A. K. YOG, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri R. N. Bhalla, advocate, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Murlidhar, senior advocate assisted by Sri S. Goswami, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. ( 2 ) SRI S. Goswami, learned counsel for the respondents initially raised a preliminary objection regarding payment of deficient court fee of Rs. 95. However, after perusing the original record of the case, Sri Goswami withdrew the said preliminary objection. Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel for the appellant also made requisite correction in the memorandum of appeal at the relevant place. ( 3 ) SRI R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, an Arbitrator was appointed, who gave an interim award dated 25. 1. 2000 (copy of which is said to have been received by the appellant on February 1, 2000) Final award was given on 14. 2. 2000. There is no dispute that interim award as well as final award (as defined under Section 2 (i) (c) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called the Act), which defines expression : " "arbitral award includes an interim award. " It is also not in dispute that interim award as well as final award could be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. It is also not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties before this Court that both interim award as well as final award can be challenged under Section 34 (3) proviso which reads : " (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral Tribunal : provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days but not thereafter. " ( 4 ) IN view of the above settled position in law, interim award could be challenged within three months, i. e. , 24. 4. 2000 (to be counted from the date of interim award itself) or up to 1. 5. " ( 4 ) IN view of the above settled position in law, interim award could be challenged within three months, i. e. , 24. 4. 2000 (to be counted from the date of interim award itself) or up to 1. 5. 2000 (to be counted from the date of receipt of the said interim award ). Similarly final award could be challenged. ( 5 ) SRI R. N. Bhalla, advocate submitted that the impugned judgment and order dated 24. 1. 2002, passed by District Judge, Mathura in Misc. Case No. 12 of 2000 rejecting objection of the appellant under Section 34 of the Act and refusing to set aside interim award as well as final award, prima facie suffers from illegality to the effect that interim award having merged in final award and objection under Section 34 of the Act having been preferred within a prescribed period of three months. the finding of the court below that interim award cannot be assailed on merit, was wrong. Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel argued that interim award having merged in the final award, contents of interim award can also be assailed and it cannot be said that his objections against interim award are time barred under Section 34 of the Act. ( 6 ) HAVING carefully perused the record of the case, it is abundantly clear that interim order was not of a nature which can be said to be an order of ad interim nature and subject to final award being passed. It is well-settled that some of the interim orders are of temporary nature which merged in the final orders, but there are certain interim orders/judgments which attained finality. ( 7 ) IN this context, a reference be made to Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others, AIR 1964 sc 993 (V 51 C128) Paras 10 and 11 and Ram Lakhan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue Allahabad and others, 1997 (2)AWC 1199 : 1997 ACJ 478. ( 8 ) THE interim award in the facts of the instant case cannot be said to be of temporary nature and subject to final award being passed, inasmuch as the Arbitrator by giving interim award, finally decided the matter between the parties by breaking amendment of the constitution on the basis of which subsequent elections were held. ( 8 ) THE interim award in the facts of the instant case cannot be said to be of temporary nature and subject to final award being passed, inasmuch as the Arbitrator by giving interim award, finally decided the matter between the parties by breaking amendment of the constitution on the basis of which subsequent elections were held. The appellant having preferred not to challenge the interim award within a period of limitation as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act and elections having been permitted to be conducted on the basis of amended constitution cannot be allowed to be turned down and challenged. The principle of merger, therefore, is not attracted in the facts of the instant case. I have also carefully gone through the impugned Judgment passed by the court below and find that it had referred to the objection/grounds of challenging the final award and I find no illegality in the same which may warrant an interference by this Court with an order passed by the District Judge under Section 34 of the Act. ( 9 ) NO other point has been pressed. ( 10 ) IN view of the above, the present F. A. F. O. has no merit and is dismissed in limine. ( 11 ) NO order as to costs. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties agree that the aforesaid two F. A. F. O. Nos. 525 of 2002 and 526 of 2002 may be connected with each other, as the two first appeal from orders are based on same facts and raise an identical question of law to be adjudicated by this Court. ( 13 ) THE F. A. F. O. No. 525 of 2002 is being taken as leading case. ( 14 ) IN view of the above judgment, F. A. F. O. No. 526 of 2002 also deserves to be dismissed. .