Judgment ( 1. ) THE petitioner who was working as Assistant Manager, Cash in the United Commercial Bank, Sabalgarh, Distt. Morena has called in question the order dated September 9, 1998 Annexure P-1 passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment of removal from service with immediate effect and the order Annexure P-2 dated September 9, 1998 passed by the Appellate Authority modifying the punishment in appeal and converting the same into compulsory retirement from service. ( 2. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner he was appointed as a Cashier cum Godown Keeper in the respondent Bank with effect from January 29, 1973. He was promoted to the post of Junior Management Grade Scale-I in the year 1987 and was posted at Sabalgarh vide order dated January 14, 1992. ( 3. ) WHILE the petitioner was working in the Sabalgarh Branch he was suspended on March 14, 1996, by order dated March 12, 1996 Annexure P-6 and subsequently a chargesheet dated July 5, 1996 Annexure P-7 was issued to him. The petitioner submitted his reply to the chargesheet vide Annexure P-8. Vide Annexure P-9 certain corrections were done to the chargesheet. An enquiry was ordered and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on July 14, 1997 vide Annexure P-10 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter the Disciplinary authority Respondent No. 3 passed the order of punishment vide Annexure P-1. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the appellate authority vide memorandum of appeal Annexure P-12. The appellate authority after hearing the petitioner in response to his appeal passed the order Annexure P-2 reducing the punishment from that of removal of service to compulsory retirement. The petitioner had submitted a Review Petition before the Respondent No. 1 but the same remained undecided till date. ( 4. ) THE petitioner by this petition has challenged the orders Annexures P-1 and P-2 on various grounds. The main ground urged by the petitioner are: (i) documents requested for by the petitioner were not submitted. (ii) that the evidence account holders who are examined as defence witnesses by the petitioner were not considered by the authorities concerned. (iii) the findings of the enquiry officer is perverse. (iv) Opportunity of examination of the petitioner as required under Rule 6. 17 of the United Commercial Bank Officer Employees Regulations 1976 hereinafter referred as the regulations were not followed. (iii) the findings of the enquiry officer is perverse. (iv) Opportunity of examination of the petitioner as required under Rule 6. 17 of the United Commercial Bank Officer Employees Regulations 1976 hereinafter referred as the regulations were not followed. (v) The statement of witnesses recorded in the preliminary enquiry, copy of the report of the preliminary enquiry and copy of the complaint were not supplied to him. ( 5. ) IN the enquiry proper opportunity of defence was not given. In all it is stated by the petitioner that the enquiry was held contrary to rules in violation of the principles of natural justice and deserves to be quashed. ( 6. ) THE respondent Bank on the contrary submitted that the petitioner has committed serious act of misconduct and the entire action was taken against him in accordance with the rules and regulations. Full opportunity of defence was extended to the petitioner and there are enough material available on record on the basis of which finding of guilt has been recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the appellate authority has modified the order of punishment. The respondent bank have also made available the original enquiry proceedings for perusal of this Court. It is submitted by the bank that in view of the above, no interference is called for. ( 7. ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. It was vehemently submitted by Shri D. K. Katare learned counsel for the petitioner that copies of the complaint, statement recorded in the preliminary enquiry and the material on the basis of which charge-sheet was issued were not supplied to him. It is also argued by him that the account holders have given their statement from the statement of DW-1 Shri Chirongilal appearing at page 155 of the enquiry proceedings and the statement of D W-2 appearing at page 165 of the enquiry proceedings. They have clearly stated that they have no complaint against the petitioner as the account holders had no complaint. The enquiry officers observation that the witnesses are tutored is a perverse finding. It is also stated by him that before issuing the punishment order show cause notice was not issued to him. ( 8. ) IN support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance in the cases of Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and Ors. The enquiry officers observation that the witnesses are tutored is a perverse finding. It is also stated by him that before issuing the punishment order show cause notice was not issued to him. ( 8. ) IN support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance in the cases of Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1986 SC 2118 : 1986 (3) SCC 229 1986 2 LLJ468, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr. , AIR 1987 SC 943 : 1987 (2) SCC 179 , Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 67 : 1999 (2) SCC 10 : 1999-I-LLJ604. Union of India v. K. A. Kittu and Ors. , 2001 (1) SCC 65 : 2001-I-LU-157, Dayaram Dayal v. State of M. P. and Anr. , AIR 1997 SC 3269 : 1997 (7) SCC 443 : 1998-I-LLJ336. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments, counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the bank cannot be sustained and the orders impugned are liable to be quashed. ( 9. ) PER contra Shri N. K. Mody, learned counsel for the Bank has submitted that in the instant case action has been taken as per the principles of natural justice, reasonable opportunity of defence was extended to the petitioner. Inviting my attention to various proceedings that have taken place it is stated that all the relevant documents were supplied to the petitioner and no prejudice has been caused. Referring to various judgments arguments were advanced with regard to scope of interference with such matters. According to the learned counsel no case warranting interference is made out. ( 10. ) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. ( 11. ) THE charges which were levelled against the petitioner are contained in the charge-sheet dated June 5, 1996 Annexure P-7 and the allegations are contained in the statement of allegation which is at Page 32 of the petition. According to the allegations, the petitioner while functioning as Assistant Bank Manager at Sabalgarh Branch in the year 1992 indulged in various acts of commission and omission. It is averred that by making fictitious credit entries he had extended benefits to the tune of Rs. 70,000/-by passing forged withdrawals. According to the allegations, the petitioner while functioning as Assistant Bank Manager at Sabalgarh Branch in the year 1992 indulged in various acts of commission and omission. It is averred that by making fictitious credit entries he had extended benefits to the tune of Rs. 70,000/-by passing forged withdrawals. Amongst others, the articles of allegations are as under: "shri S. K. Mittal, PFM No. 14118, while functioning as Asstt. Manager, Sabalgarh branch during the period commencing from 1992, indulged in various acts of omission and commission, the details of which are as -under: 1. Shri S. K. Mittal, on November 20, 1995, allowed one Shri Banwarilal Sharma to open a Savings Bank account with an initial cash deposit of Rs. 500/- with the branch. In the 3 concerned SB A/c. bearing No. 3090/16, Shri S. K. Mittal posted the voucher of Rs. 500/- and immediately thereafter made a fictitious credit entry of Rs. 20,000/- and thus drew a credit balance of Rs. 20,500/ -. Thereafter on the same date, Shri S. K. Mittal entered a withdrawal slip of Rs. 20,000/- in the token book, posted the same in SB A/c. No. 3090716 in the ledger and then passed the same for payment. Shri S. K. Mittal thus derived/extended undue pecuniary gain of the said sum of Rs. 20,000/- at the wrongful cost of the Bank. Further, with an intent to suppress the facts relating to his said act, Shri S. K. Mittal himself attended to the work of balancing of concerned Savings Bank ledger and tallied the balances by showing an overdraft of Rs. 19,500/- in the account and that too without bringing the same to the notice of the Manager of the branch. Subsequently, sensing exposure of his said act, Shri S. K. Mittal, on January 5, 1996, deposited the said sum of Rs. 20,000/-back in the account. On the same date i. e. on January 5, 1996, the account then was closed/allowed to be closed. Work relating to all the aforesaid entries/transactions, almost at every stage, was performed by Shri S. K. Mittal himself. 2. Savings Bank account bearing No. 112176 in the name of Shri Chirongilal s/o Lallu Ram, as on the date of September 2, 1995, was showing a balance of Rs. 70,037725. On the concerned ledger folio No. 235 note (s) reading as "under Banks lien from Rs. 2. Savings Bank account bearing No. 112176 in the name of Shri Chirongilal s/o Lallu Ram, as on the date of September 2, 1995, was showing a balance of Rs. 70,037725. On the concerned ledger folio No. 235 note (s) reading as "under Banks lien from Rs. 55,000/-and no payment without Managers permission" were appearing. Shri S. K. Mittal with an ulterior motive, removed the ledger folio from the ledger and then carried over the balance of Rs. 70,037725 on a fresh folio and filled up entire particulars in his own hand. Thereafter, on July 14, 1995, July 21, 1995 and July 29, 1995, Shri S. K. Mittal passed forged withdrawal slips of Rs. 20,0007-Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- respectively from the account. Depositors signature (s) on the slips do not tally at all with the specimen signatures on record. Entire work relating to entry of withdrawal slips in token book, their posting in ledger, verification of depositors signatures thereon and their passing for payment, was attended to by Shri S. K. Mittal himself. Further, with a view to suppress the fact of such continuous heavy withdrawals from the account (so as not to give any scope for doubt), Shri S. K. Mittal jotted down incorrect balance (s) of the said account in the balance book and also made manipulations in the date (s) written in the ledger. Thereafter, sensing exposure of his concerned ill acts, a sum of Rs. 70,000/-was deposited back in the account on February 6, 1996. By his aforesaid acts, Shri S. K. Mittal Shrikishan Mittal vs. UCO Bank and Ors. (25. 06. 2002 -MPHC) Page 7 of 15 (25. 06. 2002 -MPHC) Page 7 of 15 derived/extended undue pecuniary gains for the intervening period (s) and his said acts are in violation of Regulation 3 (1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees Regulations 1976, as amended. ( 12. ) THE main case of the petitioner is that the account holders were examined by him as defence witnesses (DW-l and DW-2) and both of them have stated that they have no complaint against the petitioner. However, the Enquiry officer did not consider their averments properly and rejected the defence only on the ground that they were tutored witnesses. ( 13. However, the Enquiry officer did not consider their averments properly and rejected the defence only on the ground that they were tutored witnesses. ( 13. ) A perusal of the report of the enquiry officer as contained in Annexure P-10 goes to indicate that the enquiry officer has considered the statement of the witnesses of the bank namely Shri V. K. Bansal, MW-1 and Shri B. L. Shakya, MW-2 and 34 documents ME- 1 to ME-34. Shri V. K. Bansal who at the relevant time was working as Branch Manager has stated in his evidence that the petitioner himself opened an account bearing S. B. No. 3090/16 made credit entries by transfer of Rs. 20,000/-and then proceeded to show overdraft etc. against this account. The Branch manager has stated that he never permitted the petitioner to allow overdraft nor the petitioner informed him about this overdraft. The enquiry officer has elaborately dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and on the basis of the statement recorded by the witnesses of the management has held the allegations to be proved, the enquiry officers finding are based on evidence of the Branch Manager and the other witness Shri B. L. Shakaya who was working as Clerk Cum Assistant Cashier has stated that the petitioner had received and obtained payment from him by giving token of withdrawal slip dated October 16, 1995 for Rs. 40,000/- and October 26, 1995 for Rs. 10,000/- from the account of Shri Chirongilal. I am briefly referring to statements of these witnesses and the finding of the enquiry officer thereof to indicate that there are enough material available on record to show that the petitioner is guilty of the charges levelled against him. The main case of the petitioner is that the account holders namely Shri Chirongilal and Shri Banwari Lal Sharma who were examined by him as defence witnesses and in whose accounts irregularities had committed had no complaint. It is the case of the petitioner that the enquiry officer has rejected his defence in an arbitrary manner. However, the enquiry officer has elaborately considered their statement and observed that the evidence indicates that the amounts were received by the petitioner but the defence witnesses have also stated that ultimately they have received the payments. It is the case of the petitioner that the enquiry officer has rejected his defence in an arbitrary manner. However, the enquiry officer has elaborately considered their statement and observed that the evidence indicates that the amounts were received by the petitioner but the defence witnesses have also stated that ultimately they have received the payments. However, in cross-examination they were unable to say as to when they received the amount, who paid the same to them and the fact that they had no complaint, came to be made only with the intention of protecting the petitioner. On the basis of the documents and statement of the management witnesses the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion that the petitioner had made fictitious credit entries and tried to extend, derived and extended pecuniary benefits by passing forged withdrawal slips. By this he has exhibited lack of integrity and honesty. The enquiry officer after a detailed examination of the statement of witnesses and document has observed that the defence witnesses were tutored witnesses and therefore, their statement cannot be relied upon. ( 14. ) SHRI Katare by referring to the statement of the defence witnesses and by pointing out some minor discrepancies on various points tried to emphasise that there are no evidence to indicate that the charges are established. It is a well settled principle that in departmental enquiry cases when administrative action is challenged, the scope/ of judicial review is very limited. The scope of judicial review in cases of departmental enquiry was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. B. C. Chaturvedi, AIR 1996 SC 484 : 1995 (6) SCC 749 : 1996-I-LLJ1231. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case had observed that the Disciplinary authority and the appellate authority being the fact finding authorities have power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. The power for imposing appropriate punishment and examination of evidence is vested in such authorities, the Courts while exercising powers of judicial review cannot substitute their own conclusion by re-appreciating the evidence and substitute its own finding. It is only required to be seen if enough material is available to come to a reasonable conclusion. Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. It is only required to be seen if enough material is available to come to a reasonable conclusion. Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora, AIR 1997 SC 1030 : 1997 (3) SCC 72 . In this case also, it was held that in cases of departmental enquiry while considering the same and the finding recorded therein, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited and it is only to see whether the enquiry is vitiated because of non observation of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity, finding based on no evidence or punishment totally disproportionate. Considering the case in hand in the light of the aforesaid, there cannot be any doubt that from the records there are enough material available to hold that the charges levelled against the petitioner as proved. The argument that the findings are perverse cannot be accepted. The materials on record are such that the charges levelled against the petitioner are said to have been proved. This Court as already indicated hereinabove cannot act as an appellate authority and substitute its own findings to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. ( 15. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner had stated that copies of the complaint report of the preliminary enquiry and statement of witnesses recorded in the preliminary enquiry were not provided to him. It is also stated that certain additional documents were filed during the course of enquiry copies thereof were not supplied to him. ( 16. ) AS far as supplying the records of preliminary enquiry is concerned, the preliminary enquiry was conducted only for the purpose of prima facie assessment of case. After the charge sheet was issued the report of preliminary enquiry, the statement of witnesses were not at all considered. The proceedings of the preliminary enquiry were not part of the departmental enquiry. The enquiry officer has not considered the same and has recorded the finding on the basis of the material produced before him. As the records of the preliminary enquiry were not part of the enquiry proceedings it was not necessary to supply the same to the petitioner. The proceedings of the preliminary enquiry were not part of the departmental enquiry. The enquiry officer has not considered the same and has recorded the finding on the basis of the material produced before him. As the records of the preliminary enquiry were not part of the enquiry proceedings it was not necessary to supply the same to the petitioner. The petitioners submission that additional documents were taken on record after the departmental enquiry was over and he was not accorded opportunity of hearing to see those documents and prepare his defence cannot be accepted. The records of the enquiry indicate that copies of these documents were supplied to the petitioner and he was given opportunity to examine them and give his defence. The records indicate that the enquiry officer permitted the presenting officer to produce the additional documents which were sent to the petitioner vide letter dated February 28, 1997 and his objections were considered during the hearing of defence statement. Even otherwise the petitioner has not shown as to what prejudice was caused to him because of acceptance of these witnesses. Merely because some additional documents were directed to be taken on record that by itself will not vitiate the entire enquiry. The petitioner has to demonstrate the prejudice caused to him because of the aforesaid. The petitioner in the instant case has not shown any prejudice. ( 17. ) APART from above the petitioner has also invited my attention to an application dated March 11, 1997 Annexure P-15 according to which permission to cross examine the witnesses and 8 documents referred to therein were not given. A perusal of the aforesaid document Annexure P-15 indicates that it does not bear the endorsement or signature of enquiry officer or any other authority. The document dated December 4, 1996 is said to have been sent by registered post. Shri Mody has produced the entire original record of the enquiry and the enquiry proceedings does not indicate that any such application was filed on the basis of which it can be said that such a contrary was made. It is submitted by Shri Mody that such an application was not on record and does not indicate such an application was filed. ( 18. It is submitted by Shri Mody that such an application was not on record and does not indicate such an application was filed. ( 18. ) AS far as the question of producing documents, permitting additional documents, permission to cross examine witnesses and production of record of preliminary enquiry are concerned, the petitioner has simply made averments that these have resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity to him. The question is whether the enquiry is vitiated in view of the above. In this regard, the law stands settled by the Supreme Court in the judgment of State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 : 1996 (3) SCC 364 : 1996 2 LLJ296. After considering the various judgments on the subject the Supreme Court has summarised the entire principle. In sub-para 3 of para 34 it is observed as under at p. p. 311 and 312 of LLJ: " (3 ). In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: Procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under " no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz. , whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/ government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i. e. , whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. " ( 19. ) IT is therefore necessary that proof of prejudice has to be the base for interfering in such matters. The petitioner in the instant case has not demonstrated as to what prejudice has been caused to him, except for making statement that documents were not supplied to him. I am of the considered view that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It is not a proposition of law that for each and any violation of a fault of natural justice the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside. In such cases the test adopted is, has the violation of a procedure resulted in causing prejudice to the employee. Such complaints have to be examined on the touchstone of the prejudice. The basic principle is taking everything together whether the delinquent employee has received a fair hearing or not. This principle cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. In such cases the test adopted is, has the violation of a procedure resulted in causing prejudice to the employee. Such complaints have to be examined on the touchstone of the prejudice. The basic principle is taking everything together whether the delinquent employee has received a fair hearing or not. This principle cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. While applying the rule of audi alteram partem, the Court must always consider the overriding object of this rule which is to ensure a fair hearing so that there is no failure of justice. There may be some cases where the interest of the State or public interest may call for curtailing the rule. In such cases the Court will have to balance the interest of State and the public vis-a-vis the interest of the person concerned. Under this principle, an order of penalty should be set aside automatically without considering the proof of prejudice being caused to the employee. If substantial provisions have not been violated and the delinquent employee have received a fair hearing, the rule is no interference is called for. If the substantial provision has normally been complied with and the test of prejudice is not applicable then interference should not be made. ( 20. ) VIEWED in the light of the aforesaid principle I am of the considered view that in the instant case full opportunity has been granted to the petitioner. He has participated in the enquiry, cross examined the witnesses of the management at length, copies of all the relevant and important documents was also given, opportunity of producing defence witnesses and the defence witnesses were also examined. In all the procedure has been completely followed and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Moreover he has received a fair hearing and the enquiry proceedings cannot be said to be vitiated on any count whatsoever. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the law laid down in the case of State Bank of Patiala (supra ). ( 21. ) ACCORDINGLY, I have to hold that the petitioner was given appropriate opportunity of hearing and the enquiry conducted against the petitioner cannot be said to be vitiated on any ground. ( 21. ) ACCORDINGLY, I have to hold that the petitioner was given appropriate opportunity of hearing and the enquiry conducted against the petitioner cannot be said to be vitiated on any ground. The petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr. (supra ). It is argued that no show cause notice was issued to him before imposing the punishment. No rule or regulation or statutory requirement has been brought to my notice which requires issuance of any show cause. That apart the petitioner after imposing the punishment had submitted an appeal to the appellate authority. The appellate authority gave him opportunity of hearing and he had appeared before the appellate authority and made his submissions. After considering his submission the appellate authority had interfered with the punishment and modified the same. In view of the above no prejudice is caused to the petitioner and therefore no interference is called for. ( 22. ) INVITING my attention to Rule 6. 17 of the Regulation of 1976 it has been argued by Shri Katare that if the employee closed his evidence it is the duty of the enquiry officer to generally examine the employee but in the instant case it is submitted that Rule 6. 17 has been violated and therefore the entire proceedings are vitiated. In this regard Shri N. K. Mody learned counsel appearing for the Bank placing reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , AIR 1980 SC 1170 : 1980 (3) SCC 304 , has argued that this will not vitiate the enquiry proceedings. In para 3 of the aforesaid judgment it has been observed as under: "there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that the 1955 rules and not the 1969 rules were followed. As pointed out by the High Court in the charges framed against the appellant and in the first show cause notice the reference was clearly to the 1969 rules. The appellant himself mentioned in one of his letters that the charges have been framed under the 1969 rules. The enquiry report mentions that Shri Mukharji was appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the 1969 rules. The appellant himself mentioned in one of his letters that the charges have been framed under the 1969 rules. The enquiry report mentions that Shri Mukharji was appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the 1969 rules. It is, however, true that the appellant was not questioned by the Enquiry Officer under Rule 8 (19) which provided as follows: The enquiring authority may, after the member of the services closes his case and shall if the member of the services has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the member of the service to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. " It may be noticed straightway that this provision is akin to Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1989 and Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1974. It is now well established that mere non-examination or defective examination under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K. C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 241 , Bibhuti Bhushan Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 381 . We are similarly of the view that failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 (19) of the 1969 Rules does not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer is able to establish prejudice. In this case the learned single Judge of the High Court as well as the learned Judges of the Division Bench found that the appellant was in no way prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of Rule 8 (19 ). The appellant cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all stages. The appellant was fully alive to the allegations against him and dealt with all aspects of the allegation in his written defence. We do not think that he was in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with Rule 8 (19 ). ( 23. ) THE Rule 8. 19 referred to in the above judgment is pari materia with Rule 6. 17 of the regulation in the present case. We do not think that he was in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with Rule 8 (19 ). ( 23. ) THE Rule 8. 19 referred to in the above judgment is pari materia with Rule 6. 17 of the regulation in the present case. In the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) the aforesaid submission of Shri Katare has no force and has to be rejected. ( 24. ) AS already indicated hereinabove, the question of interference and judicial review in such cases is very limited. The case has to be examined in the light of reasonableness of administrative decision. This Court is only required to find out if the authorities have let out some relevant factors or taken into consideration irrelevant factors. The decision of the authorities should be within the four corners of the law and should be one which a reasonable man would normally arrive at. Considering in the light of the aforesaid there cannot be any doubt that in the instant case all relevant factors have been taken into consideration and on consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances the orders impugned have been passed. The Supreme Court have in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. G. Ganayutham, 1977 (7) SCC 463 : 2000 2 LLJ648 and Union Bank of India v. K A. Kittu and Ors. (supra), considered the scope of judicial review in such cases and has laid down various factors to be determined. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid there cannot any doubt that in the instant case no interference is called for. Again in the case of Disciplinary Authority cum-Regional Manager and Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, 1996 (9) SCC 69 : 1996 2 LU-379 it has been observed that in cases pertaining to misconduct relating to banking services for the purpose of punishment on officer proof of loss to bank is no answer. During the course of arguments, Shri Katare has submitted that no loss has been caused to the bank. In view of this it is stated by him that the punishment could not be imposed. I am unable to accept the aforesaid contention. During the course of arguments, Shri Katare has submitted that no loss has been caused to the bank. In view of this it is stated by him that the punishment could not be imposed. I am unable to accept the aforesaid contention. Merely because the police authorities failed to take action under the criminal law that does not mean that the petitioner has not committed the misconduct. In similar cases it is held that proof of loss to the bank is not a material factor in deciding the issue. ( 25. ) CONSIDERING the case in the light of the facts stated hereinabove and catena of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove and many others which have not been referred to as it would be repetition of the same proposition of law it is crystal clear that none of the criteria laid down for interference is made out. ( 26. ) CONSIDERING the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the legal provisions involved, I have no hesitation in holding that in the instant case the action taken by the bank is reasonable, just and proper and no interference into the same is called for. ( 27. ) ACCORDINGLY no case for grant of any relief is made out. The petition is devoid of merit. The same is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.