ORDER Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has called in question the defensibility of the orders passed by the M.P. Administrative Tribunal (in short 'the Tribunal') in M.A. Nos. 12/95 and 53/95. It is apposite to mention here, the first application was filed by the State of M.P. for review and the second was at the instance of the respondent No. 5 and both these applications sought review of the order passed in O.A. No. 2879/90. The facts which are essential to be depicted are that the petitioner was appointed as a Stenographer vide order dated 5-9-1975. The respondent No. 5, Som Chandra Agrawal, was appointed in a similar post on 13-2-1980. The Department of General Administration, Government of M.P. created post of Stenographer to the Head of the Department in the payscale of Rs. 900-1450 and also the post of Stenographer of 'Pravar Shreni'. The petitioner was appointed to the second category in the year 1984 and the respondent No. 5 was appointed to the first category. It is putforth that the respondent No. 5 did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for being appointed as Stenographer to the Head of the Department. The post of Pravar Shreni Stenographer was published vide order dated 30-12-1986 and the order passed in favour of the petitioner was cancelled as a consequence whereof the petitioner was reverted to the previous payscale i.e. Rs. 860-1460. However, the order in favour of the respondent No. 5 to this writ petition was not cancelled and his promotion to the post of Stenographer to the Head of Department continued. Later on vide order dated 7-10-1985 a clarification was issued that the said private respondent could not have been appointed to the post in question but the respondent No. 3 did not pay any heed to it and they allowed the respondent No. 5 to continue in the higher post putting the petitioner to grave harassment, humiliation and demoralisation as he was reverted to the lower grade. The petitioner being senior, as pleaded, should have been appointed as Stenographer to the Head of Department and the respondent No. 5 should have been reverted being junior but the authorities turned a blind eye. The petitioner being senior, as pleaded, should have been appointed as Stenographer to the Head of Department and the respondent No. 5 should have been reverted being junior but the authorities turned a blind eye. It is putforth in the petition that the State Government vide order dated 15-3-1988 formulated a comprehensive policy of promotion for the post of Stenographers and accordingly all stenographers were brought in one cadre having a single seniority list creating three grades of the Stenographers, namely, Stenographer Grade-I with the payscale of Rs. 1820-3300; Stenographer Grade-II with the payscale of Rs. 1500-2680; and Stenographer Grade-III with the payscale of Rs. 1290-2040. This policy also prescribes five years of service for promotion to the next higher grade. Later on, modifications were issued to the policy. It is putforth that the basis for promotion was seniority-cum-merit. The seniority list was published on 30-4-1990 showing the position as on 1-4-1989 wherein the petitioner was shown as senior to the respondent No. 5. In the meanwhile the payscale of stenographer was revised and the Joint Director (Employment), respondent No. 3 herein issued an order on 31-8-1990 to promote the petitioner in the Stenographer Grade in the payscale of Rs. 1640-2900 but the respondent No. 5 was promoted in the Grade-I in the payscale of Rs. 2000-3500. After receipt of the aforesaid order the petitioner being perplexed submitted a representation and as the same became an exercise in futility he preferred an application before the Tribunal which was registered as O.A. No. 2879/90. Again vide order dated 31-8-1990, Annexure P/12 to the present writ petition, the private respondent was conferred the higher benefit than that of the petitioner. Various contentions were putforth before the Tribunal and the same were combatted with full vehemence by the contesting respondents. A plea relating to limitation was raised. The Tribunal on consideration of the factual scenario in entirety allowed the application filed by the petitioner. As benefit was not conferred in pursuance of the order passed by the Tribunal he filed an application for contempt which was registered as M.A. No. 39/95. At this juncture, the State of M.P. as well as the private respondent filed applications for review as has been indicated hereinbefore. As benefit was not conferred in pursuance of the order passed by the Tribunal he filed an application for contempt which was registered as M.A. No. 39/95. At this juncture, the State of M.P. as well as the private respondent filed applications for review as has been indicated hereinbefore. It is apposite to wit that before the Tribunal applicants who had sought for review of the main order had raised a colossal complaint with regard to limitation, delay and laches. The Tribunal upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties allowed the application seeking review of the original order on the basis that the question of limitation had not been considered in the original order sought to be reviewed and that came within the arena of error apparent on the face of record and accordingly allowed the applications for review which as a corollary entailed in the dismissal of application for contempt. It is urged in the petition that the orders allowing the review at the instance of the respondents No. 1 to 3 and 5 herein are absolutely illegal, improper, unjust and contrary to the settled position of law inasmuch as the foundation on which the order is based does not come within the grounds specified for review. It is also putforth that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in regard to the scope of review and hence, the order passed by it is sensitively vulnerable. A return has been filed by the respondents No. 1 to 4 contending, inter alia, that the application filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal was hopelessly barred by time and was not entertainable in view of the provisions enshrined u/s 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (for brevity 'the Act') and, therefore, no relief could have been granted by the Tribunal but as the same was done the respondents in the Original Application sought review of the order and the Tribunal appositely reviewed the order. It is also putforth that the petitioner had forfeited his right to challenge an order of 1986 as he did not assail the same within the prescribed period of limitation and hence he could not have called the validity of the same in question before the Tribunal. It has also been pleaded that claim of the petitioner vis-a-vis the respondent No. 5 was not warranted consideration inasmuch as both were promoted taking into account their respective merits. It has also been pleaded that claim of the petitioner vis-a-vis the respondent No. 5 was not warranted consideration inasmuch as both were promoted taking into account their respective merits. Many an aspect has been highlighted to justify the order of review passed by the Tribunal. A return has been filed by the respondent No. 5 contending, inter alia, that the Original Application filed was partly allowed though the same did not deserve consideration by the Tribunal as the petitioner had no ground to claim parity of promotion with the answering respondent. Various aspects have been highlighted with regard to merits of the case which need not be dwelled upon in this writ petition inasmuch as the sphere of challenge is quite limited. It is admitted in the return that the cause of action had arisen in the year 1986 during the period of three years immediately, preceding the date of establishment of the Tribunal and as such the petition ought to have been filed by the petitioner challenging the promotion of the respondent No. 5 within a period of one year from the date of establishment of the Tribunal as provided u/s 21 of the Act, but the same was not done. While so stating the respondent No. 5 has also pleaded that the petition before the Tribunal was not tenable as the policy letter dated 18-2-1983 was not assailed on the basis of which the petitioner and the answering respondent were promoted under different channels. In paragraph 9 of the return, it has been putforth that seniority list published on 30-4-1990 does not anyway render assistance to the petitioner because as an actual fact the petitioner and the respondent from 1986 were enjoying different payscales as such the gradation list did not create any right in favour of the petitioner. Justification has been given in support of the order passed by the Tribunal for review on the ground that the reasons ascribed by the Tribunal are within the province of review. An application for intervention has been filed by one Ashok Kumar Gupta on the ground that any order passed in the writ petition would cause serious prejudice to him as he is senior to the respondent No. 5. The application for intervention was allowed by this Court by order dated 15-4-1998. Assailing the order impugned, it is submitted by Mr. An application for intervention has been filed by one Ashok Kumar Gupta on the ground that any order passed in the writ petition would cause serious prejudice to him as he is senior to the respondent No. 5. The application for intervention was allowed by this Court by order dated 15-4-1998. Assailing the order impugned, it is submitted by Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has fallen into error by reviewing its own order, though the grounds for review were not attracted. It is urged by him that the Tribunal vide order in paragraph 13 has recorded a finding that the present petitioner (who was respondent No. 4 in the review petition) should have challenged the order dated 30-12-1986 within a period of one year from the date of establishment of the Tribunal as provided in section 21 of the Act and the same was not filed within the specified prescribed period and the said application had become barred by limitation. It is also observed as no application for condonation of delay was filed the Original Application should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. That apart, it is putforth by him that the Tribunal dwelled upon the aspect of locus standi of the present writ petitioner to challenge the promotion of the respondent No. 5 to the writ petition as he was given selection grade on the basis of a totally different criteria. In paragraph 15, it is canvassed by Mr. Dixit that the Tribunal has also adverted to the merits in review as if it was hearing an appeal. Mr. S.K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State and its functionaries and Mr. Piyush Dharmadhikari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 argued in support of the order passed by the Tribunal. It is canvassed by them that the application having not been filed within the period of limitation as prescribed u/s 21 of the Act and no application for condonation having been filed, the Tribunal was justified in reviewing its own order. It is also urged by them that if the order passed in the Original Application is allowed to remain the status of Private respondent will be affected and, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly reviewed its own order. It is also urged by them that if the order passed in the Original Application is allowed to remain the status of Private respondent will be affected and, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly reviewed its own order. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the petitioner submitted representations but continuous submission of representations do not extend the period of limitation. The learned counsel submitted that the case of Mukesh Jain was also considered and a direction had been issued in his favour. It is urged by them that as the complex situation had arisen the Tribunal applied the correct principle that injustice having been done to one person cannot be undone by doing injustice to another person. In support of the submissions Mr. Dharmadhikari has placed reliance on decisions rendered in the cases of Jai Chand Sawhney Vs. Union of India (UOI), ; S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, ; Secretary to Govt. of India vs. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad, 1995 Suppl (3) SCC 231; and Administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu and others vs. R.D. Valand, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 593. To appreciate the whole scenario it is apposite to refer to certain decisions in the field. In the case of Chhajju Ram vs. Neki and others, AIR 1922 PC 112 it was held that reviewing Court cannot consider grounds not decided by former Court. In the same case their Lordships also held that concept of 'sufficient reason' must be interpreted as meaning a reason sufficient of grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. In the case of AIR 1934 213 (Privy Council) it has been held that a Court hearing an application for review has no jurisdiction to order review because it is of the opinion that a different conclusion should have been arrived at. It was also held that Order 47, Rule 1 of the CPC must be read as in itself definitive of the limits within which review is permitted. In this context we may profitably refer to the Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court rendered in the case of Stiaram v. Kantram, 12 N L J 148 wherein the Full Bench expounded the law as under: Review is not permitted where new material comes in existence subsequently. In this context we may profitably refer to the Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court rendered in the case of Stiaram v. Kantram, 12 N L J 148 wherein the Full Bench expounded the law as under: Review is not permitted where new material comes in existence subsequently. A review cannot therefore be granted on the ground that the previous decision of the case had proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of the law. The question of hardship to the applicant does not arise in such a case. In the case of Mohammad Hasan Khan vs. Ahmad Hafiz Ahmad Ali Khan and another, 1957 MPLJ 476 : AIR 1957 Nag 97 their Lordships referred to the decision rendered in the case of AIR 1949 106 (Federal Court) and came to hold that it does not appear that a review of Judgment which proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of law is covered by any of the clauses under Order 47, Rule 1 and, therefore, a decision is erroneous is no ground for ordering review. In this context we may usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, wherein their Lordships held as under: A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of record would be made out. In the decision rendered in the case of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, their Lordships expressed the view as under: But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except 'where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility.' An error apparent on the face of record exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. It is worthwhile to mention here that in the said case Krishna Iyer J., in a separate judgment in his inimitable style stated thus: A plea for review, unless the first judicial review is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the moon. In this regard we may humbly state that a person seeking review need not have the aspiration that he if thinks of reaching the farthest star he would be reaching at least top of the tree. Such hope and aspiration are not ordinarily permissible in law and if it becomes permissible one must come within the parameters of review. In this context we may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Manu Pujhari and Another Vs. State of Orissa, wherein G.K. Misra, J. (as his Lordship then was) after referring to the law laid down in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, and K.M. Shanmugam Vs. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others, held as under: The same principles also apply to determination of errors of facts apparent on the face of the record. Some illustrations may be given as to what have been taken to be errors apparent on the face of the record. An error which does not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness has been treated as being apparent. Such errors are not demonstrated by any process of close reasoning. An erroneous view of law on a controversial matter, or a wrong exposition of law, or a wrong application of law, or failure to apply correct law has never been treated as a mistake or error apparent on the face of record. It is well known that Court having jurisdiction to decide a matter may decide it either wrongly or rightly. Correction of such mistaken conclusion does not come within the ambit or purview of review. If the Court applies its mind to a particular fact or law and then comes to a wrong conclusion after conscious reasoning, it can never be contended that the error is one apparent on the face of the record and can be corrected by it. Correction of such mistaken conclusion does not come within the ambit or purview of review. If the Court applies its mind to a particular fact or law and then comes to a wrong conclusion after conscious reasoning, it can never be contended that the error is one apparent on the face of the record and can be corrected by it. The position of law has been well expressed by Mr. Justice Ramaswami in Ramaswami Padayachi vs. Shanmugha Padayachi 1959 2 Mad LJ 201. It would be profitable to extract the relevant observation: It is now well settled that the mistake of error justifying a review under O. 47, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code, is most often an error of fact and may in certain cases be one of law also. But in all cases it should be an error of inadvertence; in the case of an error of law it should not have been arrived at by a process of conscious reasoning. Further, if it is an error of law, the correction suggested or asked for should be such that the bare statement carried conviction without further reasoning or extraneous matter. So, an erroneous view on a debatable point of law or a failure to interpret the law correctly would not be an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The test in such matters is whether the Court itself would have made the correction if it was aware of the particular fact or circumstances while writing the judgment. In other words, whether it is an inadvertent mistake or error or a conscious application of mind leading to a result which one party may consider to be erroneous or a mistake......... Similar view was expressed by the Orissa High Court in the case of Utsaba Pradhan and Others Vs. Kandhuni Choudhury and Others, . The High Court of Karnataka in the case of G.S. Gupta vs. Basheer Ahmad and others, AIR 1977 Kar 193 ruled that if the Court decides a legal question incorrectly, that cannot be a ground for review and it is for the higher court to set right that finding. In this context it is apposite to refer to certain decisions. In the case of Dev Krishna and Another Vs. Dhani Ram Saligram, a Division Bench of this Court held as under: A court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly. In this context it is apposite to refer to certain decisions. In the case of Dev Krishna and Another Vs. Dhani Ram Saligram, a Division Bench of this Court held as under: A court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Secondly, if a point is arguable and has not been argued by the parties and the court has taken a view in agreement with the actual wording, no review lies simply because the actual wording may not be quite correct or the appearances have to be qualified by explanation or some other evidence. Thirdly, a mistake to be apparent, should be one which has only to be pointed out to be corrected immediately, without any argument. If the court has entered into a discussion of the pros and cons and has justified one of the two alternative views then certainly the mistake, if any, is not apparent or patent. At this juncture we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in the case of Susheela Naik and another vs. G.K. Naik, (2000) 9 SCC 366 wherein in para 3 their Lordships posed the question and answered the same in para 4. We think it absolutely appropriate to reproduce both the paras: 3. The short question is when the learned Single Judge of the High Court remanded the proceedings for fresh decision to the first Appellate court, in review proceedings another learned Single Judge could have almost sat in appeal. In our view, only on the ground that the review proceedings were heard by treating them almost as appeal the orders could not be sustained and, therefore, the impugned orders are set aside and the remand order passed by the learned Single Judge earlier is confirmed subject to the clarification that the question of injunction agitated by the appellants will have to be examined only on the basis of prima facie case put forward by the plaintiffs concerned and the question of title will not be treated to be required to be considered on merits so as to bind the parties in the light of the pleadings as they stand today. The seminal question that arises for consideration is whether the Tribunal is correct and justified in reviewing its order in the manner it has been so done by the impugned order. Sub-section (3)(f) of section 22 of the Act confers power on the Tribunal to review its decisions. The seminal question that arises for consideration is whether the Tribunal is correct and justified in reviewing its order in the manner it has been so done by the impugned order. Sub-section (3)(f) of section 22 of the Act confers power on the Tribunal to review its decisions. The concept of review has been embodied u/s 114 and Order 47 and Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as 'the CPC') carve out certain definite and specific limits conferring power of review on a Court. The Act confers power of review but by such conferral of power it cannot be said that it can transgress the limit or parameters of review as has been understood in law. We have stated the law relating to the concept of review as we have felt obligated to state so as the Tribunal has dealt at length with regard to many an aspect in its order for review. The Tribunal has written quite a long order and dealt with the factum of limitation and delay and laches was reconsidered. The Tribunal has also adverted itself to the applicability of a particular circular. It has also dealt with the matter from which it is clearly perceptible that the Tribunal was adjudicating the matter as if it was dwelling upon the lis afresh. We may at this juncture state that Mr. P. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 has submitted that the decisions rendered in the cases of Jaichand Sawhney (supra); S.S. Rathore (supra); Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad (supra); and Administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu and and others (supra) would go a long way to show how the original application was barred by limitation. We do not have to state under what circumstances the application would have been time barred and whether delay could have been condoned. Suffice it to say in the original order the Chairman of the Tribunal in para 13 referred to the objection of limitation and rejected the same. We think it appropriate to reproduce in toto para 13 of the original order: 13. The objection of the respondents on the ground of limitation deserves to be rejected. The limitation of one year will not govern the challenge to impugned order Ann. A-4. Inasmuch as the application had been agitating his supersession and subsequent reversion to the lower grade. We think it appropriate to reproduce in toto para 13 of the original order: 13. The objection of the respondents on the ground of limitation deserves to be rejected. The limitation of one year will not govern the challenge to impugned order Ann. A-4. Inasmuch as the application had been agitating his supersession and subsequent reversion to the lower grade. Ultimately he succeeded when the Director reported in favour of the applicant which was also approved by the Minister. Therefore, he could legitimately wait for the outcome of the said report. In these circumstances, the application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. No other objection has been raised. On the other hand the respondents admit that the candidature of the applicant is superior in all respects. On a perusal of the aforesaid reason it cannot be said that the Tribunal at the first instance had not adverted to the issue of limitation. In the review order in para 14 there has been deliberation with regard to aspect of limitation. We have no hesitation in holding that in the review application the matter of limitation could not have been again agitated as if the Tribunal was sitting in appeal. In this regard, we think it apposite to refer to the decision rendered in the case of Ittavira Mathai Vs. Varkey Varkey and Another, wherein their Lordships laid down as under: .......Even assuming that the suit was barred by time, it is difficult to appreciate the contention of learned counsel that the decree can be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation. If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. It had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities...... We have referred to the aforesaid decision only to highlight even when the issue of limitation has been erroneously decided that cannot be a ground for review. The same can be a subject-matter of appeal. We may hasten to add at the first instance the Tribunal had expressed the view and taken into consideration certain documents and interpreted it in a different manner. A different interpretation would not come within the ambit and sweep of the concept of review. Hence we experience no difficulty to arrive at the conclusion that the Tribunal has grossly erred in reviewing its own order. Consequently, the order passed in review applications forming the subject-matter of M.A. No. 12/95 and M.A. No. 53/95, Annexure-P/20, is quashed and the order passed at the first instance in O.A. No. 2879/90, Annexure-P/19, is restored. The applicant in the original application shall reap all the benefits which were conferred on him by the Tribunal at the first instance. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed