JUDGMENT Chandresh Bhushan, J.—This Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent has been preferred by the Appellant against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in First Appeal No. 17/90, on 23-1-1991 reversing the judgment and decree passed in her favour by-Third Additional Sessions Judge to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Morena in Civil Suit No. 203-A/85, on 30-3-1990. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in brief are that the Appellant was employed as a teacher in a school run by the society of which Respondent No. 1 was the Secretary. The Respondent No. 2 was the Head Master and Respondent No. 3 was the Principal of the said school. Appellant's services as such a teacher were terminated w.e.f. 22-3-1979 vide resolution dated 12-3-1979 of the said Managing Committee. This order of termination was passed without any prior approval from any authority. The District Education Officer on that basis on 29-8-1979 issued communication (Ex.P/12) to the Secretary of the Society that the Appellant may be reinstated with immediate effect. The Appellant thereafter went to the school on 31-8-1979, but was not permitted to join. She approached the President of the Managing Committee, who directed the Principal to peruse the order of District Education Officer and to comply. Still the Appellant was not allowed to join-on her job as a teacher. No salary was paid to her. She also went on hunger strike and during her hunger strike, the Respondent No. 3, Principal gave a letter in writing (Ex.P/13) on 30-4-1982 to the Collector, Morena that the Appellant will be allowed to join in the school and the Collector, Morena also on the same day communicated this consent to the Union leaders. Still she was not permitted to join. Thereafter, the District Education Officer also wrote to the Secretary of the Society on 7-4-1983 (Ex. P/14) that the Appellant should be taken back within seven days otherwise his office shall be constrained to terminate the recognition of the said institute. Still the Appellant was not permitted to join back. Thus, she filed a Civil Suit claiming the arrears of her salary amounting to Rs. 34211.60 p. together with future wages and for declaration of the order of her removal dated 22-3-1979 as illegal and for injunction prohibiting the Respondents from interfering with her services in the said school. Still the Appellant was not permitted to join back. Thus, she filed a Civil Suit claiming the arrears of her salary amounting to Rs. 34211.60 p. together with future wages and for declaration of the order of her removal dated 22-3-1979 as illegal and for injunction prohibiting the Respondents from interfering with her services in the said school. This suit registered as Civil Suit 203-A/85 was decided by Third Additional Sessions Judge to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Morena on 30-3-1990 in her favour. On an appeal by the Respondents No. 1 to 3, impugned judgment and decree dated 23-1-1991 was delivered by the learned Single Judge holding that the suit of the Appellant was non-maintainable and was hopelessly barred by limitation. 3. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed against her by the learned Single Judge, this L.P.A. has been preferred by the Appellant on the ground that the decision by the learned Single Judge was wrong. She has contended that the said order of her dismissal was passed without any prior approval of the Competent Authority and was therefore non-est being in violation of the provisions contained in Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Section 6 of M.P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karmchariyon Ke Vetano Ka Sanday) Adhiniyam, 1978. It has been further contended that therefore no appeal under such Adhiniyam could have been filed by her and therefore this suit was maintainable and that it was also within limitation because the cause of action accrued to her on 1-2-1984, only, i.e. after refusal by the Respondents to permit her to work on the post of teacher in spite of written acknowledgment dated 30-4-1983 by the Respondent No. 3 and the directions of the District Education Officer, dated 7-4-1983. 4. As far as the question of maintainability of the suit itself was concerned, it cannot be disputed that the claim of the Appellant that her removal was void ab-initio was based on the protection given to such teachers under Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Section 6 of M.P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karmchariyon Ke Vetano Ka Sanday), Adhiniyam, 1978, as it stood at that time. This provision as it stood at that time, i.e. before amendment in 1981 was as follows: Section 6(a): (i)... (ii)... This provision as it stood at that time, i.e. before amendment in 1981 was as follows: Section 6(a): (i)... (ii)... (iii) no teacher or other employee shall be dismissed or removed from service or his services terminated without prior approval of the Competent Authority; 5. Thus, this case was not of a dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law but was a dispute arising out of a right created under a special statute. It is true that this special Statute nowhere expressly excludes the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in respect of any dispute arising out of a right created under the Act. But relying on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Others, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others, wherein the question involved was regarding jurisdiction of a Civil Court in cases involving recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment Act and Industrial Disputes Act and it was held that the only remedy available to the aggrieved party was to approach the forums created by Industrial Disputes Act provided the dispute was industrial dispute, it was submitted by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents that a suit for enforcement of any such right by the Appellant was not maintainable in any Civil Court because there was a specific appellate forum provided under the proviso to the said Sub-clause (iii) of Section 6 of the said Act. 6. The underlying basic principle in the above referred cases, that where any right or obligation under Special Statute is sought to be enforced or recognized and where the said Act provides a forum in that respect then the only remedy that is available to the person claiming it was by approaching the forum so provided, has not been disputed by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant during the course of his arguments. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant however submitted in this respect that the remedy of appeal was not available to her under the said proviso because the remedy in appellate forum was available only to those whose orders of termination were passed after prior approval of the Competent Authority had been obtained by the Managing Committee. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant however submitted in this respect that the remedy of appeal was not available to her under the said proviso because the remedy in appellate forum was available only to those whose orders of termination were passed after prior approval of the Competent Authority had been obtained by the Managing Committee. In the present case, no such prior approval was obtained by the society and therefore, according to him, the appellate forum or the remedy by way of appeal was not available to her. For this, he places reliance on the following observations made by this High Court in Sidhi Bala Bose Library Association and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors. reported in 7979 MPLJ 379 : 7979 JU 485, in para 26 of its' judgment: ...Even where the Competent Authority approves the management's action, the aggrieved employee can appeal against the same and the appellate authority may set it aside. 7. It was argued by him that no appeal would lie where the management's action has not been approved by the Competent Authority as was in the present case. But after hearing the Learned Counsel of Appellant at length we are unable to agree to this submission of his. The said observations of the Court only implied that even where there was approval by the Competent Authority to aggrieved employee had the opportunity to prefer appeal against it as provided under the said Act. It has nowhere been observed in that case that the appeal would not lie if there was no approval by the Competent Authority of management's action. On the other hand, a perusal of Rule 10, Clause (a) of M.P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karamchari) Appeal Rules, 1978, clearly suggests that the appeal would lie even if there was no such prior approval of the Competent Authority. This Rule provided that the appellate Authority while passing the order shall keep in view whether prior approval of the competent Authority was obtained before the order appealed against was passed. In case appeal could be preferred only where prior approval of competent Authority was obtained, this question whether the approval was obtained or not could not be required to be kept in view while passing the order because in that case if there was no such prior approval no appeal would have been there. 8. In case appeal could be preferred only where prior approval of competent Authority was obtained, this question whether the approval was obtained or not could not be required to be kept in view while passing the order because in that case if there was no such prior approval no appeal would have been there. 8. It is also not disputed that no such appeal was filed by the Appellant. Thus, considering all this, that finding of the learned Single Judge of this Bench in First Appeal that the suit by Appellant itself was not maintainable was correct and lawful. 9. Similarly in spite of our sympathy with the Appellant-teacher, the contentions regarding bar of limitation put forward on her behalf, cannot be accepted. 10. A Division Bench of this Court had in the case of Tilakram v. State of M.P., reported in 7965 MPLJ 982 , held that such a suit for declaration was governed by Article 120 (new 113) of the Limitation Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, , State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2219 and Union of India and others Vs. Nandlal Raigar, , repeatedly held that such suits against orders of removal from service were governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act (36 of 1963). The period of limitation provided under this Article 113 was of three years from the date when the right to sue accrued. 11. In the case of State of Punjab (supra), a Full Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court has also laid down that it cannot be said that there was no limitation for instituting the suit for declaration by a dismissed or discharged employee on the ground that the dismissal or discharge was void or inoperative. Again in the case of Union of India (supra), it was specifically held that a plea that the order of dismissal was wrong being in violation of rules and therefore it could be ignored and that the suit therefore, could be filed at any time cannot be allowed. Therefore, the contentions that the order being without prior approval of the Competent Authority and thus being in violation of legal provision was void ab-initio or non est, even if accepted, would not make any difference as far as the limitation is concerned. 12. Therefore, the contentions that the order being without prior approval of the Competent Authority and thus being in violation of legal provision was void ab-initio or non est, even if accepted, would not make any difference as far as the limitation is concerned. 12. The starting point of limitation under Article 113 as per the principle laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mst. Rukhmabai Vs. Lala Laxminarayan and Others, would be from the date the right asserted in the suit was clearly and unequivocally infringed by the Defendant. In the present case, the communication dated 22-3-1979, received by the Appellant on 31-3-1979 that as per resolution dated 12-3-1979 of the Committee she was dismissed from service with effect from the date of her suspension was very clear and unequivocal and therefore the limitation clearly ran from 31-3-1979. The learned Single Judge has been generous enough to even extended to 4-9-1979, i.e. the date when the then President of the Society communicated in unequivocal terms to the District Education Officer that his directions dated 29-8-1979 for reinstatement of Appellant are not acceptable to the Society. 13. The contentions advanced for the Appellant by her Learned Counsel in this respect that the written assurance dated 30-4-1983 (Ex. P/13) by Respondent No. 3, who was the Principal of the said school amounted to acknowledgment and therefore gave a fresh cause of action from that date also cannot be accepted because, there was nothing to show that the Respondent No. 3 was in any way authorized by the Society to acknowledge any such liability on it's behalf. Similarly, the communication of the District Education Officer dated 7-4-1983 to the Secretary of the Society or reiterated refusal by the Society also do not give any fresh cause of action. In the case of S.S. Rathore (supra) it was also observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that repeated unsuccessful representations would not amount to fresh first date for the fresh cause of action. In the case of S.S. Rathore (supra) it was also observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that repeated unsuccessful representations would not amount to fresh first date for the fresh cause of action. In that case it was held that where an appeal was provided and was made, the cause of action shall first arise when the authority made it's order on appeal or where such order was not made till the expiry of six months, then on the expiry of six months from the date the appeal was filed and submission of any subsequent representation to the head of establishment cannot be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation. 14. The said enactment of the State, i.e. the Adhiniyam of 1978 in proviso 2 of Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Section 6 provides for an appeal against the orders of dismissal. No other remedy or recourse has been provided in the said Act. The appeal so provided under the Act was not preferred by the Appellant. In view of this position and the law as discussed before, the only conclusion was that the suit having been filed on 20-4-1984, i.e. beyond a period of three years after the accrual of the right to sue, was clearly barred by the law of limitation and therefore the finding to this effect by the learned Single Judge could not be called as incorrect or against the law. 15. No other ground against the impugned order was argued before this Bench. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Bench was in effect as discussed earlier, in accordance with law and thus, valid and called for no interference. This L.P.A. thus fails and it is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the circumstances of the parties, it is ordered that each of the party shall bear it's own costs. Final Result : Dismissed