SHANTI NIKETAN MONTESSORI SCHOOL v. STATE OF M. P.
2002-06-28
DIPAK MISRA
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Dipak Misra, J. The petitioner, Shanti Niketan Montessori School Education Society (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') is registered under the provisions of the M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. The aim and object of the society is to provide school education especially to the children coming from the weaker section of the society. In furtherance of its object the Society opened a school near Satrastha in Hoshangabad District. The said school commenced in the year 1981. Initially the school commenced in a rented premises which was owned by one Shri K.N. Tiwari. Adjacent to the said rented accommodation, a piece of Government land admeasuring 19,688 sq. ft. was situated on plot No. 239. As the plot was lying vacant the same was utilized by the Society for the purpose of play ground for the children. Thus the Society was in de-facto possession from the year 1981. According to the writ petitioner as the aforesaid plot was lying vacant and the petitioner Society was in need of a larger accommodation, had applied to the competent authority for allotment of the said land. It has been pleaded that the State has issued instructions in the form of Revenue Book Circular for allotment of government land for charitable or public purposes. The Collector of the District has been authorised to deal with the allotment of the land to the deserving persons. In the said circular it has been provided that in case the area exceeds 500 sq.ft., the permission of the State Government is a pre-requisite. As the application of the petitioner was in respect of a larger plot, a proposal was sent to the Government for accord of sanction for allotment of the said land. The State Government after taking into consideration the entire gamut of facts and circumstance granted permission for allotment of the said land to the petitioner Society vide order dated 13/20-7-1988, which has been brought on record as Annexure P.1. In the aforesaid permission letter it was stipulated that the land was allotted on payment of premium of Rs. 39,200/- and the annual ground rent of Rs. 1568/-. It was also stipulated therein that the petitioner Society should deposit the amount within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the said order.
In the aforesaid permission letter it was stipulated that the land was allotted on payment of premium of Rs. 39,200/- and the annual ground rent of Rs. 1568/-. It was also stipulated therein that the petitioner Society should deposit the amount within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the said order. It is setforth that the said order was addressed to the Collector and a copy of the same was also endorsed to the petitioner Society. On receipt of the copy of the aforesaid letter, the petitioner approached the Collector, Hoshangabad for acceptance of the premium as well as the ground rent, but the Collector refused to accept the said amount from the petitioner Society on the reasoning that the amount would be accepted only after the information is received from the State Government. The petitioner in spite of its best efforts was not able to know when the order of the State Government was received by the Collector, Hoshangabad. However, in the order sheet dated 22-5-1989 recorded in the Case No. 17-A/20(1) 83-84, it has been mentioned that the order passed by the State Government had been received in the office of the District Collector. The Collector directed the Nazul Officer to get the money deposited within a period of six months and on the basis of the aforesaid order passed by the Collector, the concerned Nazul Officer issued a notice to the Society whereby the petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 39,200/- as premium and a sum of Rs. 1568/- as ground rent for the aforesaid land. The petitioner was further directed to appear before the Nazul Officer to deposit the requisite amount on 14-7-1989 along with necessary stamps. The Nazul Officer prepared the map of the land and the lease deed and the same was forwarded to the Collector on 8-3-1991 for his signature. In spite of such a communication, sent by the Nazul Officer, the Collector did not take any action and the lease deed in question could not be executed. As time rolled by, the landlord in whose building the school was functioning, insisted for vacation of the same and the petitioner Society having no other option and being in urgent need of alternative accommodation started construction of a small building on the land in question in anticipation of the execution of the lease deed.
As time rolled by, the landlord in whose building the school was functioning, insisted for vacation of the same and the petitioner Society having no other option and being in urgent need of alternative accommodation started construction of a small building on the land in question in anticipation of the execution of the lease deed. It has been pleaded that all other formalities except the execution of the lease deed had already been completed, and the petitioner had also obtained verbal permission from the Collector to commence the construction. It had also got the permission from the Municipal Council, Hoshangabad as well the Deputy Director, Town and Country Planning, Bhopal Region, who had approved the lay-out plan of the said area. After obtaining permission from various statutory authorities, the petitioner commenced the construction on the land in question. After the petitioner had started construction on the aforesaid land, the Nazul Officer passed an order of prohibition on 26-12-1997 requiring the petitioner society not to proceed with the construction. The petitioner appeared before the Nazul Officer and produced the documents wherein no objection certificate had been obtained by the Municipal Council and other authorities and upon perusal of the sanctions and purpose of petitioner Society the Nazul Officer passed an order dated 5-1-1998 vacating the order of stay. The petitioner society was permitted to proceed with the construction work. The said order passed by the Nazul Officer, Hoshangabad has been brought on record as Annexure P. 6. It is the case of the petitioner that the landlord was handed over the vacant possession of the old building on 30-12-1997 and the school started running in the newly constructed building with temporary arrangements from January, 1998. It is the case of the petitioner that at that juncture one Deepchand Samaya, who is in possession of the land adjoining to the land, in question was interested to have this land lodged certain complaints before the competent Department of the Revenue authorities as a result of which the State Government issued a show cause notice on 17-3-1998, Annexure P. 7, requiring the petitioner to file the necessary reply within a week. The petitioner society vide Annexure P. 8 filed the reply. The entire gamut of facts was brought forth in the show cause which was filed by the petitioner.
The petitioner society vide Annexure P. 8 filed the reply. The entire gamut of facts was brought forth in the show cause which was filed by the petitioner. However, the State Government called for a report from the Collector by memorandum dated 16-1-1998 on the basis of which an enquiry was conducted by the S.D.O. who submitted a report to the Collector. The said report has been brought on record as Annexure P.9. The S.D.O. had found nothing wrong with the action of the petitioner Society and he had expressed an opinion that there has been no encroachment upon the land. It is putforth in the petition that the Nazul Officer-cum-Deputy Collector, Hoshangabad sent another report directly to the State Government alleging that the petitioner Society had raised the construction without obtaining the 'No objection Certificate' and without getting possession of the land. The report of the Nazul Officer has been brought on record as Annexure P. 10. On the basis of the report the State Government on 27-4-1998 vide Annexure P. 11 cancelled the permission granted earlier. In the said order it has been mentioned that the petitioner Society had failed to deposit the requisite amount, of premium within the stipulated period and further held that the petitioner Society had raised the construction without obtaining the lease and possession of the land in question. It is averred that the order passed vide Annexure P. 11 is per se illegal as it is founded on misconceived grounds inasmuch as the petitioner Society had deposited the amount within six months from the date of the order as per the direction of the competent revenue authority. It is also putforth that the amount was received by the competent authority on 3-7-1989 within two days from the date of intimation regarding the deposit of the said amount and, therefore, there is no failure on the part of the petitioner Society to comply with the direction of the State Government and the ground which has been made for cancellation of the land is based on erroneous assumption of facts.
It is also putforth in the petition that the petitioner had constructed the building after obtaining due permission and in anticipation that execution of lease deed would be complied with as it had performed its part of obligation as required under the direction of the State Government and only the formality of the execution of lease deed remained to be done. It is also putforth that the order of cancellation is arbitrary and non est in the eye of law as it suffers from the vice of malice. It is also alleged that the reasons which find place in the order are not sustainable as they are per se unjust and improper and in fact the entire proceeding for cancellation has taken place at the behest of Deepchand Samaya who was interested in getting the land in his favour. It is also averred that the school has been running smoothly, and it has enrolled about 600 students who belong to the weaker section of the Society. The school has also employed 16 teachers and three other staff members and if the cancellation takes place serious jeopardy would be caused to the School in question. It is also putforth that the Tahsildar (Nazul) has issued a notice commanding the petitioner Society to demolish the construction. In this factual backdrop, the petitioner has prayed to summon the entire record from the State Government and to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashment of the impugned order dated 27-4-1998, Annexure P.11, and further to quash the notice dated 6-5-1998 and to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the competent authority to execute the lease deed in favour of the petitioner Society. A return has been filed by the answering respondents 1 to 4 contending, inter alia, that the petitioner has not approached this Court in clean hands as it has made allegation that said Deepchand Samaya has been the catalyst in initiation of the proceeding though the said Deepchand Samaya has not been impleaded as a party in the petition. It is also setforth that the State Government had accorded sanction for grant of lease to the petitioner on certain conditions and as the petitioner had violated the conditions by not depositing the premium and ground rent within the stipulated time, it was within the jurisdiction of the State Government to cancel the allotment.
It is also setforth that the State Government had accorded sanction for grant of lease to the petitioner on certain conditions and as the petitioner had violated the conditions by not depositing the premium and ground rent within the stipulated time, it was within the jurisdiction of the State Government to cancel the allotment. It is the further stand that the petitioner was required to deposit the amount within six months from the date of receipt of the notice, but the petitioner did not do so and the State Government was not inclined to condone the breach committed by the petitioner. It is also putforth that the Government while taking the decision has taken into consideration the entire scenario and after following the due procedure of law and having regard to the doctrine of audi alteram partem, has cancelled the lease. It is also highlighted that no permission was obtained by the petitioner to start the construction and the area in question had not been granted in favour of the petitioner by way of lease and, therefore, the whole action of the petitioner was unauthorised and illegal. It is the stand df the respondents that in absence of execution of lease deed in favour of the petitioner, it was not within its domain to proceed with the construction. It is also putforth that the order of status quo passed by the Nazul Officer was vacated due to lack of jurisdiction but the said authority has clearly mentioned that he had no right to permit or grant permission for carrying on of the construction. It was incumbent on the part of the petitioner to obtain 'No objection' from the office of the Collector but as the same has not been done, the order of cancellation is justified. It is also pleaded that the report given by the S.D.O. is just an opinion and it does not help the petitioner. The possession of the petitioner from 1981 has been refuted. It is also putforth that the petitioner had approached the authorities for the first time on 3-7-1989 to deposit the amount in question. It is also the stance of the respondents that execution of lease deed is not an empty formality inasmuch as it confers the right in favour of the lessee and unless the same is done, no right flows.
It is also the stance of the respondents that execution of lease deed is not an empty formality inasmuch as it confers the right in favour of the lessee and unless the same is done, no right flows. A reply has been filed by respondent No. 5, the Municipal Council, Hoshangabad, wherein it has been stated that the respondent No. 5 on the basis of the verification of the map submitted by the Society, granted permission to construct the building but that does not necessarily mean that the respondent had recognised the right of the petitioner with regard to title of the land, inasmuch as the State Government is the competent authority to grant lease or to cancel the lease. A rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4, wherein it has been stated that at the instance of Deep Chand Samaya the steps have been taken for cancellation, inasmuch as the said Samaya is the intervener in this writ petition. It is putforth in the rejoinder affidavit that the Collector for the first time gave notice to the petitioner in the month of June/July, 1989 and hence, there is no violation on the part of the petitioner in depositing the amount of premium and ground rent. The Collector did not accept the amount earlier within the date mentioned above as he was of the view that the amount could be accepted only after receipt of the order passed by the State Government. It has been pleaded that the order of Government along with the records were received on 22-5-1989 and immediately intimation was given to the petitioner and he complied with the requirement. The verbal permission granted by the Collector has also been reiterated. It is also highlighted that merely because the order dated 13/20-7-1988 was endorsed to the petitioner it cannot be construed that he was required to deposit the amount within six months as mentioned in the said order. The vacation of the order of stay passed by the Nazul Officer has also been relied upon. It is also the case of the petitioner that the S.D.O. had conducted an enquiry on the basis of direction issued by the Collector, Hoshangabad and, therefore, his report cannot be marginalised. It is putforth that the Dy.
The vacation of the order of stay passed by the Nazul Officer has also been relied upon. It is also the case of the petitioner that the S.D.O. had conducted an enquiry on the basis of direction issued by the Collector, Hoshangabad and, therefore, his report cannot be marginalised. It is putforth that the Dy. Collector had no authority to submit a report but he did so for reasons best known to him. Various other facts have been highlighted how the Society would face immense difficulty if the lease is not executed. I have heard Mr. S.K. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents 1 to 4 and Mr. Riyaz Mohd, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 Corporation and Mr. Imtiyaz Hussain learned counsel for the intervener, It is submitted by Mr. Agarwal that vide Annexure P.1 dated 20-7-1988 allotment order was passed on certain conditions and thereafter notice was issued to the petitioner on 1-7-1989 requiring the petitioner to deposit the premium and ground rent and when the petitioner had complied with the same, there was no justification to cancel the permission. It is urged by him that the Collector should have executed the lease deed and should not have delayed and because of the delay, on the compelling circumstances, the petitioner was constrained to raise the construction. It is also convassed by him, if the petitioner had violated the condition in causing delay in deposition of the requisite sum, the competent authority should not have accepted the same and that apart when the amount was accepted in 1989 a stop for cancellation should not have been taken in the year 1998 on that ground. The learned counsel for the State on the contrary, submitted that the petitioner very well knew that he had to deposit the amount within six months and the notice issued vide Annexure P.2 did not extend the period. It is also urged by him that the petitioner had taken liberty by constructing on the land without getting the lease deed executed and such an action is inexonerable and, therefore, the cancellation entailed. The learned Government Advocate supported the order passed vide Annexure P. 11 and contended there has been no violation of principles of natural justice. Mr.
It is also urged by him that the petitioner had taken liberty by constructing on the land without getting the lease deed executed and such an action is inexonerable and, therefore, the cancellation entailed. The learned Government Advocate supported the order passed vide Annexure P. 11 and contended there has been no violation of principles of natural justice. Mr. Riyaz Mohd, learned counsel for respondent No. 5 while accepting that the permission was granted by the Municipal Corporation submitted the said act does not create any right in favour of the petitioner. Mr. Imtiyaz Hussain, learned counsel for the intervener placed reliance on his written note of submissions and supported the order passed by the State Government. Various allegations have been made in the written note which need not be adverted to in detail for the simple reason, in a case of this nature the same need not be dwelled upon. The core question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the order of cancellation passed by the State Government is defensible. Vide Annexure P.1 dated 13/20-7-1988, the competent authority of the State Government had allotted the land by fixing the premium and the annual rent. Certain other conditions were imposed therein. The essential conditions which have been harped upon are that on receipt of the order, the applicant should have deposited the premium, and the rent within six months failing which the competent authority should have obtained appropriate orders from the State Government. Vide Annexure P. 2, a notice was issued directing the petitioner to deposit the amount which the petitioner did immediately. The show cause notice which is contained in Annexure P. 7 required the petitioner to explain why after expiry of six months amount was deposited though the order of allotment mentioned that further order from the State Government was necessary to be obtained and secondly, without grant of lease, the petitioner had constructed on the land in question. The petitioner filed a show cause and on the basis of the show cause the impugned order vide Annexure P. 11 has been passed.
The petitioner filed a show cause and on the basis of the show cause the impugned order vide Annexure P. 11 has been passed. On a perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the competent authority had calculated six months from the date of Annexure P.1 and has come to hold that there has been a breach of condition and the said authority had further held that the construction had taken place on the land in question. On consideration of these two aspects, the order of cancellation was passed which ultimately compelled the Tahsildar to direct the petitioner to demolish the structure. The quintessence of the submission of Mr. Agarwal is that as far as the deposit of premium and ground rent is concerned, the petitioner is not at fault inasmuch as the Collector did not accept the amount immediately on the ground that he had not received the copy of the order and the petitioner deposited the requisite sum after receipt of the notice. The stand of the State counsel in oppugnation is that the petitioner was aware of it and, therefore, he should, have deposited the amount and the notice issued vide Annexure P. 2 did not extend the period. It is putforth by him that in Annexure P. 1 it was clearly provided if the petitioner failed to deposit the amount a further order should be received from the State Government and in view of the said unequivocal stipulation in the order of allotment, no other authority had any right to issue notice for depositing the amount, I need not have to delve in detail in regard to the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the parties. The seminal question that emanates from the factual matrix is whether the State Government by its conduct has exonerated the delay. In the counter affidavit, a stand has been taken that the State Government has not exercised its discretion in condonation of the delay in depositing and treated it as a breach. It is perceptible that the initial order of allotment was issued vide Annexure P.1 sometime in the month of July, 1988. The six months' period expired in January, 1989. The petitioner was asked to deposit the amount in July, 1989 vide Annexure P.2 and the petitioner did so immediately. The State Government did not take action against any of the authorities who accepted the amount.
The six months' period expired in January, 1989. The petitioner was asked to deposit the amount in July, 1989 vide Annexure P.2 and the petitioner did so immediately. The State Government did not take action against any of the authorities who accepted the amount. The amount was deposited by way of treasury challan. The steps for cancellation was taken in the year 1998 after expiry of nine years. If a breach had been committed, the amount in question should not have been accepted and if it has been accepted, immediate rectificatory measure should have been taken by refunding the amount and cancelling the order of allotment. No action on that score was taken. With the passage of time, the petitioner had reasons to believe that his deposit had been accepted. He rightly believed that the lease deed would be executed. Thus as far as the first part of the order vide Annexure P. 11 is concerned, that there has been a breach of condition of order of allotment as there had been delay in depositing the same, does not commend acceptance inasmuch as it is the State Government which slept over the matter for a period of nine years. Hence, I am inclined to hold that the State Government by its implied conduct condoned the lapse, if any, on the part of the petitioner and, therefore, it cannot form the foundation of the order of cancellation. As far as the second limb of reasoning of cancellation is concerned it pertains to raising of construction on the land in question by the petitioner society. Many a reason has been ascribed in the petition. Constraints which compelled the society to raise the construction have been canvassed by Mr. Agarwal. It is putforth that the State Government should have afforded an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner society. It is also highlighted by him that no opportunity of hearing was given and the order of cancellation has been passed. It is also highlighted by him that the school has come into existence in full swing and if it is demolished the State Government would not get any benefit and it would tantamount to national loss. It is not disputed that the petitioner society raised the construction, when the lease deed was not executed. True it is, it had obtained permission from the statutory authority.
It is not disputed that the petitioner society raised the construction, when the lease deed was not executed. True it is, it had obtained permission from the statutory authority. Construction should have been raised after following the due process of law. It may be a lapse on the part of the society but whether it is such a lapse which would entail in cancellation of the order of allotment, more so, when the first ground is now not available warranting such cancellation. The State Government has a duty in a welfare State to see that educational institutions are maintained. Here is a society which has constructed a school and as has been averred more than 600 students are getting education. If it is a fact, then it requires deliberation, careful consideration and proper use of discretion. As far as this facet is concerned, this Court thinks that the discretion should be left to be exercised by the State Government. The State Government should consider whether this violation by the Society should be condoned in view of the fact that there was sufficient reasons on the part of the petitioner to raise the construction. For this purpose there should be a proper and fair enquiry. Accordingly, it is directed that the State Government shall issue a notice to the petitioner in this regard and the representation of the petitioner shall appear in person on the date fixed and explain its stand. It will be open to the petitioner to produce documents with regard to obtainment of permission from the competent authorities about the present status of the school. The authority concerned shall also get an inspection made to appreciate the obtaining factual scenario and thereafter take a decision so that there is no national loss. The authority concerned shall also keep in view that this Court has not accepted the first facet of reasoning on which the cancellation of allotment was founded. Consequently, the orders passed vide Annexures P. 11 and P. 12 are quashed and it is directed that the competent authority shall cause an enquiry as directed above and finalise the matter within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order passed today. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.