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2002 DIGILAW 602 (AP)

R. S. Paroda v. A. Uma

2002-04-25

A.R.LAKSHMANAN, GOPALA KRISHNA TAMADA

body2002
AR. LAKSHMANAN, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS Contempt Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 25-1-1999 in CC. No. 1360 of 1997 holding the appellants as guilty of contempt of this Court for violation of order dated 3-12-1996 passed in W. P. No. 29904 of 1995 and imposing the punishment of fine of rs. 1,000/- on each of the appellants. ( 2 ) THIS case has a chequered history. To have a proper understanding of the matter, it is necessary to briefly narrate the events that led to the passing of the impugned order by the learned Single Judge. ( 3 ) THE respondent - writ petitioner herein is a Post Graduate in Science from sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati and also completed M. Tech. , in Chemistry from i. I. T. , Delhi in the year 1993. Pursuant to a notification issued by the 3rd respondent inviting applications for holding a competitive examination for filling up of vacancies of Scientists of ARS (Agricultural research Services) and for other posts under indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), the respondent applied for the same. She appeared for the written test consisting of General Knowledge, professional subjects I and II held on 14th, 15th and 16th October, 1994 with Roll no. 5784. Thereafter she was called for interview on 9-3-1995 before the Board constituted for the discipline of biochemistry (Plant Sciences ). Apart from the respondent, two more candidates appeared for the interview. She claims that the Board has recommended the names of all the candidates appeared for the interview for recruitment to the post of ARS in ICAR. Appellant No. 2 herein in his proceedings dated 27-3-1995 directed the respondent to appear before the competent Medical Board for medical examination and the Medical board sent its report to the Deputy Director of ICAR after medical examination. Similarly enquiry was also made by the police as to the antecedents of the respondent on 18-6-1995 and report, was submitted to ICAR. It appears that, however, in the results published by the 3rd respondent in the Employment News on 9-7-1995, her name did not find place. She made representations to the appellants but nothing has been communicated to her. Similarly enquiry was also made by the police as to the antecedents of the respondent on 18-6-1995 and report, was submitted to ICAR. It appears that, however, in the results published by the 3rd respondent in the Employment News on 9-7-1995, her name did not find place. She made representations to the appellants but nothing has been communicated to her. On these averments she filed the writ petition seeking the following prayer: to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to issue an order of appointment to the petitioner for the , post of Scientist under Agricultural research Services in pursuance to the examination conducted by the 3rd respondent for the year 1994-95 from the date on which other candidate or candidates are appointed in the discipline of Bio-chemistry (Plant sciences) with all monetary benefits by holding the publication of the 2nd respondent in Employment News edition dated 9-7-95 in so far as it relates to the selection of candidates in examination Biochemistry (Plant sciences) as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. . . . ( 4 ) A learned Single Judge of this Court passed an ex parte order on 3-12-1996 in the following terms: the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that he had served personal notices to the respondents and counter was filed. He pointed out that in the all India Examination conducted by the Board only three persons were qualified in the written test and they were also called for viva-voce. he drew my attention to the rules of recruitment which states that only a person recommended by the Board for admission will be asked to appear for final examination by the Indian council of Agricultural Research, which is the appointing authority. In other words, the appointing authority comes to the picture only after selection by the recruitment board. The inescapable inference is that since the petitioner had been asked to appear before the Medical Board, by the authority, the recruitment board had already declared her as successful candidate and had recommended her name for appointment by the appointing authority. In spite of this factual position, the announcements of results did not include her name. There is obviously a discrepancy between this announcement of the results and the direction to the petitioner to appear for medical examination by the appointing authority. In spite of this factual position, the announcements of results did not include her name. There is obviously a discrepancy between this announcement of the results and the direction to the petitioner to appear for medical examination by the appointing authority. Since the respondents, have not cared to appear and clarify this discrepancy, I must take it that the petitioner was a successful candidate, but unreasonably denied appointment by omitting her name from the declaration of the results. I, therefore deem it fit to issue a mandamus to the respondent No. 3 to include her name in the list of successful candidates and the first respondent shall make suitable appointment to the petitioner in accordance with her qualification. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. ( 5 ) AGAINST the said order, a review application was filed by the respondents on 28-1-1997 with a petition to condone the delay in filing the review on the ground that in view of Section 14 of the Administrative tribunals Act, 1985, the High Court has no jurisdiction as the Government of India as far back on 20-4-1987 issued notification vesting jurisdiction over ICAR in the Central administrative Tribunal. The appellants also filed delay condonation application on 18-8-1997. ( 6 ) IT may be noted herein that after the review application was filed, the respondent herein filed CC. No. 1360 of 1997 on 22-9-1997 to punish the appellants for wilful disobedience of the orders dated 3-12-1996. ( 7 ) IT is the case of the appellants in the counter filed in the contempt application. that for appointment as Scientist in ARS one should get minimum 50% marks of the aggregate of 700 marks earmarked for written and oral test. The petitioner secured only 340 marks out of 700 and therefore her name was not recommended for appointment by ASRB. Out of the three persons appeared for viva voice, only one candidate was qualified and recommended by the Board for appointment. It is also contended that medical examination and verification of character and antecedents is part of recruitment process adopted with a view to avoid delay in issue of offer of appointment to the selected candidates and this practice is being followed in Civil services examinations conducted by UPSC irrespective of the fact whether the candidate is finally selected or not. It is also contended that medical examination and verification of character and antecedents is part of recruitment process adopted with a view to avoid delay in issue of offer of appointment to the selected candidates and this practice is being followed in Civil services examinations conducted by UPSC irrespective of the fact whether the candidate is finally selected or not. In the letter issued to the respondent for medical examination, it was clearly mentioned that the same does not constitute an offer of appointment. ( 8 ) A learned Single Judge of this Court ordered notice in the contempt case on 29-9-1997. On 29-10-1997 in the review application - Rev. WPMP. No. 28816 of 1997 the following order was passed: in the circumstances learned Counsel for the review petitioners has given an undertaking that if in the meanwhile i. e. , before the next date of hearing of the case, if the training course begins, the petitioner will be admitted without fail and permitted to undergo training subject to the result of review petition. ( 9 ) ON 27-12-1997 when the review application came up for hearing, the learned single Judge passed the following order: in this case, I had already decided that the petitioner is entitled for admission. The respondents in the writ petition have filed a review petition and after some arguments and suggestions for consideration, the learned Counsel for the respondents has sought time till 23-1-1998. The learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that in the meanwhile the next course starts on 7-1-1998. In the circumstances, there will be a direction to the respondents to admit the writ petitioner in the course of National Agricultural research Management Institute, rajenderanager, Hyderabad on production of this order. A copy of this order shall be sent to the institute to admit the petitioner without fail. Post on 23-1-1998. ( 10 ) IT appears that pursuant to the said order, the respondent was admitted to the training at National Academy of agricultural Research Management (NAARM) for few days but she was not allowed for training on the basis of a letter addressed by ICAR to NAARM. ( 11 ) AGGRIEVED by the orders dated 27-12-1997, the appellants herein preferred special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 446 of 1998 wherein the Supreme Court passed the following order on 21-1-1998. ( 11 ) AGGRIEVED by the orders dated 27-12-1997, the appellants herein preferred special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 446 of 1998 wherein the Supreme Court passed the following order on 21-1-1998. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with a request to the High Court to decide the review application on 23-1-1998, the day fixed for hearing this application. If the review petition is not decided on that day, the impugned direction given by the High Court will stand stayed till the review petition is decided. ( 12 ) ON 23-1-1998, the learned Single Judge took up hearing of the review application and passed the following order: the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if no decision is given to-day the earlier direction to admit the petitioner to the training course may be taken as stayed and though the petitioner has been admitted on 21-1-1998 to the course she may be asked to discontinue tomorrow. When i asked the learned Counsel for the respondents whether he gives an undertaking that no steps will be taken as the case is part heard he refused to give any undertaking on the ground that he has no instructions and therefore he cannot take the risk. At the same time according to the wording of the order of the Supreme Court unless the review petition is decided the stay will come into operation. Since I have decided to hear the writ petition, it is taken on record that the review has been decided in terms of the Supreme court s order and the earlier direction will continue to operate. The case will be posted for further hearing on tuesday i. e. , on 27-1-1998. ( 13 ) THEREAFTER, it appears that the 3rd respondent was discontinued from the training course and the Director, NAARM was also directed to be present in the Court on 6-2-1998. On 6-2-1998 the learned Single judge heard the review application and on a consideration of the recruitment rules and relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in P. K. Ramchandera Iyer v. Union of India by an elaborate order dated 20-2-1998 declined to interfere with the earlier order dated 3-12-1996. The learned Single Judge held that the ranking is only according to the aggregate marks and no minimum mark is fixed for being qualified. The learned Single Judge held that the ranking is only according to the aggregate marks and no minimum mark is fixed for being qualified. As regards the contention as to the jurisdiction of the High court in the matter, it was held that since the agricultural Scientists Research Board was not notified and only the ICAR has been notified as the institution amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative tribunal, once mandamus is issued to the board to include the name of the petitioner in the list of selected candidates, ICAR is bound to give the appointment as recommended by the Board. ( 14 ) AGGRIEVED by the same, the appellants preferred writ appeal being w. A. No. 630 of 1998. ( 15 ) WHILE the appeal was pending, the Contempt Case came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Judge on a consideration of the material on record as also the relevant files placed before him and the decision of the apex Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. came to the conclusion that the appellants are guilty of contempt of this Court. The learned Single judge found that until the order of this court is reversed in a properly constituted appeal or is suspended during the pendency of the appeal by way of an interim order by the appropriate appellate authority, the order must be obeyed and no material has been put forth as to what action they had taken for securing the compliance of the order dated 3-12-1996. The learned Judge also found that the tenor of the various affidavits filed by the appellants gives an impression that the order which according to them is without jurisdiction need not be implemented and non-compliance of such an order would not amount to contempt of this Court. ( 16 ) THEREAFTER, a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 18-4-1999 (sic. 28-6-1999 (1999 (3) ALT 489 (D. B.)) allowed the Writ Appeal setting aside the orders of the learned Single Judge dated 3-12-1996 and 20-2-1998. ( 16 ) THEREAFTER, a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 18-4-1999 (sic. 28-6-1999 (1999 (3) ALT 489 (D. B.)) allowed the Writ Appeal setting aside the orders of the learned Single Judge dated 3-12-1996 and 20-2-1998. The Division Bench found that since the prayer in the writ petition is for a direction to ICAR to give appointment to the respondent-writ petitioner to the post of Scientist in ICAR and in view of the decision of the Apex Court in L. Chandra kumar v. Union of India the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition at the first instance. It was also held that in view of section 14 (3) of the Administrative tribunals Act, the matters concerning recruitment to any service are outside the purview of any Court. Review Writ Appeal misc. Petition No. 3026 of 1999 preferred thereagainst was dismissed. ( 17 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that as the respondent was not a selected candidate, she could not be sent for the training and all the attempts to get the review decided did not fructify. Learned Counsel vehemently submitted that since the review petition was not decided as per the orders of the Supreme court on 23-1-1998 and the same was decided on 20-2-1998, the impugned direction issued in the order dated 3-12-1996 is deemed to have been stayed and the same is merged in the order passed by the learned single Judge in review application dated 20-201998. He further submitted that since the order dated 3-12-1996 was merged in the order passed in the review petition dated 20-2-1998 and since the same was set aside in appeal by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 18-4-1999, it should be construed that no contempt has been committed by the appellants. The decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge in tayabbhai s case (2 supra) has no application and is distinguishable on facts. The centre of controversy involved in Tayabbhai s case (2 supra) is as to the interpretation of section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharshtra State Amendment ). The decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge in tayabbhai s case (2 supra) has no application and is distinguishable on facts. The centre of controversy involved in Tayabbhai s case (2 supra) is as to the interpretation of section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharshtra State Amendment ). In Kiran singh v. Chaman Paswan the Apex Court clearly held that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. It was also held that a defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect couldn t be cured even by consent of parties. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the various documents taken notice of by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that the appellants had deliberately flouted the orders of this Court and as such the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is perfectly in order and as such no interference is warranted. ( 19 ) WE may firstly consider whether the decision of the Apex Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. (2 supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge for arriving at the conclusion that the appellants are guilty of contempt of court, has application to the facts of the present case. ( 20 ) IN our opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court in Tayabbhai s case (2 supra) has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. In the above judgment, the main question involved was as to the interpretation of section 9-A of Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra State Amendment) - effect of orders passed by a Civil Court exercising power under Section 9-A and effect of non-compliance of orders passed by Civil Court during pendency of decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our considered view, the said decision is not all applicable to this case. In our considered view, the said decision is not all applicable to this case. Section 9-A CPC empowers the Civil Court/ high Court in Maharashtra to pass appropriate orders during the pendency of decision on issue of jurisdiction and in that case Civil Court had held that it has got jurisdiction when such issue was raised but even then parties therein flouted orders passed by Civil Court and even orders of high Court were repeatedly flouted and parties did not purge contempt. Here in the instant case, there is no provision to pass any orders during the pendency of a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution of India when the writ petition is not maintainable on ground of jurisdiction. There is no question of interpretation of Section 9-A CPC involved herein nor there was any decision by the learned Single Judge that mis Court has got jurisdiction. When a petition under Art. 226 is not maintainable on ground of jurisdiction, it is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. Further even without there being any decision of the learned Single Judge on jurisdiction despite clear order of the supreme Court, the appellants purge contempt and admitted respondent to training course. Further, in Tayabbhai s case (2 supra), the Apex Court held that question of jurisdictions has to be decided by a court at the earliest possible time as soon as it is raised. But, in the instant case, there was no decision by the learned Single Judge, which, in our opinion, goes to the root of the matter. In other words, the centre of controversy in tayabbhai s case was Section 9-A CPC and action of parties was judged in the light of facts of that case. In the instant case, the facts are entirely different and there is no iota of similarity. Further in Tayabbhai s case, the supreme Court held that parties in the said case did approach the Civil Court bona fide believing that it has got jurisdiction and civil Court held so and even High Court of bombay while holding that Civil Court had no jurisdiction held that the suit instituted in that case was held as bona fide. Further in Tayabbhai s case, the supreme Court held that parties in the said case did approach the Civil Court bona fide believing that it has got jurisdiction and civil Court held so and even High Court of bombay while holding that Civil Court had no jurisdiction held that the suit instituted in that case was held as bona fide. But, in the instant case, filing of writ petition cannot be held as bona fide because of question of jurisdiction was not to be decided later but it was expressly barred by Section 14 (3) of the administrative Tribunals Act and a constitution Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the said provision in L. Chandra kumar v. Union of India (3 supra ). The observations of the learned Single Judge that if the appellants believe that this Court has no jurisdiction, they should have initiated appropriate proceedings for getting setting aside the orders and having not done so, they are guilty of contempt is factually not correct because the appellants have been availing the legal remedies by filing review petition and a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court. The ex parte order was passed on 3-12-1996 whereas the review petition was filed on 28-1-1997. Therefore, the appellants took steps immediately to file the review petition. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that no case for contempt of this court has been made out much less wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court. Further, in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (4 supra), the Apex Court held that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. We, therefore, set aside the order-dated 25-1-1999 passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 21 ) IN our opinion, the writ petition filed by the respondent writ petitioner herein is not maintainable as per the provisions of section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal act, 1985. The establishment of ICAR being a society owned and controlled by the government of India, notification dated 20-4-1987 was issued by the Central government conferring jurisdiction on the central Administrative Tribunal. Hence, in our considered opinion, the writ petition is not maintainable. The establishment of ICAR being a society owned and controlled by the government of India, notification dated 20-4-1987 was issued by the Central government conferring jurisdiction on the central Administrative Tribunal. Hence, in our considered opinion, the writ petition is not maintainable. ( 22 ) SECTION 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 stipulates that the matter relating to recruitment falls within the jurisdiction of the State Administrative tribunal or Central Administrative Tribunal as the case may be. Therefore, the Writ petition being not maintainable ought to have been dismissed. ( 23 ) IN this context, we may beneficially refer to a Full Bench decision of the High court of Madras in Government of Tamil nadu v. Hepzi Vimalabai. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court referred two questions to the Full Bench for its opinion. The first question is, whether recruitment to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 15 (1) (a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, on the coming into force of the Act, would come within the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, or would lie within the purview of the State administrative Tribunal. One of us viz. , ar. Lakshmanan, CJ (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Full Bench held: having regard to the use of the words recruitment and matters concerning recruitment in the Preamble and in sections 14,15 and 28 of the Act and in art. 323-A of the Constitution, it is clear that the Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all matters specified therein and the High court shall not have jurisdiction to decide questions relating to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment in writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. Further, the court is also of the view that the word recruitment cannot be clubbed with the expression appointment because persons appointed will never be aggrieved by recruitment. The Court is also of the view that there can be no distinction such as recruitment and prerecruitment matters. Further, the court is also of the view that the word recruitment cannot be clubbed with the expression appointment because persons appointed will never be aggrieved by recruitment. The Court is also of the view that there can be no distinction such as recruitment and prerecruitment matters. Thus overruling the judgment in Ruban s case 1990 wlr1: (1990)2 LLH 92 the Court holds that recruitment to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the state would exclusively fall within the provisions of Section 15 (1) (a) of the administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the same would be outside the purview of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 24 ) AGAIN in para 36, it was further held: art. 323-A of the Constitution uses the expression recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service and posts. There is a clear distinction between the words recruitment and appointment . Having regard to the use of the word recruitment and matters concerning recruitment in the preamble and in Section 14,15 and 28 of the Act and in Art. 323-A of the constitution, it is clear that the tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all matters specified therein and the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to decide questions relating to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to writ petitions filed under Art. 226 of the constitution of India. ( 25 ) THUS, the Full Bench answered the question as follows: recruitment to any Civil Service of the state or to any civil post under the state would exclusively fall within the provisions of Section 15 (l) (a) of the administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the same would be outside the purview of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 26 ) THE writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in our opinion, is not maintainable as the organisation in which the respondent is seeking appointment is notified under Section 14 (2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and the jurisdiction pertaining to all matters from recruitment to post retrial disputes has been conferred on Central Administrative tribunal w. e. f. 15-5-1997. Thus, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge has failed to review the earlier ex parte order dated 3-12-1996 passed in W. P. No. 29904 of 1985 wherein the appellants were directed to appoint the respondent as scientist. It has been done despite the fact that a copy of the notification under Section 14 (2) of the Act is on record. Further, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court Chandrakumar s case (3 supra) held that the State and Central administrative Tribunals shall continue to entertain the matters as courts of first instance and the decision of the Tribunal can be challenged before the Division Bench of the concerned High Court. But, in the instant case, the matter was pending before a learned Single Judge of this Court lingering on unnecessarily. In our opinion, the impugned order dated 27-12-1997 besides being without jurisdiction has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice as firstly, the high Court has no power to pass any order including the impugned order and secondly respondent cannot be admitted in training started on 7th January, 1998 as she was not a selected candidate and training started on 7th January, 1998 was meant for newly selected candidates. ( 27 ) THE learned Single Judge had assumed the role of Selection Committee and substituted his opinion with that of the recruitment board/appellants herein and declared the respondent as successful in the selection when she was not successful in the selection, she having acquired 340 out 700 marks when the minimum qualifying marks were 350 out of 700. The learned Single judge, in our opinion has committed an error of jurisdiction in interfering with the said selection process of policy decision of the appellants in this respect thereby substituting his own selection criteria. The learned Single Judge, in our opinion, could not have refused to review the ex parte judgment dated 3-12-1996 on the ground that review of the order was a matter of judicial discretion although the ex parte order was passed when the stand of the appellants was not before the learned Single judge and the records produced subsequently would show that the respondent herein was not a successful candidate for the selection and therefore could not be appointed. Courts, in our opinion, should not assume the role of the appointing authority and issue mandamus by giving positive directions to the authorities to appoint the candidates. Courts, in our opinion, should not assume the role of the appointing authority and issue mandamus by giving positive directions to the authorities to appoint the candidates. ( 28 ) THE High Court exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution cannot pass orders on sympathy or humanitarian grounds, contrary to the rule of law. The Supreme court in catena of decisions has deprecated the practice of issuing directions to the government and other educational institutions on humanitarian grounds directing them to hold supplementary examination for enabling the students of the concerned institutions to appear at the examination with a condition that the declaration of their result would be subject to the ultimate settlement of the question of recognition of the institutions in which they are studying. Such a direction, the Supreme court held is destructive to the rule of law and Court cannot grant directions on humanitarian grounds contrary to law. In state of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers training Institution the practice of admitting students by unauthorised educational institutions and then seeking permission for permitting the students to appear for the examination has been looked with disfavour by the Court. The Supreme Court declared that the jurisdiction of the Court under article 32 and of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution should not be frittered away for such a purpose. In AP. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of A. P the Apex Court observed that any direction of the nature sought for permitting the students to appear at the examination without the institution being affiliated or recognised would be in clear transgression of the provision of the Act and the regulations. The Court cannot be a party to direct the students to disobey the statute as that would be destructive of the rule of law. ( 29 ) IN State of Maharashtra v. Vikas sahebrao Rtoundale the Supreme Court held that the High Court has committed a manifest error in law in exercising its prerogative power conferred under Art. 226 of the Constitution, directing the appellants therein to permit the students to appear for the examination. In CBSE v. P. Sunil Kumar, the Supreme court following its earlier decisions in State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph teachers Training Institute and A. P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Govt. In CBSE v. P. Sunil Kumar, the Supreme court following its earlier decisions in State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph teachers Training Institute and A. P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A. P. (6 and 7 supra) set aside the directions issued by the Kerala High Court wherein students studying in institutions not affiliated to the Board of Secondary education were allowed to sit at the examination and also directed to grant the certificates subject to the result of all the pending proceedings as regards the question of affiliation. It was held "we are conscious of the fact that our order Setting aside the impugned directions of the High court would cause injustice to these students. But to permit students of an unaffiliated institution to appear at the examination conducted by the Board under orders of the Court and then to compel the. Board to issue certificates in favour of those who have undertaken examination would tantamount to subversion of law and the court will not be justified to sustain the orders issued by the High Court on misplaced sympathy in favour of the students". ( 30 ) IN Guru Nanak Dev University v. Praminder KR. Bassal the Supreme Court held that direction to admit students cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. It was held that decisions on matters relevant to be taken into account at the interlocutory stage cannot be deferred or decided later when serious complications might ensure from the interim order itself. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge was apparently moved by sympathy for the candidate than by an accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. The supreme Court said that such orders cannot be allowed to stand. The courts should not embarrass academic authorities by itself taking over their functions. ( 31 ) IN our opinion, it is for the selection body to fix the selection criteria and minimum qualifying marks for the final selection having regard to the nature, duties and responsibilities and class of the post. ( 32 ) WE have also perused order in the writ Appeal passed by the Division Bench. ( 31 ) IN our opinion, it is for the selection body to fix the selection criteria and minimum qualifying marks for the final selection having regard to the nature, duties and responsibilities and class of the post. ( 32 ) WE have also perused order in the writ Appeal passed by the Division Bench. V. V. S. Rao, J, speaking for the Bench in the concluding portion of the judgment observed as under: in view of the above, reasoning in the impugned judgment for entertaining the writ petition, with great respect, is not sustainable. We may make a few observations, which in our view are apposite in a situation like this. No doubt an analysis of the facts and appreciation of various contentions made by the petitioner, do indicate that the arguments is plausible one. However, strong a petitioner s case may be, unless the jurisdiction is vested, no courts is competent to adjudicate upon the issues that arise for consideration. In the present case, this Court has no initial jurisdiction and cannot entertain the disputes concerning the service matters at the first instance. That is the law declared by the Hon ble Supreme Court. In the face of the law declared by the supreme Court, this Court is not competent to take a contrary view, which should be void in the eye of law. Discipline of law requires that law declared by the Apex Court shall be followed and the High Court is not competent to interpret the judgments of the Supreme Court and arrive at a suitable conclusion to get over the questions of jurisdiction. Not only because of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India but also because of doctrine of precedent - the law declared by the highest Court is binding on all the lower courts. For all the above reasons, we allow the writ Appeal setting aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 3-12-1996 and 20-2-1998 without costs. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner made a request that in view of the undertaking given in the contempt case, the petitioner may be given an appointment in the first respondent Council. This is seriously disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondents-appellants. In view of our findings, we do not feel inclined to give any such directions. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner made a request that in view of the undertaking given in the contempt case, the petitioner may be given an appointment in the first respondent Council. This is seriously disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondents-appellants. In view of our findings, we do not feel inclined to give any such directions. However, it will be open to the competent authority or Central Administrative Tribunal to consider such a request, if made, in accordance with law. ( 33 ) AGAIN the respondent herein moved an application to review the aforesaid order under Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of cpc made in Writ Appeal No. 630 of 1998, placing reliance on a statement appears to have been made in the affidavit filed in wamp. No. 1243 of 1998 in W. A. No. 630 of 1998. The Division Bench observed: learned Counsel for the review petitioner submits that the statement that is quoted in the above paragraph to the effect that the learned Senior advocate who appeared on behalf of the respondents did not give any undertaking to the effect that respondents would consider the appointment of the petitioner is not correct. Therefore, the learned counsel says that an error has crept into the judgment, which is apparent on the face of the record and that this Court may show indulgence and review the order to that extent. Having heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondents in the appeal, this court passed orders setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge upon lacing reliance on the decision of the apex Court in L. . Chandrakumar v. Union of India observing that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain matters relating to appointments to the Public services. Having said so once, it is not open to this Court once again now to give a contrary direction in favour of the review petitioner, which would virtually amount to allowing the very writ petition. It is, however, open to the review petitioner to place the affidavit filed by the respondents before the competent authority or the Central administrative Tribunal for appropriate directions. We, therefore, see no ground to entertain this review application. It is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, open to the review petitioner to place the affidavit filed by the respondents before the competent authority or the Central administrative Tribunal for appropriate directions. We, therefore, see no ground to entertain this review application. It is accordingly dismissed. ( 34 ) WE are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in the Writ Appeal as well as in the Review writ Appeal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3026 of 1999. ( 35 ) FOR the forgoing reasons, we hold that the appellants are not guilty of contempt of this Court and therefore the end of justice would be met if the order of the learned single Judge dated 25-1-1999 imposing the punishment on the appellants to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each in CC. No. 1360 of 1997 is set aside It is accordingly set aside and the contempt Appeal is allowed. We however, make it clear that the dismissal of the contempt appeal would not stand in the way of respondent approaching the Central administrative Tribunal for redressal.