ORDER Dipak Misra, J. By this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners, two in number, have prayed for calling for the records pertaining to the circular dated 2-11-1995 as published in the Official Gazette on 6-11-1995 contained in Annexure P-23 and to issue a writ of certiorari for quashment of the same being violative of the M.P. Private Educational Institutions (Promotion of Teachers and other Employees working in Schools) Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') and to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents 1 to 3 to approve the promotion of the petitioner as recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee. There is a further prayer for issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the said respondents cancelling the promotion or to issue any adverse order and to pass such other order/orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. At the very outset we may state that though in relief sought there is assail to Annexure P-23 being violative of the Rules, as an actual fact, the real challenge is to the amendment brought into the Rules by the impugned notification as contained in Annexure-23. We may clearly state here that the relief clause is not happily worded and in any case we are not going to advert to the validity of the amendment which has been brought into existence by the notification dated 2-11-1995 because of the nature of order we are going to pass due to present obtaining factual matrix. It is not disputed at the Bar that the petitioner No. 1 was working as an Upper Division Teacher in Hindi and the petitioner No. 2 was working as an Upper Division Teacher in the subject of Economics. The cases of both of them were considered as per the stipulation in the Rules by the Departmental Promotion Committee and a select list was prepared. The recommendation made by the Departmental Promotion Committee was sent to the competent authority of the State Government for approval. As has been putforth in the writ petition, as some objections were raised by the respondent No. 6 and amendment vide Annexure P-23 had come into force, the approval was not granted. The recommendation made by the Departmental Promotion Committee was sent to the competent authority of the State Government for approval. As has been putforth in the writ petition, as some objections were raised by the respondent No. 6 and amendment vide Annexure P-23 had come into force, the approval was not granted. The respondent No. 4, namely, the New Education Society, which is running the educational institutions, vide Annexures P-6 and P-7 promoted the petitioners to the posts of lecturers and sent the same for approval by the competent authority. However, subject to obtaining of approval, the petitioners were allowed to be promoted and function in the promotional posts. During the pendency of the writ petition, as has been informed to us at the Bar, the petitioners have attained the age of superannuation. In view of the aforesaid factual scenario the moot question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioners who have been holding the promotional post and discharging the duties as lecturers as a consequence of order of promotion passed in their favour by their employer vide Annexures P-6 and P-7 should be entitled to the pay-scale and if so, from whom. This being the centripodal question we need not to advert to the vires of the amended rule as that would not be relevant at this juncture and we have said so at the beginning also. Before we determine the question which has been posed above we think it apposite to refer to the Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules. They read as under: 5. Select List.- (1) Promotion Committee shall prepare a list of such persons as are held by the Committee to be suitable for promotion to the service. This list shall be sufficient to cover the vacancies. (2) The selection for inclusion in such list shall be based on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority. (3) Due regard shall be paid to the reservation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates as per prescribed by the Government from time to time. (1) The list as finally approved by the Promotion Committee shall form the select list promotion but the approval of the Commissioner, Public Instruction shall be necessary for promotion on the post of High School Principal/Lecturer/Principal of Higher Secondary School. (2) The select list shall ordinarily be in force until it is reviewed or revised. (1) The list as finally approved by the Promotion Committee shall form the select list promotion but the approval of the Commissioner, Public Instruction shall be necessary for promotion on the post of High School Principal/Lecturer/Principal of Higher Secondary School. (2) The select list shall ordinarily be in force until it is reviewed or revised. On a scrutiny of both the Rules it becomes quite clear that the promotional Committee have the authority to prepare a list and the said list has to be remain in force until it is reviewed or revised. Inclusion of names in the list ipso facto does not confer any right of promotion on the incumbent. The right gets ripened after the approval is given by the Commissioner, Public Instruction. The language which has been used in sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 makes it plain as noon day that getting prior approval before conferring the privilege of promotion from the Commissioner, Public Instruction is a condition precedent. That is the sine qua non and there cannot be any deviation. This is the legal position and there can be no exception to that. In this instant case, as the prior approval has not been given by the Commissioner for whatever reason the petitioners if promoted cannot be entitled to get the salaries from the State Government because the State Government had not granted the approval. Despite the aforesaid Rule the Society, the employer, for the reasons best known to it vide Annexure P-6 and P-7 granted promotion to the petitioners. It is submitted by Mr. K.K. Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner that when the Society has given the benefit of the promotion to the petitioners and they have discharged their duties they are entitled to the pay scale of the lecturer. Mr. A.G. Dhande, learned senior counsel has submitted that the order of promotion clearly postulated that the order of promotion was subject to the approval by the State Government. He has also putforth that the petitioners have not prayed for grant of salaries from the Society and the same being not included in the relief clause, such a relief cannot be granted by this Court. Mr. He has also putforth that the petitioners have not prayed for grant of salaries from the Society and the same being not included in the relief clause, such a relief cannot be granted by this Court. Mr. S.K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate has submitted that if the orders vide Annexures P-6 and P-7 would not have been worked out the matter would have been different but as has been admitted by the Society the orders of promotion were given effect to and the Society cannot wriggle out of it by putting the blame on the State Government. We should first refer to the technical controversy raised by Mr. Dhande that there is no mention in the relief clause as prayed for by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is well settled in law that a Writ Court can mould the relief clause if the same flows from the facts of the case and the same is not dependent upon any other kind of inference. To put it differently: if the Court is not required to advert to many a complex fact for moulding the relief, the same can always be granted by moulding the relief clause. This is the prerogative of the writ court and this view of ours gets fortified by the decision rendered in the case Nilamani Mishra vs. State of Orissa, 71 (1991) C.L.T. 99 wherein the Chief Justice B.L. Hansaria (as his Lordship then was) held as under: 8. The next question is relatable to the grant of appropriate relief to the petitioner. In this connection it has been urged by Mr. Misra that as the petitioner has not specifically prayed for setting aside the approval accorded to the promotion of O.P. No. 4 by the Director of Secondary Education, the promotion in favour of this opposite party cannot be set aside by this Court in the present proceeding. Reference to the prayers as made by the petitioner shows that the first of the same concerns the seniority and the second to the question of recommendation of the name of the petitioner for promotion as the Headmaster and a direction to O.P. No. 2 to approve the same. This shows that there is specific prayer for declaring the promotion of O.P. No. 4 as invalid in the eye of law. This shows that there is specific prayer for declaring the promotion of O.P. No. 4 as invalid in the eye of law. But then the, petitioner having prayed for an other order or direction which would afford complete relief to him we are of the opinion that merely because of absence of any specific prayer for setting aside the approval of the promotion of O.P. No. 4 to the post of Head Master, this relief may not be denied to the petitioner. In taking this view, we have borne in mind certain decisions of the Apex Court which have held that Court have very wide discretion in the matter of framing their writ to suit the exigencies of particular cases and an application cannot be thrown out simply on the ground that the proper writ or direction has not been prayed for. This was the view expressed in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In Sri Satya Narain Singh Vs. District Engineer, P.W.D. and Another, appropriate relief was granted due to changed circumstances and because of the prayer for grant of any other relief to the petitioner. In The State of Haryana Vs. The Haryana Cooperative Transport Ltd. and Others, the mere circumstance of the petitioner not asking for the writ of quo warranto in so many words was not regarded as sufficient not to entertain that question, as facts necessary for challenging the appointment in question had been clearly stated in the petition. It was pointed out that the petitioner had invited the Court to issue such other suitable writ (apart from certiorari which was specifically asked for, but which was regarded as inappropriate) as the Court may deem fit and proper. In B.R. Ramabhadriah Vs. Secretary, Food and Agriculture Department, Andhra Pradesh and others, , it was reiterated that the relief should be suitably moulded and it should not be denied as purely technical and narrow procedural grounds. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law we are not persuaded to accept the technical objection raised by Mr. Dhande. The next aspect which requires to be adjudicated is whether the burden should be saddled on the Society or on the State Government. Unless the approval is given the promotion is not fructified for the purpose of concretisation of the rights of petitioners qua the State. Dhande. The next aspect which requires to be adjudicated is whether the burden should be saddled on the Society or on the State Government. Unless the approval is given the promotion is not fructified for the purpose of concretisation of the rights of petitioners qua the State. However, the Society has been running the institutions and possibly, for sustaining its own reputation appointed the petitioners as lecturers and they did discharge duties of the lecturers. We may repeat at the cost of repetition that the said aspect is not controverted. On the contrary it has been admitted. Hence, we are of the indubitable conclusion that as the petitioners have been promoted by the respondent No. 4 they are entitled to receive the salaries in the relevant pay-scale from the respondent No. 4, their employer, and accordingly it is so directed. Consequently, we command the respondent No. 4 to pay the salaries to the petitioners in the pay-scale of the lecturer from the date they worked in the said post. It has been mentioned before us that the petitioners have been given the pay-scale of Upper Division Teacher and, therefore, the command would confine to the differential amount. The same shall be paid by the Society within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order passed today. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed