B. S. A. SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THE respondents 1 and 2 herein filed O. S. No. 158/88 on the file of the Subordinate judge, Tadepallegudem against the appellants for their eviction and for damages contending that they have purchased the suit schedule property from one Muddam Paparao, respondent No. 3 herein. The appellants herein filed O. S. No. 44/88 on the file of the same Court against Muddam Paparao, the original owner, and the respondents 1 and 2 herein and others for specific performance of an oral agreement of sale dated 1-5-1988. The court below by a common judgment decreed the suit O. S. No. 158/88 filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein and dismissed o. S. No. 44/88 which was confirmed by the learned single Judge in his common judgment and decree dated 20-2-2002 passed in A. S. Nos. 286/96 and 40/99. The learned single Judge allowed the cross- objections filed by the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 158/88. Aggrieved by this, the present lpa. ( 2 ) FOR brevity, the parties are referred to as arrayed in O. S. No. 158/88. ( 3 ) IN this LPA, the counsel appearing for the appellants (defendants 1 and 2 in O. S. No. 158/88) raised four contentions which are as follows:- (1) The suit O. S. No. 158/88 filed by the plaintiffs (i. e. ,) Vejju venkateswara Rao and Vejju tirupati Rao, respondents 1 and 2 herein, is not maintainable since the rent that is being paid is only rs. 300/- per month by the defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiffs have to go before the Rent controller seeking eviction and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (2) The suit O. S. No. 158/88 is not maintainable even assuming that the rent being paid by the defendants 1 and 2 is Rs. 1,300/- as both the plaintiffs will be receiving rs. 650/- each per month towards their share. (3) The notice given by the plaintiffs is hit by Sec. 106 of the Transfer of property Act and as such the suit is not maintainable. (4) There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants and as such the suit for eviction is not maintainable. ( 4 ) THE facts are not in dispute. (3) The notice given by the plaintiffs is hit by Sec. 106 of the Transfer of property Act and as such the suit is not maintainable. (4) There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants and as such the suit for eviction is not maintainable. ( 4 ) THE facts are not in dispute. The case of the appellants-defendants is that the suit schedule property belongs to one Muddam papa Rao, 3rd respondent herein, and they have taken the premises on lease from 1960 onwards on payment of Rs. 300/- per month and he was issuing receipts for the rents. In may 1988, the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 gave a notice to them stating that they purchased the suit schedule property under exs. B-4 and B-5 sale deeds dated 11-5-1988 and 12-5-1988 respectively and they sought for their eviction of the suit schedule premises on the ground that same is required for personal occupation and use. Immediately, the defendants seemed to have given a reply notice stating that the landlord already agreed to sell the suit schedule house to them under an oral agreement of sale on 1-5-1988 and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants. ( 5 ) HAVING received the notice the plaintiffs filed O. S. No. 158/88 on 15th november, 1988 seeking eviction of the defendants and perhaps the suit papers might have been returned with some office objections. In the mean time the defendants filed O. S. No. 44/88 on 15-5-1988 seeking specific performance of the oral agreement. ( 6 ) THE Trial Court gave a finding that the rent that is being paid by the defendants is only Rs. 300/- but not Rs. 1,300/ -. But the suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed by holding that the suit is for damages for use and occupation of the premises and since the defendants were not paying any rent to the plaintiffs. As stated supra the learned single judge dismissed the appeals filed by the defendants and allowed the cross-objections filed by the plaintiffs by holding that the rent payable is Rs. 1,300/- but not Rs. 300/- as contended by the defendants by relying on Ex. B-2 dated 22-4-1988, a rent receipt for rs. 1,300/ -. In this factual background we have to consider the contentions raised by the defendants. 1,300/- but not Rs. 300/- as contended by the defendants by relying on Ex. B-2 dated 22-4-1988, a rent receipt for rs. 1,300/ -. In this factual background we have to consider the contentions raised by the defendants. ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY, the defendants (i. e. ,) the appellants before us paid rent of Rs. 1,300/- per month to the original owner after the suits are filed. If the case of the defendants is that they paid only Rs. 300/- we do not know why and for what purpose they paid rs. 1,300/- towards rent for the month of september, 1987. It is interesting to note that they paid the rent for the month of september 1987 in the month of September 1988. ( 8 ) WITH regard to the first contention, admittedly, the suit schedule building consists of two mulgies in the ground floor and four mulgies in the first floor and it is adjacent to the railway station, which is a business locality. It is rather difficult to believe that the rent being paid is only rs. 300/ -. At any rate in the absence of any evidence to show that the defendants paid only Rs. 300/- the version of the plaintiffs has to be given credence keeping in view the locality, plinth area and structure of the building. ( 9 ) HENCE, we hold that the Civil Court is having jurisdiction but not the Rent controller. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contends that the appellants adduced sufficient documentary evidence to prove that they paid rent of rs. 300/- only. It is interesting to note that under Exs. A-1, A-2 and A-3 they paid rent of rs. 300/- but there is no evidence whatsoever for which month they paid the rent. It is also interesting to note the other documentary evidence filed by them. Under ex. A-4 they filed 14 bunch receipts each for rs. 1,000/ -. If the rent paid by them is only rs. 300/- how he paid Rs. 1,000/- under 14 receipts on the same day. The appellants did not speak how they paid Rs. 1,000/- each under 14 rent receipts. Except one or two receipts and some ledger entries no evidence whatsoever worth consideration was placed before the Court to prove their contention. If the rent paid by them is only rs. 300/- how he paid Rs. 1,000/- under 14 receipts on the same day. The appellants did not speak how they paid Rs. 1,000/- each under 14 rent receipts. Except one or two receipts and some ledger entries no evidence whatsoever worth consideration was placed before the Court to prove their contention. Hence the learned single Judge is justified in rejecting the contention of the appellants that they paid only Rs. 300/- as rent. ( 10 ) WITH regard to the second contention, the learned counsel for the appellants contends that even assuming that the rent payable is Rs. 1,300/- since the suit schedule property was purchased by both the plaintiffs under different sale deeds the tenancy has to be bifurcated and each of the landlords will be receiving Rs. 650/- and as such the matter has to go to the Rent controller but not to the Civil Court. We do not subscribe to the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants for the reason that they have taken the entire building on lease from the original owner though the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 who are no other than the brothers might have felt it better to take the sale deeds in the name of both of them to avoid future complications and immediately after purchasing the house, they have issued a notice asking the appellants-defendants to vacate the premises. Of course they have given a reply that they have already purchased the property under an oral agreement of sale. While the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-Respondents 1 and 2 contends that this plea was not raised even before the learned single Judge, the counsel for the appellants disputes this fact. Be that as it may, we need not go into the controversy at this stage. Further from the date of purchase of the property the plaintiffs became the absolute owners of the suit schedule property and the suit was filed by the tenants (i. e. ,) appellants seeking specific performance of the oral agreement. But the fact remains that they did not choose to pay any rent to the plaintiffs. Only under Ex. B-2, they seemed to have paid rs. 1,300/- towards rent for the month of september 1987 in September 1988. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the receipt was fabricated. But the fact remains that they did not choose to pay any rent to the plaintiffs. Only under Ex. B-2, they seemed to have paid rs. 1,300/- towards rent for the month of september 1987 in September 1988. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the receipt was fabricated. But in the cross-examination, the 1st appellant who was examined as P. W. I in O. S. No. 44/88 categorically stated that "the signature in ex. B-2 is that of mine in receipt No. 1/5 dated 22-4-1988. It is true that it is mentioned in Ex. B-2 that the rent for september was paid as per the receipt no. 1/5 dated 22-4-1988. As per Ex. B-2 the rent for the month of September is rs. 1,300/-". Further it is seen that the lease is a single and a composite one. It is not the case of the appellants that; they have the house on lease from two individuals. Merely because two brothers purchased the schedule property under different sale deeds the tenancy cannot automatically stands bifurcated or separated more so when the appellants set Up the plea of oral agreement of sale and both of them jointly filed the suit. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that they never acknowledged the ownership of the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2. ( 11 ) NEXTLY the learned counsel for the appellants contends that the landlord has not attorned the tenancy to the plaintiffs. But the moment the plaintiffs have purchased the property they served a notice on the tenants to vacate the premises and hand over the vacant possession of the premises. The appellants did not take the plea that the tenancy was not attorned to the plaintiffs. The landlord never disputed the sale of property in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2. Hence it is not open to the appellants-tenants to claim that they need not pay the rent to the plaintiffs as there is no attornment of tenancy by the landlord. Accordingly, we do not find any substance in this contention. ( 12 ) WITH regard to the third contention that the notice issued by the plaintiffs is hit by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act, the appellants either at the time, of receipt of notice or in the written statement, never raised such plea. Accordingly, we do not find any substance in this contention. ( 12 ) WITH regard to the third contention that the notice issued by the plaintiffs is hit by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act, the appellants either at the time, of receipt of notice or in the written statement, never raised such plea. In fact there was no issue on this fact in the trial Court. Hence we cannot allow the appellants to raise this issue at this stage. We are in perfect agreement with the finding of the learned single Judge that even if the notice is not in accordance Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, the very fact that the appellants-tenants observed silence amounts to waiver of the notice to be given by the plaintiffs as required under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 13 ) WITH regard to the fourth contention that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants-defendants and the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2, we can only observe that as the plaintiffs entered into the shoes of the landlord the tenancy of the appellants enures in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2. In fact that was not the case of the appellant either at the time of giving reply to their quit notice or in the written statement. They cannot raise the said plea at this stage. ( 14 ) FOR the foregoing discussion we do not find any merits in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and the LPA is liable to be dismissed. It is to be kept in mind that the judgment in A. S. No. 40/99 filed by the appellants against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 44/88 has become final wherein the oral agreement of sale set up by the appellants was disbelieved by the Court below. ( 15 ) THE LPA is accordingly dismissed and the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge is confirmed. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants are still in possession of the schedule property. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 submits that possession was already taken by Court amin on 11-4-2002. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants are still in possession of the schedule property. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 submits that possession was already taken by Court amin on 11-4-2002. In these peculiar circumstances we direct maintenance of status quo as on to-day till the execution court passes an order on the delivery petition. The Trial Court is directed to pass orders by the end of June, 2002 on delivery petition. If the court finds that the appellants are in possession of the property they are entitled to continue in possession for a period of four months from to-day.