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2002 DIGILAW 588 (CAL)

Rinchin Chapkhanwala v. Nyimo Lhamo

2002-09-04

Altamas Kabir, GORACHAND DE

body2002
JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J.: The respondent as plaintiff filed an application under section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, for grant of Letters of Administration in respect of a Will dated 7th January, 1988, executed by Phu Doma @ Phuti Lhamu, since deceased, resident of Chapleton 15, Robertson Road, Darjeeling Town. The plaintiff/petitioner claimed that Late Phu Doma @ Phuti Lhamu, the widow of Late M.L. Tempa, died at Darjeeling in D.D.M.A. Hospital on 13th July, 1988, but prior to her death she had duly executed her last Will on 7th January, 1988, making the plaintiff/petitioner the sole beneficiary under the Will and appointing her brother, Kami Tshering, as the sole Executor of the Will. 2. Kami Tshering duly applied for probate of the aforesaid Will in the Court of the District Delegate at Darjeeling, and the same was numbered as Misc. (Probate) Case No. 52 of 1989. The said Kami Tshering died on 7th November, 1989, during the pendency of the probate case and on his death there was no one left to continue with the probate proceedings as he was the sole Executor named in the Will. Accordingly, the plaintiff/petitioner applied for grant of Letters of Administration along with a copy of the Will with a prayer to tag the said application with the pending Misc. (Probate) Case No. 52 of 1989. 3. In her application for Letters of Administration the plaintiff/petitioner stated that she was the elder sister of the testatrix and her co-widow and was residing on Chapleton 15, Robertson Road, Darjeeling Town. The testatrix also left behind her daughter, Smt. Rinchin Chapkhanwala, wife of Mr. M. Chapkhanwala, who was residing in the out-house of Chaplet on 15, Robertson Road, Darjeeling Town. Claiming to be the sole legatee under the Will of Phu Doma the plaintiff/petitioner claimed that she was entitled to get Letters of Administration to administer the properties forming the estate of Late Phu Doma. M. Chapkhanwala, who was residing in the out-house of Chaplet on 15, Robertson Road, Darjeeling Town. Claiming to be the sole legatee under the Will of Phu Doma the plaintiff/petitioner claimed that she was entitled to get Letters of Administration to administer the properties forming the estate of Late Phu Doma. The said application for grant of Letters of Administration was contested by Smt. Rinchin Chapkhanwala by filing a written objection wherein she contended that she is the sole child and legal heir of Phu Doma and no Will as filed by the plaintiff/petitioner in Court had ever been executed by her mother, and, in any event, if there was such a Will in existence, the same had been created under suspicious circumstances by the petitioner in collusion with unscrupulous persons with the intention of depriving the objector from her lawful and legitimate right, title and interest over the properties left by her mother. It was also contended by the objector that the properties in question were jointly owned and possessed by her mother during her life time and her mother's brother and that in view of partition of the property her mother's portion fell into the share of the objector and her mother. According to the objector, ever since such partition she had been living with her family members in the holding at premises No.15 Robertson Road, Darjeeling Town, till her mother's death and also thereafter. She claimed to be in peaceful occupation of the same as lawful owner thereof. On the basis of the pleadings of the respective parties the following issues were framed:–– 1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2) Was the impugned Will dated 7th January, 1988, lawfully executed by Phu Doma @ Phuti Lhamu ? 3) Is the impugned Will legal, valid and effective? 4) Is the petitioner entitled to any Letters of Administration as sought for? 5) To what other relief, if any, the petitioner is entitled? 4. Deciding all the issues in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner the learned District Judge, Darjeeling, by his judgment and order dated 16th May, 1997, decreed the suit upon holding that the Will dated 7th January, 1988, had been lawfully executed by Phu Doma @ Phuti Lhamu and directed Letters of Administration to be issued with the copy of the said Will in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner. 5. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the objector, Rinchin Chapkhanwala, has filed the instant appeal urging that the learned District Judge had erred in decreeing the suit and granting Letters of Administration in respect of the Will of Phu Doma in favour of the respondent herein. 6. The challenge thrown by the appellant is mainly based on her contention that the Will in question is an unnatural Will made in suspicious circumstances and procured by the respondent in collusion and conspiracy with unscrupulous persons with the object of depriving the appellant from inheriting her mother's properties, and that the testatrix at the relevant time did not have the testamentary capacity for executing the purported Will. On the other hand, it has also been contended that no Will had at all been executed by the testatrix on 7th January, 1988. 7. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Senior Counsel, contended that the Will alleged to have been executed by Phu Doma was an unnatural Will since by such Will the testatrix without any explanation whatsoever, sought to deprive the appellant, who was her only child, from inheriting her properties. Mr. Roy submitted that the circumstances in which the Will was alleged to have been made clearly indicates that the testatrix was not capable of or had no testamentary capacity to execute the Will. 8. Referring to section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and more particularly Explanation 4 thereof, Mr. Roy submitted that the same clearly stood in the way of grant of Letters of Administration to the respondent. Mr. Roy pointed out that section 59 indicates that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by Will. Mr. Roy submitted that Explanation 4 of section 59 provides that no person can make a Will while he is in such a state of mind, whether arising from intoxication or from illness or from any other cause, that he does not know what he is doing. 9. Mr. Roy submitted that the testatrix was admittedly about 80 years of age when she was alleged to have executed the Will in support of which Letters of Administration was sought for by the respondent. 9. Mr. Roy submitted that the testatrix was admittedly about 80 years of age when she was alleged to have executed the Will in support of which Letters of Administration was sought for by the respondent. It was also on evidence that the testatrix was suffering from various physical ailments for 2 to 4 years prior to her death and that she was both hard of hearing and had poor eyesight during this period. Furthermore, from about the end of 1987, the physical and mental condition of the testatrix worsened to such an extent that she could do nothing on her own. In fact, her acute weakness prevented her from leaving her house. Mr. Roy submitted that the evidence clearly indicates that the testatrix did not leave her house on 7th January, 1988, when she was purported to have executed the Will, and there is no evidence to show that she visited the chamber of Advocate, B.B. Dewan (P.W.6) on 7th January, 1988, with the help of any other person. Mr. Roy urged that even if it be accepted that the testatrix had signed the Will in her Advocate's chamber, she obviously had no knowledge of what she was signing since the evidence on record clearly indicates that at the relevant point of time she was not of sound or disposing mind or memory within the meaning of section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. 10. Mr. Roy submitted that from the tenor of the Will it would also be clear that Phu Doma was unable to appreciate the extent of her property or to form a judgment with respect to the parties she intended to benefit after her death. Relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Musstt. Padma vs. Dharma Das, reported in 15 C.W.N. Page 728, Mr. Roy contended that Phu Doma was incapable of disposing of her property with understanding and reason which is the test of a sound and disposing mind as laid down in the said decision. 11. Mr. Relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Musstt. Padma vs. Dharma Das, reported in 15 C.W.N. Page 728, Mr. Roy contended that Phu Doma was incapable of disposing of her property with understanding and reason which is the test of a sound and disposing mind as laid down in the said decision. 11. Mr. Roy submitted that since Phu Doma was quite incapable of understanding the nature and effect of a complicated instrument like a Will, the same was sought to be drafted and explained to Phu Doma by a lawyer (P.W.6) and also contains the signature of a medical practitioner (P.W.2) for the purpose of obviating the difficulty of establishing the testamentary capacity of the testatrix. Mr. Roy urged that the deposition of both the two abovementioned witnesses, neither of whom are attesting witnesses, are full of contradictions and failed to establish the genuineness of the Will and, although, according to P.W.6 sometime in 1986-87 the testatrix had come to his chamber to instruct him to prepare her Will, no explanation had come forth as to why the learned Advocate took two years to prepare her Will when admittedly the testatrix was then a very sick person. It was contended that the said statement was obviously intended to create an impression that when Phu Doma instructed her lawyer to prepare her Will she was in a normal state of health and even if her health deteriorated thereafter, at the time of execution of the Will, the legal validity of the Will remains unaffected. 12. Mr. Roy then urged that from the evidence of P.W.6 it would appear that he did not consider it necessary to enquire from Phu Doma as to whether she had made any earlier Will and whether or not she had any children or grand children who would be her natural beneficiaries. Mr. Roy submitted that it was also rather unusual for a lawyer not to preserve the manuscript of the instructions received from his client for the preparation of a Will and not to insist upon the said client putting his or her signature on the instructions. It was submitted that since P.W.6 had not produced the said instructions, the learned District Judge ought to have drawn an adverse inference from his conduct. 13. With reference to the evidence of the Doctor (P.W.2), Mr. It was submitted that since P.W.6 had not produced the said instructions, the learned District Judge ought to have drawn an adverse inference from his conduct. 13. With reference to the evidence of the Doctor (P.W.2), Mr. Roy submitted that such evidence was clearly dubious. Strangely enough, Doctor Wangdi, who attended to Phu Doma in her last days, was not examined as witness and instead one Doctor Pinto, who had never treated the testatrix, was made to testify as to her health. Mr. Roy urged that the evidence of Doctor Pinto clearly contradicts the evidence of the respondent in this regard. Contrary to normal practice, P.W.2 did not maintain any record of his examination of the testatrix, although he was fully aware that the Will allegedly executed by her could become the subject-matter of a contentious cause. 14. Mr. Roy submitted that even the evidence of Doctor Khare (P.W.7) examined on the respondent's behalf, does not help the respondent's case as there is no evidence to relate the prescription tendered in evidence by P.W.7 to the testatrix, and, in any event, the said prescription does not also bear any precise date. 15. Mr. Roy submitted that in the same fashion the evidence of the respondent also does not in any way establish the testamentary capacity of the testatrix or prove that she was of sound mind on the date of execution of the Will and that she knew and approved the contents thereof. 16. It was then contended that the evidence on record would make it clear that prior to her death Phu Doma used to reside in joint mess with the respondent, who is the only legatee under the Will, and her brother, Kami Tshering, the sole Executor named in the Will. It was submitted that at a time when Phu Doma was in her old age and was suffering from different ailments, which had rendered her both physically and mentally weak, the respondent and Kami Tshering living in close proximity with Phu Doma were able to influence and dominate her mind. The testatrix was not in a position to resist and was not, therefore, a free agent when she was alleged to have executed the Will. 17. Mr. The testatrix was not in a position to resist and was not, therefore, a free agent when she was alleged to have executed the Will. 17. Mr. Roy urged that the very fact that the Will purported to exclude the only daughter of the testatrix from inheriting her properties and provides for her sister and co-widow to be the sole legatee raises a strong presumption of undue influence. 18. In this regard reference was made to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ajit Chandra Majumder vs. Akhil Chandra Majumder, reported in A.I.R. 1960 Calcutta Page 551, wherein it was observed that the onus of satisfying the conscience of the Court that the Will being sought to be propounded is the last Will of a free and capable testator lies upon the party propounding the Will. In all cases in which circumstances exist which raises suspicion in the mind of the Court, it is for the propounder of the Will to remove such suspicion and to establish that the testator knew and approved all the contents of the document and is only when such onus has been discharged does the onus shift to those who oppose the Will to prove fraud or undue influence. 19. Apart from the above, it has been sought to be urged that the testatrix executed a Will on 6th July, 1982, bequeathing all her properties to the appellant and appointing the appellant's husband as the Executor of her said Will. Subsequently, the testatrix also executed a Deed of Partition on 20th April, 1985, which was in keeping with the tenor of the said Will. Mr. Roy urged that the aforesaid acts of Phu Doma clearly indicates her love and affection for her daughter and that the Will alleged to have been executed by Phu Doma on 7th January, 1988, does not reflect the true feelings of Phu Doma towards the appellant and is, therefore, an unnatural Will. 20. Mr. Roy submitted that although the Will dated 7th January, 1988, purports to nullify the effect of the Deed of Partition and it has been sought to be shown that the appellant was in permissive possession of the property of the testatrix at Darjeeling, such a situation is legally absurd since by virtue of the Deed of Partition the appellant became the absolute owner of the property. 21. Mr. 21. Mr. Roy also contended that the respondent and her brother Kami Tshering, fraudulently induced Phu Doma to make a Will in the respondent's favour although she had earlier made a Will leaving all her properties to the appellant and had also executed a Deed of Partition in 1985, allotting half of her Darjeeling property to the appellant. Mr. Roy submitted that there is no logical explanation for the sudden change in Phu Doma's attitude towards the appellant and only supports the appellant's case that such change of attitude was highly unnatural and was induced by the respondent and her brother, Kami Tshering. 22. Mr. Roy submitted that the evidence on record casts a good deal of suspicion as to the circumstances in which the Will dated 7th January, 1988, was purported to have been prepared and executed, having particular regard to Phu Doma's mental and physical condition and the situational circumstances which enabled the respondent and Kami Tshering to dominate the mind of Phu Doma who was unable to resist such domination. 23. Mr. Roy submitted that in view of the evidence on record the learned Court below had erred in coming to a finding that the appellant had not succeeded in establishing that there were such suspicious circumstances and unscrupulous methods adopted in the preparation and execution of the impugned Will on 7th January, 1988, which clearly indicate that the same was an unnatural Will and was purported to have been executed by Phu Doma under undue influence of the respondent herein and her brother, Kami Tshering. Mr. Roy submitted that the learned Court below had laid undue stress on the G.D. Entry marked Exhibit 4 to prove that a strained relationship existed between Phu Doma and her daughter, Rinchin Chapkhanwala and son-in-law, M.L. Chapkhanwala. 24. Mr. Roy submitted that the circumstances in which the impugned Will was said to have been executed establish beyond doubt that the testatrix was not physically and mentally sound and in a position to execute the Will as a free agent. 25. Mr. Roy submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below, together with the directions given for issuance of Letters of Administration in favour of the respondent, were liable to be set aside. 26. Appearing for the respondent, Nyimo Lhamo, Mr. 25. Mr. Roy submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below, together with the directions given for issuance of Letters of Administration in favour of the respondent, were liable to be set aside. 26. Appearing for the respondent, Nyimo Lhamo, Mr. Samaraditya Pal, firstly contended that although much of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant were in respect of the alleged unnatural circumstances in which the impugned Will was sought to be executed, there was no pleading whatsoever on such count. In any event, the unnatural non-speaking disposition would not invalidate the Will, but, at best, it may raise doubts of suspicious circumstances which were required to be proved. Mr. Pal urged that when the signature of the testatrix and the attesting witnesses and the execution of the Will had been duly proved, the Will must take effect. If, therefore, the suspicion raised is directed towards testamentary capacity of the testatrix the same is required to be specifically pleaded by the caveator. In support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Pal also referred to the Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ajit Chandra Majumder (supra). Mr. Pal pointed out that the said decision laid down the proposition that the initial onus of satisfying the conscience of the Court lies with the party propounding a Will. In all cases in which circumstances exist which excite the suspicion of the Court, it is for those who propounded the Will to remove such suspicion and to prove affirmatively that the testator knew and approved all the contents of the document and it is only when such onus is discharged that the onus is shifted to those who opposed the Will to prove fraud and undue influence in preparation and execution of the Will. The Court also observed that the burden of proving undue influence is not discharged by merely establishing that the person had power undoubtedly to overbear the Will of the testator. It must be shown that in any particular case that power was, in fact, exercised and that it was by means of exercise of that power that the Will was obtained. In the said decision it was also observed that the fact that the propounder gets the largest benefit under the Will does not by itself make a Will invalid in law. In the said decision it was also observed that the fact that the propounder gets the largest benefit under the Will does not by itself make a Will invalid in law. That is only a circumstance which should make the Court more vigilant to examine the evidence with "suspicion", but no more. 27. Mr. Pal also referred to and relied on a Bench decision of this Court in (Rani) Prayag Kumari Debi vs. Siva Prasad Singh (A.I.R. 1926 Calcutta Page 1) wherein, in an appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of possession this court had occasion to consider as to whether the testator of a Will had sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of execution. While considering the said question it was, inter alia, observed that ordinarily the execution of a Will by a competent testator raises the presumption that she knew and approved the contents of the Will, particularly when the testamentary capacity of the testator had not been challenged and no objection on the point had been taken in the Court below nor in the grounds of appeal to the High Court. 28. A similar view was taken by this Court in Surendra Nath Chatterji vs. Jahnavi Charan Mukherji (A.I.R. 1929 Calcutta Page 484) wherein it was observed that on proving of the signature of the deceased or his acknowledgement that he had signed the Will, he will be presumed to have known the provisions of the instrument he has signed. Such a presumption, however, is liable to be rebutted by proof of suspicious circumstances and upon such proof being supplied it would be up-to the propounder of the Will to remove those suspicious circumstances. Mr. Pal submitted that since there was no specific pleading regarding the unnatural nature of the Will, it must be held that the propounder had discharged her onus upon proving execution of the Will. 29. Mr. Pal then referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rabindra Nath Mukherjee & Anr. vs. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (A.I.R. 1995 S.C. Page 1684) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the question relating to deprivation of her natural heirs by the testatrix. 29. Mr. Pal then referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rabindra Nath Mukherjee & Anr. vs. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (A.I.R. 1995 S.C. Page 1684) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the question relating to deprivation of her natural heirs by the testatrix. Reversing the view taken by this Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that deprivation of natural heirs by a testatrix should not raise any suspicion, because the whole idea behind the execution of a Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. 30. Mr. Pal referred to various other decisions on this point which only has the effect of multiplying the views expressed in the cases mentioned hereinabove. 31. Mr. Pal submitted that while cross-examining the respondent (P.W.1) there was no suggestion that Phu Doma was not in full possession of her mental capacity and that she was incapable of understanding the contents of the Will and/or executing the same. In fact, there was no suggestion put to the respondent of any undue influence having been exerted on Phu Doma in executing the impugned Will. Mr. Pal submitted that except for eliciting that before her death Phu Doma had become hard of hearing and had poor eye sight no specific question as to her testamentary capacity had been put to the respondent in cross-examination. Mr. Pal submitted that this aspect was not also raised at the time of cross-examination of Dr. Pinto (P.W.2) who claimed to have examined Phu Doma in the chamber of Mr. Dewan at the time of execution of the will by Phu Doma. Mr. Pal submitted that in cross-examination P.W.2 clearly indicated that at the time of his examination of the testatrix she was not suffering from any ailment within the normal limits of the age group to which she belonged. 32. Referring to the evidence of P.W.6, Shri B.B. Dewan, Advocate, Mr. Pal submitted that the said witness had deposed that the contents of the Will had been explained to the testatrix and after understanding the contents and after being satisfied about the correctness thereof she had executed the Will in the presence of the attesting witnesses. Mr. 32. Referring to the evidence of P.W.6, Shri B.B. Dewan, Advocate, Mr. Pal submitted that the said witness had deposed that the contents of the Will had been explained to the testatrix and after understanding the contents and after being satisfied about the correctness thereof she had executed the Will in the presence of the attesting witnesses. Mr. Pal submitted that the evidence of P.W. 6 stood unshaken in cross-examination and the learned Court below rightly relied on the same in allowing the respondent's application for grant of Letters of Administration. 33. Mr. Pal submitted that the very fact that the respondent was not present at the time of execution of the impugned Will went a long way in disproving the appellant's claim that the Will had been procured by undue influence. Mr. Pal urged that, in any event, the Will itself explained the reason why the appellant was excluded from the Will and as to why she was included in the Partition Deed registered on 20th August, 1984. Mr. Pal urged that if the impugned Will is found to be valid then the Partition Deed or any provision thereof could not invalidate the same. If a dispute arose as to whether a particular property would form part of the estate of the testatrix in the course of administration of the estate of the deceased, then appropriate legal proceedings would have to be initiated for adjudication of title, but the same would not invalidate the Will in any way. 34. Mr. Pal contended that the evidence of the appellant was that of an interested person and from her cross-examination it would be seen that from 1974 to 1985 the appellant and her husband had stayed in Singapore. Mr. Pal submitted that the learned Court below had rightly held that the respondent had proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the impugned Will had been duly executed by Phu Doma on 7th January, 1988, after being satisfied about the correctness of the contents thereof and that the appellant had failed to establish that either Phu Doma did not have testamentary capacity to execute the same or that the same had been obtained by the respondent upon exercising undue influence, taking advantage of the poor physical and mental condition of the testatrix. Mr. Pal urged that the appeal was liable to be dismissed with costs. 35. Mr. Pal urged that the appeal was liable to be dismissed with costs. 35. Having regard to the fact that the testatrix chose to exclude her only child from her Will, we have given our anxious consideration to the facts of the case made out by the respective parties and the evidence adduced in support thereof and we are inclined to uphold the judgment and decree of the learned Court below. 36. It is no doubt true that the exclusion of the appellant from the impugned Will raises suspicion as to the circumstances in which the same was executed, but the evidence adduced on behalf of the propounder stood unshaken in cross-examination. In our view, the appellant has failed to establish that Phu Doma did not have the required testamentary capacity to arrange for preparation and execution of the Will or that any undue influence was brought upon her to execute the same. On the other hand, the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent propounder clearly establishes that the testatrix knew and understood the contents of the Will and executed the same of her own free will. While P.W.2 has deposed as to her general physical and mental condition on the date of execution of the Will, P.W.6 has in detail narrated the events which took place in his chamber at the time of execution of the Will. P.W.3, Shri Padam Bahadur Dewan, a retired Dy. Superintendent of Police, who knew the testatrix and was requested by her to be present at the time of execution of the Will, was an attesting witness and he too deposed in detail as to the manner in which the Will was executed by Phu Doma, and thereafter by one Major P. Sherpa and he himself. We see no reason to disbelieve his evidence or the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.6 who were present in their respective capacities at the time of execution of the impugned Will. P.W.2 examined the testatrix and found her to be in normal health as compared to her age at the time of execution of the Will. We see no reason to disbelieve his evidence or the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.6 who were present in their respective capacities at the time of execution of the impugned Will. P.W.2 examined the testatrix and found her to be in normal health as compared to her age at the time of execution of the Will. We also see no reason to disbelieve P.W. 6 since there is nothing to suggest that there was a conspiracy hatched by the respondent in collusion with any of the said witnesses to compel Phu Doma to execute the impugned Will with the intention of depriving the appellant from her mother's properties. As has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Mukherji's case (supra) merely because the natural heirs had been deprived by the testatrix cannot give rise to any suspicion particularly when from the evidence it is established that the respondent had no part to play in the preparation and execution of the Will. 37. It is settled law that the initial onus of proving the genuineness of a Will lies with the propounder of the Will, but once such onus is discharged, the Will must be held to have been validly executed and it was up to the persons who opposed the Will to prove fraud and undue influence in order to disprove the case of the propounder and to establish that the Will had been executed under undue influence or that the testator/testatrix did not have the testamentary capacity to understand the contents of the Will or to execute the same. 38. In the instant case, the testatrix was at liberty to exclude the appellant from her Will and it was for the appellant to prove that such exclusion was brought about by undue influence or that the testatrix was not in full command of her physical and mental condition and that her weakened state, both physical and mental, had been taken advantage of by the respondent to cause such exclusion. 39. 39. In our view, the appellant has failed to discharge such onus and in view of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent it must be held that the learned Court below was right in holding that the appellant had failed to establish that the Will had been prepared and executed in unnatural and/or fraudulent circumstances and had rightly directed issuance of Letters of Administration in favour of the respondent. 40. Having regard to the above the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed and the application for vacating the interim order is also disposed of accordingly. 41. There will be no order as to costs. 42. Let the records be sent down expeditiously by Special Messenger at the cost of the respondent. Such cost is to be deposited within a week from date. 43. Stay as prayed for is considered and refused having regard to the view taken by us. 44. If an urgent xerox certified copy of the judgment is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant expeditiously, subject to compliance with all the required formalities. G. C. De, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.