Judgment I.P.singh, J. 1. The sole appellant has been convicted under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default one month simple imprisonment. 2. The facts leading to the case are that the appellant was a licenced dealer under the provisions of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984 of the public distribution system shop at Village-Bhalua within Budhauli Gram Panchayat of Nawadah district. It has been alleged that the Supply Inspector (RW. 2) submitted an enquiry report (Ext. 1) to the Anchal Adhikari, Pakariwarawan. In the said report it has been alleged that on 22.6.1985 the appellant was allotted 3 quintals of sugar for distribution among the consumers but the same was sold in black market. According to the Supply Inspector the consumers had made complaint against the dealer and on that basis the said enquiry was done and enquiry report was submitted. It has been further alleged that on 29.6.1985 the said report was forwarded to the Officer Incharge, Pakariwarawan police station for instituting a case. Accordingly a case was registered and a formal F.I.R. was drawn up. The police started investigation and after completion of investigation the police submitted charge sheet against the appellant. Thereafter cognizance was taken and finally the trial concluded with the result as indicated above. 3. The appellant pleaded not guilty and has stated that he has been falsely implicated in this case. 4. The prosecution in order to prove its case has examined altogether 5 witnesses. P.W. 1 is Sidhi Sharan Pandey, P.W. 2 is Jadunandan Singh P.W. 3 is Harendra Sharma. P.W. 4 is Bidya Bhusan. P.W. 5 is Md. Ishlam. 5. P.W. 2 the Supply Inspector informant of this case has fully supported the case of the prosecution. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that in the present the procedure for trial was summary procedure and it was necessary that the same Special Judge who had recorded the entire evidence ought to have decided the case and the successor in office could not have decided the case on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. 7. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that in the present the procedure for trial was summary procedure and it was necessary that the same Special Judge who had recorded the entire evidence ought to have decided the case and the successor in office could not have decided the case on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. 7. The rationale behind the aforesaid view appears to be that under Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specified for the trial of summons case has to be followed in summary trials and section 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence. Thus it is evident that in summary trial only substance of evidence has to be recorded which does not record the entire statement of the witness instead it only records the substance of the statement of the witness what he stated before the court. Therefore the Judge or the Magistrate who has recorded such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate the evidence led before him and the successor Judge or Magistrate cannot appreciate the evidence only on the basis of evidence recorded by his predecessor. In my opinion, that appears to be the reason why the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 326 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have not been made applicable to summary trials. 8. In the present case the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 was recorded by the Sessions Judge, Nawadah, the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 was recorded by the 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge, Nawadah, the statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded by the Special Judge, Shri B.N.P. Singh and the judgment was delivered by the another Special Judge, Sri Uma Shanker Prasad. As such it is obvious that the evidence of the witnesses was recorded by different Presiding Officers and finally the judgment was delivered by another Special Judge on the basis of the evidence recorded by his predecessor. The special Judge, who delivered the judgment had not himself recorded the evidence. He could not have proceeded from the stage where his predecessor had left the case and could not have used the evidence recorded by his predecessor. The special Judge, who delivered the judgment had not himself recorded the evidence. He could not have proceeded from the stage where his predecessor had left the case and could not have used the evidence recorded by his predecessor. Therefore, the judgment and order is vitiated on account of said illegality and the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. 9. Accordingly, the conviction and sentenced passed by the court below is set aside and the appellant is acquitted from the charge levelled against him. He is discharged from the liability of the bail bond. 10. In the result this appeal is allowed.