Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 589 (CAL)

Kesoram Rayon & Kesoram Industries Ltd. v. Pran Ballav Das

2002-09-04

ARUN KUMAR MITRA

body2002
JUDGMENT ARUN KUMAR MITRA, J. 1. Challenging the order dated 11.4.2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Hooghly in Misc. Appeal No. 24 of 2002 arising out of order no. 3 dated 22.2.2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) First Court, Hooghly Sadar in Title Suit No. 34 of 2002 (Pran Ballav Das vs. Kesoram Rayon & Kesoram Industries Ltd.) this revisional application has been preferred. 2. The fact of the case and/or the context in which this revisional application has been moved is inter alia as follows:- The opposite party no. 1 being the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction being Title Suit No. 34 of 2002 before the court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) First Court at Hooghly with the following prayers:- (a) A declaration declaring that the plaintiff was born on 10.12.1947. (b) A declaration that the date of superannuation of the plaintiff is 10.12.2005. (c) A declaration that the letter of superannuation of defendant no. 2 dated 30.11.2001 and the letter dated 9.2.2002 relating to such superannuation is illegal, inoperative, fraudulent, void, ultra vires having no binding force upon the plaintiff. (d) A permanent injunction restraining the defendants from superannuating the plaintiff on 28.2.2002. (e) Decree for all cost of the suit. (f) Such other relief as in law and equity as the plaintiff may be entitled to. 3. In the plaint, it has been contended by the plaintiff that he is an employee under the defendant company in its fabrication department at its factory at village and post office Nayasarai, P.S. Magra, District Hooghly. 4. The plaintiff joined the defendant company as a Clerk (apprentice) under the provisions of Apprenticeship Act of 1961 on 6.3.1980. On successful completion of the apprenticeship period, the petitioner was employed as an Extra Badli worker on and from 4.2.1981 (having Card No. EB-37, Folder No. 1252), at the company unit at Nayasarai in the District of Hooghly. The plaintiff is a Commerce Graduate. He submitted all requisite documents with regard to his educational qualification, proof of age (date of birth etc.) at the time of his employment. The petitioner was made permanent on and from 1.11.1983. On 4.2.1981, the petitioner declared his date of birth as 10.12.1947 and filled up ESI form and PF form and became entitled to ESI benefit on and from 4.2.1981. 5. The petitioner was made permanent on and from 1.11.1983. On 4.2.1981, the petitioner declared his date of birth as 10.12.1947 and filled up ESI form and PF form and became entitled to ESI benefit on and from 4.2.1981. 5. According to the plaintiff, he did not fill up any declaration form on 1.11.1983 but one form was filled up by the administration on 1.11.1983 at the back of the plaintiff after getting his signature before hand. The plaintiff states and submits that he was born on 10.12.1947 and as per the standing order he is to retire on 10.12.2005 that is practically effective on 31.12.2005. 6. The plaintiff categorically states that he joined the service of the defendant company at the age of 33 years on 4.2.1981. All the records of the company as also the Employees' State Insurance Corporation recorded the date of birth of the plaintiff as 10.12.1947. The plaintiff in support of his such claim has annexed the following documents to the plaint:- (i) Pass certificate of primary final examination 1958-59 (ii) Admit Card for the Higher Secondary Examination, 1967 (iii) Certificate of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education for the year 1965 and all showing 10.12.1947. 7. The plaintiff received the superannuation notice dated 30.11.2001 from the defendant no.2 (opposite party no.2 herein) asking the plaintiff to retire from the employment with effect from 28.2.2002 on the ground of plaintiffs attaining the age of superannuation on 3.2.2002 as per the records of the defendant company. The plaintiff made a representation in writing dated 29.1.2002 before the General Manager (Personnel) (opposite party no.2 herein) through which the plaintiff made a request to recall and/or withdraw the notice served on the plaintiff and the plaintiff stated in that representation that he will attain his 58 years on 10.1.2005 and not on 3.2.2002 as alleged by the defendant. 8. The defendant no.2 by letter dated 9.2.2002 refuted the claim of the plaintiff and again reiterated that the claim of the petitioner company to the effect that his claim for date of birth as 10.12.1947 is pointless and baseless and cannot be entertained. 9. The plaintiff alleges in the plaint that the notice of superannuation dated 30.11.2001 and the letter in reply by the defendant on 9.2.2002 in reply to the plaintiffs letter dated 1.12.2001 are illegal, inoperative, unauthorized, void, arbitrary and without any binding force upon the plaintiff. 9. The plaintiff alleges in the plaint that the notice of superannuation dated 30.11.2001 and the letter in reply by the defendant on 9.2.2002 in reply to the plaintiffs letter dated 1.12.2001 are illegal, inoperative, unauthorized, void, arbitrary and without any binding force upon the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff is neither to retire on 28.2.2002 nor his date of birth is on any day prior to 10.12.1947. On these averments, the petitioner being the plaintiff filed the suit with the prayers referred to above. 10. The case made out in this revision petition is that the petitioner herein being the defendant no.1 received a letter dated 22.2.2002 from the learned advocate for the opposite party no.1 along with injunction petition from which it transpired that the learned Civil Judge, First Court (Junior Division) at Chinsura Hooghly had passed an ex parte order of injunction restraining the petitioner herein from superannuating the opposite party no.1/ plaintiff from service on the basis of the notice of superannuation dated 30.11.2001 till 5.3.2002. Subsequently, according to the petitioner, the order passed by the learned Trial Judge was extended further from time to time. The petitioner further alleged that challenging Order No.3 passed on 22.2.2002 by the learned trial Judge in title suit no. 34 of 2002 (Pran Ballav Das vs. Kesoram Rayon & Kesoram Industries Ltd.) the petitioner/defendant no.1 moved an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and on 28.2.2002 the above application being AST No. 136 of 2002 came up for hearing before Hon'ble Justice Bhaskar Bhattacharya and His Lordship disposed of the said application without interfering with the said order since alternative forum was available to the petitioner. On 1.3.2002, the opposite party no.1 herein being the plaintiff filed an application under section 141 before the learned trial Judge praying for direction upon Officer-in-Charge, Mogra Police Station to see that the order as passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) on 22.2.2002 is carried out. The defendant no.1 (petitioner herein) contested the said application by filing written objection. Immediately, thereafter, the defendant no.1 therein filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for proponing the hearing of the matter pending before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), the defendant no.1 filed objection against the injunction petition and the defendant no.1 also filed written statement. 11. Immediately, thereafter, the defendant no.1 therein filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for proponing the hearing of the matter pending before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), the defendant no.1 filed objection against the injunction petition and the defendant no.1 also filed written statement. 11. The petitioner also alleges that in spite of such objection and inspite of filing written statement, the learned trial Judge passed order no.8 dated 2.3.2002 on contest on the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the opposite party no.1 and by the said Order the O.C. Mogra Police Station was directed to provide adequate assistance to the plaintiff/opposite party no.1. 12. The petitioner being the defendant no.1 herein filed an application on 4.3.2002 for stay of operation of said Order No.8 dated 2.3.2002 and that application was rejected. The petitioner against the said rejection order preferred appeal before the learned District Judge, Hooghly being Misc. Appeal No. 24 of 2002. The said appeal was admitted by the learned District Judge on 5.3.2002 but no stay was granted. Challenging the said order dated 5.3.2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Hooghly in Misc. Appeal No. 24 of 2002 a revisional application was moved being AST No. 161 of 2002 (C.O. 784 of 2002) which was disposed of by one learned Single Judge of this Court on 18.3.2002. The petitioner also moved another revision application being AST No. 162 of 2002 (C.O. 785 of 2002), challenging Order No. 9 dated 4.3.2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), First Court at Hooghly in title suit no. 34 of 2002 and prayed for stay of operation of the above two orders. By a common order and/or judgment, the two revisional application being AST No. 161 & 162 of 2002 were disposed of by Single Judge of this court on 18.3.2002. 13. The aforesaid Misc. Appeal No. 24 of 2002 thereafter was heard by the learned District Judge, Hooghly and was dismissed on 11.4.2002. Challenging the said order dated 11.4.2002 this revisional application has been moved by the petitioner. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff/ opposite party no.1 in the trial Court is not maintainable and the reliefs claimed are barred by law and accordingly no interim order can be passed in favour of the plaintiff. 15. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff/ opposite party no.1 in the trial Court is not maintainable and the reliefs claimed are barred by law and accordingly no interim order can be passed in favour of the plaintiff. 15. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the suit is not maintainable for three reasons:- (1) Firstly, the suit appears basically to be one for specific enforcement of a contract of personal service and such a suit is barred under sections 14(1) (a) & (b) and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act. (2) Secondly, the claim of the plaintiff arises out of industrial disputes and the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding between an employer and a workman to which the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 apply and dispute is to be settled by the labour court not the civil court. (3) Thirdly, at the fag end of the service career, it is not open to the plaintiff to seek a declaration with regard to his date of birth. In the instant case as and when the notice of superannuation was served on the plaintiff on 31.11.2001 stating that he is due to retire in February, 2002, the plaintiff came forward with the instant suit on 22.2.2002. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that when the main relief is not available to the petitioner no interim order can be made in favour of the plaintiff inasmuch as interim order is only made in aid of the main relief prayed for. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that in view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 clauses (a) and (b) of Specific Relief Act, read with section 41(e) of the same Act no claim for Specific Performance of a contract of a personal service in court of law is maintainable and the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief of Specific Performance and the only remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a suit for damages. 18. 18. The learned counsel in support of his contention to the effect that an ad interim order of injunction cannot be granted in aid of the relief prayed for in the suit designed to continue the contractual relationship of master and servant between the plaintiff and the defendant and in view of sections 14 and 41 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 an injunction cannot be issued which was to the effect of forcing an unwilling employer to retain the personal service of an employee and the remedy, if any, of such employee is the claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or breach of contract, relied on a decision reported in British Airways vs. B.N. Basu, 2002(1) CHN 123. In this decision, the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of the Division Bench of this Court occurred and the matter was referred to a third learned Judge who upheld the contention of one of the Judges and in the same light of the observation of majority Judges arguments have been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that in this Division Bench decision reliance has been placed on Vaish Degree Colleges vs. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1976 SC 888 , J. Tiwari vs. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir, AIR 1981 SC 122 , Jitendra Nath Biswas vs. Empire of India Tea Company Limited, AIR 1990 SC 255 and Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rae Bareli vs. Badri Nath Dixit, AIR 1991 SC 1525 . 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Das in support of his contention submits that a contract of personal service cannot be enforced by an order for specific performance and the remedy of the employee is a claim for damages and placed reliance on the decision reported in U.P.S.W. Corporation, Lucknow vs. C.K. Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 . 20. Mr. Das the learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that in the decision reported in AIR 1991 SC 1525 (supra) consideration has been made regarding the earlier decisions and also on the rules of the English Courts as set out in Halsburi's (4th Edition) Vo1.44. 21. Mr. Das also submits that if the relief of specific enforcement of a contract of personal service is not available to the plaintiff in civil court then no interim order can be made in favour of the plaintiff and Mr. 21. Mr. Das also submits that if the relief of specific enforcement of a contract of personal service is not available to the plaintiff in civil court then no interim order can be made in favour of the plaintiff and Mr. Das placed reliance on the observations made in paragraph 10 of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Cotton Corporation of India vs. United Industrial Bank, AIR 1983 SC 1272 . 22. Mr. Das submits that section 2K of the Industrial Disputes Act provides the definition of Industrial Dispute and section 2(s) provides the definition of workman and the opposite party no.1 herein comes within the definition of workman and the dispute comes within the definition of an industrial dispute, and, as such, the dispute is to be settled under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. Das further submits that section 2A of the said Act provides that where an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or refuses employment or otherwise terminates the services of an industrial workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and employer connected with or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or refusal of employment shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workmen nor any union or workman is a party to the dispute. He also submits that West Bengal Amendment to section 2A as contained in West Bengal Act 33 of 1989, section 3, which has taken effect on 8.12.1989 is very relevant because such amendment has introduced the words refuses employment to section 2A and such amendment also makes non-employment or refusal of employment an industrial dispute within the meaning of the said Act. The instant case is clearly a refusal of employment. In summary, the substance of Mr. Das's argument is to the extent that the opposite party no.1 is a workman and the dispute is industrial dispute within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and in the above view of the matter it is to be decided by the labour court and not by the civil court and Mr. Das also submits that under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure there is an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of the claims and contentions raised in the plaint. 23. In support of such submission, Mr. Das also submits that under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure there is an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of the claims and contentions raised in the plaint. 23. In support of such submission, Mr. Das relied on the decision reported in Chandrakant Tukaram vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, 2002(2) SCC 542 . Mr. Das relying on the decision submits that in this decision it has been held that where on a plain and meaningful reading of the plaint, there is an industrial dispute between the parties to the suit, then such dispute is properly within the jurisdiction of the labour court and not that of the civil court. 24. Mr. Das also placed reliance on the judgment reported in Rajasthan State Transport Corporation vs. Krishnakant, 1995(5) SCC 75 and submits that in this case also same principle has been adopted with reference to section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 25. Mr. Das places reliance on an earlier decision of the Apex Court reported in Jitendra Nath Biswas vs. Empire of India Tea Company Limited, AIR 1990 SC 255 and submits that here also the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if the matter is an industrial dispute, then the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. Mr. Das submits that in this case, it has further been observed that a contract of employment for personal service cannot be specifically enforced except under the industrial law and in such a case, an employee whose services have been terminated is only entitled to relief of damages. 26. Regarding third aspect of non-maintainability of this suit that is the aspect of submission of a claim for correction of date of birth at the fag end of the service career of an employee Mr. Das submits that this is not permissible as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in different cases. Mr. Das in this regard placed reliance on the decision reported in State of Tamilnadu vs. Venugopalon, 1994(6) SCC 302 , State of Orissa vs. Ramnath, AIR 1997 SC 2452 , Hindusthan Liver Ltd. vs. Yadav, 2001(4) SCC 52 , State of Uttaranchal vs. Pitambar Dutta, 2002(92) FLR 773 and Pushparani Chakraborty vs. Allahabad Bank of India, 2000(85) FLR 931 . Mr. Mr. Das submits that in any view of the matter, this suit is not maintainable and the learned court below should not have granted ad interim order of injunction in connection with the suit which is not at all maintainable. 27. Mr. Das submits that the learned court below relied only upon the decision reported in Isher Singh vs. National Fertiliser & another, AIR 1991 SC 1546 . 28. Lastly, Mr. Das conclusively submits that if there is inherent lack of jurisdiction of the civil court then whatever may be the merit in the case any order passed by the court becomes a nullity. Accordingly to Mr. Das, in the instant case, the suit is barred on attraction of the provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the submissions put forward earlier and since under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure such a suit is barred and main relief prayed for in the suit is not maintainable no interim order can also be passed in the instant suit. 29. Let us now turn around to the submissions made by Mr. Roy Chowdhury appearing for the opposite party no.1 the plaintiff in the original suit who is an employee under the petitioner company. Mr. Roy Chowdhury at the out set draws attention of this Court regarding the prayers made in the original suit. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that basic question whether the suit is maintainable or not can be derived from the prayers of the plaint, from the cause of action, from the nature of the proceeding and/or the order out of which the instant revisional application arises. 30. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submits that provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted where there is a specific bar under a special statute itself. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also submits with emphasis that the impugned order comes out of an interim order which culminated in miscellaneous appeal and the scope of interference of the revisional court is restricted within certain peripheries. Mr. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also submits with emphasis that the impugned order comes out of an interim order which culminated in miscellaneous appeal and the scope of interference of the revisional court is restricted within certain peripheries. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that the suit is not barred under any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act and there is no scope for going into the merits of the suit in the instant revisional application which deals with an order passed on an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and subsequently on a miscellaneous appeal over there. Insofar as jurisdiction aspect whether the instant suit is barred under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Roy Chowdhury refers to and rely upon decision of the Apex Court reported in Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamalakar Santaram Wadke & other, AIR 1975 SC 2238 and the decision reported in Isher Singh vs. National Fertiliser & another, AIR 1991 SC 1546 . Insofar as the scope of interference in an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria & other, AIR 1976 SC 2621 and insofar as the interference in such a case which arises out of Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in Dalpath Kumar & another vs. Prallad Singh & other, AIR 1993 SC 276 and in the same concern, Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on a decision of a Single Bench of this court reported in Jitesh Pandey vs. Urmilata Sinha & other, 2000(2) CHN 856 . 31. Conclusively, Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that the instant suit cannot be in any way said to be not maintainable or without jurisdiction. In no manner, the barring provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted in the instant case and it is not a case where there is any scope of interference in this revisional jurisdiction and insofar as the other parts of submission of Mr. Das as to whether there can be prayer for correction of a date of birth at the fag end of the service career he submits that those questions are to be decided at the time of final hearing of the suit since it relates to the merit of the suit. 32. In reply, Mr. Das as to whether there can be prayer for correction of a date of birth at the fag end of the service career he submits that those questions are to be decided at the time of final hearing of the suit since it relates to the merit of the suit. 32. In reply, Mr. Das disputes the submissions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury arid reiterates his submissions as made earlier to the extent that the suit is not maintainable. 33. From the above background, it appears that cause of action arose from the service of notice of superannuation on the opposite party no.1 by the petitioner company. 34. In the plaint, in paragraph 20, it has been stated that the cause of action of the suit has arisen on 30th November, 2001 when the letter was issued and delivered to the opposite party no.1 and the same has become grave on 9.2.2002 when the letter of request dated 1.12.2001 of the plaintiff was refused by the defendant. The prayers as made out in the plaint have been quoted earlier. 35. It is to be noted at the first and foremost that this is a revisional application against the order passed in miscellaneous appeal and the order concerns of ad interim order of injunction granted by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court below. In such an application, the scope of interference by this court sitting in revisional jurisdiction is limited. However, it is to be seen at the prima facie level as to whether the trial court passing the order is devoid of jurisdiction. If the trial court lacks initial jurisdiction to entertain the suit then of course any order passed by the trial court or first appellate court must be held to be illegal. 36. In this case, Mr. Das relied on several decisions referred to above to establish that this is an industrial dispute, the employee is a workman and civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Now barring provisions of this civil court is section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is quoted herein below:- Courts to try all civil suits unless barred:- "9. The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or implied with barred. The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or implied with barred. Explanation 1 – A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decisions of question as to religious rites or ceremonious. Explanation 2 – For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation 1 or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place." 37. It, therefore, clearly appears that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. 38. In this context, reliance may be made to the decision of the Apex Court reported in Dhula Bhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 , which is the decision of a Bench constituted by Hon'ble five Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 39. Their Lordships in this decision clearly specified certain conditions or eventualities on which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is said to be barred. The observation of Their Lordships in this regard are as follows:- "Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya's case, 1964(1) SCR 752 : AIR 1964 SC 322 or Kamla Mills's case, 1966(1) SCR 64 : AIR 1965 SC 1942 , can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows:- (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment become necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. In the decision reported in M.L. Sethi vs. R.P. Kapoor, AIR 1972 SC 2379 , Hon'ble Justice Mathur gave an explicit clarification of the word jurisdiction which is quoted herein below:- "The word jurisdiction is a verbal cast of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147, namely the entitlement to enter upon the enquiry in question. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an inquiry into the question, then any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by R. vs. Bolton, (1841) 1 QB 66. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd., (1969) 2 AC 147, Lord Baid said:- But there are many cases where, although the Tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the Tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the Tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the Tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage while engaged on a proper enquiry, the Tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice or it may ask itself the wrong questions or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its inquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the inquiry which the Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity." 40. In the above context and in view of the above observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is, therefore, clear and explicit that jurisdiction of a Civil Court under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless explicitly barred or impliedly barred by any special statute a suit of a civil nature is entertain able by a Civil Court. 41. Now let us see whether there is any such explicit bar in the instant case. According to Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner this is an industrial dispute and it is to be tried either by labour court or by Industrial Tribunal section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been referred to which is the scheme constituting an Industrial Tribunal by the Government and let us now consider what is the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard. Except as quoted above another celebrated judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered by three Hon'ble Judges in the case reported in Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamalakar Santaram Wadke & other, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , should be referred also. In this decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the issue as to whether and under what circumstances the remedy concerning an industrial dispute will be entertained by the Civil Court. In this decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the issue as to whether and under what circumstances the remedy concerning an industrial dispute will be entertained by the Civil Court. Referring to so many earlier decisions the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case arrived at the following findings:- "It would thus be seen that through the intervention of the appropriate Government of course not directly, a very extensive machinery has been provided for settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes. But since an individual aggrieved cannot approach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the Government, it is legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under the Act is not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for trial of industrial disputes. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) or within the meaning of section 2A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for adjudication of such disputes under the Act. Civil Courts will be the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability under the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach the Civil Court. It is plain that he can't have both. He has to choose the one or the other. But we shall presently show that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract is one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Act alone." 42. In that event Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract is one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Act alone." 42. In the later decision reported in Isher Singh vs. National Fertiliser & another, AIR 1991 SC 1546 , the Bench constituted by three Hon'ble Judges and presided over by Hon'ble Chief Justice Ranganath Mishra observed correction of date of birth of an employee before superannuation is not barred by section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act on attraction of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships in this judgment observed in the manner as follows:- "Law is settled that matter which come within the purview of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure are maintainable in the Civil Court. Section 9 provides:- The courts shall subject to the provisions herein contained, have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The scope of section 9 has been the subject matter of a long series of decisions and it is difficult to contend and Mr. Ashwini Kumar has, therefore, fairly accept the position that a suit for correcting the date of birth in the record would be maintainable. In fact, asking for a correction of that type may be for various purposes and need not necessarily be confined to the question of claiming the relief available under the Industrial Disputes Act. The main challenge to the Civil Courts jurisdiction is by placing reliance on section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. On a reference to that provision, we find that on the happening of certain eventualities, the reliefs available under that provision can be asked for. On 7.1.1988, none of the situations contemplated under section 2A had happened so as to give the appellant a cause of action to approach the Industrial Court. It cannot be doubted that the entertainability of the suit has to be decided with reference to the date of institution of the proceeding and since on 7.1.1988 when the civil suit was filed none of the eventualities covered by section 2A had happened, the appellant could not have approached the forum under the 1947 Act for relief. The other question which Mr. The other question which Mr. Ashwini Kumar has raised is as to whether the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to give injunction against superannuation or the other ancillary reliefs contemplated to a workman against his employer. Law is equally settled that if for part of the reliefs the suit is maintainable in the forum where it has been laid, it is not open to the forum to shut out its doors to the suitor. In that view of the matter, so far as the relief of rectification of the record relating to the date of birth is concerned, the Civil Court had jurisdiction and the High Court was not right in saying that the suit was not maintainable at all. It is necessary to go into the other aspect, namely, whether the residuary reliefs were available in the Civil Court inasmuch as the appellant has by now superannuated, even on the basis of the corrected record the only relief to which he is entitled is one of back wages. We do not think that is a relief which the Civil Court could have granted. On the basis of the rectification of the date of birth granted by the Civil Court, the appellant is entitled to work out his remedy in a different forum prescribed by law, but we find that the respondent is Public Sector Undertaking and it would do well in settling the claim of the appellant instead of driving him to a proceeding under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appeal is allowed. We award no costs." 43. In the above circumstances there cannot be slightest hesitation to observe or rather it can safely be observed that in the instant case, the trial Court did not act prima facie without jurisdiction in entertaining the suit. 44. As observed by me earlier, the other questions which relate to or concern merit of this suit cannot be decided by this court sitting in revisional jurisdiction. The court is to decide only two questions at this interlocutory state:- (i) Whether prima facie the suit is entertainable by the learned trial Judge. (ii) Whether the impugned order under revision suffers from any illegality or impropriety. 45. The scope of jurisdiction of interference by the High Court in its revisional capacity is limited. The court is to decide only two questions at this interlocutory state:- (i) Whether prima facie the suit is entertainable by the learned trial Judge. (ii) Whether the impugned order under revision suffers from any illegality or impropriety. 45. The scope of jurisdiction of interference by the High Court in its revisional capacity is limited. When this court has come to the finding that prima facie the trial court holds jurisdiction to entertain the suit then of course, it is necessary to decide whether there is any scope of interference by this court in revisional jurisdiction or not. Reference may be made in this regard to the decision reported in Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase & Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76 . This is also a decision delivered by Hon'ble three Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court where the observance is as follows:- "In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, See the decisions of this Court in Pandurang Dhoni vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav, (1966) 1 SCR 102 : AIR 1966 SC 153 and D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 : AIR 1971 SC 2324 ." 46. Reliance may also be placed on another decision of the Apex Court and this judgment has been delivered also by Hon'ble three Judges presided over by Hon'ble Chief Justice A.N. Ray reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria & other, AIR 1976 SC 2621 . Reliance may also be placed on another decision of the Apex Court and this judgment has been delivered also by Hon'ble three Judges presided over by Hon'ble Chief Justice A.N. Ray reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria & other, AIR 1976 SC 2621 . In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court deprecated the stand taken by different High Courts in interfering with the concurrent findings of the two courts below sitting in revisional jurisdiction without finding whether there is any impropriety or illegality in the order and Their Lordships observed in the manner as follows:- "It also seems that the attention of the learned Judge was not directed towards section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which lays down that an injunction, which is a discretionary equitable relief, cannot be granted when an equally efficacious relief is obtainable in any other usual mode or proceeding except in cases of breach of trust. Learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation points out that there was the ordinary machinery of appeal, under section 169 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, open to the assessee respondent. It had not even been found that the respondent was unable to deposit the necessary amount before filing the appeal. However, we abstain from deciding the question whether the suit is barred or not on this ground. All we need say is that this consideration also has a bearing upon the question whether a prima facie case exists for the grant of an interim injunction. In Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers vs. Basic Equipment Corporation, C.A. No. 508 of 1976, Date 1.11.1976 (SC) also we found very recently that, as in the case before us now, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court had overlooked the principles governing interference under section 115 Civil Procedure Code laid down by this Court in Baldevdas Shivlal vs. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1970) 1 SCR 435 : AIR 1970 SC 406 ; D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 : AIR 1971 SC 2324 ; Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase & Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76 . We direct the attention of the learned Judges concerned to the law declared by this Court. (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 : AIR 1971 SC 2324 ; Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase & Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76 . We direct the attention of the learned Judges concerned to the law declared by this Court. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court and restore that of the Appellate Court. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal allowed." 47. In a subsequent decision reported in Dalpath Kumar & another vs. Prallad Singh & other, AIR 1993 SC 276 , also the Hon'ble Apex Court took the same view and observed:- "Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is a prima facie case in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in irreparable injury to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that the balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that the balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit." 48. In a subsequent decision reported in Lekh Raj vs. Munilal & other, 2001(2) SCC 762 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the High Court should not disturb concurrent finding off acts of the two court below sitting in revisional jurisdiction when there is no impropriety or illegality and Their Lordships in this judgment observed:- "The pith and substance of these authorities, on which the appellant relies is that the court under its revisional jurisdiction cannot disturb finding of facts nor could it re-appraise evidence on record, it can only interfere if there is impropriety and illegality in the impugned order. One of the submissions for the appellant is that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction should not have permitted the inspection of the disputed shop by the Local Commissioner while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. The submission is, the revisional court could only take into consideration the fact existing on the date of filing of the eviction petition supported by evidence on record, thus by bringing on record the aforesaid report of the Local Commissioner which was called after 18 years of the pendency of the revision in the High Court, cannot be said to be within the jurisdiction of the revisional courts." 49. In the latest decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Aswani Kumar Aggarwal vs. Kalawati, 2002(2) Indian Civil Cases 743. In the latest decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Aswani Kumar Aggarwal vs. Kalawati, 2002(2) Indian Civil Cases 743. The said court observed in the manner as follows:- "It is also well-settled that when there is concurrent finding arrived at by the Courts below, the High Court should not interfere unless the jurisdiction vested in the Court has been exercised illegally or with material irregularity. In this regard reliance is placed on the Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase & Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria & other, AIR 1976 SC 2621 ." 50. It may also be relevant to refer to another decision of this Court delivered by Hon'ble Justice Bhaskar Bhattacharya reported in Jitesh Pandey vs. Urmilata Sinha & other, 2000(2) CHN 856 , in which His Lordship adopted the same view. 51. Considering the order passed by the courts below and considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties and also considering the averments made in the revisional application as well as the documents including the plaint its prayers, petition and other documents on record, with respect I hold that I am unable to agree with the contentions of Mr. Das. 52. In my opinion, neither there is any illegality nor there is any impropriety in the orders impugned and as observed by me earlier that this court is sitting in a revisional jurisdiction and this is a matter coming up at an interlocutory stage on an interlocutory application and as such this court should not disturb the findings of the courts below and the orders impugned are affirmed. I feel that keeping the orders of the courts below as it is some other directions need be given. 53. It appears from record that written statement has been filed in the main suit and now taking into consideration the interest of the petitioner company, I am of the view that suit should be disposed of expeditiously. I, therefore, direct the learned trial Judge to hear out the suit being Title Suit No. 34 of 2002 (Pran Ballav Das vs. Kesoram Rayon & Kesoram Industries Ltd.) now pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) First Court at Hooghly within six months from date. I, therefore, direct the learned trial Judge to hear out the suit being Title Suit No. 34 of 2002 (Pran Ballav Das vs. Kesoram Rayon & Kesoram Industries Ltd.) now pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) First Court at Hooghly within six months from date. In hearing the suit the learned trial Judge will take up the hearing on day to day basis without granting any unnecessary adjournment. If the suit is dismissed, the defendant company will be at liberty to adjust the amount already paid against the retrial benefits of the petitioner and if so advised in the mean time the defendant company may also take the service of the plaintiff/opposite party no.1 since the emoluments are being paid month by month and that acceptance of service will be obviously without prejudice to the rights of the defendant company and that acceptance of service if made will not create any equity in favour of the plaintiff employee. 54. With the above observations, I, therefore, dispose of the revisional application. There will be no order as to costs. 55. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, will be given expeditiously. Revisional application disposed of.