JUDGMENT G. C. De, J. M/s. Hindusthan Development Corporation Limited on the basis of this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has prayed for setting aside the Order No.2 dated 17.10.2001 passed by the ld. Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta in Criminal Appeal No. 101 of 2001. By the said order, the ld. Chief Judge while admitting an appeal under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.8.2001 in Case No. 4032 of 1998 issued notice upon the respondent complainant and thereafter, stayed the operation of the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of imprisonment, fine, compensation and cost till the disposal of the said appeal. The appellant was also permitted to remain on the same bail until further orders. 2. The petitioner herein filed a complaint before the ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta therein alleging commission of an offence by the present O.P. No.1, am Prakash Rajgarhia punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The said complaint was registered as Case No. C-4032 of 1998 and was transferred to the 15th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta for disposal. The trial Magistrate on completion of the trial by his judgment and order dated 16.8.2001 found the said accused guilty and convicted him under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for the dishonour of two cheques total amounting to Rs. 2, 33, 60, 231/- and non-payment of the same in spite of due notice and thereby sentenced him to suffer Simple Imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for three months more. In the same judgment, it was further directed that the accused person shall be liable to pay cost of Rs. 10,000/- in default, to suffer further Simple Imprisonment for 30 days. There was also a direction that if the fine and compensation money were realized, the entire amount shall be credited to the complainant. It was further directed that in case of default of payment by the convict, the complainant shall be at liberty to realize the compensation amount by the process of law. 3. It is already stated above that by the impugned order dated 17.10.2001, the ld. It was further directed that in case of default of payment by the convict, the complainant shall be at liberty to realize the compensation amount by the process of law. 3. It is already stated above that by the impugned order dated 17.10.2001, the ld. Chief Judge stayed the operation of the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of imprisonment, fine, compensation and cost till the disposal of the appeal. The present appellant being aggrieved by the said unconditional stay of operation of the entire judgment and order of conviction and sentence of imprisonment, compensation, fine and cost has preferred this revisional application. 4. The main question raised in this revisional application is whether the ld. Chief Judge acted legally, correctly, properly 'or with propriety in staying the judgment and the order of the trial Court in the manner indicated hereinabove without imposing any condition relating to deposit of the entire amount of compensation and the cost or any part thereof. 5. Mr. Bhaskar Sen, appearing on behalf of the present petitioner placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Stanny Felix Pinto vs. M/s. Jangid Builders Put. Ltd. & Anr. reported in JT 2001(1) SC 620 and referring to the provisions of sections 357, 386 and 389(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure contended that the appellate Court did not act properly in imposing such blanket order of stay in respect of the sentence, compensation, fine and cost. In the said cited decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that while suspending the sentence for an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court can direct at least a portion of the fine amount is to be remitted if the fine amount is found to be heavy. 6. Mr. Sen also relied on another judgment of the Apex Court reported in JT 1999(7) SC 558 (K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr.) in support of the contention that since the Magistrate could impose a fine up to Rs.5000/-, he was competent to grant compensation under section 357(3) of the Code and that no limit was prescribed in such a case. So it is argued that when an amount of Rs. 2,33,60,231/- was imposed as compensation and Rs. 10,000/. So it is argued that when an amount of Rs. 2,33,60,231/- was imposed as compensation and Rs. 10,000/. as cost, the appellate Court before granting an order of stay, should have taken adequate precaution to protect the interest of the present petitioner. 7. Mr. Sen also placed reliance on another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in JT 2002(1) SC 220 (Suganthi Suresh Kumar vs. Jagdeeshan) in support of the contention that in a case where the amount covered by the cheque amount remained unpaid, it should be the look out of the trial Magistrate that the sentence for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be of such a nature as to give proper effect to the object of the legislation. So, Mr. Sen contended that for a just decision the trial Court rightly passed an order of compensation under section 357(3) of the Code and also an amount of cost, and as such, the appellate Court before granting stay of operation of such order should have taken adequate security from the opposite party convicted in the case. 8. Mr. Shibdas Banerjee, appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.1, however, challenged the entire order of conviction and sentence passed by the ld. Magistrate and contended that it was not within the competence of the trial Court to pass any order of compensation under section 357(3) of the Code inasmuch as a sentence of Simple Imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 5000/- was passed. It is contended that an order under section 357(3) of the Code is permissible where a court imposes sentence "of which fine does not form a part". So Mr. Banerjee concluded that sub-section(l) and sub-section(3) of section 357 are clearly distinct in their applicability and the legislature in its wisdom has provided for different scopes of operation in respect of these two sub-sections. Since the sentence of imprisonment and fine was passed by the trial Court, it was not competent to pass an order of compensation. 9. Mr. Banerjee also argued that the principle of Stanny Felix Pinto (supra) is not applicable in this case inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court was moved from a judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay in its revisional jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Banerjee also argued that the principle of Stanny Felix Pinto (supra) is not applicable in this case inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court was moved from a judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay in its revisional jurisdiction. The High Court of Bombay in that case while suspending the sentence for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act directed the accused persons to deposit a part of the fine amount with the trial Court and the Apex Court in such a fact situation held that while suspending the sentence for the offence under section 138 of the Act, it is within the competence of the Court to impose a condition that the fine part is remitted within a certain period. It was also viewed that if the fine amount was heavy the Court can direct at least a portion thereof to be remitted at the time of suspension of the order of sentence during the pendency of the appeal. Mr. Banerjee contended that such a direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was advisory in nature and not mandatory and was left to the discretion of the Court below to decide as to whether such fine amount or part thereof is to be remitted before suspension of the sentence imposed by the trial Court in a case under section 138 of the Act. 10. Mr. Banerjee also contended that the direction for depositing part of the fine amount was passed by the High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction whereas in the present case, the appellate Court directed a stay of the sentence of imprisonment, fine and compensation which have been challenged before this Court. So it is argued that the right of appeal being a statutory right, no court can dismiss the same without perusing the records and applying its mind to the evidence on record. But in revisional jurisdiction without going into the merits of the case, a revisional application can be dismissed. Hence it is concluded that the appellate Court being a court of fact, its discretion is wide and this revisional Court is mainly a court of law for which it is not competent to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the principle enunciated by the Apex Court is not applicable in the instant case so long the appeal will be pending before the appellate Court. Accordingly, the principle enunciated by the Apex Court is not applicable in the instant case so long the appeal will be pending before the appellate Court. 11. Mr. Banerjee also argued that there is no provision in law as regards deposit of compensation amount and as such, if an amount is deposited cannot be refunded back in the event the appellate Court holds in favour of the respondent-accused persons. So it is contended that it would not be proper to direct deposit of part of the fine or compensation at this stage. Lastly, Mr. Banerjee contended that in the cited decision of the Apex Court there is nothing on record to indicate that any order was passed directing payment of the compensation by the accused as a condition precedent to suspension of the sentence imposed upon the accused. So Mr. Banerjee contended that the present revisional application is liable to be dismissed as the ld. appellate Court below has rightly stayed the order of sentence, fine and compensation in view of the express provisions of the statute. 12. In this revisional application the moot question is whether the appellate Court by a blanket order can stay the operation of sentence of fine, compensation and cost by passing a blanket order without taking any security from the accused or without ensuring due payment of fine, compensation and cost in the event the appeal is dismissed. It is already indicated above that the main argument centres round the power of the trial Court to pass an order of compensation under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But in this revisional application, I am not called upon to answer this question so long the appeal is pending before the ld. City Sessions, Judge. It is only to be decided whether the ld. Sessions Judge acted lawfully in passing the blanket order of stay. Admittedly, in this revisional application this power of the appellate Court has been challenged and it is undoubtedly a pure question of law which this Court is competent to adjudicate. 13. City Sessions, Judge. It is only to be decided whether the ld. Sessions Judge acted lawfully in passing the blanket order of stay. Admittedly, in this revisional application this power of the appellate Court has been challenged and it is undoubtedly a pure question of law which this Court is competent to adjudicate. 13. The principle adopted in Stanny Felix Pinto (supra) is in the nature of securing the fine amount as far as practicable and in the cited decision, the Apex Court took the view that when considering the total amount of fine imposed by the trial Court, there is nothing unjust or unconscionable in imposing a condition like remittance of the amount of fine imposed within a certain period or to remit a portion of the fine if the fine amount was found to be heavy. 14. In K. Bhaskaran's case(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the trial Magistrate of First Class could not have imposed a fine exceeding Rs.5000/- besides imprisonment, but no limit is mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 357 of the Code as regards the amount that can be imposed as compensation. The same view was expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a different pretext in Suganthi Suresh Kumar's case(supra). So it cannot be said at this stage that passing of the order of compensation and cost was not within the competence of the ld. Magistrate and for that reason, the appellate Court was justified in passing an order of stay. On the other hand, when the trial Court found the accused guilty for non-payment of the sum of Rs. 2,33,60,231/ - included in the dishonoured cheques and sentenced the accused to suffer Simple Imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- along with a direction to pay a compensation of Rs. 2,33,60,231/- and a cost of Rs. 10,000/-, the appellate Court while suspending the sentence should have taken into consideration this aspect and was required to secure the amount appropriately. Since such a course was not taken by the appellate Court, I hold and conclude that it is within the competence of this revisional court to regularise the said order of stay granted by the appellate Court by imposing condition so that the payment of the entire money is adequately secured. Since such a course was not taken by the appellate Court, I hold and conclude that it is within the competence of this revisional court to regularise the said order of stay granted by the appellate Court by imposing condition so that the payment of the entire money is adequately secured. In the event the accused is found not guilty by the appellate Court, there would not be any bar in refunding the said amount inasmuch as the amount of compensation directed to be deposited in Court will be in the nature of deposit of fine. The refund of fine amount after a finding of 'not guilty' is not unknown in the Procedure of Criminal Courts. There are rules as regards deposit as well as refund of fine amount by the criminal courts and such a course is being followed by all the criminal courts in India. 15. So, after a due consideration of the materials on record and the circumstances, I hold and conclude that the order of blanket stay granted by the appellate Court is liable to be modified to the extent that the accused person shall deposit one-fourth of the compensation amount in cash before the appellate Court within four weeks from the date of communication of this order and also secure the remaining amount of compensation along with the amount of cost by furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the appellate Court within four weeks from the date of communication of this order. If the said one-fourth amount of compensation is not deposited and the rest of the amount of compensation and cost are not secured within the stipulated period, the order of stay shall stand vacated. With this modification, this application is disposed of. It is made clear that since I have not gone into the merits of this case, the appellate Court shall be at liberty to proceed with the hearing of this appeal in accordance with law without being influenced by this order. 16. Let a copy of this order be sent to the court below forthwith. Xerox certified copies of this order be supplied to the parties by the Criminal Section of this Court within seven days. Application disposed of with modification.