as indicated in Section 24 Cr. P. C. for conducting any prosecution, appeal or other proceedings in the Court. He has also the power to withdraw any case from the prosecution with the consent of the Court. He is the Officer of the Court. Thus, the Public Prosecutor is to deal with a different field in the administration of justice and he is not involved in investigation. It is not in the scheme of the Code for supporting or sponsoring any combined operation between the investigating officer and the Public prosecutor for filing the report in the court. ( 5 ) IT is also observed in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander as follows:" (14) The first part of Section 424 provides that the rules, contained in Ch. ( 5 ) IT is also observed in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander as follows:" (14) The first part of Section 424 provides that the rules, contained in Ch. XXVI as to the judgment of a criminal court of original jurisdiction, shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to the judgment of any appellate court other than a High court. Ch. XXVI relates to the judgment. Sec. 366 is the first S. in the Chapter. It prescribes the mode of delivering judgment, i. e. , it shall be delivered in the open court and in the language of the court. Secs. (2) provides that the accused shall be required to attend, to hear judgment delivered. Sec. 367 prescribes the language and contents of the judgment and provides that the judgment may be in the alternative. When read with Sec. 424, it is seen that Sec. 366,367 and 368, which relate to the judgment of a criminal Court of original jurisdiction, are made applicable, as far as maybe, to the judgment of the appellate court other than the High Court. The effect of sec. 424, Gr. P. 6 would be that the judgment of the appellate court should, as far as applicable ) be in accordance with the requirements of Secs, 366, 367 and 368 of the Code. This rule is not made applicable to a High Court bearing an appeal. The proviso to Sec. 424 is significant, in that, it states that unless the appellate Court otherwise directs, the accused, shall not be brought up, or required to attend to hear the judgment delivered. This proviso makes an exception to the requirement, that is found in Sec. 366 (2), Which requires that the accused should attend when the judgmentis delivered. Sec. 367prescribes the language of the judgment and requires the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision that it shall be dated and signed in open court. While Sec. 369 prohibits altering or reviewing the judgment after a court has signed its judgment. Sec. 424 requires that the judgment of the appellate court shall, as far as applicable, be in accordance with Secs. 366,367 and 368 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which deals with the trial court. Secs, 369 and 424 do not restrict the prohibition under Sec. 369 to the trial court alone. Sec. 424 requires that the judgment of the appellate court shall, as far as applicable, be in accordance with Secs. 366,367 and 368 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which deals with the trial court. Secs, 369 and 424 do not restrict the prohibition under Sec. 369 to the trial court alone. The purpose of Sec. 424 is to prescribe mode of delivering of judgment, the language and the contents of the judgment while Sec. 369 is general in its application and prohibits all courts from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it has signed it. (15) The second section, that is relied on, is Sec, 430. Sec. 430 provides, "when the judgment passed by an appellate court upon appeal shall be final except in the cases provided for In Sec. 417 and ch. XXXII". The section deals with the finality of orders on appeal. An exception is made in the case of a judgment under sec. 417 that is, in an appeal by a public prosecutor against an order of acquittal, whether made by the trial court or the appellate court. So also, the provisions of ch. XXXII is excepted in that the judgment of an appellate court will not be final when provision is made for reference and revison. Neither Sec. 424 under Section 430 deal with the prohibition imposed under Sec. 369 prohibiting the court from altering or reviewing its judgment when once It has signed it. It was next submitted that. in any event Sec. 561-A of Criminal procedure Code runs as follows: 561-A. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High court to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent power of the High court is restricted to making such orders as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The scope of the S. has been explained in the two decisions of the Privy council, which have been uniformly followed by this court. In Emperor V. Khwajajvaeirahnuup, the Privy council, repelling the view that sec. The scope of the S. has been explained in the two decisions of the Privy council, which have been uniformly followed by this court. In Emperor V. Khwajajvaeirahnuup, the Privy council, repelling the view that sec. 561 A of Criminal Procedure code gave increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section Was enacted, observed that "it was not so" and proceeded to state: the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those powers which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved, and is inserted as Their lordships think lest it should be considered, that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. Reiterating the same view the privy council in Lola Jairam Dos v. Emperor observed that Sec. 561-A of the Code confers no new powers. It merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High court necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice. This court in State of Uttar pradesh v. Mohammad Nairn cited with approval the two decisions of the Privy council referred to above. (16) Section 561-A was added to the Code in 1923. It purports to save the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders (1) as may be necessary to give effect to any order passed under thecode, (2) to prevent abuse of the process of the court and (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The introduction of the section was because doubts were expressed about the existence of such inherent powers in the High Courts after the passing of the Criminal Procedure code, By the introduction of the section it was made clear that, the inherent powers of the High court, for the purposes mentioned in the section, shall not be deemed to be limited or affected by the provisions of the Criminal procedure Code. Thus, inherent power cannot relate to any of the matters specifically dealt with by the Code. It would follow that inherent powers cannot be invoked to exercise powers which would be Inconsistent with any of the specific provision of the Code. Thus, inherent power cannot relate to any of the matters specifically dealt with by the Code. It would follow that inherent powers cannot be invoked to exercise powers which would be Inconsistent with any of the specific provision of the Code. The saving of Inherent power is only for giving effect to orders passed under the code, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 20. Before concluding we will very briefly refer to cases of this court cited by counsel on both sides. Talab Haji Hussai v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar s case relates to the power of the High Court to cancel bail. The High Court took the view that under Sec. 561-A of the Code, it had inherent power to cancel the bail, and rinding that on the material produced before due court it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large cancelled the bail, distinguishing the decision in Lala Jairam Das v. Emperor (supra) and stated that the Privy Council was not called upon to consider the question about the inherent power of the high Court to cancel bail under Sec. 561-A. In Sankatha Singh v. State of U. P. . the court held that Sec. 369 read with Sec. 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a court. The accused applied before a succeeding sessions Judge for Re-hearing of an appeal. The learned Judge was of the view that the appellate court had no power to review or restore an appeal which hasbeen disposed of. The Supreme court agreed with the view that the appellate court had no power to review or restore an appeal. This court expressing its opinion that the Sessions court had no power to review or restore an appeal observed that a Judgment, which does not comply with the requirements of Sec. 367 of the Code, may be liable to be set aside by a superior courtbut will not give the appellate court any power to set it aside himself and re-hear the appeal observing that "section 369 read with Sec. 424 of the code makes it clear that the appellate court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed, except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error". Reliance was placed on a decision of this court in Superintendent and remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W. B. u mohan Singh (supra)by Mr. Patel,learned counsel for the respondent wherein it was held that rejection of a prior application for quashing is no bar for the high Court entertaining a subsequent application and quashing does not amount to review or revision. This decision instead of supporting the respondent clearly lays down, following chopra s case (supra) that once a judgment has been pronounced by a high Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional Jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that Judgment as there is no provision in the criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction, This court entertained the application for quashing the proceedings on the ground that a subsequent application to quash would not amount to review or revise an order made by the court. The decision clearly lays down that a Judgment of the High Court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the criminal Procedure code. The provisions of S. 561-A of the code cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. ( 6 ) IN Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal (3 supra), it is mentioned in the Head note as follows: criminal P. C (2 of 1974 ). Secs. 362 and 482 - clerical or arithmetical error - earlier order of High Court directing restoration of possession to respondent - application under Section 362 for clarification by a declaration that it was not binding on applicant and did not affect her possession - Not maintainable inherentpowers also cannot be invoked. ( 7 ) IN Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh bajwa (4 supra) the Supreme Court held as follows: (paras 9 and 10): (9) There is no provision in the Code of criminal Procedure authorising the High court to review the judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. This Court in state of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, air 1979 SC 87 : (1979 Cri. L. J. 462) held (para 20 of AIR Cri. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. This Court in state of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, air 1979 SC 87 : (1979 Cri. L. J. 462) held (para 20 of AIR Cri. L. J.):"before concluding we will very briefly refer to cases of this Court cited by counsel on both sides. 7955 SCR 1226: AIR 1958 sc 376 : 1958 Cri. L. J. 701) relates to the power of the High Court to cancel bail. The High Court took the view that under sec. 561-A of the Code, it had inherent power to cancel thebail, and finding that on the material produced before the court it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large cancelled the bail, distinguishing the decision in 72ind appl20-AIR1945pc94: (1945 (46) Cri. LJ. 662) (supra) and stated that the Privy council was not called upon to consider the question about the inherent power of the High Court to cancel bail under sec. 561-A. In Sankatha Singh v. State of u. P. (1962) supp. (2) SCR 871: AIR 1962 sc 1208 : (1962 Cri. L. J. 288) this Court held that Sec. 369 read with Sec. 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a Court. The accused applied before a succeeding sessions Judge for a re-hearing of an appeal. The learned Judge was of the view that the appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal whichhasbeen disposed of. The Supreme court agreed with the view that the appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal. This Court, expressing its opinion that the Sessions court had no power to review or restore an appeal observed that a judgment, which does not comply with the requirements of Sec. 367 of the Code, may be liable to be set aside by a superior court but will not give the appellate court any power to set it aside it self and re-hear the appeal observing that "section 369 read with Sec. 424 of the code makes it clear that the appellate court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error. Reliance was placed on a decision of this court in Superin tenden t and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W. B. v. Mohan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1002 : (1975 Crl. L. J. 812) by mr. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent wherein it was held that rejection of a prior application for quashing is no bar for the High Court entertaining a subsequent application as quashing does not amount to review or revision. This decision instead of supporting the respondent clearly lays down, following Chopra s case AIR 1955 sc 633 : (1955 Cri LJ 1410) (supra) that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. This Court entertained the application for quashing the proceedings on the ground that a subsequent application to quash would not amount to review or revise an order made by the Court. The decision clearly lays down that a judgment of the High court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal procedure Code. The provisions of section 561-A of the Code cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. "it is stated in para 10 as follows: (10) Section 362 of the Code mandates hat, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The Section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the Jormer order of final disposal is set side by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes functius officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. The Court becomes functius officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. The reliance of the respondent on Talab Haji Hussain s Case ( AIR 1958 SC 376 : 1958 Cri. L. J. 701} (supra) is misconceived. Even in that case it was pointed that inherent powers conferred on High Courts under section 561-A (Section 482 of the new code) has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is not disputed that the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code had been finally disposed of by the High court on 7-1-1999. The new Section 362 of the Code which was drafted keeping in view the recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission and the joint Select Committees appointed for the purpose, has extended the bar of review not only to the judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment. ( 8 ) IN T. H. Hussain v. M. P. Mondkar (5 supra) the Supreme Court has stated at para 12 reads follows: (12) We must accordingly hold that the view taken by the Bombay High Court about its inherent power to act in this case under Sec. 561-A is right and must be confirmed. It is hardly necessary to add that the inherent power conferred on High Courts under Sec. 561-A has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. After all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justice; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accused that the inherent power can and should be exercised in cases like the present. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE Apex Court has stated in all the above decisions, except in T. Hussain s case (5 supra) that inherent powers cannot be exercised for the purpose of review of the judgment order passedby the High Court. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE Apex Court has stated in all the above decisions, except in T. Hussain s case (5 supra) that inherent powers cannot be exercised for the purpose of review of the judgment order passedby the High Court. In t. H. Hussain s case (5 supra), the Supreme court observed that inherent powers conferred under Section 561-A has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. After all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justice; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accused that the inherent power can and should be exercised. ( 10 ) THE judgment rendered in T. Hussain s case (5 supra) is judgment of three Judges; whereas the other judgments rendered by the Supreme Court is of two Judges. It has to be seen whether the judgment delivered by the larger Bench prevails over the lesser Bench or not. It is now well settled that the principles laid down by the larger bench prevails over than the judgmentrenderedbyalesser Bench. The judgment rendered in T. Hussain s case (5 supra) has to be taken as the correct law laid down till it is set aside by a larger Bench. That is the- reason why the judgment has been referred to in Hari Singh Mann s case (4 supra) and stated that it was misconceived. In any view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the principles laid down in T. H. Hussain s case (5 supra) has to be followed taking into consideration of the principle of stare decisis or precedents laid downby the Supreme Court till it is overruled by a larger Bench. It is a fit case where inherent powers vested under Section 482 of Cr. P. C. [new Code] have to be exercised, as the main criminal revision petition is not disposed of on merits and cryptic order has been passed stating that it was dismissed for non-prosecution, though the court was not under obligation to assign reasons while dismissing the criminal revision petition. P. C. [new Code] have to be exercised, as the main criminal revision petition is not disposed of on merits and cryptic order has been passed stating that it was dismissed for non-prosecution, though the court was not under obligation to assign reasons while dismissing the criminal revision petition. In that view of the matter, I find that it is a fit case, where the revision petition has to be restored by exercising the inherent powers after following the principles laid down in t. H. Hussain s case (5 supra) as sufficient cause is made out. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, the petition is ordered.