BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) BY this writ application, the petitioner, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 has challenged a demand notice dated March 8, 1997 under Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 191o ("act") being Annexure "c" to the instant writ application. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the question involved in this writ application it will be profitable to refer to the following facts: ( 3 ) A company named Raj Laminates Private Limited merged with m/s. Landle Agencies (India) Limited in terms of the order erf merger passed by this Court on April 1, 1994. On January 11, 1995, the petitioner entered into an agreement for purchase of all assets of M/s. Landle agencies (India) Limited and came into possession of the factory premises. Subsequently, by a deed of conveyance dated August 7, IS95 the petitioner purchased all the assets of the said factory at Bawali within police Station-Budge Budge. ( 4 ) PREVIOUSLY, the electric supply at the said factory premises stood in the name of Raj Laminates Private Limited. The petitioner' after purchasing the property entered into an agreement of supply with West bengal State Electricity Board ("board") by virtue of an agreement dated march 1. 1996 and in accordance with such agreement the petitioner gave security deposit equivalent to Rs. 2,92,000/- in the shape of bank guarantee. Therefore, the petitioner got new electric meter in its own name by dint of such agreement dated March 1, 1996. ( 5 ) IT appears from record that the Board issued a notice under Section 24 of the Act to Raj Laminates Private Limited on June 18, 1996 demanding a sum of Rs. 5. 71. 242/- for AMOR for 1995-96. It further appears that subsequently another notice was served under Section 24 of the aforesaid Act upon the petitioner for shortfall of AMOR for the selfsame period of 19. 95-96 amounting to Rs. 2. 70. 242/ -. By the said notice, the petitioner was asked to pay the aforesaid amount within march 19, 1997. In default, the Board threatened disconnection of supply of electricity. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has challenged the aforesaid notice under Section 24 of the Act by. filing this writ application. 95-96 amounting to Rs. 2. 70. 242/ -. By the said notice, the petitioner was asked to pay the aforesaid amount within march 19, 1997. In default, the Board threatened disconnection of supply of electricity. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has challenged the aforesaid notice under Section 24 of the Act by. filing this writ application. ( 7 ) THE grievance of the petitioner is that a new agreement having been entered into between petitioner and Board on March 1, 1996 after giving security to the extent of Rs. 2,92,000/- and the petitioner not having defaulted in payment of any amount of consumption after coming into operation of the agreement, the Board acted illegally in issuing notice under Section 24 of the Art. ( 8 ) THE instant application has been opposed by the Board by filing affidavit-in-opposition. It is contended in the affidavit that although the petitioner purchased the property on August 7, 1995 by a registered deed from Landle Agencies (India) Limited, (he petitioner entered into possession through an earlier agreement dated January 11, 1995 and from the said date the petitioner had been consuming electricity although the meter stood in the name of Raj Laminates Private Limited. The Board thus contends that for the purpose of actual consumption by the petitioner itself, the amount claimed had fallen due and as such the Board did not commit any illegality in issuing notice under Section 24 of the Act. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, the only question arises for determination in this application is whether ihe Board can issue notice under Section 24 of the Act for the purpose of realization of the dues for a period when the petitioner was not the recorded consumer of the Board. ( 10 ) MR. Ram, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner draws attention of this Court to the agreement dated March 1. 1996 entered into between petitioner and Board and points out that liability (o pay the amount for electric consumption or other charges accrues to the petitioner from that date and thus the Board cannot issue notice under Section 24 of the Act for realization of the earlier dues payable by the previous recorded consumer. Mr. Ram points out that original notice was given to the Raj Laminates Private Limited as will appear from annexure "b" for a sum of Rs. Mr. Ram points out that original notice was given to the Raj Laminates Private Limited as will appear from annexure "b" for a sum of Rs. 5,71,242/- and after the encashment of security deposit of Raj Laminates Private Limited then lying with the board, the amount has come down to Rs. 2. 70. 242/- and the Board is trying to realize that balance amount from the petitioner by issue of notice under Section 24 of the Act. ( 11 ) MR. Mukharjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Board has on the other hand relied upon the definition of 'consumer' mentioned in Section 2 (c) of the Act and has contended that there being sufficient material to show that at the relevant point of time the petitioner was consuming electricity although the meter stood in the name of Raj laminates Private Limited, the petitioner becomes 'consumer' within the meaning of the Act and as such his client is entitled to issue notice under Section 24 of the Act for the purpose of realization of the said amount. In support of such contention Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon the following two decisions viz. (i) Bhagalpur Electric Supply Corporation vs. Hari Prasad Saha. and Ors. , reported in AIR 1938 Patna page 15 and (ii) R. C. Prosad Sharma and Ors. us. Stale of Bihar, reported in AIR 1967 sc page 349. ( 12 ) MR. Mukherjee further submits that in view of the provision contained in Section 49 (B) of the Act as amended 111 the year 1995. even after sale of a property by virtue of the order oi a Court, the amount payable for consumption by the recorded consumer become charged to the property transferred and thus subsequent purchaser is bound to pay the amount. ( 13 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going, through the materials on record I find that a fresh agreement having been entered into between petitioner and Board on March 1, 1996. the board is not entitled to invoke Section 24 of the Act for any consumption prior to the date of agreement. The liability to pay consumption charge is upon the person in whose name the meter stands. For realization of such amount, the Board can, in addition to the power conferred upon section 24 of the Act. the board is not entitled to invoke Section 24 of the Act for any consumption prior to the date of agreement. The liability to pay consumption charge is upon the person in whose name the meter stands. For realization of such amount, the Board can, in addition to the power conferred upon section 24 of the Act. recover the amount from the security deposit or other property of the recorded owner. It is alleged in this application that the Raj Laminates Private Limited is still running its business. Thus 1 find substance in the contention of Mr. Ram that in such a case even after encashing the security of the Raj Laminates Private Limited, if any further amount Is due and payable, it is the duty of the Board to proceed against Raj Laminates Private Limited to recover that amount. Section 24 authorizes the Board to disconnect supply of electricity only if any person neglects to pay any amount due from him to a licensee in respect of supply of energy to him. In the instant case, the liability of the petitioner accrued from the date of entering into agreement, 4hat is March 1. 1996. Therefore, even if the petitioner consumed electricity prior to getting meter in its own name, for the realization of any due for the consumption of that period, the electricity supplied to the petitioner by virtue of a subsequent agreement cannot be disrupted. ( 14 ) IN the case of R. C. Prosad Sharma and Ors. us. State of Bihar and Anr. . reported in AIR 1967 SC page 349 relied upon by Mr. Mukherjee, Supreme court was dealing with a case of conviction on the allegation of illegal abstraction of electric energy by unfair means. In the said case, in the book of the licensee one Musanlal was shown as the proprietor of the mill to whom energy was supplied. The evidence disclosed that the appellants purchased the mill and both of them were taking part in running the mill. Thus, both the appellants were held to be co-owners of the nill. In the said case, in the book of the licensee one Musanlal was shown as the proprietor of the mill to whom energy was supplied. The evidence disclosed that the appellants purchased the mill and both of them were taking part in running the mill. Thus, both the appellants were held to be co-owners of the nill. Since by virtue of the definition of consumer any person who is supplied with energy by a licensee or whose premises are for the time being conneeted for the supply of energy with the works of licensee becomes a consumer, the court concluded that the mill owned by the appellants were connected with the works of licensee and thus such co owners became consumer. In my view, the principles laid down in the said case has no application to this one where the Board wants to disconnect electricity of the petitioners for non-payment for a period prior to the passing of title in favour of the petitioner simply on the ground that it was in possession. Even it a person is not a consumer, he can be convicted for illegal abstraction but notice under Section 24 of the act can be given only to a person who has taken responsibility to pay the charge of consumption but has failed to pay. The recorded consumer or his estate is liable for such non-payment See 2000 (2) CHN 175 . ( 15 ) IN the case of Bhagalpur Electric Supply To. Ltd. vs. Hart Prasad Setha and Ors. (supra), a criminal proceeding under Section 44 (c) of the Electricity act initiated against five brothers ended in acquittal before Magistrate, inter alia, on the ground that it was not proved whether all the five brothers were consumers. The High Court held that the definition of consumer" in Section 2 (e) of the Act included any person whose premises are supplied with energy by a licensee and any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of supply of energy with the works of a licensee. Prima facie, the court proceeded, it should be enough to prove either that energy was supplied for the use of the accused or that accused were owners or occupiers of premises connected up with the licensee's electric system. Prima facie, the court proceeded, it should be enough to prove either that energy was supplied for the use of the accused or that accused were owners or occupiers of premises connected up with the licensee's electric system. In my view, the aforesaid proposition of law while dealing with a criminal case under Section 44 of the Act which starts with the word 'whoever' and makes any improper use of energy punishable cannot have any application to a case of issue of notice under Section 24 of the Act unless it is established that the person upon whom such notice is sought to be issued has committed In each of obligation towards licensee. In the present case, liability of the petitioner to pay to the Board accrued on March 1. 1996 and prior to that date it was the obligation of the previous recorded owner to pay for consumption ami such previous owner had continued with the security for payment. ( 16 ) SO far the other contention as regards the applicability of Section 49 (B) of Act is concerned, in my view, the said prosision merely creates a three on the property of a defaulting consumer and as such the Board is authoried to enforce that charge upon subsequent purchaser. But the said Section does not authorise the Board to disconnect the supply of electricity of a subsequent purchaser if a fresh agreement is entered into between subsequent purchaser and the Board. Therefore, threat of disconnection of petitioner's supply cannot be approved in the fact of the present case. ( 17 ) I thus quash the notice being Annexure "b" to the instant writ application on the ground that in the fact of present case the Board has no right to issue disconnection notice as the petitioner has not defaulted in complying with any of its liabilities by virtue os the agreement of supply of electricity dated March 1. 1996 ( 18 ) I, however, make it clear that I have not gone into the question whether the Board is entitled to recover the amount from the petitioner under Section 49 (B) of the Act, the same being beyond the scope of this writ application, inasmuch as the Board has not proceeded to recover the amount by invoking Section 49 (B ). ( 19 ) THE writ application thus succeeds ( 20 ) THE notice under Section 24 of the Act being Annexure "c" to this application is quashed ( 21 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Writ succeeds