JUDGMENT 1. - Both the petitions U/s. 482 Cr.P.C., though filed against the separate orders in separate criminal cases, involve common question of law, hence both the petitions are decided vide common order. 1. S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 1052/99.The brief facts giving rise to this petition are that the complainant Dev Karan filed a complaint against the accused petitioners in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar on 16.11.1992 with the averments that in the intervening night of 1st and 2nd October, 1992, one Shri Onkar was murdered by some unknown persons and a case No. 85/92 was registered at Police Station Asnawar, District Jhalawar. The complainant was summoned at Police Station on 2.10.1992 and he was abused by S.H.O. Shri Tej Singh. Further, the S1-IO told him that he has to confess the said crime. On pleading ignorance by the complainant, he was badly beaten. Thereafter, on 8.10.1992, SHO, Tej Singh alongwith constables Mohan Lal, Shiv Raj Singh and Kishore Singh gave him beating and on account of injuries, he became unconscious and his left hand got two fractures. Some other facts have also been mentioned in the complaint. The learned Magistrate after conducting an enquiry U/s.200 and 202 Cr.P.C., took cognizance against the accused petitioners U/ss. 330, 331 and 342 IPC and Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 vide order dated 16.1.1993 and after appearance of the accused petitioners, the case was committed to the Special Judge (SCST Court), Jhalawar vide order dated 25.10.1994. This case was pending for arguments for framing the charges and in the meantime an application U/s.197 Cr.P.C. was filed on 18.5.1998 on behalf of the accused petitioners and this application was dismissed by the learned Judge vide order dated 12.8.1999. Hence this petition : 2. S.B. Cr.Misc. Petition No. 1203/98. 3. The brief facts are that the complainant Chaju Ram filed a complaint in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Rajgarh, District Alwar on 29.5.1985 against the accused petitioners Chandra Bhan SHO and Phool Chand Constable with the averments that at about 2.30 PM on 24.5.1985, Shri Chandra Bhan, SHO along with Phool Chand and other constables came to the well of the complainant and made an enquiry about the gun which was licensed one. The accused Chandra Bhan wanted to have this gun by force but on intervention of the villagers, Shri Chandra Bhan went away. On the next day at about 5.00 AM, both the accused petitioners alongwith other constables entered the house of the complainant with intent to give beating and they started beating the complainant's mother Ram Pyari and Aunt Smt. Mooli. Accused Phool Chand gave beating with lathi and accused Chandra Bhan kicked both of them on their breast. Shri Gangadhar tried to intervene but he was also beaten and the accused petitioner took away the brother of the complainant Ramgeevan Harikishan Gangadhar with them and they were allowed to come out of the Police Station on 27.5.1985. The injured persons were medically examined. 4. The learned Magistrate after conducting an enquiry under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. took cognizance against Chandra Bhan under Sections 323, 45I IPC and against Phool Chand under Section 323, 325 and 451 IPC vide order dated 9.8.1985. Thereafter application under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was moved on behalf of the accused petitioners which was dismissed by the learned Addl. C.J.M., Rajgarh vide order dated 15.4.1996. Hence this petition. 5. Learned counsel for the accused petitioners contended that the complainant and other persons who received injuries were accused in Criminal Case No. 213/1985 registered at P.S.Rajgarh and one another case No. 126/85 was also registered against them and a gun was recovered vide seizure memo dated 24.5.1985 and thus for that the accused petitioners were discharging their official duty and therefore sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was required before taking cognizance against accused petitioners Chandra Bhan and Phool Chand. Similarly, the complainant Dev Karan was also an accused for an offence under Section 302 IPC and the accused petitioners Tej Singh and Ors. were discharging their official duties, thus they wanted to arrest the complainant in that case. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred the provisions of Section 46 Cr.P.C. According to Section 46, Cr.P.C., the Police Officer making an arrest shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested and if such arrest is resisted, such Police Officer may use all means necessary to effect the arrest. In view of these provisions, it was argued by learned counsel that while making arrest of the complainant Dev Karan, the accused persons were authorised to use even force. In view of these provisions, it was argued by learned counsel that while making arrest of the complainant Dev Karan, the accused persons were authorised to use even force. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court delivered in Kalyan Singh v. State of Raj. 1991 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 353, , and Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2000) 5 SCC 15 , . Learned P. P. opposed both the petitions on the ground that beating of the complainant by the accused persons does not come under the purview of discharge of official duties, hence no sanction was required. Learned counsel, Shri Sahni for the complainant Dev Karan also contended that the acts of Tej Singh & Ors. are not covered under the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and further these accused petitioners have no protection under the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. He placed reliance upon the decision in the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli and Anr. v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 287 , , and Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 , . 6. The relevant provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. are that when any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Govt. is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to Act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except the previous sanction : Now the main question which arises for consideration is that whether the accused petitioners as public servants committed alleged acts of crime while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties? In Kalyan Singh's Case (supra), the facts were that a complaint against the SHO was filed alleging that the SHO has not properly acted in discharge of his duties and prepared false statement of the complainant and others in order to save one Ahmed Noor from proceedings U/s. 145 Cr.P.C. In view of these facts, it was held that proceedings without sanction U/s. 197 cannot be taken. On the point as to whether the SHO was a public servant or not within the purview of Section 197 Cr.P.C., reference was made on the notification of the State Government N0.F. 20(7) Home (Gr.VI) 74.S.O.89, July 1974, according to which the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. were applicable to the police employees of the State Government. In Gauri Shankar Prasad's Case (supra), the facts were that the appellant in his official capacity as Sub Divisional Magistrate was present at the place of occurrence for the purpose of removal of encroachment from Government land. He allegedly entered the Chamber of the complainant using filthy language and dragging him out of his chamber. In view of these facts, it was held by Hon'ble Apex Court that alleged act had a reasonable nexus with the official duty of the appellant and therefore, sanction as provided by Section 197 Cr.P.C. was necessary. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that broadly speaking the alleged action constituting the offence must have a reasonable and rational nexus with the official duties required to be discharged by such public servant. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in both the judgments relied upon by learned counsel Shri Sahni. 7. Keeping in view the legal position as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, if the alleged act is directly concerned with the official duties and in other words the alleged action constituting the offence said to have been committed by the public servant must have a reasonable and rational nexus with the official duties required to be discharged by such public servant, sanction as provided by Section 197 I.P.C. is necessary. Keeping this legal position in mind in both the cases, it was rightly held by the learned Courts below that the alleged acts of accused Tej Singh and Ors. amounting to offences U/ss. 330, 331, 342 IPC and Section 3 of the Act, 1989 were not the acts committed in discharge of their official duties at all and similar view was rightly taken in the case against the Chandra Bhan and Phool Chand because entering the house of the complainant with intent to cause injuries and thereafter causing simple and grievous injuries does not come in discharge of official duties. Therefore, both the petitions having no merit are hereby dismissed. Therefore, both the petitions having no merit are hereby dismissed. The record of the Trial Court with copies of this order shall be sent down within a week from today.Petition dismissed. *******