JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Baramati, District Pune dated January 3rd, 1992 in Civil Appeal No. 264/8 of 1989. The property in question is House No. 154 situated in ward No. 5 at Baramati. The petitioner was inducted as a monthly tenant in the said premises which consisted of 9 Khans. The predecessor of the respondents Shivram B. Inamke since deceased, subsequently terminated that tenancy and instituted suit against the petitioner in the Court of Civil Judge, J.D., Baramati bearing Suit No. 133 of 1980 on the ground of default, bona fide requirement and nuisance. The trial Court by order dated March 28, 1988 decreed the suit on the ground of default and bona fide requirement. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Baramati in Civil Appeal No. 264/8 of 1989. The Appellate Court overturned the decree with regard to the ground of default. However, affirmed the view taken by the trial Court in so far as the ground of bona fide requirement and comparative hardship was concerned. Against this concurrent decisions of two courts below regarding the issue of bona fide requirement and greater hardship, the present writ petition under Article 227 has been filed. 2. During the pendency of this writ petition according to the petitioners, certain developments have taken place which would eclipse the need which was set up by the respondents/landlords for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. It is contended that said ground was pressed by the landlord essentially for the requirement of handicapped daughter of Nivrutti Inamke and for the wife Shivram namely Krishnabai being an old aged women, for both of them required medical treatment. In this backdrop, affidavit has been filed before this Court on 15th October, 2001 by the petitioner pointing out that the said Krishnabai has already died and that handicapped daughter Rekha has since been married and staying at her matrimonial home. In other words, it is contended that the basis on which the suit was instituted, that requirement was no more subsisting or available to the landlords. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the two courts below, though concurrent, will have to be effaced. In other words, it is contended that the basis on which the suit was instituted, that requirement was no more subsisting or available to the landlords. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the two courts below, though concurrent, will have to be effaced. However, the learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends that the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement was pressed not only on the basis of the aforesaid requirement but additionally also for the children who had grown up and they have to take higher education at Baramati. According to the respondents therefore, the requirement was not only for the handicapped daughter Rekha and old aged Krishanabai but also for other family members more particularly for the children who were to take higher education at Baramati and for their occupation. It is therefore contended that the plea taken in the said affidavit is wholly misconceived and of no avail. The learned Counsel for the respondents further contends that two courts below have concurrently accepted the plea taken by the respondents for the requirement of the children and their family and that finding of fact cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. 3. To counter this position the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that as a matter of fact the landlords had instituted another suit in 1973 in which this very ground of requirement for the children was pressed into service and was not accepted. It is therefore, contended that though the other requirement was pressed in the present suit but no decree could be passed as the decision in the previous suit would bind the respondents by principles of res judicata. 4. Having considered the rival submissions, there can be no doubt that the affidavit filed by the petitioner before this Court dated 15th October, 2001 has gone uncontroverted. In that view of the matter, it can be assumed that the facts stated in the said affidavit have been admitted by the respondents. However, the next question is whether the said fact can be said to have eclipsed the cause of action for continuation of the present suit preferred by the respondents on the ground of bona fide requirement. In that view of the matter, it can be assumed that the facts stated in the said affidavit have been admitted by the respondents. However, the next question is whether the said fact can be said to have eclipsed the cause of action for continuation of the present suit preferred by the respondents on the ground of bona fide requirement. The Apex Court in (Gayaprasad v. Pradeep Srivastava)1, reported in 2001(2) S.C.C. 604 , has held that no doubt subsequent events would be relevant and the Court would be obliged to examine that case but it should be of such a nature that it would totally eclipse the cause of action for continuation of the suit. In the present case, the fact that Krishanabai has died and the handicapped daughter Rekha has been married even if accepted, would be of no avail for the eviction was not sought only for the requirement of those two persons. If it was other way round then perhaps it was possible to hold that the subsequent events brought on record by the affidavit would completely eclipse the cause of action for institution and for continuation of the suit against the petitioner. However, as mentioned earlier, in the present case, besides the requirement for those two members of the landlords' family bona fide need was also set up in the context of the requirement of the children who have grown up and wanted to take higher education at Baramati. The plaint if read as a whole coupled with the other materials on record, including the evidence adduced before the Court, it would suggest that the requirement was not restricted to the need of handicapped daughter Rekha and Krishanabai but also for other family members and in particular the children who wanted to take higher education. Understood thus, it is not possible to take the view that the cause of action for institution and/or continuation of the suit in the present case can be said to have been totally eclipsed. On the other hand, applying the principles enunciated in the above said decision of the Apex Court this Court will have no option but to hold that the suit will have to be continued against the petitioners with regard to the other requirements set up by the landlords. 5. On the other hand, applying the principles enunciated in the above said decision of the Apex Court this Court will have no option but to hold that the suit will have to be continued against the petitioners with regard to the other requirements set up by the landlords. 5. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the present suit in so far as the ground of requirement of the children for their higher education can be said to be barred by res judicata. This plea was raised before the courts below. The Appellate Court has adverted to this aspect and found that the cause or the reason shown by the plaintiff for reasonable and bona fide claim is not the same which was in the earlier suit. The Appellate Court in paragraph 15 has also found that due to passage of time the family members of the plaintiffs have increased and now the children were taking higher education in school and college and hence they intended to reside at Baramati, which fact was not pleaded in the previous suit. In that context the Appellate Court found that the present suit cannot be said to be barred by res judicata. No doubt, the Appellate Court has also adverted to the fact that in the present proceeding additional reason pressed into service was also on the ground of handicapped daughter Rekha and old aged Krishanabai. Be that as it may, the Appellate Court therefore, took the view that the present suit cannot be said to be barred by res judicata. I find no reason to differ from the view taken by the Appellate Court, as no material has been placed before me to doubt the correctness of that view of the Appellate Court. In that sense, the present suit will have to be continued on the ground of the requirement of other family members and in particular of the children for taking higher education. No doubt, due to passage of time the children must have completed their education but that itself cannot disentitle the landlords to get the decree of eviction. The Apex Court has considered even this aspect of the matter in Gayaprasad's case (cited supra) as the parties will have to be relegated to the dates of institution of the suit. 6. No doubt, due to passage of time the children must have completed their education but that itself cannot disentitle the landlords to get the decree of eviction. The Apex Court has considered even this aspect of the matter in Gayaprasad's case (cited supra) as the parties will have to be relegated to the dates of institution of the suit. 6. The next question that arises is whether the respondents/landlords have established the plea of reasonable and bona fide need. The Appellate Court has adverted to all the relevant materials on record and found that the need stated by the landlords cannot be said to be mala fide or actuated one, but the same was bona fide need. The Appellate Court has discussed this aspect of the matter in paragraph 4 of the decision to hold that the need set up by the landlords was bona fide. Even the trial Court has taken the same view on analyzing the materials on record, and, therefore, it is not open for this Court to disturb the concurrent finding recorded by two courts below in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. No material is brought to my notice to contend that the finding recorded by the two courts below can be said to be perverse or manifestly wrong. Both the courts below have examined the materials on record and have also recorded a clear finding on fact that the need set up by the respondents was not only bona fide but also reasonable. In view of this concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below, no interference is warranted in the writ jurisdiction. 7. Even on the question of comparative hardship both the courts below have considered the materials on record and found that the plaintiffs would suffer greater hardship in the event of refusal to pass the decree for eviction. No fault can be found with either the approach or the reasons recorded by the courts below in this behalf. 8. In the circumstances, this petition is devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly this petition is dismissed. 9. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is already more than 70 years of the age and reasonable time to vacate the suit premises be granted. 8. In the circumstances, this petition is devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly this petition is dismissed. 9. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is already more than 70 years of the age and reasonable time to vacate the suit premises be granted. The Counsel for the respondents submits that ordinarily she would not have resisted that prayer but for the fact that the respondents had instituted the suit almost 20 years back and still they are waiting to enjoy the fruits of that decree. However, she submits that if the Court is inclined to grant time, it should not be more than 3 months. However, having regard to all the attending circumstances, I would think it proper to grant 6 months time to the petitioner to vacate the suit premises on giving usual undertaking within 4 weeks from today. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that although it is stated in paragraph 1 of the affidavit before this Court dated 15th October, 2001 that the petitioner was residing in the suit premises with his grand son and grand daughter-in-law, however, at present the petitioner is alone in the suit premises. The petitioner to clarify this position in the affidavit of undertaking to be filed before this Court. In case any other family member is occupying the suit premises that member shall also give usual undertaking before this Court within the same period of 4 weeks to the effect that even he would vacate the premises alongwith the petitioner within 6 months from the date of this order. It is made clear that if proper affidavit of undertaking as referred to above is not filed in time it will be open to the respondents to get the decree executed in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly. Petition dismissed. -----