TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of an order dated 8-11-1994 passed by the XIX additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, whereby the objections filed by the appellant to an Arbitral Award have been rejected and the award made a rule of the Court. The facts leading to the making of the arbitral reference and the filing of the present appeal may be briefly stated as under: the respondent is a registered civil contractor. Certain civil works in connection with the Hassan-Mangalore Railway project were allotted to the respondent by the Southern Railways of the Union of India in terms of a contract executed by the parties on 7-5-1975. Upon completion of the work, the contractor in terms of a letter addressed by it, raised certain disputes and demanded a reference to the Arbitrator in terms of the provisions of the contract. Petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration act which was registered as O. S. No. 2685 of 1982 was in due course filed by the contractor before the Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, for making a reference as the Railway Authorities had not responded to the request for such a reference outside the Court. During the pendency of the said petition, the Railway Authorities nominated 2 of its officers as Arbitrators who were subsequently replaced by Sri R. Sundara raman and Smt. Vijaya Kanth, in terms of a communication dated 15-2-1984. The Arbitrators entered upon the reference and after examining the claims made by the contractor, made an award on 14-11-1984 whereunder the appellant was directed to pay to the contractor a sum of rs. 6,84,018. 12 for the extra work done by it. The said award was filed and registered as A. S. No. 3 of 1989 before the XIX Additional City Civil judge, Bangalore. While the contractor made an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for a decree in terms of the award, the appellant filed an application under Section 16 read with Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the same insofar as Items 1, 2, 3 and 11 of the award were concerned. While the contractor made an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for a decree in terms of the award, the appellant filed an application under Section 16 read with Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the same insofar as Items 1, 2, 3 and 11 of the award were concerned. The Court below has by the impugned judgment overruled the objections to the award and passed a decree in terms thereof with interest on the award amount at the rate of 18% p. a. from the date of the award till the date of payment. While doing so, the Court below has come to the conclusion that the award made by the Arbitrators did not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record and that so long as the award was not unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, it could not be set aside on the ground that the Arbitrators had not properly appreciated the evidence adduced before them. The correctness of the said judgment and award has been assailed by the appellant as already indicated above. ( 2 ) APPEARING for the appellant, Mr. Ashok Haranahalli argued that the award made by the Arbitrators was vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the Arbitrators had accepted without any recording in the measurement books, the claim of the contractor for payment of wages for removal of slips. The measurement books maintained by the department argued Mr. Ashok Haranahalli did not record the existence of any slips or their removal by the contractor. It was submitted that in terms of para 44 of the agreement between the parties, the contractor could and ought to have insisted upon the measurement of the work executed by it. Since no such measurements had been recorded in the measurement books, the Arbitrators could not have allowed the contractor's claim regarding the removal of the slips. It was further contended that insofar as Item 2 of the award was concerned, the Arbitrators had conceded to the contractor rates for the bridge works higher than what was provided for in the agreement. The Arbitrators could not have, according to the learned Counsel determined a rate of their own or made an award on the basis thereof. To the same effect was the objection of the appellant insofar as Item 3 of the award was concerned. The Arbitrators could not have, according to the learned Counsel determined a rate of their own or made an award on the basis thereof. To the same effect was the objection of the appellant insofar as Item 3 of the award was concerned. This item relating to the redoing of the collapsed protective works was not admissible in the absence of any measurement of the works allegedly done by the contractor in the measurement books. It was contended that the Arbitrators had committed an error in awarding the interest on the security deposit of the contractor, which was according to the learned Counsel contrary to the terms of the agreement executed between the parties. The award of interest by the Court under section 29 of the Arbitration Act was also assailed by Mr. Ashok Haranahalli relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (Private) Limited and Another, Union of India v Jain Associates and another, State of Orissa v B. N. Agarwalla and Executive Engineer, dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa and Others v N. C. Budkaraj (deceased) by L. Rs and Others. It was lastly argued that the claim made by the contractor was barred by limitation and ought to have been dismissed on that ground alone. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the respondent-contractor, it was per contra argued that interference by the Court with an Arbitrators' award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act was limited to errors that are apparent on the record. It was contended that so long as there was no allegation that the arbitrators had committed any moral or legal misconduct in connection with the proceedings concluded by them, a Court examining the validity of the award could not sit in appeal, reappraise evidence or substitute its own opinion for that of the Arbitrators. The question whether the contractor had cleared the slips or attended the collapsed protective works as also the question whether the contractor was entitled to claim compensation and if so, at what rates for the said works were all matters that fell within exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitrators. The question whether the contractor had cleared the slips or attended the collapsed protective works as also the question whether the contractor was entitled to claim compensation and if so, at what rates for the said works were all matters that fell within exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators having appreciated the material placed before them and recorded their conclusions, this Court cannot interfere with the said conclusions merely because on a reappraisal of the entire matter, the Court may come to conclusions different from those of the Arbitrators. The question whether the claim was barred by limitation being a mixed question of law and fact, the finding of the Arbitrators was final and binding. Similarly, the question whether the security deposit could earn interest and if so, for what period were all matters to be determined on the basis of the provisions of the agreement on which the Arbitrators' opinion would be conclusive and final. The grant of interest by the Court below at 18% p. a. from the date of the award till the payment of the amount awarded was also supported by the learned Counsel on the decisions of the supreme Court including the one in State of Jammu and Kashmir and another v Dev Dutt Pandit. ( 4 ) THE jurisdiction of a Civil Court to examine the validity of an arbitral award and the scope of the enquiry before it is limited to the grounds set out in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The said provision inter alia states that an award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the grounds enumerated thereunder. Those grounds envisage setting aside of an arbitral award only in cases where the Arbitrator had committed a moral or legal misconduct in connection with the proceedings or where the award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after the proceedings have become invalid under Section 35 of the Act. An arbitral award may also be set aside if it is proved that the award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. The scope and nature of the enquiry by a Court examining the validity of an award in the context of the aforementioned grounds has fallen for the consideration of the Supreme court in a number of cases. An arbitral award may also be set aside if it is proved that the award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. The scope and nature of the enquiry by a Court examining the validity of an award in the context of the aforementioned grounds has fallen for the consideration of the Supreme court in a number of cases. In the case of Firm Madanlal Roshanlal mahajan v M/s. Hukumchand Mills Limited, Indore, the Supreme court declared that the award made by an Arbitrator is final on both fact and law and that no appeal lies against any such award. A Court examining the validity of the award cannot consequently correct any mistake in the adjudication made by Arbitrator unless the objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it. In cases where the arbitrator has given no reason for his award or where an award does not proceed on the basis of any legal proposition stated therein, the contention that the award suffers from errors on the face of the record must be rejected. ( 5 ) IN the case of Union of India v Bungo Steel Furniture Private limited, the Court held that the error of law can be said to be apparent on face of the award only when in the award or in any document incorporated with it, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous. If the award or any document attached to the same does not state a proposition of law as the basis on which it proceeds, it is not permissible for the Court to examine whether the Arbitrator has committed any error of law. ( 6 ) IN U. P. Hotels v U. P. State Electricity Board, the award involved interpretation of an agreement for supply of energy and the rate application. The Court held that the interpretation placed by the Arbitrator was not amenable to interference. ( 7 ) IN M/s. Sudarsan Trading Company v Government of Kerala and another, the Court held that where the award made by the Arbitrators is non-speaking, it is not permissible to probe into the reasoning under-lying the award and even where reasons are given by the Arbitrator, the court cannot appreciate the evidence to examine the reasonableness of the reasons. The following passage is in this regard apposite:"it is not open, to the Court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the Arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. In the instant case the arbitrator has merely set out the claims and given the history of the claims and then awarded certain amount. He has not spoken his mind indicating why he has done what he has done; he has narrated only how he came to make the award. In absence of any reasons for making the award, it is not open to the Court to interfere with the award. Furthermore, in any event, reasonableness of the reasons given by the Arbitrator, cannot be challenged. Appraisement of evidence by the Arbitrator is never a matter which the Court questions and considers. If the parties have selected their own forum, the deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of the evidence. The Arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it will not be for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator". (emphasis supplied) ( 8 ) IN Food Corporation of India v Joginderpal Mohinderpal and Another, the Court reiterated the view taken in the earlier cases. In sudarsan Trading Company's case, supra, the Apex Court declared that since the Court had examined different claims not to find out whether these claims were within the disputes referable to the Arbitrator but to find out whether in arriving at the decision, the Arbitrator had acted correctly or incorrectly, it could be said that the Court had acted wrongly and beyond its jurisdiction. To the same effect are the decisions of the supreme Court in the cases of Union of India v A. L. Rallia Ram, M/s. Kapoor Nilokheri Co-operative Dairy Farm Society Limited v Union of india and Others, Mis. Hindustan Tea Company v Mis. K. Shashikant and Company and Another, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v M/s. Jagannath Ashok Kumar and Another, Continental Construction Company limited v State of Madhya Pradesh, Vishwanath Sood v Union of india and Another and Food Corporation of India's case, supra. Hindustan Tea Company v Mis. K. Shashikant and Company and Another, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v M/s. Jagannath Ashok Kumar and Another, Continental Construction Company limited v State of Madhya Pradesh, Vishwanath Sood v Union of india and Another and Food Corporation of India's case, supra. ( 9 ) THE legal position in regard to the scope of the Court's enquiry while dealing with a challenge to the validity of the Arbitrator's award is therefore fairly well-settled. The Court examining the question whether the award deserves to be made a rule of the Court does not sit in appeal over the award made by the Arbitrators. It is not entitled to reappraise the material adduced before the Arbitrator to find out whether the conclusion drawn by him is or is not justified. It is also not entitled to test the correctness of the conclusion of the Arbitrator on the basis of the interpretation of the agreement executed between the parties. In the absence of any allegations that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings or that the award has been improperly procured the enquiry by the Court is limited to finding out whether there is an error apparent on the face of the record and that the error is visible by reference to any proposition stated in the award which is the basis thereof or in any document incorporated therein and which proposition is legally unsound. ( 10 ) COMING then to the merits of the challenge, we need only say that the objections raised by the appellant to the award are in essence an invitation to this Court to sit in appeal over the view taken by the arbitrators and to declare that on the basis of the material available before them and on a true and correct interpretation of the terms of the agreement, the amounts claimed by the contractor could not have been awarded. We are afraid, we cannot justify interference with the award on any such plea the temptation to do so notwithstanding. We are afraid, we cannot justify interference with the award on any such plea the temptation to do so notwithstanding. Whether or not there were any slips which the contractor had removed entitling him to payment, whether or not the contractor had executed any works for restoration of the works earlier executed, whether or not the works were executed before or after the completion of the contracted works, whether or not the contractor was entitled to claim rates in excess of those stipulated by the agreement on account of the fact that the extra work done was in addition to the works originally allotted are all questions of fact or at best mixed questions of law and fact. A Court examining the validity of the award under Section 30 of the Act cannot in the light of the settled legal position either speculate about or probe into the minds of the Arbitrators or appraise the evidence itself to determine whether the view taken by the Arbitrators was or was not justified nor can any such view (assuming the same is different from the view taken by the arbitrators) be substituted by the Court for the one taken by the Arbitrators. Suffice it to say that in the absence of any allegation regarding any moral misconduct by the Arbitrators in connection with the proceedings and in the absence of any proposition of law being erroneously stated and made a basis for the award, it is difficult to appreciate how the award made by the Arbitrator in respect of Items 1, 2, 3 and 11 which have beer partly allowed by the Arbitrators can be called in question. That is true even in regard to the question whether the claim of the arbitrators was barred by limitation for the question whether the claim was or was not beyond limitation is in itself a mixed question of law and fact. The decision of the Arbitrators on any such question would also fall beyond the scope of an enquiry or correction by the Court. ( 11 ) SIMILARLY, the argument that the award made by the Arbitrators was on a true and correct interpretation of the terms of the contract, erroneous must be rejected. The decision of the Arbitrators on any such question would also fall beyond the scope of an enquiry or correction by the Court. ( 11 ) SIMILARLY, the argument that the award made by the Arbitrators was on a true and correct interpretation of the terms of the contract, erroneous must be rejected. That is because once the existence of the contract is admitted and questions relating to its interpretation examined and determined by the Arbitrators, the Court cannot substitute the view taken by the Arbitrator for its own view even assuming that the view taken by the Arbitrators was not a correct view. The Supreme Court has in M/s. Sudarsan Trading Company's case, supra, observed thus:"once there is no dispute as to the contract, what is the interpretation of that contract, is a matter for the Arbitrator and on which Court cannot substitute its own decision. If on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the Arbitrator on certain amounts awarded, is a possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the Court. Therefore, the high Court had no jurisdiction to examine the different items awarded clause by clause by the Arbitrator and to hold that under the contract these were not sustainable in the facts found by the arbitrator". (emphasis supplied) ( 12 ) THE challenge to the validity of Items 1, 2, 3 and 11 of the award made by the Arbitrators was in the above circumstances destined to fail and was rightly rejected by the Court below. ( 13 ) THAT brings us to the only other question namely, whether the court below was justified in awarding interest on the award amount from the date of the award till its payment. There are indeed two facets on that question namely, whether the Court had the jurisdiction to award interest when the Arbitrators had not awarded the same and if it had, the jurisdiction whether the rate at which the interest has been awarded was excessive. ( 14 ) THE power of the Court to award interest has also been the subject-matter of a number of pronouncements by the Apex Court. ( 14 ) THE power of the Court to award interest has also been the subject-matter of a number of pronouncements by the Apex Court. Some of these pronouncements were seen to be in conflict with each other with the result that the question whether the Arbitrator has the jurisdiction to award interest and if so, for what period was referred to a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court for an authoritative pronouncement in executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa's case, supra. The Supreme Court by a majority decision answered the question in the affirmative and held that the Arbitrator appointed with or without the intervention of the Court has the jurisdiction to award interest on the sums due and payable even for the pre-reference period if there is no specific stipulation or prohibition in the contract against the award of such interest. The legal position as regards the powers of the Arbitrator to award interest thus stands settled. That however is not the issue in the present case. The Arbitrators have not in the present case granted any interest on the award amount determined by them in favour of the contractor. All the same, the Court below has directed that the award amount shall carry interest at the rate of 18% p. a. with effect from the date of the award till payment. It is that part of the direction of the court which has come under criticism in the present appeal. The appellant's contention is that the Arbitrators having declined to grant any interest on the award amount, the Court's power to do so was limited to what is permitted under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act. The Court could not have, it was argued, modified the award without there being any application for the same by granting interest from a period earlier than what was authorised by Section 29. Since the power under Section 29 is limited to the award of interest from the date of the decree, the interest awarded prior to the said date was wholly unsustainable. ( 15 ) SECTION 29 of the Arbitration Act provides that insofar as the award is for the payment of money the Court may in the decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable. ( 15 ) SECTION 29 of the Arbitration Act provides that insofar as the award is for the payment of money the Court may in the decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable. On the plain reading of the said provision, there is no manner of doubt that the power of the Court to grant interest on the award amount is limited to the period from the date of the decree onwards. For the rest of the period, the power to grant or refuse interest falls within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators as declared even by the Supreme court in its pronouncements. There may however be situations where an Arbitrator may grant interest not only for the period during which the proceedings remained pending before him but also till the award amount is paid. In such a case, if the award is not challenged and the amount is realised before the passing of a decree, the interest would accrue only till the date of such payment. In case however the award is challenged and the matter eventually culminates in a decree, the Court may either leave the direction regarding the interest contained in the award undisturbed or modify the same suitably. In case the Court declines to modify the direction, it would imply that the award contains a direction from the Court regarding payment of interest from the date of the decree under Section 29. Should however the Court feel that either no interest deserve to be granted or the rate at which the same is granted requires modification, it can make any appropriate direction in that regard in exercise of its powers under Section 29. Suffice it to say that the power of the Arbitrator to grant interest is subordinate to the power of the Court under Section 29. Since the said power is limited to the period from the date of the decree onwards, there is no gainsaid that the Court can invoke the same only from the date of the decree onwards whether by making a direction where there is none in the award or by allowing the direction contained in the award to remain undisturbed. Since the said power is limited to the period from the date of the decree onwards, there is no gainsaid that the Court can invoke the same only from the date of the decree onwards whether by making a direction where there is none in the award or by allowing the direction contained in the award to remain undisturbed. That view finds ample support from the decision of the Supreme Court in B. N. Agarwalla's case, supra, where the Court indicated the correct procedure that should be adopted by the Arbitrators in the matter of awarding future interest. The following passage in this regard is relevant:"from the date of passing of the award, future interest can be awarded by the Arbitrator. The correct procedure which should be adopted by the Arbitrator is to award future interest till the date of the decree or the date of payment, whichever is earlier. The effect of this would be that if the award is voluntarily accepted, which may not result in a decree being passed, then payment of interest would be made from the date of award till the date of payment. Where, however, the award is filed in the Court and a decree is passed in terms thereof, then it is for the Court to determine under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act as to whether interest should be ordered to be paid and if so at what rate. Under section 29 of the Arbitration Act, the Court can, even where the arbitrator has awarded interest from the date of the award till the date of payment, disallow interest from the date of the decree or determine a different rate at which the interest is to be paid or confirm the grant of interest as awarded in the award. When the court does not modify the award with regard to grant of interest from the date of the award upto the date of payment, the effect would be as if the Court itself has granted interest from the date of the decree till the date of payment at the rate which was determined by the Arbitrator. The future interest would be regarded as having been ordered to be paid under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act when the Court does not modify the award in this respect". The future interest would be regarded as having been ordered to be paid under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act when the Court does not modify the award in this respect". ( 16 ) WE have therefore no hesitation in holding that inasmuch as the court below has directed grant of interest on the award amount from the date of the award, it has committed an error for the power available to the Court was limited to the period following the decree and not earlier. ( 17 ) THERE is yet another angle to the aspect from which the issue can be examined. That is, if the Arbitrators had not in their wisdom awarded any interest upto the date of the decree, the same must be deemed to have been declined. Such a refusal could have been corrected by the Court and the award modified only if there was an application to that effect or an objection raised to the award seeking modification. The contractor had in the instant case admittedly made no such prayer for modification or correction of the award. The net effect of the order made by the Court insofar as it awards interest from the date of the award till the date of the decree is that the award stands modified without there being any prayer for the same. Such a course was not available to the court as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Visakapatnam municipal Corporation v K. Satyanarayana and Company, where the court observed thus:"admittedly, the respondent had not preferred any objection to the award in question under Section 30 of the Act and, in fact, had applied for a decree in terms of the award, the Trial Court could not have granted pendente lite interest which was not a part of the award. To that extent, the Trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. Reliance placed by the respondent on Section 15 (b) of the Arbitration Act is misplaced inasmuch as the expression 'obvious error' occurring therein implies an error which can be amended without affecting the decision. Any addition of the amount of interest which is specifically denied by the Arbitrators is bound to affect the award in substantial measure". Reliance placed by the respondent on Section 15 (b) of the Arbitration Act is misplaced inasmuch as the expression 'obvious error' occurring therein implies an error which can be amended without affecting the decision. Any addition of the amount of interest which is specifically denied by the Arbitrators is bound to affect the award in substantial measure". ( 18 ) FOR the above reasons, therefore, the order made by the Court below insofar as the same granted interest from the date of the award till the date of the decree is unsustainable. The power of the Court to grant such interest from the date of the decree cannot however be disputed as indeed Section 29 sufficiently empowers the Court to make a direction in that regard. We, all the same, feel that the rate of interest awarded by the Court is excessive. Instead of granting interest at the rate of 18% p. a. , interest at 8% p. a. from the date of the decree would have served the ends of justice. ( 19 ) IN the result, we allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that the direction issued by the Court below granting interest from the date of the award till the date of payment of the award amount at the rate of 18% shall stand deleted. The award amount shall instead earn interest at the rate of 8% from the date of the decree passed by the court below till realisation. The costs are made easy. --- *** --- .