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2002 DIGILAW 591 (CAL)

PRASANTA KUMAR BASU v. BURN STANDARD CO. LTD.

2002-09-05

MAHEMMAD HABEEB SHAMS ANSARI

body2002
MAHEMMAD HABEEB SHAMS ANSARI, J. ( 1 ) THE Court: Petitioner has questioned the conclusions of the enquiry officer being annexure 'f', order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority dated October 6, 1999 being annexure 'i' as also the order of the appellate authority confirming the same being annexure 'm'. ( 2 ) THE disciplinary authority by its letter dated June 30, 1999 (annexure 'f') forwarded the report of the enquiry officer dated June 28, 1999 and offered the petitioner an opportunity to make his representation in relation thereto. Upon considering the same the disciplinary authority for the reasons stated in his order being annexure 'i' agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer and passed the order of dismissal which was also confirmed by the appellate authority. ( 3 ) IN the charge sheet issued to the petitioner the 1st charge was with respect to the ? Job Done ? certificates issued by the petitioner showing therein the quantum of work done by the Contractors' workmen relating to the Contractor, M/s. Gupta Engineering Co. in relation to the bills (33 in number) for the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998. The second charge pertains to grant of exgratia payment to the workmen engaged in job contracts in respect of the same contractor during the period 1. 4. 1997 to 30. 4. 1998. ( 4 ) THE enquiry officer dealt with the said charge No. 1 under four heads. The enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty in respect of all the four sub-charges of charge No. 1 as also charge No. 2. The Disciplinary authority agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority. ( 5 ) THE conclusions arrived at by the respective authorities have been assailed by the petitioner on several grounds. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel Mr. Ajit Chandra Chattopadhyay assisted by Mrs. Rakhi Shroff shall be dealt with in a seriatim at appropriate juncture. There are certain contentions raised by Mr. Ajit Chandra Chattopadhyay which need to be disposed of before considering the rival contentions with regard to the report of the enquiry officer. ( 6 ) IT was contended by Mr. Ajit Chandra Chattopadhyay assisted by Mrs. Rakhi Shroff shall be dealt with in a seriatim at appropriate juncture. There are certain contentions raised by Mr. Ajit Chandra Chattopadhyay which need to be disposed of before considering the rival contentions with regard to the report of the enquiry officer. ( 6 ) IT was contended by Mr. Chattopadhyay that the enquiry officer is not a public servant as in terms of the rules governing the conduct of the enquiry the same could only be by a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It is not in dispute that the enquiry officer is a retired public servant. ( 7 ) MR. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents assisted by Mr. Soumya Majumdar, contended that no such objection was ever raised by the petitioner during the course of the departmental enquiry and therefore it must be assumed that the petitioner waived the said objection. It was further contended by Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee that in the absence of any objection taken at the threshold in the absence of any infirmity in the proceedings conducted by such enquiry officer the Court is required to consider whether any prejudice was caused to the petitioner. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel, elaborated the said submission by submitting that whether the regulations required a public servant to conduct an enquiry or whether an officer is required to conduct an enquiry the point to be kept in mind is that conducting an enquiry is for the purpose of gathering and ascertaining facts which is done in the presence of the delinquent employee who should be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend his case. It was further submitted that in the case on hand the disciplinary authority is distinct from the enquiry officer. The punishment in the instant case has been imposed, it was submitted, by the disciplinary authority. It was, therefore, strenuously urged that it is not open to the learned counsel for the petitioner to raise such objection which had not been raised earlier and further the same would no vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. ( 8 ) THE enquiry officer is a retired public servant. It was, therefore, strenuously urged that it is not open to the learned counsel for the petitioner to raise such objection which had not been raised earlier and further the same would no vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. ( 8 ) THE enquiry officer is a retired public servant. He is in receipt of pension and it was, therefore, feebly contended on behalf of the respondents that as he is receiving pension from the Government he does not cease to be a public servant. I cannot accede to the said submission. ( 9 ) IN order to hold whether a person is an officer of the Government (public servant) the two tests are, as held, in Manshanker Prabhashanker Dwivedi and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1970 Gujarat 97 (V 57 C 15); (i) whether he is in the service or pay of the Government and (ii) whether he is entrusted with the performance of any public duty. ( 10 ) IF both these requirements are satisfied it matters not the least what is the nature of his office, whether the duties he is performing are of an exalted character of very humble indeed. In the case on hand the said tests have not been satisfied. The enquiry officer was in the service or pay of the Government and is not so after superannuation. Also, he is not entrusted with performance of any public duty. The pension received by such retired public servant cannot be equated with pay for services rendered by him. The very connotation of the word pension is the payment for services already rendered. It is not remuneration for the services being rendered in present to the Government. ( 11 ) THE judgment in the State (SPE. Hyderabad) v. Air Commodore Kailash Chand, reported in AIR 1980 SC 522 is of no assistance to the respondents, as in that case on retirement the respondent in that case was reemployed. He was charge sheeted for having committed offences under section 5 (2) of the Corruption Act and cognizance was taken at the time when his reemployment had ceased but while he continued to be a Member of the Auxiliary Air Force. Supreme Court held that a Member of the Auxiliary Air Force is as much a public servant as an Acting Member of the Indian Air Force. Supreme Court held that a Member of the Auxiliary Air Force is as much a public servant as an Acting Member of the Indian Air Force. ( 12 ) IT is now to be seen whether the proceedings impugned in the writ petition are vitiated as they have been conducted by a person who is not a public servant. In other words the short question for consideration is as to whether the departmental enquiry would stand vitiated if conducted by a person who is not a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Penal Code and as required by the extant rules governing the service of the petitioner. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Chattopadhyay upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Central Bank of India v. C. Bernard, reported in 1990 (2) CLR 771. A few facts of the said decision need to be noticed in order to appreciate the consideration of the question as decided by the Supreme Court. In that case the enquiry officer who was appointed to conduct the enquiry retired from service during pendency of the enquiry. Notwithstanding his retirement he continued to function as an enquiry officer and concluded the enquiry. Under the bipartite settlement the enquiry officer appointed by the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank was empowered to hold enquiry and take disciplinary action. Accordingly, the enquiry officer after affording an opportunity to be heard to the employee on the question of punishment passed an order of discharge which was the subject matter challenge in those proceedings. The Supreme Court in that case accepted the contention made on behalf of the Bank that the enquiry officer need not be an officer of a bank and that even a third party could be appointed as an enquiry officer to inquire into the conduct of the employee and thus found nothing wrong with the enquiry report given by the enquiry officer who had during the continuance of the enquiry ceased to be an employee of the bank and thus had ceased to be an officer, however, the Supreme Court rejecter the contention raised on behalf of the bank that even the order passed by the enquiry officer who was authorized also to impose punishment, imposing punishment on the employee was also in order. The Supreme Court thus set aside the order of the enquiry officer imposing punishment and remitted the matter to disciplinary authority to take fresh decision based on the report of the said enquiry officer. ( 13 ) I am therefore inclined to accept the contentions made on behalf of the respondent authorities by their learned senior counsel Mr. B. R. Bhattacherjee. No doubt the regulations required a public servant to conduct the enquiry, however, it is to be noted that the enquiry officer in the case on hand is not empowered to impose the punishment. Therefore, the role of the enquiry officer under the extant rules is only to conduct an enquiry. The object of such enquiry is for the purpose of gathering and ascertaining facts in the presence of the delinquent who is to be given an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses and also to present witnesses in his defence. In the case on hand petitioner has been afforded fair and reasonable opportunity of defending his case before the enquiry officer. Unlike the case in the matter of Central Bank of India v. C. Bernard before the Supreme Court the enquiry officer who conducted the enquiry is not empowered to impose punishment nor did he so impose any punishment upon the delinquent. In my view, therefore, as the disciplinary authority was distinct from the enquiry officer the fact that the enquiry officer was not a public servant would not affect the enquiry nor for that reason the enquiry can be said to be vitiated. More importantly as contended by Mr. B. R. Bhattacherjee, no such objection was raised before the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority or even before the appellate authority. Even in the instant writ application no such plea has been taken. It must, therefore, be assumed as contended by Mr. B. R. Bhattacherjee that the requirement in the rules for conduct of enquiry by a public servant, even if it is assumed to be mandatory the same it must be held has been waived by the petitioner. Reference in this connection need only be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai v. Virgo Steels, Bombay and Anr. , reported in 2002 0 AIR (SCW) 1698. Suffice it here to extract a relevant portion from that judgment wherein the Supreme Court after referring to several judgments observed as under; 14. Reference in this connection need only be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai v. Virgo Steels, Bombay and Anr. , reported in 2002 0 AIR (SCW) 1698. Suffice it here to extract a relevant portion from that judgment wherein the Supreme Court after referring to several judgments observed as under; 14. From the ratio laid down by the Privy Council and followed by this Court in the above-cited judgments, it is clear that even though a provision of law is mandatory in its operation if such provision is one which deals with the individual rights of persons concerned and is for his benefit, the said person can always waive such a right. ? ( 14 ) THERE is one more contention which needs to be disposed of before coming to the crux of the main controversy. Mr. Chattopadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the enquiry officer examined the petitioner in the garb of mandatory questions. It is contended that the enquiry officer by cross-examination of the delinquent in the garb of mandatory questions sought to substantiate the charge leveled against the petitioner at any costs. The said procedure, it was strenuously urged, is highly irregular and thereby the enquiry proceeding stand vitiated. Referring to annexure 'j' Mr. Chattopadhyay contended that the said questions are in the nature of cross-examination of the delinquent by the enquiry officer. It is, therefore, contended that the enquiry is biased and tainted. ( 15 ) RELIANCE has been placed by Mr. Chattopadhyay upon the judgments of the Karanataka High Court in Radhakrishna Setty v. Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary Authority), Indian Overseas Bank, Central Office, Madras and Anr. , reported in 1998 (1) CLR 1280 and Bharath Electronics Ltd. v. K. Kasi, reported in 1087 (2) LLJ 203. ( 16 ) ON the other hand Mr. B. R. Bhattacherjee, learned senior counsel for the respondents contended that the questions which have been put by the enquiry officer to the delinquent and referred to as ?mandatory questions by the enquiry officer (annexure 'j') are with a view to afford the petitioner delinquent an opportunity to explain his case in the light of the evidence that has been let in on behalf of the department. None of the questions are in the form of cross-examination, it was submitted. None of the questions are in the form of cross-examination, it was submitted. Petitioner was thus afforded an opportunity to explain if he so desired the evidence that has been laid against him. Petitioner availed of that opportunity and submitted his explanation. The procedure is neither unfair, it was submitted, nor the petitioner can be said to be prejudiced thereby in any way. It was further contended that the petitioner has failed to establish any prejudice that has been caused to him thereby. ( 17 ) JUDGMENTS of the Karnataka High Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, lay down the well known proposition of law with regard to the role of an enquiry officer. ( 18 ) IT is well settled that an enquiry officer is entitled to put questions to witnesses for clarification wherever it becomes necessary, however if the enquiring authority plays the role of the presenting officer, the enquiry would be vitiated. Also, where the nature of questions put to witnesses of either party are not by way of seeking clarification which an enquiry officer is entitled to do but with a view to fill in the lacuna it can be said that the role of the enquiry officer is to be regarded as objectionable exposing a state of biased mind on the part of the enquiring authority. To establish the same one would have to look at the questions posed by the enquiry officer with a view to ascertain whether it was by way of clarification or to fill in lacuna in the departments' case or to establish the charge leveled against the delinquent. It is needless to reiterate that in a departmental proceeding the enquiry officer has a very important and significant role. He is expected to be impartial, fair and just. The very object of a departmental enquiry is to afford the delinquent a fair opportunity to defend his case. Though an enquiry officer does not function like a Court and its proceedings also cannot be equated with the proceedings of the Court nevertheless, he acts as an arbiter on whose findings and conclusions the disciplinary authority is to take further action in the matter. The enquiry officer thus has an obligation which the law casts upon him to gather evidence in a just and fair manner ensuring fair opportunity to both parties to present their evidence oral and/or documentary. The enquiry officer thus has an obligation which the law casts upon him to gather evidence in a just and fair manner ensuring fair opportunity to both parties to present their evidence oral and/or documentary. An enquiry officer cannot act as a prosecutor or as a witness for either of the parties. His role is to gather material both oral and/or documentary. ( 19 ) JUDGED in the light of the above the ?mandatory questions? (annexure 'j') put to the delinquent do not disclose any biased mind nor of they depict an effort on the part of the enquiry officer to fill in the lacuna in the department's case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also not been able to point out any question put to petitioner by the enquiry officer which can be characterized either as (i) filling in the lacuna in the department's case or (ii) disclosing a biased mind. A fair reading of the questions as also the answers which have been given voluntarily by the petitioner would show that an opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to offer his explanation with respect to the evidence oral and/or documentary brought on record on behalf of the department up to that stage. Even from the enquiry report submitted by the disciplinary authority it has not been established that the enquiring officer acted with a view to substantiate the charges leveled against the petitioner. The nature of questions and the answers given by the petitioner thereto would show that it was open to the petitioner to rely upon his answers at any stage of the proceedings. In fact, some of the answers are the very defence which the petitioner has taken in relation to the charges. ( 20 ) IN my view, therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to this ground has to rejected. The enquiry, in my view, is not vitiated merely because certain questions have been put to the petitioner by the enquiry officer. ( 21 ) LET us now consider the crux of the controversy namely the validity of the orders passed by the disciplinary authority based upon the enquiry officer's report and the order passed by the appellate authority confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. ( 21 ) LET us now consider the crux of the controversy namely the validity of the orders passed by the disciplinary authority based upon the enquiry officer's report and the order passed by the appellate authority confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. ( 22 ) BEFORE we deal with the rival contentions it would be appropriate to keep in mind the ambit and scope of judicial review by a writ Court in the matter of departmental proceedings. ( 23 ) IT is well settled that judicial review, generally speaking, is not directed against a decision but is directed against the decision making process. A writ Court does not act as an appellate authority. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 the majority judgment was to the following effect; ?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. ? ( 24 ) BRIEFLY summarized the three heads of grounds on which action of departmental authority is subject to control by judicial review are (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, (iii) procedural impropriety. ? ( 24 ) BRIEFLY summarized the three heads of grounds on which action of departmental authority is subject to control by judicial review are (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, (iii) procedural impropriety. ( 25 ) THUS, interference with the decision of departmental authority can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of such authority had held proceedings in violation of principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the modes of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion. ( 26 ) IT is in the light of the above well settled principles that the rival contentions need to be considered. It would be convenient to deal with several contentions with respect to the charges in seriatim. ( 27 ) THE first charge related to the admissibility of ?lead charges payment? to the contractor. The imputation is to the effect that the petitioner allowed lead charges as claimed by the contractor and the same was certified by the petitioner. Reference has been made to 33 bills of the contractor M/s. Gupta Engineering Company,. In accordance with the certification be the petitioner, those bills were paid to the contractor and thereby a financial loss has been caused to the company. ( 28 ) THE aforesaid charge No. 1 was dealt with by the enquiry officer under four heads; sub-charge No. 1 is in respect of 12 bills pertaining to purchase order M-1, M-2 and M-4 for handling of wheels, bogies and steel materials by using company's crane and loco. Under this head, the company is said to have suffered a loss of Rs. 16,67,793. 56/ -. ( 29 ) SUB charge No. 11 related to 5 bills for unloading of wheels. Petitioner certified for payment five bills amounting to R. 1,09,733. 17/- towards ?lead charges?. Only one bill for Rs. 5,873. 19/- was paid leaving a balance as liability of the company. ( 30 ) SUB charge No. III was regarding 8 bills for handling of scrap materials. In respect of eight bills a sum of Rs. 1,42,194. Petitioner certified for payment five bills amounting to R. 1,09,733. 17/- towards ?lead charges?. Only one bill for Rs. 5,873. 19/- was paid leaving a balance as liability of the company. ( 30 ) SUB charge No. III was regarding 8 bills for handling of scrap materials. In respect of eight bills a sum of Rs. 1,42,194. 33/- was claimed by the contractor and was certified by the petitioner pertaining to handling of scrap materials. ( 31 ) SUB charge No. IV was regarding eight bills which had been certified by the petitioner amounting to Rs. 3,34,253. 41/- for loading and unloading of steel material charges when the purchase order was for gas cutting of steel materials. Though certified be the petitioner some of bills had not been passed by the respondent authorities for payment. Resultant position is that payment of Rs. 1,30,930. 83/- was made and liability is respect of the balance. ( 32 ) THE enquiry officer based upon the evidence and material on record observed that as Deputy Manager (S/s) petitioner-the C. O. with respect to 33 bills (exhibits M- ( to M-41) used to send in some strips of paper the ?job done? certificate showing therein the quantum of work done by Contractor's workmen (in tonnage) every month for raising his bills the Company for the services as shown rendered therein. ( 33 ) WITH regard to sub charge No. 1 relating to 12 bills it was observed on the basis of evidence of MW's 1 to 3 that the estimate of job done by the Contractor's labourers as certified by the petitioner authorizing the ?three leads? while stating that unloading and loading was done ?with the help of our crane and loco ?without indicating how and why the ?lead charges? were authorized to contractor. It was further observed that on the aforesaid authorization (job done certificate) of C. O. , the contractor used to raise his bills on the Company and petitioner thereafter also certified the correctness of the bills. The enquiry officer further observed that the admissible contract rate payable for loading/unloading is for involvement of such manpower/manhour of the contractor in such operations and it does not admit of separate ?lead charge?. On the basis of evidence on record the enquiry officer was of the view that it was impossible to handle wheel sets and bogies manually. The enquiry officer further observed that the admissible contract rate payable for loading/unloading is for involvement of such manpower/manhour of the contractor in such operations and it does not admit of separate ?lead charge?. On the basis of evidence on record the enquiry officer was of the view that it was impossible to handle wheel sets and bogies manually. Similarly with respect to handling of steel materials made inside the works with the help of company's crane/loco, the purchase order has not provided for separate ?lead charge?. It was further observed by the enquiry officer that if at all such charges (lead charges) were to be allowed the purpose thereof, indicating what movement, if any, was involved and how ought to have been stated in the job data supplied by C. O. for billing, Sub charge No. III was in respect of handling of scrap materials at yard. It was observed by the enquiry officer that the operations involved in such handlings are regulated by purchase order agreements Exs. M1, M3, M4 which provided for handling of scrap materials inside the works on lorry load basis or MT basis. The rates fixed being Rs. 306 per lorry and Rs. 112 per MT. It was held that these rates were ignored and the lead charges were allowed. With regard to sub charge No. IV it was similarly held that in terms of purchase order Ex. M2 which related to labour cost for gas cutting of steel materials in the yard and also movement of cylinders at the time of operations and stacking of gas cut materials including their movement to gas cutting site as and when required. The prescribed rate was Rs. 137 per MT which was ignored. It was thus concluded by the enquiry officer that the supervision and control at the operating level of the work pertaining to the sub charges II, III and IV dependent solely on the petitioner C. O. who had furnished job done certificates to the contractor on the basis of which the contractor submitted the bills and latter the same were certified by the petitioner. The enquiry officer accordingly held the charge No. 1 established. ( 34 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer are perverse. The enquiry officer accordingly held the charge No. 1 established. ( 34 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer are perverse. It is submitted that M. W. 1 admitted in cross examination that for handling of crane work contractor's labour are required and/or used. It is further contended that it is on record in the evidence of Debasish Ganguly that purchase order is silent about the mode of transport. The conclusion arrived at by the respondent authorities that lead charges may apply if the materials are handled manually is based on surmise and conjecture. It is further contended that the most vital point raised in the defence arguments which has not been considered either by the enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority is that the petitioner merely recommended the job work done but had not recommended the rates quoted by the contractor. Learned counsel has referred to the various bills wherein, it has been certified by the petitioner as under; ?the work content of the bill is checked and certified. All the operations are correct. ? it is thus contended that the rate was not recommended and it was the duty of the accounts department to check and verify the rates of the bills with the purchase order. No query was raised by the accounts department nor any objection was raised on the bills submitted by the contractor by the accounts department. It is further contended that with respect to sub charge IV of charge No. 1 which was pertaining to cutting of materials in terms of the purchase orders, if handling of the materials was not in the purchase order that could have been pointed out by the accounts department before passing of the bill. ( 35 ) IN short, it is the contention of the petitioner that he has merely certified and recommended the job done but not recommended the rates quoted by the contractor and that it was the duty sanctioning authority who is senior in rank to the petitioner to have considered the same as also of the accounts department to check and verify the rates of the bills with the purchase order. The findings and the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority has already been noticed supra. The findings and the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority has already been noticed supra. The enquiry officer based upon the evidence on record held that the petitioner was directly responsible for having jobs in question done under his direct supervision and the petitioner failed to maintain proper records. It was further held, as noticed supra, that on the job done certificate of the C. O. , contractor used to raise his bills on the company and petitioner thereafter certified the correctness of the bills. It was further held that for identical nature of job, bills certified by the petitioner was without lead charges and, therefore, there was no occasion for allowing lead charges in respect of the bills in question. Keeping in vies, the limited scope of judicial review as noticed supra, it cannot be said that the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are either perverse or based on no evidence. Having examined the report of the enquiry officer I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings of the enquiry officer cannot be held to be findings based on no evidence. ( 36 ) THERE is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that he merely certified the work done and it was for other authorities to check and verify the correctness of the said bills with reference to the purchase orders. The very object of certification by a responsible officer under whose supervision the job is required to be done would be defeated if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted. Petitioner must be held accountable for the job data furnished and the certification of the bills for the job done by the contractor. Each officer in the organization has a role to play in the hierarchy. Each one is thus accountable for the acts which fall within his province. Principle of accountability is thus attracted to individual act of the person concerned. The adage ?passing the buck? has no application in service law jurisprudence. It is, therefore, no defence to the charge that it is for other authorities to check and verify the certification made by the petitioner. The aforesaid contention has accordingly to be and is hereby rejected. Principle of accountability is thus attracted to individual act of the person concerned. The adage ?passing the buck? has no application in service law jurisprudence. It is, therefore, no defence to the charge that it is for other authorities to check and verify the certification made by the petitioner. The aforesaid contention has accordingly to be and is hereby rejected. ( 37 ) WITH regard to charge No. 2, the imputation is that on job contracts against purchase orders No. M-1, to M-4, petitioner advised the contractors exgratia payment amounting to Rs. 13,53,281/ -. The defence of the petitioner was that he acted under the instruction of the DGM (P) who used to hold meetings with the unit head and obtained his consent to that effect. It was also contended before the respondent authorities that the concerned contractor did not want to be reimbursed for the amounts and the matter was noncontractual. It is in the evidence of MWs. 4, 6 and 7, as can be seen from the enquiry report that there was no provision for advising exgratia payment to contractor labours. The enquiry officer significantly observed in para 235 of his report as under; ?the C. O. pleaded that the practice has grown-up in the Unit for a long time. This was admitted by MW1 Sri A. R. Acharjee, DGM (Pandp ). If it was so the failure of the DGM (Pandp) or for that matter of the head of the Unit, who might have got to know about this practice in due course to take action for discontinuance of it, is a point for consideration. This, in my opinion, can act as a mitigating factor but cannot nevertheless absolve the C. O. of his own responsibilities. ? ( 38 ) IT is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the findings on charge No. 2 holding the petitioner guilty is wholly untenable. It is submitted that the petitioner was only the forwarding authority after recommendation of the departmental heads with regard to additional work being done by the contractors labour. It was further submitted that the material evidence on this aspect of the matter is of M. W. 1. and M. W. 3 to the effect that they recommended the additional work from their respective department. ( 39 ) IN my view, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is worthy of consideration. It was further submitted that the material evidence on this aspect of the matter is of M. W. 1. and M. W. 3 to the effect that they recommended the additional work from their respective department. ( 39 ) IN my view, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is worthy of consideration. The enquiry officer held, as noticed supra, from his observation in para 23. 5, the mitigating factor as practice had grown up in the unit for a long time which was also admitted by M. W. 1. who is none other than the D. G. M. (P ). There is thus sufficient material on record to hold as the enquiry officer observed that a practice has grown up in the unit for a long time. The conclusion, therefore, arrived at by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority holding the petitioner guilty of the said charge suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by this Court. It must, therefore, be held that charge No. 2 is not established. ( 40 ) NEXT, it was contended that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are mechanical without application of mind. I cannot accede to the said submission. The disciplinary authority agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer and has also in his elaborate order dealt with various charges and contentions. Likewise the appellate authority has elaborately dealt with the various contentions raised before it. ( 41 ) LASTLY, it was contended that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate keeping in view the unblemished service rendered by the petitioner in the respondent organization. ( 42 ) NO doubt, the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority is based upon the two charges having been established. The charge No. II, it has been held hereinbefore is not established for the reasons aforestated. However, it cannot be said that the punishment inflicted is grossly disproportionate to the charge No. 1 which stands established. Charge No. I is of a grave and serious nature. The punishment imposed is dismissal from service. It is one which could be imposed under the rules for the charge which stands established. However, it cannot be said that the punishment inflicted is grossly disproportionate to the charge No. 1 which stands established. Charge No. I is of a grave and serious nature. The punishment imposed is dismissal from service. It is one which could be imposed under the rules for the charge which stands established. In my view, therefore, on the authority of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra AIR 1963 SC 779 there is no warrant to interfere with the impugned punishment. In the result, writ application is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall, however, be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.