JUDGMENT 1. - At the request of counsel for both the parties, I have finally heard them at this stage.The complainant-appellant has preferred this leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 10.3.1998 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Itawa acquitting the respondents of the offence under sections. 451, 323, 341 & 504 IPC. 2. Having carefully gone through the judgment, it appears that the learned trial Magistrate has recorded its conclusion that the complainant has not been able to establish charges against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt mainly on three grounds, viz., (i) though it was alleged that neighbours came at the time and place of incident, but none of the neighbours was produced in evidence (ii) there were serious contradictions in the statements of PW-1 Ramnathi, complainant herself and PW-2 Goverdhan Singh regarding the day of arrival of PW-2 Goverdhan Singh at the house of PW-1 Ramnathi and (iii) DW-1 Arjun Singh has denied the occurrence. 3. It is well, settled that normally the views of the trial Court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial Court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witnesses and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. 4. I find much strength in the argument of Mr. K.N. Shrimal, appearing for the respondents that while dealing with appeal against the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, it should not be reversed by the High Court even if it appears that another view regarding the occurrence was possible. In Kalyan & Ors. v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 , the High Court reversed the trial Court's order of acquittal by taking a different possible view. On appeal, their Lordships of the Apex Court held that the High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the two propositions, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate Court to disturb a finding of fact and (ii) non-interference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court. Their lordships further held that even if another view regarding the occurrence was possible, as taken by the High Court, the same could not be made a basis for setting aside the order of the trial Court in view of the settled position of law on the point. 5. Reference may also be made to a recent decision of the Apex Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2002 CCR (SC) 24 , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held:- "..... We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not been done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have, been set aside. The view taken by the learned Trial Court was a reasonable view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was possible that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal." 6. In the case at hand, on examining the judgment of the trial Court in the light of the evidence on record, it appears to me that the grounds of acquittal recorded by the trial Court are sound enough. The judgment being based on proper appreciation of evidence does not warrant interference by this Court.Consequently, leave to appeal is refused.Leave to appeal refused. *******