ORDER Dipak Misra, J. By this writ petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner, Samviliyanit Karmachari Kalyan Samiti, Bhopal, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') a society registered under the Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 represented by its Secretary has prayed for issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to treat the State Government retired absorbed employees who got lump sum amount in lieu of full pension on par with other State Government retired employees for all purposes and grant them all benefits and facilities and further to issue a writ of mandamus to grant the employees who have been absorbed and have been given lump-sum amount in lieu of full pension, the benefit of restoration of one-third portion of commuted pension on expiry of 10 years from the date of retirement and further to confer the benefit of restoration of residual portion of commuted pension from the date one-third portion of commuted pension is restored and to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the memorandum dated 14-7-1998, Annexure P/8, and to grant all other benefits including D.A., I.R. etc. increasing the pension, medical facilities and certain other reliefs. The facts as have been exposited are that the petitioner-Society is registered under the Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. The members of the Society are the absorbed employees of one or the other body corporate such as, Corporations, Boards, Universities and autonomous bodies etc. A copy of the list of members of the Society has been brought on record as Annexure P/1. An illustration has been given indicating that Shri S.S. Nanoti was in the Madhya Pradesh State Secretariat, General Administration Department and he retired from the State Government on 31-7-1977 and thereafter he was appointed in Barkatuallah University, Bhopal, and subsequently he was absorbed in the University. Similarly one Shri Kashinath Athley was Joint director of Treasuries and Accounts in the State of Madhya Pradesh and he was sent on deputation to the M.P. Housing Board on the post of Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer and he was absorbed in the Board's services wherefrom he was superannuated, Other members whose list has been appended to Annexure P/1 stand in similar footing with these two persons. It is putforth in the petition that initially they were sent on deputation without their specific consent looking to the demand and requirement of the State Enterprises/Organizations and thereafter on the recommendations of the concerned organization they were absorbed. The State Government lent their services for formation of the new organizations and their efficient functioning. Though they had rendered 25 to 30 years services in various departments before they were permitted to be absorbed in the State Enterprizes/Organizations. The members of the Society were given the retiral benefits as contained in the Appendix II of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Pension (Commutation) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). It is urged in the petition that the Rules provide facility of commutation of pension to the State Government retirees belonging to all classes of pensioners ranging from Class I to Class IV. Reference has been made to Rules 32, 33 and 34 of the aforesaid Rules. It is setforth that the Rules provide the facility of commutation to the State Government retirees belonging to all classes of pensioners to the extent of one-third portion of pension as originally sanctioned at the time of retirement. A lump-sum amount is paid to the retirees in advance on the basis of "number of years purchased" with reference to the age of retirees as shown in the 'Table'. It is averred in the writ petition that according to the Rules once commutation of pension is done, a retired employee becomes entitled to draw the residual portion of the pension which is two-third of the pension as originally sanctioned for the remaining period of his life till his death. The moment a retiree commutes one-third of the portion of his pension, he automatically loses his claim on the said one-third of the pension for the whole of his life. It is putforth that this was the position in respect of the commutation of pension prevalent since introduction of concept of commutation till 30-6-1985 i.e. prior to the introduction of the new concept of restoration from 1-7-1985. The State Government passed an order on 13-7-1985 giving it effect from 1-7-1985. This was made applicable to the retired government servants. However, the said benefit was not extended to the retired government servants like the members of the petitioner-Society who were absorbed in the autonomous bodies/State Enterprizes. The State Government passed an order on 13-7-1985 giving it effect from 1-7-1985. This was made applicable to the retired government servants. However, the said benefit was not extended to the retired government servants like the members of the petitioner-Society who were absorbed in the autonomous bodies/State Enterprizes. It is putforth that there is violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also contended that persons like the members of the petitioner-society are entitled to be treated on par with other retired government servants. Various other grounds have been urged to substantiate the points urged in the petition. We are not dwelling upon the grounds urged in the petition for the type of order we are going to pass. A return has been filed by the answering respondents contending, inter alia, that the relief claimed by the petitioner-Society cannot be granted to those employees who have been absorbed in the other organizations keeping them on par with the retired government servants. It is also putforth that the Rules are not applicable to the members of the Society and, therefore, the petition is misconceived. It is urged that the members of the society who have been absorbed in the organizations are not treated as State pensioners as they have taken a lump-sum capitalised value of pension as per various circulars of the State Government. A reference has been made to the State Government Finance Department Order No. F.B. 6/17/76/R.II/IV, dated 27-7-1976 wherein it has been clarified that such absorbed Government servants are not eligible for the payment of relief/interim relief/Dearness Allowance and their claim to be treated on par with other General State Government pensioners is unacceptable. It is further setforth that the facility of restoration of commuted pension has been given to the State Government pensioners from 1st July, 1985 and the members of the society cannot agitate the facet of discrimination on this score. It is the further case of the respondents that the absorbed employees have received the benefit of Contributory Provident Fund etc. as per rules applicable at the time of recruitment in their concerning Organizations where they have been absorbed and hence, they do not come in the category of Government pensioners. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed pointing out various aspects as to how the members of the Society are entitled to be treated on par with the retired Government employees. as per rules applicable at the time of recruitment in their concerning Organizations where they have been absorbed and hence, they do not come in the category of Government pensioners. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed pointing out various aspects as to how the members of the Society are entitled to be treated on par with the retired Government employees. We need not to advert to the rejoinder affidavit in detail. An additional return has been filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 wherein it has been asseverated that when a Government servant is sent on deputation in public interest to various Corporations/autonomous bodies to whom the grant-in-aid is given by the State Government in that case consent of the concerned Government servant is not taken, as there is no requirement or necessity in the Rules to do so. It is also putforth that as far as absorption of the Government servants who are sent on deputation in concerning Corporations/autonomous bodies etc. is concerned, consent of the concerning Government servant is taken from him in writing and only after the written consent is obtained he is absorbed in accordance with the Rules and procedure. Quite apart from the above, various other aspects have been highlighted to show that the society has no case for interference. We have heard Mr. V.S. Shroti along with Mr. A.P. Shorti, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate for the State. It is pertinent to state here that the learned Government Advocate has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition before this Court is not maintainable inasmuch as members who have formed the society are seeking relief against the State Government pertaining to period of their services which they have rendered in the Government and further their claim of parity relates to the retired Government servants. Mr. Yadav has fairly conceded that such a point has not been taken in the return or in the additional return but as the issue of maintainability goes to the very root of the matter involving jurisdiction of this Court, that can be raised being a pure question of law. In essence, submission of Mr. Mr. Yadav has fairly conceded that such a point has not been taken in the return or in the additional return but as the issue of maintainability goes to the very root of the matter involving jurisdiction of this Court, that can be raised being a pure question of law. In essence, submission of Mr. Yadav is that all the rules and regulations which are applicable to the government employees are made applicable as they have; rendered considerable length of service in the Government and, therefore, the marrow of grievance, if studied and scrutinized in proper perspective is really against the Government on the base and foundation that they were employed under the Government at one point of time before the absorption and hence, the same has to be agitated before the State Administrative Tribunal which is instituted under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (in short 'the Act') and not before this Court. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, . Mr. V.S. Shroti, learned counsel being assisted by Mr. A.P. Shroti, per contra has contended that the members of the petitioner-Society are not Government employees but are employees of the Corporation or Boards and autonomous bodies and, therefore, they can approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is his further submission that section 28 of the Act completely barred the jurisdiction of the High Court but the said provision has been struck down by the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and once the said eclipse is non-existent there is no impediment or remora for invocation of jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel has also highlighted that the ratio laid down in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) in paragraph 99 is an obiter dicta and there is no question that the Tribunal would in all circumstances be the court of first instance and that apart, the same being an obiter dicta does not have the effect of a binding precedent on this Court. To buttress his submission he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Madhav Rao Scindia vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 530 and Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs. Shivakant Shukla, . Mr. To buttress his submission he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Madhav Rao Scindia vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 530 and Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs. Shivakant Shukla, . Mr. Shroti has also proponed that as an exceptional circumstance exists this court can interfere in spite of the alternative remedy provided under the Act. To bolster his submission he has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, . The learned counsel has highlighted that status of the persons who are very old in age the relief claimed and condition of service are to be taken into consideration to exercise jurisdiction on merits. Certain citations have been commended to us which we shall deal with at a latter stage. At the very outset we are required to deal with the issue of maintainability. Be it noted, though the said facet has not been raised in the counter affidavit or in the additional return but as a pure question of law arises and issue of jurisdiction goes to the very root of the matter the significance of it cannot be marginalised. It does emanate from the factual exposition of the case and when the question of law touching the jurisdiction clearly flows from the factual matrix to treat it as a trivial matter would amount to use of discretion which is impermissible in law. We may hasten to add that the submission of Mr. Shroti that the members of the petitioner-Society are employees of Corporations, Boards and autonomous bodies and, therefore, they are entitled to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has left us unimpressed inasmuch as the real quintessence of the grievance of the members of the Society is relatable to their claim when they were Government servants. They are basing their centre ground on the fact that they had rendered substantial period of service under the Government. Thus, we are not inclined to accept the submission that the relief sought for is not in the backdrop or bedrock of the service rendered to the Government but a claim of parity because of absorption in the autonomous body or Corporation. That would be, in our considered opinion, putting the cart before the horse. We are impelled to repel the aforesaid submission of Mr. Shroti. That would be, in our considered opinion, putting the cart before the horse. We are impelled to repel the aforesaid submission of Mr. Shroti. We unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the claims of the members of the petitioner-Society squarely rest on the plea that they were Government employees at one point of time. The next issue that arises for consideration is whether this Court can entertain the petition directly under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the Apex Court in paragraph 99 has held as under: 99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extend they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no scintilla of doubt that High Court cannot directly entertain a petition. Submission of Mr. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no scintilla of doubt that High Court cannot directly entertain a petition. Submission of Mr. Shroti is that when a part of section 28 of the Act has been struck down by the Apex Court, the bar is lifted. While so submitting the learned counsel has also contended that the observations of the Apex Court is in the nature of an obiter dicta and hence, is not binding on this Court. The decisions rendered in the cases of Madhav Rao Scindia (supra) and Shivakant Shukla (supra) are on a totally different factual matrix and the principles laid down therein in regard to precedents do not apply to the case at hand. We need not detain ourselves to dwell upon the issue whether an obiter dicta would be binding on us. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the central issue is of judicial review and in that context their Lordships have stated what we have quoted hereinabove. In our considered opinion that is not an obiter dicta but the dictum of the judgment and hence, we are not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Shroti that the same is not a binding precedent as far as this Court is concerned. The next limb of submission of Mr. Shroti is that as exceptional circumstances exist the petitioner-Society need not be sent to avail the alternative remedy provided under the Act and this Court can directly entertain the writ petition. He has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra). He has enumerated many an exceptional circumstances. However, in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the concept of alternative remedy in the backdrop of the provision enshrined under the Debts Recovery Tribunal Act, 1993. The basic fallacy in the submission is that approaching the M.P. Administrative Tribunal is not an alternative remedy. In our considered view, the aforesaid proposition is absolutely fallacious as institution of a proceeding in the Tribunal is unlike agitation before any other forum. The basic fallacy in the submission is that approaching the M.P. Administrative Tribunal is not an alternative remedy. In our considered view, the aforesaid proposition is absolutely fallacious as institution of a proceeding in the Tribunal is unlike agitation before any other forum. Its establishment, purpose, jurisdiction, schematic quintessence are quite different and the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) has made it absolutely clear that it is the Court of first instance and the High Court cannot entertain a petition directly barring on certain limited circumstances. In that view of the matter the submission that the petitioner should not be sent to avail the alternative remedy does not stand to reason. We are not inclined to accept the said submission of Mr. Shroti. Now we shall refer to certain decisions which have been cited by Mr. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioner. We need not to deal with each decision but shall refer to a few. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to the decision rendered in the case of Dr. A.K. Doshi Vs. Union of India, . In the aforesaid case their Lordships in paragraphs 15 and 16 have held as under: 15. It was also submitted that the Central Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the 2nd respondent. It was submitted that the appellant had already become a Member of the Company Law Board. It was submitted that by virtue of section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Administrative Tribunal could only exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of an all-India service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being a post filled by a civilian. It was submitted that the post of Member (Technical) Company Law Board was neither an all-India service nor a civil service of the Union nor a civil post under the Union. Reliance was placed upon the authority in the case of Canara Bank vs. Nuclear Power Corpn. of India Ltd. In this case it was held that the Company Law Board was a court. Based on this authority it was submitted that since the Company Law Board is a court, its Members could not be holding civil posts under the Union. Reliance was placed upon the authority in the case of Canara Bank vs. Nuclear Power Corpn. of India Ltd. In this case it was held that the Company Law Board was a court. Based on this authority it was submitted that since the Company Law Board is a court, its Members could not be holding civil posts under the Union. It was submitted that both the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court erred in holding that the post of Member, Company Law Board was a civil post. Both the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court have relied upon various Rules, notably Rules 6, 7, 10 and 13 of the said Rules and concluded that these Rules indicated control by the Government. It was held that as the Government had control, thus the post was a civil post. It must be mentioned that we have reservation in accepting this view. However, for all these years the post has lain vacant. Even if we were to hold in favour of the appellant no useful purpose would be served. The 2nd respondent would have to be given time to challenge in a proper forum. On facts set out hereinabove the end result would be the same. The selection of the appellant would be set aside. The post would then lie vacant for the period it takes to dispose of that matter. The only sufferer would be the litigating public. As in this case the facts are very gross, we see no reason to interfere. We leave this question open to be decided in an appropriate matter. In the case of Smt. Babli and another etc. vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others, 2002 L.I.C. 4 a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held as under: The Central Administrative Tribunal has to entertain applications claiming allotment or regularisation of Govt. accommodation unless such claim is shown to be a condition of service. Nor could it assume jurisdiction where eviction action is taken against an employer for his alleged unauthorised occupation of the premises under the Eviction Act. In this context, we need not to refer to the other decisions cited by Mr. Shroti because the decisions have been cited only to show on what conditions or a base a matter can be filed before the State Administrative Tribunal. In this context, we need not to refer to the other decisions cited by Mr. Shroti because the decisions have been cited only to show on what conditions or a base a matter can be filed before the State Administrative Tribunal. We have referred to these decisions to show that they do not throw any light to radiate the submission of the learned counsel. If the lis has to be agitated before the Tribunal then it has to be done as it is a forum of the first instance. We have already indicated hereinbefore, the claim of the members of the petitioner-society is relatable to their employment in the Government service and, therefore, the M.P. Administrative Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide the matter and thereafter it can be assailed in a writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, the decisions cited by Mr. Shroti are of no avail. Ex-consequenti, as all the submissions raised by Mr. Shroti are devoid of substance, we are of the considered opinion, the writ petition is not maintainable at present before this Court and the members of the Society are at liberty to approach the M.P. Administrative Tribunal. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.