JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This writ petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, takes exception to the order passed by the School Tribunal, Pune Region, Pune dated 16th September, 1988 in Appeal No. 52 of 1988. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the respondent school. It is not in dispute that before the completion of one year, his services came to be terminated by order dated 26th March, 1987 on the premise that he was appointed against a temporary post only for one academic year. That order was challenged by the petitioner before the School Tribunal by way of Appeal No. 36 of 1987. The School Tribunal allowed the said appeal by order dated 30th June, 1987. The School Tribunal held that the appointment of the petitioner was against the permanent vacancy and therefore, on probation. In the circumstances, the Tribunal held that the termination order was illegal as it was founded on wrong assumption. The petitioner was accordingly continued in service. It is however, before the expiry of the two years, the management once again terminated the service of the petitioner on 29th April, 1988. The reason indicated in the order is that probation period was to expire and therefore, you are removed from the service with effect from 30th April, 1988. This order was challenged by the petitioner before the School Tribunal by way of Appeal No. 52 of 1988. Before the Tribunal management adduced several materials to justify its order while contending that the petitioner was on probation and that his termination was simple termination. Nevertheless, the materials were relied by the management only to justify its order to contend that the management was of the view that the work performance of the petitioner was not satisfactory. Besides, there was material to suggest that even the conduct of the petitioner was not proper. The Tribunal has analysed the entire materials and found that the subject termination was simple termination and there was material to justify the view formed by the management and there was no warrant to interfere with the order passed by the management. Accordingly, appeal came to be dismissed by order dated 16th June, 1988. This order is challenged in the present writ petition. 3. According to Mr. Accordingly, appeal came to be dismissed by order dated 16th June, 1988. This order is challenged in the present writ petition. 3. According to Mr. Sakhare the petitioner was appointed initially on 11th July, 1986 and he continued for one academic term but his services were terminated by order dated 26th March, 1987, which order has been set aside and his services were reinstated. He contends that the petitioner continued for the second academic year and has successfully completed the second academic year. In this view of the matter, according to him, the management could not have terminated the services of the petitioner, but by taking recourse to the enquiry contemplated under Rule 36 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981. It is next contended that in any case the only reason stated in the impugned order is that the petitioner's services were terminated as the probation period was to expire and not because of his work performance or otherwise. Moreover, the said order is punitive one because the materials referred by the management to justify the order are nothing but stigmatic. He further contends that in any case the management cannot be allowed to rely on those materials as that is not the basis specified in the order. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents has supported the order passed by the Tribunal. The respondents have seriously disputed that the petitioner had already completed two years service before the impugned order was passed, as contended by the petitioner. Further, according to the respondents, the order is simple termination and therefore, is not punitive in nature. If this be so, no other enquiry was necessary. Moreover, the management has justified the order also by pointing out materials and those materials cannot be used against the management to hold that the subject order was punitive in nature or to hold that in absence of enquiry conducted under Rule 36 the same would be invalid. Reliance has been placed on the ruling reported in 59 F.L.R. page 95 (Bombay High Court Division Bench) (Abdul Menon Azmi)1, 2002(1) All.M.R. 104 (Bombay D.B.) (Shri Gor Tushar Jayantilal v. The Secretary, Seth P.T. Seth T.G. Nanavati Charity Trust and 3 others)2, 2001(9) S.C.C. 319 (Krishnadevaraya Education Trust and another v. L.A. Balakrishana)3, 2002(1) All.M.R. 302(S.C.) (Pavenendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences and another)4. 4. After having considered the rival submissions, I am of the view that there is no substance in this writ petition. The first contention that the petitioner has completed two years in service as he worked for two complete academic years and therefore completed the probation period is without any substance. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules to support this contention. On the other hand the express provision is that the probation period would continue for a period of two years. The term "two years" referred to therein cannot be ascribed to "two academic years" as is sought to be contended, for that would tantamount to re-writing the relevant provision. Atleast the scheme of the provisions do not give such indication and the learned Counsel has not referred to any such specific provision in that regard. Admittedly, in the present case the petitioner was appointed on 11-7-1986, whereas came to be terminated by the impugned order dated 29-4-1988 w.e.f. 30-4-1988, i.e. within two years. Hence, there is no substance in the argument that the petitioner had already completed his probation period and therefore, could not be removed without holding enquiry under Rule 36, as contended. 5. There is no substance even in the other contentions. The subject termination order as produced on record clearly mentions that the petitioner was being removed from 30th April, 1988 since his probation period was to expire. The management has rightly contended that the termination order was simple termination and not punitive one. The management has no doubt relied on materials before the Tribunal to justify its decision of terminating the services of the petitioner. The legal position in this respect is enunciated in the decision of the Apex Court 2001(9) S.C.C. 319 as well as 2002(1) All.M.R. 302(S.C.) that those materials cannot be used against the management to hold that the order was punitive in nature. Both these decisions have analyzed the entire gamut of case law on the subject. The Apex Court in the former judgment in paragraph 5 has observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. The Apex Court in the former judgment in paragraph 5 has observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. The Apex Court further observed that if the services are not satisfactory, which means that he is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. The Apex Court further observed that termination during probation period if without any reason, perhaps such an order would be sought to be challenged on the ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, naturally, services of an employee on probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. Even in the present case, no reason has been assigned except stating that probation period has expired. The Apex Court has observed that if the order on the face of it states that services have been terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk of the allegations being made, that the order itself casts a stigma. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. The mere fact that in response to the challenge the employer states that the services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment. Even in the subsequent decision referred to above, the Apex Court has reiterated the said legal position. The Apex Court in paragraph 29 of this decision has observed that generally speaking when a probationer's appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude---Whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. The Apex Court then observed that in order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. 6. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. The Apex Court then observed that in order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. 6. Applying the above settled principles, it is incomprehensible as to how the subject order passed can be said to be illegal or invalid or for that matter stigmatic and would require the management to conduct enquiry against the petitioner before terminating the services. Accordingly, merely because the management has relied on certain matters while justifying its action, that would obviously not weigh against the management. Moreover, those materials cannot be the basis to doubt the genuineness and validity of the order. In Pavenendra's case (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of this decision, the Apex Court has observed that equally an order which is otherwise valid cannot be invalidated by reason of any statement in any affidavit seeking to justify the order. For this statement of law, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushal Kumar Shukla)5, 1991(1) S.C.C. 691 case. 7. Understood thus, there is no substances in any of the abovesaid contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Hence this petition fails and therefore, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule discharged. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----