JUDGMENT - Dr. CHANDRACHUD D.Y., J.:---The dispute out of which these proceedings in the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure arise, has a chequered history. The applicant before the Court is a public trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and is known as the Hazrat Baba Tajuddin Trust. Hazrat Baba Tajuddin was a sufi saint, who resided at Nagpur. There is an area called Tajbagh in Nagpur, which the applicant trust claims to be under its control. 2. In the year 1946 a suit for possession (Regular Civil Suit No. 134-A of 1946) was instituted by one Mohammad Masood Khan against the erstwhile Tajabad Committee for the recovery of the possession of an area admeasuring 8 acres comprised out of field Survey Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 50 of mouza Bidpeth, Thak No. 175, P.H. No. 28 of Nagpur. The plaintiff claimed that he had purchased the land from one Nawab Mohiuddin Khan on 2-4-1929. A certain portion of that land, admeasuring 8 acres, was stated to be in the possession of the Tajabad Committee, in respect of which the suit for possession was filed. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court by a judgment and order dated 16-6-1947. Regular Civil Appeal No. 87-A of 1947 was dismissed on 31-12-1949. A second appeal was filed before this Court by the original plaintiff. In the said appeal, a decree came to be passed in terms of a compromise, which was entered into between the parties, in the following terms: "1. That the respondent withdraws all his pleas against the title and possession of the appellant over the fields Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 50 having total area 84.92 acres situated at mouza Bidpeth, Thak No. 175, Patwari Halka No. 28 in Tahsil and District Nagpur and now accepts that the appellant is the full owner and entitled to possession thereof including the suit land as described in paras 1 and 1(a) of the plaint. 2. That the appellant hereby declares that out of the aforesaid fields he agrees to dedicate permanently by way of Wakf 20 acres consisting of the suit lands with some lands around the suit land and grave yard contained in one of the numbers of the aforesaid fields. 2. That the appellant hereby declares that out of the aforesaid fields he agrees to dedicate permanently by way of Wakf 20 acres consisting of the suit lands with some lands around the suit land and grave yard contained in one of the numbers of the aforesaid fields. The appellant would execute a duly stamped and registered wakf deed in respect of the above 20 acres of land with a map drawn to scale showing the land dedicated within a period of three months, in the name of Hajrat Baba Tajuddein Awaliya. The appellant will make the proper arrangement for the management of the wakf property in that deed. 3. That the remaining land out of the aforesaid fields amounting to 64.92 acres is hereby restored by the respondent to the appellant who will be entitled to remain in possession, management and enjoyment thereof as owner, subject to the condition that the respondent will be entitled to get the same transferred in the name of Hajrat Baba Tajuddin Awaliya after the period of four years on the nominal compensation stated below fixed by Raje Bahadur Raghojirao Bhonsale in the presence of and with the consent of the parties. The appellant will be legally entitled to realise and appropriate the entire income from this 64.92 acres of land continuously for a period of four years after restoration of the physical possession thereof by the respondent without any construction from any person, including the respondent. It is only after the appellant is allowed peaceful enjoyment of this land for the above period, the respondent will be entitled to purchase at the price stated below. 4. That the respondent will be entitled to purchase the said 64.92 acres of land from the appellant for the nominal consideration of Rs. 6500/- (six thousand five hundred only). This consideration would be paid by the respondent within the aforesaid period of four years and the respondent will be entitled to get a deed of transfer thereof executed as stated above from the appellant. The entire costs for such a deed would be borne by the respondent. 5. That the costs of the parties throughout be borne by themselves as incurred." 3. On 4-3-1959 an application for the execution of the decree was filed by the original plaintiff. It has been stated before the Court that the aforesaid proceedings came to be dismissed on 16-12-1960. 5. That the costs of the parties throughout be borne by themselves as incurred." 3. On 4-3-1959 an application for the execution of the decree was filed by the original plaintiff. It has been stated before the Court that the aforesaid proceedings came to be dismissed on 16-12-1960. The decree holder instituted another application for execution which is stated to have been dismissed as infructuous on 11-3-1964, decree-holder expired on 20-5-1965 and the respondents are stated to be the sons and a daughter of the original decree-holder. In the year 1969, the respondents instituted fresh execution proceedings being Regular Darkhast No. 289 of 1969 for possession of the land. On 23-7-1969 the applicant, being the judgment-debtor, filed its objection at Exhibit 9 to the execution proceedings. Several objections were raised. But, insofar as is material to these proceedings, it would be necessary to note that the principal objection was that under the terms of the compromise the decree-holder was to dedicate permanently land admeasuring 20 acres by the creation of a waqf. Clause 2 of the compromise decree provided that the decree-holder would execute a duly stamped and registered waqf-deed in respect of 20 acres of land with a map drawn to scale showing the land dedicated within a period of three months in the name of Hajrat Baba Tajuddin Awaliya. The decree-holder was also to make provisions for the proper management of the waqf property. This, according to the applicant, was a condition precedent and unless the condition was fulfilled, the decree-holder was not entitled to take possession of 64.92 acres from out of the area of 84.92 acres. According to the applicant, the period for the creation of the waqf expired on 11-2-1958, which was upon the expiry of the stipulated period of three months after the date of the consent decree. The period of four years during which the decree-holder was to enjoy possession of 64.92 acres was to commence on 12-2-1958 and was to end on 12-2-1962. According to the applicant, the decree-holder failed to create a waqf in respect of 20 acres of land and was, therefore, not entitled to the possession of 64.92 acres of land. In the circumstances, it was urged that the right to possession and the right to execute the decree had been lost by the decree-holder long before his death on 20-5-1965. In the circumstances, it was urged that the right to possession and the right to execute the decree had been lost by the decree-holder long before his death on 20-5-1965. Since the decree-holder failed to create a waqf, it was contended that he had no right to the possession of 64.92 acres of land. 4. On 10-10-1969, the Executing Court rejected the objections raised at Exhibit 9 on the ground that the decree which had been passed by this Court in terms of the compromise in the second appeal had to be executed and the Executing Court could neither go behind the decree nor hear the objections which were raised by the other side to the execution. This order of the Executing Court was challenged before the District Court at Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 355 of 1969 which was allowed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge on 1-9-1970. The Appellate Court remanded the matter back to the trial Court for deciding the objections which had been raised by the appellant, after hearing both the parties. A second appeal, being Second Appeal No. 183/72, was filed before this Court. During the pendency of the appeal, a compromise pursis came to be filed by the contesting parties and the Court accordingly disposed of the appeal on 22-1-1987 in the following terms: "Parties by Counsel. In view of the agreed pursis in which the respondent has stated that as per the pursis he would not press his objections, the learned Counsel for the appellant does not want to press this appeal. Hence disposed of as not pressed. No order as to costs." The pursis which was tendered before this Court in the second appeal was to the following effect: "The respondent-J. Dr. Tajabad Committee submits that upon the appellants executing and registering a waqf deed of 20 acres of land surrounding the shrine of Hazrat Baba Tajuddin Aulia out of the suit land and further executing and registering a sale deed of five acres of open and unoccupied land out of the field Survey Nos. Tajabad Committee submits that upon the appellants executing and registering a waqf deed of 20 acres of land surrounding the shrine of Hazrat Baba Tajuddin Aulia out of the suit land and further executing and registering a sale deed of five acres of open and unoccupied land out of the field Survey Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 50 mouza Bidpeth, P.H. No. 28, Thak No. 175, Tahsil and District Nagpur in favour of the Welcome Co-operative Housing Society bearing Registration No. NGP/HSC-1134/81 of Chhota Loharpura, Nagpur within one month from today, the objections raised by the respondent to the execution proceeding shall not be pressed and shall be unconditionally withdrawn. In case the appellants endorse their consent to this proposal on the face of this pursis the instant appeal may be disposed of as settled out of Court; otherwise the same be disposed of in accordance with law." Consequently, what was agreed between the parties was that the decree-holder would execute a registered waqf deed in respect of 20 acres of land surrounding the shrine of the Saint and would further execute a registered sale-deed in favour of a named Co-operative Housing Society of five acres of open and unoccupied land specified therein within a period of one month. Thereupon, it was stated, the objections raised by the judgment-debtor to the execution proceedings shall not be pressed and shall be unconditionally withdrawn. 5. The admitted position is that no waqf deed or sale deed as postulated by the compromise pursis that was tendered before this Court was entered into within one month of the judgment in the second appeal which was rendered on 22-1-1987. 6. As already noted earlier, on 1-9-1970, the Extra Assistant Judge had allowed the appeal filed by the judgment-debtors against the order of the Executing Court rejecting the objections at Exhibit 9. Thereafter, as noted above, a compromise pursis was tendered before this Court in the second appeal, by which the judgment-debtor agreed not to press the objections to the executability of the decree subject to the satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the pursis, one of them being that a registered waqf deed be executed within a period of one month in respect of land admeasuring 20 acres. That condition was not fulfilled within the stipulated period. That condition was not fulfilled within the stipulated period. Various other objections, namely those at Exhibits 75, 80, 89, 106 and 108, came to be filed before the Executing Court. All these objections were again rejected by the Executing Court against which a civil revision application, being C.R.A. No. 986 of 1988, was carried to this Court. The civil revision application was allowed by a judgment and order dated 1-3-1989 of a learned Single Judge of this Court. The aforesaid judgment in the civil revision application is between the parties to the present proceedings and would have a significant bearing on the present case. The learned Single Judge held that the withdrawal of the objections to the execution of the decree by the judgment-debtors was subject to the specific condition of the decree-holder executing a registered waqf deed to the extent of 20 acres of land surrounding the shrine of Hazrat Baba Tajuddin out of the suit land and further executing a registered sale-deed in respect of five acres of open and unoccupied land in respect of Welcome Co-operative Housing Society. Moreover, these obligations were to be discharged within a period of one month and it was only on the discharging of these obligations that the judgment-debtors undertook to withdrawn all their objections to the executability of the decree. The withdrawal of objections, it was held, was contingent upon the discharge of the obligations within the stipulated period of time. The learned Single Judge held that admittedly neither of the two obligations came to be discharged before the Executing Court rejected the objections or until 14-10-1988. The decree-holder neither executed the waqf deed in respect of 20 acres of land in favour of the judgment-debtor nor did he execute a sale deed of five acres of land in favour of the Co-operative Housing Society. In that context, the learned Single Judge held thus: "In these circumstances as long as the obligations could not be discharged by the appellants within one month, there was no question of the respondent withdrawing their objections. The position which prevailed before the Executing Court was that the decree-holder did not discharge his obligations and therefore, all the objections contained in these different applications were very much alive before the Court and the directions of the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge to the Executing Court to decide Exhibit 9 according to law were very much there. The position which prevailed before the Executing Court was that the decree-holder did not discharge his obligations and therefore, all the objections contained in these different applications were very much alive before the Court and the directions of the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge to the Executing Court to decide Exhibit 9 according to law were very much there. It is an admitted position that the Executing Court did not look into Exhibit 9 at all." The learned Single Judge thereafter considered the other objections which had been raised to the executability of the decree, namely those contained in Exhibits 75, 80, 89 and 106. The learned Single Judge also found that there was no substance in any of those objections. Finally, it would be necessary to refer to the objections which are contained in paragraph 15 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, who found that the initial obligation under the consent decree was of the decree-holder to execute a registered waqf deed and it was only thereafter that the decree holder could claim the right to execute the decree any further. In the circumstances, by the judgment and order dated 1-3-1989, the learned Single Judge allowed the civil revision application and directed the Executing Court to reconsider the objections at Exhibits 9 and 108. However, the rejection of the objections at Exhibits 75, 80, 89 and 106 were confirmed. 7. After the disposal of the civil revision application by the learned Single Judge, the decree-holders filed a reply, styled as a rejoinder to the objections of the judgment debtor at Exhibit 9. This was on 23-3-1989. In paragraph 2 thereof the decree-holders referred to the fact that various applications seeking the execution of the compromise decree had earlier been filed by the decree holder and the last of those which was filed on 6-12-1963 was dismissed as infructuous on 11-3-1964. In para 6(a), it was sought to be averred that the original civil suit which had been instituted by the plaintiff was for possession of land admeasuring hardly eight acres and it was inconceivable that a Clause relating to the dedication of 20 acres of land by way of a waqf in favour of Hazrat Baba Tajuddin Awaliya would have been incorporated in the said compromise. Then it was averred in para 6(b) that the judgment-debtor, trust, was estopped from contending that the decree-holder had not created a waqf in respect of 20 acres of land and that this was a condition precedent, since the judgment-debtor had failed to place the original decree-holders in possession of the entire land as provided for in the consent terms. Moreover, in paragraph 6(c) of the reply it was expressly submitted on behalf of the decree-holder that the consent decree, insofar as it provided that the decree holders shall convey 64.92 acres of land to the judgment debtor after the expiry of four years at a consideration of Rs. 6,500/- was unconscionable and was in any event unenforceable: "The question of the original decree holder Mohammad Masood Khan remaining in possession, management and enjoyment of 64.92 acres of land described above for a period of 4 years and thereafter transferring the same in favour of the J. Dr. Committee/Trust on a nominal compensation of Rs. 6,500/- does not merit any consideration in as much as the compromise that was entered into between the parties before the High Court in Second Appeal No. 248/1950 was after all a contract and this terms of the compromise could have been enforced had the J. Dr. Committee/Trust placed the decree holder in actual physical possession of 64.92 acres of land on 11-11-1957 itself. Today this term of the compromise has become unenforceable as it is unconscionable on the face of it. Today the land is worth not less than Rs. Five lakhs per acre and to imagine that after being placed in possession the decree-holders would transfer the entire 64.92 acres of land in favour of the J. Dr. Committee/Trust for nominal compensation of Rs. 6,500/- is a travesty of truth. The contract that was evidenced by the compromise decree dated 11-11-1957 in Second Appeal No. 248/1950 was a conscionable contract when it was entered into between the parties on 11-11-1957. As on the date of filing of the instant execution the condition that the decree-holders shall after being placed in possession remain in possession, management and enjoyment of the 64.92 acres of land for a period of four years only and thereafter would transfer the same to the J. Dr. Committee/Trust for a nominal compensation of Rs. As on the date of filing of the instant execution the condition that the decree-holders shall after being placed in possession remain in possession, management and enjoyment of the 64.92 acres of land for a period of four years only and thereafter would transfer the same to the J. Dr. Committee/Trust for a nominal compensation of Rs. 6,500/- is, on the face of it, unconscionable and no sane person not acting under a delusion would agree to transfer 64.92 acres of land within the limits of the Nagpur Municipal Corporation and the Nagpur Improvement Trust for a paltry consideration of Rs. 6,500/- and no honest person and a man of ordinary prudence would enforce such a term of unconscionable contract, the more so when the decree of inadequacy of consideration is extreme and writ large on the face of the compromise itself." In para 6(d) of the reply, the decree-holders admitted that the original decree holder had not executed a waqf deed in respect of 20 acres of land within the stipulated period. However, it was submitted that the heirs of the decree-holder had on 25-10-1988 dedicated 20 acres of land and in terms of the settlement arrived at in the second appeal before this Court, a registered sale-deed in respect of five acres of land in favour of the Co-operative Housing Society had also been executed on 20-3-1989. 8. Insofar as the objections at Exhibit 108 are concerned, it would be material to note that the principal objection therein is that the decree could not be executed upon the failure of the decree-holder to execute a registered waqf deed in respect of 20 acres of land. 9. The learned trial Judge thereafter considered the objections at Exhibits 9 and 108 and by the impugned order dated 1-12-1994 rejected those objections. The learned trial Judge held that the decree-holders had on 25-11-1988 executed a waqf deed and though it had been executed beyond the period of three months, as reserved in the compromise decree, the Court had the power to enlarge the time under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned trial Judge held that the decree-holders had on 25-11-1988 executed a waqf deed and though it had been executed beyond the period of three months, as reserved in the compromise decree, the Court had the power to enlarge the time under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Executing Court also accepted the submission, which was urged on behalf of the decree-holders, that since the land was in possession of the judgment-debtor it was for the judgment-debtor to part with the possession thereof in the first instance to the decree-holder and in the absence thereof the decree holder was not under an obligation to execute a waqf deed within the stipulated period of time. The execution of the waqf deed on 25-11-1988 was, in the circumstances, held to be lawful and proper. Finally, it was held that the execution proceedings have been initiated within the period of limitation. 10. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant has urged that the learned trial Judge has committed a clear illegality in coming to the conclusion that the execution of a waqf deed on 25-11-1988 amounted to a compliance with the obligation by the decree-holders of the obligations which have been cast under the consent terms. The consent terms were entered into on 11-9-1957 and the obligation to execute the waqf deed was to be fulfilled within a period of three months thereafter. In the present case, this was not done for over 30 years since the expiry of the date which was prescribed under the compromise decree. Moreover, it was urged that even though the Court under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure has the power in an appropriate case to extend the time which has been fixed for performance even under a consent decree, in the present case, there was no application by the decree-holder for the extension of time for executing the waqf deed after the expiry of a period of almost 30 years after the date of the consent decree. The learned Counsel then urged that the pursis which was filed before this Court in the second appeal stipulated that the judgment-debtor would withdraw its obligations to the executability of the decree provided the terms set out in the pursis were complied by the decree-holders within the time prescribed thereunder. Admittedly, that was not done. The learned Counsel then urged that the pursis which was filed before this Court in the second appeal stipulated that the judgment-debtor would withdraw its obligations to the executability of the decree provided the terms set out in the pursis were complied by the decree-holders within the time prescribed thereunder. Admittedly, that was not done. Consequently, Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge was in error in coming to the conclusion that there was compliance of the terms of the consent decree by the decree-holders. The learned Counsel submitted that the judgment of this Court dated 1-3-1989, which was a judgment inter partes has been completely overlooked by the learned trial Judge. Finally, it was urged that once the decree-holder contends before the Court that a part of the decree under which they are to convey 64.92 acres of land to the judgment debtor is not executable, the terms of the decree cannot be changed by the Executing Court and the decree itself cannot be executed in part. The compromise decree embodies a contract between the parties which cannot be enforced only in part. In the present case, the parties have assumed mutual obligations, under which the decree holder was to create a waqf in respect of 20 acres of land and was to be in possession of 64.92 acres of land for a period of four years upon the expiry of which the land would be conveyed to the judgment debtor. In the present case, the decree holder has contended that he is relieved of his obligation of conveying the land back to the judgment-debtor. It was urged that in a consent decree where there are reciprocal obligations, a decree holder who seeks to excuse himself from the liability to comply with his obligations under the decree is not entitled to maintain an action for the execution of the decree. 11. Before dealing with the submissions, which have been urged on behalf of the applicant, it would be necessary to note that the respondents have been served and have entered appearance. The respondents, however, have not appeared at the hearing. 12. The consent decree which was entered into between the parties provided in clause one that the judgment-debtor accepted that the decree-holder is the full owner and entitled to possession of the lands bearing Survey Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 50 a total area of 84.12 acres. The respondents, however, have not appeared at the hearing. 12. The consent decree which was entered into between the parties provided in clause one that the judgment-debtor accepted that the decree-holder is the full owner and entitled to possession of the lands bearing Survey Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 50 a total area of 84.12 acres. The decree-holder agreed to dedicate permanently by way of waqf 20 acres of the suit land and he agreed to execute a duly stamped and registered waqf deed within a period of three months and to make proper arrangements for the management of the waqf property. The third clause of the consent decree was that the remaining land out of 64.92 acres of land is "hereby restored" to the decree holder, who will be entitled to remain in possession. However, the judgment-debtor was given the right to have the property transferred in the name of Hazrat Baba Tajuddin Awaliya after a period of four years on a compensation which had been fixed by the parties at Rs. 6,500/- on the basis of a mediation. Now, there is no dispute about the fact that the original decree holder failed to execute the deed of waqf, as agreed to between the parties within the period stipulated. The deed of waqf was not executed within the period of three months and, the original decree holder failed to execute the waqf deed at all. The judgment debtor had filed objections to the execution proceedings and, as already noted earlier, the matter came up before this Court in a second appeal, in which a pursis was filed by the judgment-debtor setting out that he would withdraw the objections to the executability of the decree provided certain terms and conditions were fulfilled. The first of those terms and conditions was that the decree holders must execute a deed of waqf in respect of 20 acres of land on or before the expiry of one month from the date of the pursis. The second condition was the execution of a sale-deed in respect of five acres of land in favour of a named Co-operative Housing Society within one month. The judgment-debtor agreed that if these two conditions were fulfilled within the period stipulated, the objections to the execution proceedings shall not be pressed and shall be unconditionally withdrawn. The second condition was the execution of a sale-deed in respect of five acres of land in favour of a named Co-operative Housing Society within one month. The judgment-debtor agreed that if these two conditions were fulfilled within the period stipulated, the objections to the execution proceedings shall not be pressed and shall be unconditionally withdrawn. Admittedly, both the aforesaid conditions were not fulfilled within the time which was stipulated. Thereafter, when the matter again travelled to this Court in a civil revision application, a learned Single Judge of this Court by a judgment and order dated 1-3-1989 held that the obligation of the judgment-debtor to withdraw the objections to the execution of the decree was contingent upon the due discharge of the obligations of the decree holder. The obligations of the decree holder were to be discharged within the time which was stipulated in the pursis filed by the judgment-debtor. The learned Single Judge recorded that admittedly neither of the two obligations were discharged before the expiry of the period which was stipulated. In the judgment and order dated 1-3-1989, this Court specifically recorded while interpreting the terms of the compromise decree that the obligation to create a waqf in respect of 20 acres of land was that of the decree-holder and it was only on the discharge of this initial obligation that the other Clauses in the decree were to be performed. The order of the learned trial Judge dated 1-5-1989 has attained finality and has been accepted by both the sides. 13. The learned trial Judge was, in the present case, of the view that it was open to the Court in exercise of the powers conferred by section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend the time which has been reserved for compliance of the obligations under the consent decree. There can be no dispute about the proposition that the Court in exercise of powers under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure can in an appropriate case extend the time which has been fixed by parties even in a consent decree. In the present case, it would be necessary to make a reference to the two stipulations as to time made between the parties at different stages of the proceedings. In the present case, it would be necessary to make a reference to the two stipulations as to time made between the parties at different stages of the proceedings. The first of the time limits, which is prescribed by Clause (2) of the consent decree, is the period of three months for the execution of a deed of waqf. The second of the time limits which was laid down by the parties was in the course of the second appeal, where the judgment-debtor accepted that if the decree-holders execute a deed of waqf and sale deed, as agreed, within a period of one month from 23-1-1987, their objections to the execution of the decree would stand unconditionally withdrawn. Insofar as the second of the aforesaid time periods is concerned, the period of one month, which was stipulated for execution of a deed of waqf and the sale deed, was prescribed in the context of the judgment-debtor withdrawing its objections to the execution of the decree. If the obligations which were cast upon the decree-holders were not fulfilled within the stipulated period of one month then the waiver of the objections to the execution of the decree would not arise. The objections to the executability of the decree would have to be considered by the Executing Court in that event. In fact, that was the reason why a learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment and order dated 1-3-1989 came to the conclusion that since the decree-holders had not performed their part of the obligations as specified in the joint pursis within the time stipulated, the objections which had been filed at Exhibits 9 and 108 stand revived and must be dealt with by the Executing Court in accordance with law. The Executing Court has, in the present case, come to the conclusion that it was well within its power to enlarge the time, which was prescribed under the consent decree, for the execution of a deed of waqf which was finally executed on 25-11-1988. There could be no doubt about the proposition of law. The two points which have been urged on behalf of the applicant are that there was no application for the enlargement of time and no case was made out for such an enlargement of time. There could be no doubt about the proposition of law. The two points which have been urged on behalf of the applicant are that there was no application for the enlargement of time and no case was made out for such an enlargement of time. The only point which has weighed with the Executing Court is that under the consent decree it was for the applicant to first part with the possession of the lands in question and since this was not done, there was no delay in the execution of the waqf which was eventually executed on 25-11-1988. The learned Counsel for the judgment debtor urges that this finding is now directly in the teeth of the observations of this Court in paragraph 15 of the judgment and order dated 1-3-1989, which has attained finality. The learned Single Judge has held that it was the initial obligation of the decree holder to execute the waqf and only thereafter could he claim execution of the further Clauses of the decree. An important issue which needs consideration is as to whether the judgment debtor is estopped from raising objections to the executability of the decree by the circumstance that apart from the waqf which has now been created, a sale deed has been executed as provided for in the pursis filed in the second appeal, though after the period specified therein. If the judgment debtor has taken the benefit of both, then the objections to the execution proceedings may fail. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the judgment debtor has stated, in response to a query of the Court, that the present trustees of the public trust have no details or information of the Co-operative Society in whose favour the sale transaction took place or when it took place. The applicant is a charitable trust. The learned Counsel submitted that the question as to how the transfer of land to a private Co-operative Society could be an acceptable condition for the trust to waive the objections which it had raised in the course of the execution proceedings is a matter which ought to have been scrutinised by the Executing Court. The learned Counsel submitted that the question as to how the transfer of land to a private Co-operative Society could be an acceptable condition for the trust to waive the objections which it had raised in the course of the execution proceedings is a matter which ought to have been scrutinised by the Executing Court. The learned Counsel submitted that in this context the present trustees of the trust have not obtained or been in a position to obtain any information about the circumstances in which the alleged sale deed has been executed in favour of the Co-operative Society or as regards the parties to the sale transaction. This is a matter on which there has been no consideration by the Executing Court, beyond a passing reference to the fact that a sale deed had been executed. This is an issue on which no assistance is forthcoming to the Court, in the absence of the respondents. The execution proceedings have been pending for long and I was of the view that in a matter, such as the present, it would have been desirable for this Court to set at rest the controversy once and for all. Unfortunately, the respondents have chosen to remain absent when the matter has been called out for final hearing. I am thus of the view that it would be appropriate if the matter is considered afresh by the Executing Court. The Executing Court has, in its brief judgment, not considered the order of remand which was passed by this Court on 1-3-1989, by which the Executing Court was directed to consider the objections at Exhibits 9 and 108. Various facets of the case have been elaborated in the course of this judgment and it would be proper if the Executing Court is directed to reconsider the objections which have been filed on behalf of the applicant expeditiously and within a period of four months from the date on which a certified copy of this order is produced by the parties or is received by the Court. The Executing Court would consider all the aspects of the matter including the question as to whether the judgment debtor has taken the benefit of the compromise decree. The Executing Court would consider all the aspects of the matter including the question as to whether the judgment debtor has taken the benefit of the compromise decree. Similarly, the decree holders, if they are so advised, would be at liberty to move an appropriate application for extension of time under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Executing Court. In the circumstances, the civil revision application is allowed to the extent that the impugned order dated 1-12-1994 of the Executing Court shall stand quashed and set aside. The Executing Court shall pass fresh orders on the applications at Exhibits 9 and 108 after hearing the parties. -----