ORDER Arun Mishra, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, a company registered under the Companies Act, seeking the quashment of the proceedings initiated by the M.P. Financial Corporation, Indore, u/s 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 for sale of the property to respondent 2, M/s Sai Chemicals Ltd. Bombay on 24-4-1995 and to direct the Corporation to restore the possession of the factory to the petitioner. By way of amendment further relief has been sought to restore the machinery and the property to the factory premises in the State in which it was on 25-4-1995. Subsequently the property has been sold to respondent 3, M/s Kali Sales Corporation. The petitioner-company avers in the petition that the company had set up an industry at a huge expense of Rs. 25 lacs at Pachmarhi Road, Piparia, for manufacture of hawai chappals, canvass shoes and cycle tyre-tubes in the year 1965. In the year 1971 the company took a loan of Rs. 9,50,000/- from M.P. Financial Corporation and thereafter took the loan of Rs. 6,50,000/- in the year 1978. The factory came into difficulty and became a sick unit and was closed in the year 1989 and it could not repay the loan of the Corporation. An application u/s 31 was moved by the M.P. Financial Corporation. No action was initiated u/s 29. The petitioner further avers that having elected to make an application u/s 31 it was not open to the respondent to initiate proceeding u/s 29 of the Act. The respondent/corporation took over the factory situated at Pachmarhi Road, Piparia, Distt. Hoshangabad. A panchanama was prepared and possession was delivered to Shri Hemant Malviya. After taking possession the offers were invited by the Corporation for sale of the industrial unit on "as is where is basis". The notice was published in Dainik Bhaskar, Bhopal as per Annex. P-4 on 7-10-1994. 10th and 11th October, 1994 were fixed for inspection of the industrial unit and upto 14-10-1994 offers were to be made. It is submitted that the property is worth about one crore rupees and has been set up in about 5.8 acres. Offers were not invited by making publication in all India papers having wide circulation. Kamal Kishore, son of the Managing Director was residing as a care taker of the unit. He was asked to vacate the premises on 24-4-1995 within 24 hours. Offers were not invited by making publication in all India papers having wide circulation. Kamal Kishore, son of the Managing Director was residing as a care taker of the unit. He was asked to vacate the premises on 24-4-1995 within 24 hours. He did not vacate the premises and was forcibly removed from the premises. Before such removal the company did not receive and letter/offer made by respondent 2. A copy of the letter (P-6) was handed over by the Corporation which is alleged to have been dispatched on 24-3-1995. On this letter address was shown as 114, Chhitranjan Avenue, Calcutta, which was not the proper address. Thus the letter P-6 was not sent on the correct address. Thus no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to offer the sale amount. Wrong address was written on P-6 and this letter was not received by the petitioner. The respondent-Corporation in its return contend that the petitioner committed gross default in due repayment of loan and interest and in the result till 12-9-1994 a sum of Rs. 50.57 lakhs became due. u/s 29 the Corporation has special powers to recover the loan and section 31 authorises it to apply to the District Judge for attachment and sale of property. It is stated that respondent No. 1 has been held to be entitled to abandon the action taken u/s 31 of the Act at any stage and to commence fresh action u/s 29 of the Act. Notices were published in Dainik Bhaskar and Nava Bharat on 6-10-1994. One M/s Agarwal Associates submitted its tender on 14-10-1994. The tender was offered for Rs. 12.60 lakhs. The committee rejected the tender of M/s Agarwal Associates. Fresh notice inviting tender was published in Financial Express on 14-1-1995 (Annex.R-1/15), Economic Times dated 21-1-1995 (Annex. R-1/16); Punjab Kesri dated 16-1-1995, (Annex. R-1/17); M.P. Chronicals dated 17-1-1995 (Annex. R-1/18) and Dainik Bhaskar dated 18-1-1995, (Annex. R-1/19). The first three papers have circulation all over India. Shri Hemant Mehta for M/s Shree Kali Sales Corporation submitted the tender for Rs. 15,25,501/- and it was revised to Rs. 23,50,501/-. On 20-3-1995 this tender was placed for consideration before the committee. The committee called the tenderer and persuaded him to enhance his offer to Rs. 28 lacs. Offer of Rs. 28 lakhs was comparable to the realisable market value of the assets ascertained by technical staff at Rs. 30.60 lakhs. 15,25,501/- and it was revised to Rs. 23,50,501/-. On 20-3-1995 this tender was placed for consideration before the committee. The committee called the tenderer and persuaded him to enhance his offer to Rs. 28 lacs. Offer of Rs. 28 lakhs was comparable to the realisable market value of the assets ascertained by technical staff at Rs. 30.60 lakhs. A letter was written to the petitioner on 24-3-1995 on the registered address as communicated by the petitioner to respondent 1 at the time of sanction of loan. No change in the address was intimated by the petitioner. Thus there is no infirmity in the action taken by the M.P. Financial Corporation. M/s Kali Sales Corporation, was added as respondent No. 3 during the pendency of the writ petition. An application has been filed by Allahabad Bank as intervenor contending that it is also one of the creditors and loan was secured selling the property by respondent 1 is illegal. Counsel for the petitioner submits that it was not open to initiate the proceedings u/s 29. Second submission is that no effective offer was made as per Annex. P-6, as P-6 was not received by the petitioner. It was not sent at the correct address. Thus the sale in favour of respondent 2 is bad in law. The offer of price on which the unit was proposed to be sold ought to have been proposed to the petitioner first. This opportunity has been denied. Thus the sale to respondent 2 and the subsequent sale is bad in law. Counsel for respondent 1 submits, that action is proper and the decision of Mahesh Chandra Vs. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and others, ) has been overruled by the Supreme Court in the recent decision in Haryana Financial Corporation and Another Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Another, . Learned counsel submits that the notice P-6 was sent in the instant case on the registered address. In view of the decision in Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and another, , it is submitted that even when an order has been obtained by corporation invoking provisions of section 31, recourse to remedy is still available u/s 29. Learned counsel submits that action is not mala fide in any manner and the scope of interference in the writ petition is limited. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and another, , it is submitted that even when an order has been obtained by corporation invoking provisions of section 31, recourse to remedy is still available u/s 29. Learned counsel submits that action is not mala fide in any manner and the scope of interference in the writ petition is limited. Smt. I. Nair, senior counsel for the intervenor submits that M.P. Financial Corporation could not sale property as bank loan has priority which was secured and charged on the property sold. The first question for consideration is whether it was open to the Corporation to have taken the recourse to the proceedings u/s 29. The Apex Court in A.P. State Financial Corporation (supra) held that even if a decree has been passed u/s 31 recourse can be taken u/s 29 by Corporation. This court in Dogar Tools Private Limited and Others Vs. Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation and Another, , has held as under- After hearing the counsel for the appellants, we are of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. It appears that it is a case where borrower is clearly interested in delaying the repayment. The unit is lying closed since the year 1982-83 and all efforts for settlement have come to an end. It is a case of long drawn litigation. Initially proceedings u/s 31 were started. Ultimately they were withdrawn long back in the year 1996. Still the petitioners did not pay any amount to the Corporation. Liberty was given to proceed u/s 29 though no such liberty was required or called for as the scope of proceedings u/s 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act to recover dues in case of default by sale of mortgaged property is an independent right. u/s 29 of the Act, the Financial Corporation has the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale the industrial unit and realise the amount of loan and such a transfer shall be treated as if it had been made by the owner of the property. Section 31 contains the special provision for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation. An application can be made to the Distt. Section 31 contains the special provision for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation. An application can be made to the Distt. Judge praying for the reliefs of an order for the sale of the property pledge, mortgaged or hypothecated or assigned as security for the loan or advance, or for enforcing the liability of any surety, or for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, or for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board where such removal is apprehended. There is no effect on proceedings u/s 31. The matter came up for consideration by the Apex Court in the case of A.P. State Financial Corporation vs. M/s Gar Re-rolling Mills, and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and another, . It has been candidly laid down by the Apex Court that the Financial Corporation has a remedy available to it u/s 29 of the Act even after having obtained an order or a decree after invoking the provisions of section 31 of the Act but without executing that decree/order. The legislature has left the choice to the Corporation to act u/s 31 of the Act in the first instance and save its rights and remedies u/s 29 to be availed at a later stage. However, the Corporation cannot simultaneously pursue two remedies at the same time. The reach and scope of the two remedies is essentially different. A decree u/s 31 of the Act not being a money decree or a decree for realisation of the dues of the Corporation, recourse to it cannot debar the Corporation from taking recourse to the provisions of section 29 of the Act by not pursuing the decree or order u/s 31 of the Act. Similarly, if the corporation has taken recourse to the provisions of section 29 of the Act, there is no bar for it without taking those proceedings to their logical conclusion to abandon them and approach the court u/s 31 of the Act. It is also open to the Corporation to proceed u/s 31 in the first instance and to proceed subsequently u/s 29 of the Act. In the instant case, proceedings u/s 31 have been withdrawn in the year 1996 to start the proceedings u/s 29. It is also open to the Corporation to proceed u/s 31 in the first instance and to proceed subsequently u/s 29 of the Act. In the instant case, proceedings u/s 31 have been withdrawn in the year 1996 to start the proceedings u/s 29. Hence there is no impact of the withdrawal of the proceedings u/s 31 of the Act. The second question for consideration is whether the sale deed executed in favour of respondent 2 is bad in law and whether notice P-6 was not received by the petitioner which contain an offer to purchase on the sale price and to repay the remaining amount in instalments and the petitioner has been deprived of that offer. Firstly it has to be seen whether there is any necessity of making such an offer. Their Lordships of the Apex Court in M/s Jagdamba Oil Mills (supra) overruled the decision of Mahesh Chandra (supra). It has been held by their lordships that it is not the statutory requirement to make the offer to the defaulter unit holder. It is not necessary to associate defaulter at every stage of sale of property. The Apex Court in Jagdamba Oil Mills (supra) has held as under- 15. The view in Mahesh Chandra's case (supra) appears to have been too widely expressed without taking note of ground realities and the intended objects of the statute. If the guidelines as indicated are to be strictly followed, it would be giving premium to a dishonest borrower. It would not further the interest of any Corporation and consequently of the industrial undertakings intending to avail financial assistance. It would Only provide an unwarranted opportunity to the defaulter (in mosts cases chronic and deliberate) to stall recovery proceedings. It is not to be understood that in every case the corporation shall take recourse to action u/s 29. Procedure to be followed, needless to say, has to be observed. If any reason is indicated or cause shown for the default, same has to be considered in its proper perspective and a conscious decision has to be taken as to whether action u/s 29 of the Act is called for. Thereafter, the modalities for disposal of seized unit have to be worked out. The view expressed in Gem Cap's case (supra) appears to be more in line with the legislative intent. Thereafter, the modalities for disposal of seized unit have to be worked out. The view expressed in Gem Cap's case (supra) appears to be more in line with the legislative intent. Indulgence shown to chronic defaulter would amount to flogging a dead horse without any conceivable result being expected. As the facts in the present case shown not even a minimal portion of the principal amount has been repaid. That is a factor which should not have been lost sight by the courts below. It is one thing to assist the borrower who has intention to repay, but is prevented by unsurmountable difficulties in meeting the commitments. That has to be established by adducing material. In the case at hand factual aspects have not even been dealt with, and solely relying on the decision in Mahesh Chandra's cases (supra), the matter has been decided. Section 29 gives a right to the financial corporation inter alia to sell the assets of the industrial concern and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the financial corporation. This right accrues when the industrial concern, which is under a liability to the financial corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations as envisaged in section 29 of the Act. Section 29(1) gives the financial corporation in the event of default the right to take over the management or possession or both and thereafter deal with the property. The aforesaid guidelines issued in Mahesh Chandra's case place unnecessary restrictions on the exercise of power by the financial corporation contained in section 29 of the Act by requiring the defaulting unit holder to be associated or consulted at every stage in the sale of the property. A person who has defaulted is hardly ever likely to cooperate in the sale of his assets. The procedure indicated in Mahesh Chandra's case will only lead to further delay in realization of the dues by the corporation by sale of assets. It is always expected that the corporation will try and realize the maximum sale price by selling the assets by following a procedure which is transparent and acceptable, after due publicity, wherever possible. In view of the aforesaid it is not necessary to go into the fact whether P-6 was received by the petitioner or not. It is always expected that the corporation will try and realize the maximum sale price by selling the assets by following a procedure which is transparent and acceptable, after due publicity, wherever possible. In view of the aforesaid it is not necessary to go into the fact whether P-6 was received by the petitioner or not. However, it is clear that P-6 was sent at the registered address of the petitioner. This address has been mentioned in the 12th annual report P-6 was sent by registered post and there is presumption of it being served. True it is that in some of other correspondence two other addresses have been mentioned but the fact remains that the letter was dispatched on the petitioner's address and no rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner to show that the address mentioned in annual general meeting is incorrect. Otherwise also the proceedings were in the knowledge of the petitioner as the notice inviting tender was published in three all India news papers and 3 state level papers. Petitioner has come up with the false averment that no publicity was made in all India news papers for inviting tender. Petitioner's representative was very much residing in the factory. Thus it cannot be held that the sale has been held in mala fide manner. The stand taken by the corporation makes it clear that offer as per first tender was not accepted. Fresh notice was issued. Thus the corporation has taken care to receive maximum possible value. Action has not been shown mala fide in the instant case. The action cannot be said to be unfair in any manner. In my opinion parameter of judicial scrutiny in such matter is limited as observed in Dogar Tools Pvt. Ltd. (supra) as under:- The scope of interference by this court in proceedings u/s 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act in writ jurisdiction is not to sit over it as an appellate authority. The jurisdiction of the court is limited and can be exercised in two situations, namely (i) where there is a statutory violation on the part of the corporation, or (ii) where the corporation acts unfairly i.e. unreasonably. The Apex Court has cautioned the High Courts not to convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. The jurisdiction of the court is limited and can be exercised in two situations, namely (i) where there is a statutory violation on the part of the corporation, or (ii) where the corporation acts unfairly i.e. unreasonably. The Apex Court has cautioned the High Courts not to convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. In the case of U.P. Financial Corporation vs. M/s Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 1435 , the Apex Court has observed that the corporation, no doubt has to act within the four corners of the act and in furtherance of the object underlying the Act. But this factor cannot be carried to the extent of obligating the corporation to revive the resurrect every sick industry irrespective of the cost involved. Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account. The fairness required of the corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it. Fairness is not a one way street. In the present case, the conduct; of the petitioner goes to show that they are not serious about their unit. Considering the period passed and the fact that the amount is due for the last about two decades, it cannot be said that the petitioners intention is to pay off the public money to the corporation. In any case, the action of the corporation cannot be said to be unfair or unjust or arbitrary. Prolonging the proceedings in these circumstances is not going to serve any useful purpose. The next question is about priority between the intervenor-Allahabad Bank and the M.P. Financial Corporation. It is for them to settle their dispute in appropriate petition before appropriate forum. An intervener cannot be allowed to enlarge scope of writ petition, it is dispute inter se intervenor and M.P. Financial Corporation. No relief has been claimed by the petitioner in this regard. I find no merit in the writ petition. The same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed