JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - This is not an uncommon case which this Court deals with Petitioner who has been convicted for the offence under Sections 450/376. I.P.C as per the judgment dated 4.5.1998 of C.J.M. -cum-Asst. Sessions Judge. Khurda at Bhubaneswar in S.T. No. 190/55/293 of 1997/96 and the confirming judgment dated 10.12.2001 of Addl. Sessions Judge. Fast Track Court No. 2. Bhubaneswar in Criminal Appeal No. 23/98/40/01 has preferred this revision challenging legality and correctness of the said orders of conviction. 2. At the stage of hearing on admission since the Petitioner's prayer for bail was refused by this Court, on the request of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and on consent of learned Standing Counsel, the revision was taken up for hearing and disposal at the first instance and that is how though this is a criminal revision of the year 2002, the same stands disposed of in the following manner. 3. According to the prosecution the prosecutrix (P.W.5) and the Petitioner are the co-workers being the employees under the KONARK T.V. COMPANY situated at Bhubaneswar. As stated by the prosecutrix, on two instances Petitioner had borrowed respectively a sum of Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1,000/- as hand loans from her. When the latter loan of Rs. 1.000/- was not returned by the Petitioner in due time, there was repeated demands from her which resulted in altercation between the two on some occasions preceding the date of occurrence. P.W.5 also alleged that in one occasion when she requested to return the money Petitioner proposed her to spent a night with him at Puri and to take back that amount and she had not only refused but retaliated to that conduct of the Petitioner. As alleged by the prosecutrix, on 18.7.1995 at about 11. P.M. while she was engaged in cooking in her rented house situated under Sahidnagar Police Station in Bhubaneswar township, Petitioner accompanied by two other unknown persons, entered into her house and at the point of Knife they threatened to kill her two years young daughter it she would create noise and thereafter Petitioner and the accompanying two persons raped her one after the other Prosecutrix further narrated that she along with her younger sister aged about 16 years and a younger brother together reside in that house after there was a matrimonial dispute between her and her husband. According to her, by the time of occurrence, her younger sister was witnessing T.V. programme in the nearby house of the land lady and she returned to the house soon after departure of the culprits. She (P.W. 5) narrated the incident to her sister and both of them cried. Prosecutrix further narrated that her brother returned to the house on the following day morning but she did not state anything about the rape except mentioning that Petitioner with his associates misbehaved her and showed a knife and she also restrained her brother from making a confrontation with the Petitioner. In her evidence prosecutrix has narrated that at the time of sexual intercourse with her culprits were using condom. On the following day morning i.e. on 19.7.1995 at 9. A.M. she went to her office and in the afternoon when she fainted she was taken to the E.S.I. Hospital at Bhubaneswar and she was given treatment. She has also stated in her evidence that on 19.7.1995, or on the subsequent date she did not narrate about the incident of rape to her colleagues because of he threatening given by the Petitioner. Ultimately, on 26.7.1995, at about 1.30 P.M. she lodged the written report (Ext-1) in the police station also narrated in her evidence that after the occurrence and before lodging the F.I.R. she had thought of committing suicide and she had left a suicide note with her colleague named Abhiram Barik. As it reveres from the Case Diary and the evidence of the I.O. (P.W. 10) charge sheet was submitted : only against the Petitioner because identity and whereabouts of the other two rapists could not be known or traced. 4. In the trial Court, charge was framed against the Petitioner for the offence u/s 450 and 376, I.P.C. Petitioner denied to the said accusation and claimed for trial. Incurs of trial, prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses and relied on documents Exts. 1 to 10. No Material Object was tendered in evidence by the prosecution. Petitioner did not adduce any defence evidence. On assessment of evidence on record trios Court found that evidence of P.W.5 gets ample corroboration from the evidence of P.W. 6, her brother and P.W.8 the Doctor. 1 to 10. No Material Object was tendered in evidence by the prosecution. Petitioner did not adduce any defence evidence. On assessment of evidence on record trios Court found that evidence of P.W.5 gets ample corroboration from the evidence of P.W. 6, her brother and P.W.8 the Doctor. Accordingly, trial Court recorded order of conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to undergo R.I. for six years and to pay a fine of Rs 100/- in default to undergo R.I. for 7 days u/s 376, I.P.C. and further to undergo Rule 1 for two years for the offence u/s 450, I.P.C. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge on assessment of such evidence and hearing argument from Petitioner did not disturb the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court on the ground that prosecutrix is a married woman and she came to the Court to complain about a gang rape on her and in view of the ratio In the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs. State of Gujarat a corroboration need not be sought for when a lady complains of sexual abuse and her sole testimony is sufficient to warrant a conviction. Appellate Court also recorded that in the case at hand corroboration to her version is available because the incident was narrated by her brother (P.W.8) and also she stated about the same to the Doctor. Appellate Court also rejected the contention of the Petitioner to doubt the veracity for the delayed action in lodging the F.I.R. According to learned Addl. Sessions Judge from the available evidence and preponderance of the same a case of gang raps is proved. Accordingly, as noted above, he maintained the order of conviction. 5. Constrained by that finding Mr. S.K. Sahoo learned Counsel for the Petitioner, argues that though the scope of interference by the revisional Court is limited so far as the factual finding is concerned but non-assessment of evidence of improper assessment of evidence by the Courts below is an illegally which the revisional Court should take note of while considering whether the finding of the Courts below are sustainable. Learned Standing Counsel has no dispute on the legal preposition as well. That being the settled position of law, this Court allowed the parties to place the evidence Oil record vis-a-vis the findings recorded by the Courts below. Learned Standing Counsel has no dispute on the legal preposition as well. That being the settled position of law, this Court allowed the parties to place the evidence Oil record vis-a-vis the findings recorded by the Courts below. On perusal of the evidence on record and the Imputed findings of the Courts below, this Court finds that both the Courts below forgetting norms prescribed for appreciation of evidence accepted the version of P.W. 5 as verses from Holy book and strengthened their findings by relying on non-existing corroboration be it from P.W. 6 or any other witness, Under such circumstance this Court takes the job of re-appreciating evidence to find out whether the charge has been proved through the prosecution evidence. 6. The alleged occurrence as narrated by P.W. 5 goes to indicate that the house is inhabited by three persons, viz., herself, her younger brother and sister and her child, i.e., daughter aged 2 years. Though the evidence of P.W. 10 does not indicate about the site plan or the spot map and nothing has been asked to him in course c! recording his evidence it reveals from the spot visit noted in the Case Diary that the rented house of P.W. 5 is at the point of entrance gate. That is a house with asbestos roof and she had sublet a portion of her rented house to Anr. parson named Niranjan (not the Petitioner) and also there are a few adjoining neighbours and one of them is one Bijay. The land lady with her family resides in the main pucca building inside the same premises but at a distance of about 50 feet from the occurrence house. Therefore, this topography has to be borne in mind while assessing and appreciating evidence of P.W. 5. 7. As narrated by her, at about 11 P.M. in the night, she was engaged in cooking in the adjoining enclosed verandah. Petitioner entered into her house after entering Into the premises by coming through the main gate, Her evidence indicates that there was sufficient quarrels between the two relating to non-repayment of loan of Rs. 1,000/- and such an altercation has taken place itself on the date of occurrence in the office. P.W.5 has also narrated in her evidence that on her demand for repayment, Petitioner had suggested to her to spend a night with him at Puri. 1,000/- and such an altercation has taken place itself on the date of occurrence in the office. P.W.5 has also narrated in her evidence that on her demand for repayment, Petitioner had suggested to her to spend a night with him at Puri. Inspite of all these past events, as per her evidence, she not only allowed the Petitioner to enter in to her house but also did not raise protest for coming to her house at such odd hours in the night. She also did not call any body to remain present because her sister was witnessing the T.V. only at a distance of fifty feet i.e. at a distance of about 17 cubits and her small rented house is surrounded by neighbours. Her further evidence relating to forcible sexual intercourse is that in the occurrence room she was pushed to the floor and after removing her wearing garments she was ravished by the three culprits one after the other, each for a duration of five minutes. A combined reading of paragraphs 1 and 2 of her deposition goes to indicate that after pushing her to the floor her garments were removed before committing rape because in paragraph 2 of her evidence she has stated that" I put on my dress which were removed by the accused". During cross-examination she has stated that she resisted to the act of rape. Admittedly, she did not suffer any external injury much less a scratch. No such evidence is forthcoming from the evidence tendered by the prosecution. That circumstance leads to consider the credibility and truthfulness of P.W.5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argues that she is an experienced campaigner and several such allegations against other is sub-judice in different Courts including the High Court. This Court does not take note of such a contention because no such evidence is brought on record Be that as it may as noted above, the above noted circumstance of absence of injury gives rise to a valid presumption that the occurrence could not have taken place in the manner she has stated. Ext. This Court does not take note of such a contention because no such evidence is brought on record Be that as it may as noted above, the above noted circumstance of absence of injury gives rise to a valid presumption that the occurrence could not have taken place in the manner she has stated. Ext. 4 coupled with the evidence of P.W 8 in that respect supports the finding of this Court that on 19.7.1995 when she was examined by the Doctor there was no external injury on her body nor she complained of pain to her private parts or bleeding from P.V. Because of the aforesaid circumstance if the evidence of P.W.5 has to be accepted relating to rape on her in the manner she has stated, then it should have some post-occurrence corroboration from different circumstances so as to find credibility in her evidence. 8. According to P.W.5, soon after the occurrence and decamping of the culprits, her sister returned to the house and she narrated the incident to her. Though Bhagwati Sahu has been cited as a witness in the chargesheet but prosecution did not choose to examine her. Therefore, the best corroborative evidence which could have been made available to the Court has been withheld in this case. The trial and the appellate Courts have absolutely gone wrong in stating that evidence of the brother (P.W.6) corroborates to the evidence of P.W.5 relating to the occurrence of rape when in her evidence P.W.5 has clearly stated that she did not state anything to her brother relating to the occurrence of rape. Even in his evidence P.W 6 has stated that he was informed by his sister that the Petitioner had come with two Ors. and misbehaved with her by pointing a knife and (sic) her saree. He has not stated that ns saw any torn saree. P.W.5 has not stated that her saree was torn during the course of occurrence. Prosecution has not produce any torn saree as a Material Object. The Courts below have closed their eyes to such evidence, and for reasons best known to them recorded that evidence of P.W.6 is corroborating to the evidence of P.W.5 relating to the occurrence of rape. Thus, this Court has no hesitation to comment that the aforesaid findings of the Courts below is based on no evidence on record. 9. The Courts below have closed their eyes to such evidence, and for reasons best known to them recorded that evidence of P.W.6 is corroborating to the evidence of P.W.5 relating to the occurrence of rape. Thus, this Court has no hesitation to comment that the aforesaid findings of the Courts below is based on no evidence on record. 9. The land lady has been examined as P.W.9. In her examination-in-chief, she stated that though P.W.5 is a tenant under her but she had no knowledge about anything else. Prosecution was permitted to put leading questions and in that process, prosecution confronted to her that she had seen two persons, going out from the house of P.W. 5 at about 9 A.M. (which should be 9 P.M) on 18.7.1995 and that by that time, sister of P.W.5 was in the house of P.W. 9 and that hearing the hullah raised by P.W.5, her sister returned to that house. If that suggestion given to P.W. 9 is the case of the prosecution, then it emerges from that circumstance that at the time of decamping of the culprits. P.W.5 raised alarm (hullah). That is not the version of P.W.5. These contradictions in the case of prosecution remains unreconciled at any stage of the trial. Be that as it may. the evidence of P.W.9 does not lend any support to the case of the prosecution to corroborate to the version P.W.5 relating to any occurrence of rape or-post occurrence scenario in the rented house of P.W. 5 According to the evidence of P.W.5 on 19.7.1995 she left a suicide note with a colleague named Abhiram Barik. Said Abhiram Barik was examined as a witness by the investigating officer on 29 7.1995. But he has not been cited as a chargesheet witness nor any such suicide note of P.W.5 was seized from him or produced in the Court at the time of trial. If the evidence of PW.5 is to be believed relating to the post Occurrence conduct then the aforesaid evidence could have been of much relevance if that would have been available to the Court. Statement of Abhiram Barik which is available in the Case Diary does not whisper anything about any suicidal note or any note handed over to him by P.W. 5 on 19 7.1995. Therefore, the evidence of P.W 5 in that respect is found uncorroborated. 10. Statement of Abhiram Barik which is available in the Case Diary does not whisper anything about any suicidal note or any note handed over to him by P.W. 5 on 19 7.1995. Therefore, the evidence of P.W 5 in that respect is found uncorroborated. 10. It reveals corn the spot visit noted in the Case Diary that one Bijay Kumar Sahu is one adjoining neighbour on the northern side of the occurrence house and one Dhrubananda Swain en the southern side of the said house. It also reveals from that spot visit that one Niranjan Naik was occupying an enclosed space as a sub-lessee from P.W.5 since nth July. 1995. None of those persons nave either been cited as chargesheet witness nor they have been examined in course of investigation nor their evidence is available to Court about anything that happened on or after the occurrence on 18.7.1995. When the evidence of P.W. 5 relating to giving of resistance by her at the time of rape, which continued far a period of 15 minutes, that could not have remained unnoticed by persons living in the other side of the wall at about n P.M. in the night, that is a period of tranquillity and silence. 11. Admittedly. P.W.5 was examined by a Doctor on police requisition after a gap of more than 7 days from the data of occurrence. Therefore, in that connection, no support from the medical evidence available on the police requisition is not to the disadvantage of the prosecution nor it is of any advantage to the accused out the fact remains that on 19.7.1995 at about 4 P.M. when P.W.5 became unconscious in the office and she was taken to E.S.I, hospital the Doctor did not find any Injury nor any mark of violence on her private parts. She also did not complain before the Doctor relating to gang tape having been committed on her. The report Ext.4 indicates that (he symptom of being faint and unconscious might nave been due to some psychological affect and dipression. That could not have been caused because of a gang rape which occurred about 20 hours before. The aforesaid evidence of P.W.6 and Ext.8 are only on the basis of supposition and not on the basis of any positive finding. 12. Prom all the above indicated circumstances and evidence. That could not have been caused because of a gang rape which occurred about 20 hours before. The aforesaid evidence of P.W.6 and Ext.8 are only on the basis of supposition and not on the basis of any positive finding. 12. Prom all the above indicated circumstances and evidence. It does not appear that what P.W.5 narrated about the occurrence of rape, be the absolutely truth. In that respect, since there is lack of corroborative evidence relating to the post-occurrence conduct ct P.W.5 and the post-occurrence circumstances, therefore, a conviction cannot be warranted against the Petitioner on the basis of such uncorroborated evidence. In that respect this Court refers to and relies on the case Of Dilip and Anr. v. State of M.P. (2001) 21 OCR (SC) 629 in which their Lordship taking into consideration a similar circumstance of uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix and want of corroborative evidence propounded as follows: 12 The law is well-settled that prosecutrix in a sexual offence is not an accomplice and there is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon and made basis of conviction unless corroborated in material particulars. However, the rule about the admissibility of corroboration should be present to the mind of the Judge. In State of Himichal Pradesh Vs. Gian Chand on a review of the decisions of this Court, it was held that conviction for an offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated by medical evidence and other circumstances, such as the report of chemical examination etc.. If the same is found to he natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on. This Court further held: If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. 13. In Madan Gopal Kakkad Vs. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. 13. In Madan Gopal Kakkad Vs. Naval Dubey and Another this Court has held (vide para 23) that lack of oral corroboration to that of a prosecutrix does not come in the way of a safe conviction being recorded, provided the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basis infirmity, and the "probabilities factor does not render it unworthy of credence, and that, as a general rule, corroboration cannot be insisted upon, except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case medical evidence can be excepted to be forthcoming. 14. The age of the prosecutrix was around 16 years, may be a (sic) more. The fact remains that she was not just a child who would nave surrendered herself to a forced sexual assault without offering any resistance whatsoever. Without going into testing truthfulness of the explanation offered by the prosecutrix that because of being over-awed by the two accused persons she was not able to resist, the fact remains that the 'probabilities factor' operates against the prosecutrix. The gang rape is alleged to have been committed at about 2 P.M. in her own house, situated in a populated village by the side of the main road where people were moving on account of Holi festival. The prosecutrix did raise hue and cry to the extent she could and yet none was attracted to the place of the incident. The prosecutrix is said to have sustained injuries, also (sic) from her private parts staining her body as also the clothes which she was wearing. This part of the story is not only not corroborated by the medical evidence, is rather believed thereby. The presence of bloodstains is not confirmed by forensic science laboratory or by the doctors who examined the prosecutrix. Her own maternal aunt to whom the story of sexual assault has been narrated by the prosecutrix gives a version which does not tally with the version of the prosecutrix as given in the Court. The presence of bloodstains is not confirmed by forensic science laboratory or by the doctors who examined the prosecutrix. Her own maternal aunt to whom the story of sexual assault has been narrated by the prosecutrix gives a version which does not tally with the version of the prosecutrix as given in the Court. The learned Counsel for the State relied on Section 114-A of Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that in a trial on a charge u/s 376(2)(g) of I.P.C. on the prosecutrix stating that she was not a consenting party, the Court shall presume absence of consent of the woman alleged to have been raped. Suffice it to observe that we should not be misunderstood as recording a finding that the prosecutrix was a willing party to sexual intercourse by the accused persons. The Court is finding it difficult to accept the truthfulness of the version of the prosecutrix that any sexual assault as alleged was committed on her in view of the fact that her narration of the incident becomes basically infirm on account of being contradicted by the statement of her own aunt and medical evidence and the report of forensic science laboratory. The defence has given suggestions in-cross-examination for false implication of the accused persons which however nave not gone beyond being suggestions merely. It is not necessary for us to dwell upon further to find out the probability of truth contained in the suggestions because we are not satisfied generally of the correctness of story as told by the prosecutrix. We find it difficult to hold the prosecutrix in the case as one whose testimony an implicit reliance can be placed. 13. The citation relied won by the teamed Standing Counsel in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs. State of Gujarat, is a principle to De followed white appreciating the evidence that normally, a woman in Indian Society does not come with a false allegations of rape. That principle is to be followed when evidence of the prosecutrix is credible and reliable as per the principle propounded and adopted by the apex Court in the decisions noted in the preceding paragraph. 14. That principle is to be followed when evidence of the prosecutrix is credible and reliable as per the principle propounded and adopted by the apex Court in the decisions noted in the preceding paragraph. 14. For the reasons indicated above, this Court finds that in the present case, the charge for the offence under Sections 457 and 376 I.P.C has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubts and therefore, Petitioner s entitled to the benefit of doubt and accordingly, he is acquitted. Since the Petitioner has already surrendered to Jail custody, he be set at liberty forthwith.