JUDGMENT Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. The writ petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:– (a) A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents, each one of them, their servants and subordinates to act in accordance with law and to withdraw, recall and rescind the purported orders dated 2nd February, 1984, dated 19th September, 1981, 28th May, 1980 and dated 8th November, 1980 and the Notification No. 209/D.S.(N) U.L. (Cal)/6(1)/27/Vol.2176 dated 16th July, 1982 and to give exemption of the land of your petitioner under Section 20(1 )(a) of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. (b) A writ of and/or in the nature of Certiorari directing the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 to certify and send all relevant records of in connection with the above, case being U.L. Case No. 6(1)/27 Vol. No.2 of 1976 and Appeal Case No.52 of 1982 to this Hon'ble Court to that conscionable justice may be administered by setting aside and/or quashing. the purported orders dated 2nd February, 1984, dated 19th September, 1981, dated 28th May, 1980 and dated 8th November, 1980 and the Notification No. 209/D.S.(N) U.L. (Cal)/6(1 )/27 Vol.2176 dated 16th July, 1982. (c) A writ and/or in the nature of Prohibition calling upon the respondents each one of them, their servants and subordinates to forbear from proceeding further pursuant to the said Notification and the purported orders, and also not to proceed any further in pursuance of the said orders and purported Notification. 2. The writ petition was affirmed on 26.6.1984. On 9.10.2001 the petitioners filed an application for bringing subsequent events as part of records being CAN. No. 5701 of 2001 and prayed for allowing the same as part of the writ application. From the application for taking notice of subsequent events, it appears that statements made therein are facts which happened prior to the filing of writ petition i.e. 26.6.1984. In that view of the matter, the prayer for bringing on records, the subsequent events in terms of the order dated 9.10.2001 passed by the D.K. Seth, J. cannot be considered as subsequent events. This writ petition has been opposed by the respondents by filing an affidavit. In that view of the matter, the prayer for bringing on records, the subsequent events in terms of the order dated 9.10.2001 passed by the D.K. Seth, J. cannot be considered as subsequent events. This writ petition has been opposed by the respondents by filing an affidavit. The petitioner has challenged the decision of the appellate authority passed under Section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as said Act) which arose assailing the decision of the order dated 9.8.1981 passed by the competent authority, Calcutta, rejecting the appeal. The petitioner has also assailed the decision of the State Government refusing to allow “application for exemption of the land” in terms of Section 20 of the said Act. The application under Section 20 of the said Act praying for exemption was dismissed by the appropriate authority. It is submitted that the petitioner is engaged in the business of sale and purchase of the lands, hence, ceiling limit as prescribed under the said act to retain quantum of vacant land ceiling limit of the said is not applicable. It is the further case that the petitioner has sold out different lands different to persons in terms of the contract. Therefore, such lands could not be included in the ceiling limit of the petitioner and as such is entitled to get exemption under the Act. It is further argued that the petitioner is the owner of the two premises one 39 Prince Golam Md. Shah Road and other 129, Prince Anwar Shah Road, which are already covered under the proceeding of the Land Acquisition Act and as such these lands cannot be considered as ‘land’ in terms of the said Act for declaring the same as 'vacant land' of the petitioner. This writ petition has been contested by the State Government contending that the petitioner did not take any point before the competent authority, so far as pendency of acquisition proceeding of the premises in respect of the said premises and as such aforesaid point as is raised for the first time herein cannot be considered. It is further contended that the prayer for exemption under Section 20 of the said act was rejected long back in the year of 1980 against which no step was taken by the petitioner. It is further contended that the prayer for exemption under Section 20 of the said act was rejected long back in the year of 1980 against which no step was taken by the petitioner. So, after a long lapse of so many years, it cannot be challenged in the writ proceeding. It is further stated that the order of rejection was not illegal. Having regard to the contentions as raised on the petitioner's right of getting some relief under Section 20 of the said act, the order of vesting of land by the State Government and exemption rule to retain such vacant land in excess to the ceiling limit as well as the relevant provisions of the said act is required to be discussed. Section 20 of the said Act reads thus:– “Section 20: Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provision of this chapter. (a) Where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may required, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter. (b) Where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, satisfied that the application of the provision of this chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may by order, exempt subject to such condition, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter. Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reason for doing so are recorded in writing. Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reason for doing so are recorded in writing. (2) It an any time the State Government is satisfied that any of the condition subject to which any exemption under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-section (1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for State Government to withdraw new order such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of the chapter shall apply accordingly.” 3. On bare reading of Section 20 of the said act, it appears that for consideration of the prayer for exemption in terms of the said Act, the person concerned holding lands in excess of the ceiling limit is to satisfy his right to have such exemption on “public interest”. From the records, it appears that the petitioner filed an application under Section 20 of the said Act to retain excess vacant land of 35 Bighas 9 Cattahs 14 Chittacks and 17 Sq. ft. as it appears from the statement submitted together with the application under Section 20(1)(a) of the said act appearing at page 36 of writ petition. In that application the petitioner had shown area of excess land held by him under column 'A' of such statement appearing at page 37 of the writ petition. The petitioner included aforesaid two premises Nos. 39, Prince Golam Md. Shah and 129, Prince Anwar Shah Road in such list. It appears that the petitioner accepted holding over of the lands in excess of the ceiling limit. The petition was rejected by the State Government by its communication dated 28.5.1980. The petitioner preferred a review application in terms of the statutory provision of the said act which also was rejected by the decision on 8.9.1980 as annexed ‘A’ to the writ petition. The petitioner did not prefer any appeal challenging the said decision dated 8.9.1980. Petitioner filed return under Section 6 of the said act and a draft statement was prepared under Section 8 of the said Act. As regards the vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit, under Section 8(3) of the said act, the petitioner filed an objection against such draft statement. Petitioner filed return under Section 6 of the said act and a draft statement was prepared under Section 8 of the said Act. As regards the vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit, under Section 8(3) of the said act, the petitioner filed an objection against such draft statement. In the said proceeding, the petitioner had taken the points as follows:– “That your petitioner has got objection to the publication of the said statement and prefers objection on the following amongst other grounds: (a) For that the draft statement as published under form III of Rule 5 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is wrong and illegal. (b) For that the draft statement is vague and does not state the particulars of all vacant lands as required under Section 8(2) of the Act. (c) For that having regard to Annexure ‘H’ to the statement under Section 8(1) in which the particulars of lend which have been disposed on or after 17.2.1975, have been shown and having regard to the fact that all these transfers were bona fide sale under registered deeds for valuable consideration as contemplated under Section 4(4)(a) of the Act the competent authority has got no jurisdiction to deal with such land taking into account as your petitioners land in the aforesaid alleged draft statement. (d) For that the competent authority ought to have considered that the petitioner is a ‘Coloniser’ to develop the land for construction and then selling it to the individuals and as such he should have held in dealing with return under Section 6(1) that the petitioner is entitled to retain the said land in view of the Government Circular No. 1/32/76 U.L.E. (XII) dated 18.11.1976 issued by the Ministry of Works and Housing of the Government of India. (e) For that in connection with disposal of return under Section 6(1) the Competent Authority should have held that the petitioner is a limited company and the properties and assets of the said company actually belongs to the shareholders of the company and the vacant land held by the company is owned by the shareholders as per their respective shares.” 4. Such objection in terms of Section 8(3) of the said act was decided on 8.9.1982 by the competent authority. In the objection under Section 8(3) of the said act, the petitioner did not take any ground that the premises Nos. Such objection in terms of Section 8(3) of the said act was decided on 8.9.1982 by the competent authority. In the objection under Section 8(3) of the said act, the petitioner did not take any ground that the premises Nos. 39, Prince Golam Md. Shah Road and 142, Prince Anwar Shah Road since were notified for acquisition those could not be considered as the vacant lands of the petitioner. Under Section 8 of the said act, the competent authority got the jurisdiction to decide the objection. Since the petitioner being a company engaged in the business of the sale and purchase of the lands the contention that ceiling limit had no application, was rejected. Petitioner preferred appeal under Section 33 of the said act challenging the decision passed by the competent authority and for the first time before the said authority took a ground that the aforesaid two premises were subject matter of the acquisition proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act. It is the case of the petitioner that after considering that point his appeal was required to be decided. Since the petitioner did not urge said point before the original authority, the competent authority under said Act, said officer had no opportunity to decide the question. In that view of the matter, non-consideration of question raised by the appellate authority cannot be said to be an illegal and arbitrary decision. It appears that under Section 33 of the said act there is no provision for setting up a new ground before the Appellate Authority for the first time. Even if it is assumed that the appropriate authority had power to consider additional ground, it appears that no steps were taken by the petitioner by filing such statement before the appellate authority praying leave to take a new ground. In that view of the matter the decision of the appellate authority is not attracted wrath of judicial review by this Court. Though some portions of the petitioners vacant lands namely those two premises have already been acquired, still then no relief can be granted to the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner filed application praying exemption under Section 20 of the said act in respect of total land 36 Bigghas 4 Cattahs 13 sq. ft. as it appears at page 35 of the writ petition. It appears that the petitioner filed application praying exemption under Section 20 of the said act in respect of total land 36 Bigghas 4 Cattahs 13 sq. ft. as it appears at page 35 of the writ petition. Hence from his own statement, it is proved that the petitioner wanted to retain excess vacant !ands as were in excess of ceiling limit permissible and in the retained lands, petitioner did not show premises No. 29, Prince Golam Md. Shah Road and 142, Prince Anwar Shah Road. Since the petitioner's statement of the vacant lands as were in excess was shown including the said two premises, no relief is permissible in writ proceeding. The petitioner has not made any objection for the premises already acquired. As such the petitioner cannot be entitled to get the possession of the said lands and cannot claim any relief in. the present case. Having regard to that question of material fact, I am of the view that it is not a fit case to interfere with the decision under challenge. The petitioners wanted to retain the lands in excess of the ceiling limit for business of sale and purchase of the lands and there is no logic that for the aforesaid two premises, the provision of the present act does not apply. Even at the time of argument, the petitioner failed to satisfy the Court that the acquisition proceeding reached its finality in respect of the said premises by taking possession. It is a settled law that so long the acquisition proceeding is not completed by taking possession of the land mere pendency of acquisition proceeding is not the ground to oust the jurisdiction of competent authority under the present Act to decide the matter. Section 42 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has covered the legal position, which reads thus :– “42. Act to override other laws.– The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a Court, tribunal or other authority.” In that view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner is not legally sustainable and there is no material to interfere with the impugned decision. Furthermore, from the records, it appears that the rule against the respondent No.1, the State of West Bengal, respondent No.3, Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Land Utilization and Reforms and Land and Land Review Department who is the appellate authority under Section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the respondent No.4, Competent Authority, Calcutta, under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, were discharged in terms of the order dated 4th March, 1987 passed by the Court. Since the appellate authority whose order is under challenge as well as the competent authority whose order, was the subject matter for decision by the appellate authority are no more parties in the writ proceeding in view of the rule as was discharged by the aforesaid order, this writ application is also not maintainable for deciding the question with reference to the impugned decision as passed by those authorities. The petitioner did not take any steps to restore the order dated 4th March, 1987 whereby rule was discharged. Having regard to such position, the writ application is not maintainable and no relief can be granted in absence of those respondent Nos.1, 3, and 4. Having regard to such, the writ application is dismissed, rule against the respondent Nos. 2 and 5 thus discharged. No order as to costs.