T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) CRIMINAL Revisional Case no. 1221 of 1999 is directed against the order dated 4-8-1999 passed by the learned judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sathupalli, in Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999 in MC No. 14 of 1993. ( 2 ) TRANSFER Criminal Revision Case No. 1093 of 2001 has been transferred from the Court of the Sessions Judge, Khammam, whereat it has been numbered as Criminal revision Petition No. 7 of 1998. ( 3 ) BOTH these revision cases can be disposed of together since the parties are the same and the same and both the cases emanate from the main M. C. No. 14 of 1993. ( 4 ) THE first respondent in both these cases is wife of the petitioner and the second respondent is their daughter. The second respondent has since become major and is also married, she has decided not to pursue her claim against the revision petitioner. Therefore, in both these cases the claim of the first respondent-wife alone shall be considered. ( 5 ) THE marriage between the petitioner and the first respondent was dissolved by mutual consent with effect from 23-4-1990 in OP No. 15 of 1989 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Asifabad. She filed MC no. 14 of 1993 claiming maintenance for herself and also on behalf of the second respondent. The maintenance case was allowed after enquiry by an order dated 6-11-1996 awarding maintenance at Rs. 450/- per month for the wife and Rs. 400/- per month for the daughter with effect from 16-6-1993 i. e. , the date of filing of the petitioner. The revision petitioner sought to file a revision petition against the order passed in MC No. 14 of 1993 along with an application to condone the delay of 440 days. That application for condonation of delay having been dismissed, the revision could not be entertained. Therefore, the respondents 1 and 2 filed Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 on 6-3-1997 claiming recovery of maintenance for the period in between 16-6-1993 to 5-3-1997 for a total amount of rs. 20,250/- for the first respondent and rs. 18,000/- for the second respondent. That Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 was allowed on 9-2-1998 and the petitioner was ordered to be detained in prison till the payment of the maintenance amount. Assailing that order in Crl. 20,250/- for the first respondent and rs. 18,000/- for the second respondent. That Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 was allowed on 9-2-1998 and the petitioner was ordered to be detained in prison till the payment of the maintenance amount. Assailing that order in Crl. MP No. 293 of 1997, the petitioner filed Criminal Revision Petition no. 7 of 1998 on the file of the Sessions judge, Khammam. The said Criminal revision Petition No. 7 of 1998 has been subsequently transferred to this Court and numbered as Transfer Criminal Revision case No. 1093 of 2001. The first respondent filed another Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999 for realisation of the arrears of maintenance from 16-6-1993 to 16-7-1999 for a total amount of Rs. 32,850/- for herself and for an amount of Rs. 29,200/- for the second respondent. By an order dated 4-8-1999, the learned Magistrate directed realisation of the said amount by means of an attachment of the salary of the petitioner. Criminal Revision Case No. 1221 of 1999 is directed against the said order. As aforesaid, the second respondent appeared through her Counsel and filed an affidavit stating inter alia that the she was not interested in claiming maintenance from her father. The whole claim, therefore, is confined to the first respondent only. ( 6 ) SRI J. Prabhakar. learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, contends that during the pendency of the Crl. R. C. No. 1221 of 1999, the petitioner paid rs. 35,000/- on several occasions and the petitioner has, therefore, no objection in adjusting the amount of Rs. 20,250/- claimed in Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 out of the said amount of Rs. 35,000/ -. The learned Counsel further contends that the claim of the first respondent in Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999 filed on 16-7-1999 having been filed for a period of more than 12 months is clearly time barred. Therefore, the first respondent is entitled to only an amount of Rs. 5,400/- from August, 1998 to July, 1999. ( 7 ) SRI M. Rajamalla Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, on the other hand contends that the second application can be treated as continuation of the earlier application. The learned Counsel further contends that even in the first application maintenance can be claimed in respect of the future period also. ( 7 ) SRI M. Rajamalla Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, on the other hand contends that the second application can be treated as continuation of the earlier application. The learned Counsel further contends that even in the first application maintenance can be claimed in respect of the future period also. ( 8 ) IN view of the said contentions, the following points arise for my determination: (1) Whether the second application can be treated as continuation of the earlier application? (2) Even in the first application maintenance can be levied for future period also. (3) Whether the claim of the first respondent in Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999 is barred by limitation? ( 9 ) THE first application in Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 was filed for recovery of the maintenance for the period in between 16-6-1993 to 5-3-1997. The maintenance was ordered in MC No. 14 of 1993 on 6-11-1996 with effect from 16-6-1993 i. e, the date of filing of the said MC. Therefore, admittedly Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 having been filed on 16-3-1997 was well within the time. ( 10 ) THE second application in Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999 was filed on 22-7-1999 claiming the arrears of the maintenance from the beginning till 16-7-1999. That means the second application also covers the whole of maintenance claimed in the first application. But the fact remains that the second application was filed 2 years, 4 months and 16 days after the filing of the first application. By 22-7-1999 on which date the second application came to be filed, the claim beyond the period of one year immediately preceding the date of that application is clearly time barred. ( 11 ) UNDER the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal procedure ( the Code for brevity) a warrant can be issued for recovery of the maintenance amount due within the period of one year from the date on which it became due. The amount of maintenance becomes due obviously so soon after the order awarding maintenance is passed. When under the first application maintenance was claimed upto 5-3-1997, the maintenance from 6-3-1997 onwards automatically becomes due from the date succeeding that date. The amount of maintenance becomes due obviously so soon after the order awarding maintenance is passed. When under the first application maintenance was claimed upto 5-3-1997, the maintenance from 6-3-1997 onwards automatically becomes due from the date succeeding that date. On a plain reading of the above provision, it is obvious in the first instance that the maintenance amount from 6-3-1997 till 5-3-1998 can be claimed within that date or at any rate on or before 6-3-1998. However, in this case the second application was filed on 22-7-1999 for a period of 2 years, 4 months and 16 days. Obviously, this period is beyond the period of one year when the amount became due. Nonetheless, maintenance for a period of one year preceding the date of filing of the second application i. e. , 22-7-1999 can be recovered under that application notwithstanding the fact that the period covered by that application is beyond the period of limitation and for a period of 2 years, 4 months and 16 days. ( 12 ) THE contention now set forth before this Court is that the second application can be treated as continuation of the earlier application. The Orissa High Court in Jagat bandhu Sahu v. Lakshmi Devi, AIR 1958 orissa 257, held thus:"the application made by Lakshmi Dei in mcno. 20 of 1956 on 20th July, 1956, should therefore for all practical purposes be taken as continuation of the previous MC No. 4 of 1956 which was admittedly filed within time. There is a decision of Rangoon High Court reported in U. Hpay Latt v. Ma Fo Byu. 37 lj 91 (2) = (AIR 1935 Rang 407) (A), in support of this view. I am therefore satisfied that the claim was not barred by limitation and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was justified in issuing a warrant for realization of the arrear maintenance due to the opposite party. "it is obvious that the first application was filed within the time. Even the second application was also filed within the time, but it includes the earlier claim also. ( 13 ) IN Nagjibhai v. Bal Zaber, 1974 Crl. LJ 551, the Gujarat High Court however had taken a different view. In that case, the order for maintenance was passed on 31-7-1953. The husband committed default after having paid maintenance for some months. ( 13 ) IN Nagjibhai v. Bal Zaber, 1974 Crl. LJ 551, the Gujarat High Court however had taken a different view. In that case, the order for maintenance was passed on 31-7-1953. The husband committed default after having paid maintenance for some months. Enforcement petition was filed on 26-7-1956 claiming arrears for a period of 7 months. That application was allowed on 25-2-1959. Fresh application was moved on 11-6-1959 but that was dismissed for default on 21-7-1959. The wife, however, made a further application on 22-8-1959 for recovery of the arrears of maintenance. It was held thus:"on 25-2-1959 the Court finally decided that she was entitled to recover rejecting all the pleas raised by the husband. When the husband raises a plea to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, the previous order passed under Section 448 is substituted by the subsequent order. The period of one year is therefore to be calculated from the date when the subsequent order is passed under the proviso. In the instant case, no such application was made for enforcement of the order within the period of one year. The application made within the period of one year is only for claiming maintenance from december, 1970 to December, 1971, as said earlier. Warrant for recovery of the amount due for those months can only, therefore, be issued. Issue of warrant for the amount which had become due prior to that period is, therefore, n6t warranted by the provisions of the aforesaid second provision to sub-section (3) of Section, 488 of the code. "thus, the Gujarat High Court had taken a different view. ( 14 ) IN Maniben v. Manibhai, 1983 Crl. LJ 1935, a learned single Judge of the gujarat High Court held thus: "if an earlier application for recovery of amount of maintenance filed by the wife under Section 125 (3) is dismissed for default, it would not debar the wife from claiming that amount in another application as well as the amount which would remain in arrears if the second application is also within one year of the dismissal of the earlier application or there is no negligence on the part of the wife. " apparently, the said judgment is in conflict with the earlier judgment of the same High court. " apparently, the said judgment is in conflict with the earlier judgment of the same High court. However, it is obvious from the said judgment that the second application could also be made within the period of limitation so that it can be treated as continuation of the first application. ( 15 ) IN Bimala Dei v. Karan Mulia, 1986 Crl. LJ 521, a learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court held thus:"the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Code in clear and categorical terms puts an embargo on the power of the magistrate to issue any warrant for recovery of the amount due unless the application is made to the Court within a period of one year from the date on which it become due. Therefore, the Magistrate has a duty to find out the date on which the amount became due. "the Orissa High Court dissented the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in maniben s case referred to hereinabove. However, the question as to whether the second application is the continuation of the first application or not has not arisen in the said case. ( 16 ) IN Sardar Beg Sahib v. Sidhani Bi, 1987 Crl. LJ 1779, the Madras High Court held that whatever amount that had become due before one year prior to the date of the application could not be recovered by way of a warrant. According to the facts in that case, the maintenance became due on 19-10-1978. The first application was filed on 24-2-1981. That was managed to be dragged on by the husband for some time. She filed second application in the year 1982. It was held under those circumstances thus:"therefore, in the second application also, it was open to the wife to seek for the issuance of a warrant to recover the amount of maintenance due only from 24-2-1980. But for the reason that the warrant states that the amount of arrears of maintenance is from 19-10-1978 the warrant is not void, but the warrant has to be restricted to the recovery of maintenance from 24-2-1980. "it is obvious thus that in the first application although she claimed arrears that was restricted to the period of one year preceding the date of filing of that application. In the second application from that date i. e. , 24-2-1980 it was considered. "it is obvious thus that in the first application although she claimed arrears that was restricted to the period of one year preceding the date of filing of that application. In the second application from that date i. e. , 24-2-1980 it was considered. Therefore, the second application was treated as continuation of the first application although it has not been specifically held so. ( 17 ) IN P. Ataullah v. Maimunnisa Begum, 1984 (1) ALT 324 , a learned single judge of this Court has taken a different view. In that case the husband against whom an order was passed in the year 1979 preferred a revision to the Sessions court and the learned Additional Sessions judge, Kurnool, dismissed the revision only on 12-11-1982. The application filed under section 125 (3) of the Code on 6-1-1983 is within one year i. e. , from the date of dismissal of the revision petition. Under those circumstances, it was held thus:"the matter became final only by virtue of the order passed by the learned II Additional sessions Judge on 12-11-1982. In this view of the matter, the application viz. , Cr. MP no. 91/83 in MC No. 95/79 on the file of the additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, adoni, is within the time. The learned counsel, however, submits that in the absence of any stay nothing prevented the respondents from filing an application earlier. But for the purpose of limitation of one year, the court can ignore the fact that the matter was pending by way of a revision and the order of maintenance became final only on the dismissal of the revision on 12-11-1982 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. "when the arrears of maintenance was claimed for the period of 37 months it was held thus:"however, the proviso lays down that an application has to be made within one year. That means at least there can be imprisonment in respect of the 12 months. Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment awarded by the lower Court is reduced to 12 months. " ( 18 ) IN S. Thippawami v. S. Vanjamma, 1990 (1) ALT 290 , a learned single Judge of this Court has considered the law on the point and was of the view that the first application for recovery of maintenance due shall be filed within one year from the date on which it became due. " ( 18 ) IN S. Thippawami v. S. Vanjamma, 1990 (1) ALT 290 , a learned single Judge of this Court has considered the law on the point and was of the view that the first application for recovery of maintenance due shall be filed within one year from the date on which it became due. Even if the said application is dismissed for default or for non-prosecution or for some other reason, the claim would be within the time if successive applications are made within one year of each other. What all that has to be done is that the application has to be made within one year. In such a case, the husband is debarred from pleading that the claim made is for more than 12 months and that he need not pay the amount due for more than 12 months. It is obvious, therefore, that in the successive applications should also be filed within one year from the other application. Although in the second application the amount covered by the first application is claimed, it cannot be treated as barred by limitation since it is continuation of the earlier application. ( 19 ) THUS, it is obvious from the concatenation of the above judgements that the second application can be treated as continuation of the first application but the same shall be filed within one year from the date of dismissal of the first application. What is sine qua non is that the application shall be filed within the period of limitation. In such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the second application includes the claim for more than 12 months, still it being the continuation of the first application, the arrears can be claimed. When that be the clear position of law, in this case, the second application was filed beyond the period of one year obviously and, therefore, the wife cannot plead that the same being the continuation of the first application she can claim all the amount from the beginning. Of course, in this case, the maintenance from 16-6-1993 to 5-3-1997 having been claimed within the period of limitation, there is no difficulty for recovery of the same. Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-husband, squarely concedes that the amount of Rs. Of course, in this case, the maintenance from 16-6-1993 to 5-3-1997 having been claimed within the period of limitation, there is no difficulty for recovery of the same. Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-husband, squarely concedes that the amount of Rs. 20,250/- covered by the first application would be given set-off from the amounts already paid to a tune of Rs. 35,000/ -. In the second application, an amount of rs. 32,850/- was claimed again from the beginning i. e. , 16-6-1993 onwards. Since the second application has been filed beyond the period of 2 years, 4 months and 16 days which includes the period covered by the first application, the claim in the second application shall have to be restricted, under the above circumstances, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of filing of that application. In other words, that application having been filed on 22-7-1999 the maintenance can be recovered from 22-7-1998 onwards till 22-7-1999 i. e. , for a period of one year and certainly she is not entitled to recover the same from 6-3-1997 till 21-7-1998. ( 20 ) ADMITTEDLY, an amount of Rs. 35,000/- was deposited from time to time into the Court. After giving credit to an amount of Rs. 20,250/- covered by the first application, there remains a balance amount of Rs. 14,750/ -. Out of this amount, the eligible amount covered by the second application to the tune of Rs. 5,400/- alone shall be given credit from this amount. Therefore, there is an excess amount to the extent of Rs. 9,350/ -. Sri J. Prabhakar. learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-husband, represents that the revision petitioner has no objection in adjusting the said excess amount towards the monthly maintenance from the date of passing orders in Criminal Revision Case no. 1221 of 1999. Deposits have been made from 10-8-2000 to 5-9-2001 continuously every month but not in equal amounts. To the best of his ability the petitioner has been depositing the amounts in liquidation of the arrears. When that be the fact, I see no reason as to why the excess amount shall not be given credit to the arrears from august, 1999 onwards although there has been no successive applications filed by the respondent-wife after Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999. When that be the fact, I see no reason as to why the excess amount shall not be given credit to the arrears from august, 1999 onwards although there has been no successive applications filed by the respondent-wife after Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999. In this connection, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent- wife in this case seeks to place reliance upon a judgment of the Bombay High court in Swati v. Suresh, 1996 0 AIHC 534. The Bombay High Court was of the view thus:"the first proviso to Section 125 (3) of the code of Criminal Procedure cannot be construed too technically and narrowly which would frustrate and defeat the very objective for which the said provision has been enacted. It is the fundamental principle of law that multiplicity of proceed ings should be avoided as far as possible and practicable, and if the aggrieved wife, children or parents, as the case may be, has made an application for recovery of arrears of maintenance and during the pendency of such application, the maintenance has fallen due for the period post application, pending adjudication before the Court, there cannot be and should not be any need for filing fresh application for recovery of maintenance which had become due during the pendency of the application. Multiplicity of applications for recovery of maintenance which had become due during the pendency of the application under section 125 (3) Cr. PC already filed is neither in the interest of justice nor the requirement of law and, therefore, insistence for making fresh application for recovery of arrears of maintenance during the pendency of the application already filed would be unjustified and would rather lead to abuse of the process of the Court. It is always open to the Court seized of an application for recovery of arrears of maintenance to pass an order directing the husband to make the payment of arrears of maintenance up to the decision since such power is implicit in exercise of jurisdiction of the Court, while disposing of the application for recovery of arrears of maintenance. The first proviso to section 125 (3) cannot be overstretched that for arrears of maintenance which had fallen due during the pendency of application for recovery of maintenance, the aggrieved person should make an application again within a period of one year from the date on which it became due. The first proviso to section 125 (3) cannot be overstretched that for arrears of maintenance which had fallen due during the pendency of application for recovery of maintenance, the aggrieved person should make an application again within a period of one year from the date on which it became due. "i am afraid, I cannot concur with the said decision of the Bombay High Court in view of the conclusion arrived at by me herein above having regard to the decisions of this Court and another High Court. Judicial discipline requires to follow the precedent of the self-same Court which is binding. Anyway, as I have taken the view that the revision petitioner-husband has been continuously depositing the amount in liquidation of the arrears, he cannot now be permitted to raise the plea of limitation insofar as the post second application period inasmuch it is a volitional payment. ( 21 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, to sum up, the impugned order dated 9-2-1998 passed Crl. MP No. 283 of 1997 directing issuance of the warrant is hereby set aside. Since the claim covered by the said Crl. MP no. 283 of 1997 has been totally liquidated, that application stands disposed of accordingly. Crl. MP No. 690 of 1999 is allowed in part for a period of one year as indicated above in the order supra. Consequently, the excess balance amount of rs. 9,350/- is ordered to go in liquidation from the month of August, 1999 onwards as indicated in the order supra. ( 22 ) IN the result, Crl. R. C No. 1221 of 1999 stands allowed in part and Tr. Crl. R. C. No. 1093 of 2001 stands disposed of accordingly.