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2002 DIGILAW 625 (CAL)

State of West Bengal v. Sushanta Kumar Saha

2002-09-19

Ashok Kumar Mathur, Jayanta Kumar Biswas

body2002
JUDGMENT Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J. Writ Petition No.9111(W) of 1999 was filed in this Court by the respondent in this appeal. By the impugned judgment and order dated 14th July, 2000 a learned single Judge allowed the said writ petition; the First Information Report (in short F.I.R.) dated 22nd April, 1999 leading to initiation of Nabadwip P.S. Case No.63 of 1999 .dated 22nd April, 1999 under sections 403/406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(in short I.P.C.) and section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955-was quashed. 2. The case made out in the said writ petition was as follows :- One Shri Lakshmindar Das Gupta, a Chief Inspector (F & S), was a very influential officer of the Food & Supplies Department of the Government of West Bengal. Since the respondent could not fulfill said Chief Inspector's demands, a false case had been foisted on him on the basis of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the said Chief Inspector along with others on 22nd April, 1999. The search and seizure was not conducted following the procedure. The illegal raid resulting in institution of the false case infringed the respondent's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The F.I.R. was not maintainable, as no specific allegation was made therein about violation of any Control Order. 3. Because of the nature of the allegations made in the writ petition that the prosecution had been launched mala fide with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, it is necessary to narrate, briefly, the factual position that was existing as on the said 22nd April, 1999. i.e. the relevant point of time. 4. The main function of the Department of Food & Supplies of the Government of West Bengal is: running the Public Distribution System in both statutory and modified rationiag areas. The Directorate of District Distribution, Procurement and Supply is the main executive wing of this Department. This Directorate functions through the District Controllers (F&S), the Sub-Divisional Controllers(F & S), and the Inspectors(F & S) at the district, the sub-division, and the block levels respectively. The Public Distribution System in the statutory rationing areas is regulated by the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964; in, the modified rationing areas it is governed by the terms and conditions of agreements executed by the Government with the dealers/distributors/wholesalers, etc.. Distributors appointed in the modified rationing areas are described as 'M.R. distributors'. The Public Distribution System in the statutory rationing areas is regulated by the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964; in, the modified rationing areas it is governed by the terms and conditions of agreements executed by the Government with the dealers/distributors/wholesalers, etc.. Distributors appointed in the modified rationing areas are described as 'M.R. distributors'. They are selected according to procedure laid down by the Directorate by issuing instructions from time to time. 5. The respondent was appointed one such M.R. distributor by an agreement dated 1st September, 1969-executed by and between the Governor of the State of West Bengal and the respondent. The relevant portions of the said agreement are quoted below :- Whereas the Government has agreed to appoint the said Sushanta Kumar Saha and the said Susharita Kumar Saha has agreed to act as a 'Distributor' in food-stuffs under the scheme framed by the Government for distribution of food-stuffs to consumers in the districts of West Bengal. (3) The Distributor shall according to directions to be issued in that behalf purchase from the Government 'or from the specified Rice Mills food-stuffs in quantities allotted by the District Magistrate/Controller and at rates approved by the Government and shall sell the same to appointed Retailers as may be assigned to him for this purpose, according to the directions issued to the Distributor in that behalf by the District Magistrate or the Controller, as the case may be, and at the price fixed by the Government from time to time. (4) The Distributor shall deposit in advance the price of the food-stuffs in the local Treasury by challan in favour of the Controller under the appropriate sub-head under the major head 124 Capital Outlay on schemes of Government Trading' or in cash in case of direct purchase from specified Rice Mills, according to the directions issued by the Controller or District Magistrate in this behalf, and on production of such challan or document showing cash payment, the food-stuffs will be supplied to the Distributor from Government godown or godowns of Storing Agencies set up by the Government or from the specified Rice Mills particularly mentioned in and against Delivery permits issued in that behalf: Provided that the Distributor shall be entitled to re-imbursement of cost of transport including handling at the rate fixed by the Government from time to time for lifting and transporting stock from Government godowns/Storing Agency godowns situated at a distance beyond 5 miles from his godowns or such distance for which re-imbursement may be allowed by Government from time to time. Provided further that the Distributor shall accept the responsibility and be liable for actual shortage if any in transit in respect of such stocks; provided further that the Distributor on allowing a rebate to the retailer at the rate fixed by Government from time to time shall be entitled to re-imbusement from Government by the amount of such rebate. (5) In the event of ex-Government godown rate of any particular stock being increased subsequent to the delivery of the stock to the Distributor and before sale of the same to Retailers the Distributor shall make a further deposit of money in the local Treasury in favour of the Controller immediately on demand in the manner aforesaid in order to cover the amount of such increase in the value in respect of stock remaining with him on the date of such increase. Similarly in the event of a corresponding decrease in the ex-Government godown rate of any particular stock, the Distributor shall be entitled to a refund to the extent of the difference due to such decrease. Similarly in the event of a corresponding decrease in the ex-Government godown rate of any particular stock, the Distributor shall be entitled to a refund to the extent of the difference due to such decrease. (6) The Distributor immediately on receipt of the quantities of food-stuffs so purchased by the Distributor shall enter the same in appropriate stock registers in the form as may from time to time be prescribed to be maintained by him in his behalf and shall not make any unauthorized transfer, despatch or movement of the same or part thereof elsewhere. (7) The Distributor shall also maintain in such form as may from time to time be prescribed a register of daily stock and sales which shall be made up-to-date at the end of each day. The Distributor shall at all reasonable times produce the said register for inspection by any officer of the Government authorized on that behalf. (10) The Distributor shall offer all facilities to the inspecting staff of the Department of Food and Supplies as well as the staff of any other Government Department authorized in this behalf by the Government for having inspection of their stocks and books of accounts. (11) The Distributor shall comply with such other requisitions and directions as may be given or issued to and received by the Distributor from time to time by the District Magistrate or the Controller, as the case may be. (14) Any stock of food-stuffs remaining with the Distributor after cancellation of his appointment and/or termination of this Agreement shall be dealt with or disposed of according to the directions issued in this behalf by the District Magistrate or the Controller, as the case maybe, and not otherwise Save as aforesaid Government shall have no liability in respect of such stock." 6. The respondent was appointed by the said agreement for acting as M.R. Distributor in food-stuffs at village Swarupganj of Krishnanagar sub-division of the district Nadia. His specified godown was located within the jurisdiction of Nabadwip Police Station of the said district Nadia. 7. On 25th September, 1990 a group of Panchayat representatives met the District Controller(F & S), Nadia in a deputation for lodging complaint against the respondent regarding alleged illegalities in the distribution by him of the rice supplied by the Government at subsidized rate for distribution to landless agricultural labourers. 7. On 25th September, 1990 a group of Panchayat representatives met the District Controller(F & S), Nadia in a deputation for lodging complaint against the respondent regarding alleged illegalities in the distribution by him of the rice supplied by the Government at subsidized rate for distribution to landless agricultural labourers. Consequently, the respondent's godown was raided on 26th September, 1990. The incident ultimately led to the institution of E.C. Case No. 29 of 1990 under section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955-before the learned Judge, Special Court (E.C. Act), Nadia. It ultimately ended in respondent's acquittal. 8. The notice dated 26th September, 1990, issued by the District Controller (F & S) in connection with the search and seIzure in the respondent's godown, was challenged in a writ petition [Civil Order No.10494(W) of 1990]. By an order dated 7th October, 1990 the authorities were directed not to interfere with the running of the respondent's business. By another order dated 22nd October, 1990-passed on that writ petition-the authorities were directed to release all the seized articles and also to make allotment of rationed articles. That writ petition was claimed to be pending decision as on 22nd April, 1999. 9. Again, on 28th January, 1992 the District Controller, the Sub-Divisional Controller and the other officials on a surprise visit at the respondent's godown claimed to have found that the respondent besides changing the quality of rice received from the Food Department, had sold NBSF BLD rice in clandestine manner and falsified and tampered with the relevant documents. Consequently, the District Magistrate suspended the supplies of food-stuffs to the respondent. On the basis of an F.I.R., E.C. Case No. 70 of 1992 was started against the respondent before the learned Judge, Special Court(E.C. Act), Nadia. Authorities' such actions were challenged in a fresh writ petition [Civil Order No.1042(W) of 1992]. By interim order the authorities were directed to resume supply. This writ petition was also claimed to be pending decision as on 22nd April, 1999. 10. On 27th February, 1997 the said Directorate issued a circular laying down detail guidelines regarding the scheme of Targeted Public Distribution System. By the scheme the Government proposed to streamline the Public Distribution System by identifying families below the poverty line (in short 'BPL'); and selling essential articles(food-grains) to them at especially subsidized prices. 11. 10. On 27th February, 1997 the said Directorate issued a circular laying down detail guidelines regarding the scheme of Targeted Public Distribution System. By the scheme the Government proposed to streamline the Public Distribution System by identifying families below the poverty line (in short 'BPL'); and selling essential articles(food-grains) to them at especially subsidized prices. 11. By a subsequent circular dated 23rd May, 1997 the Food & Supplies Department of the Government notified that as per Government of India's guidelines, to supply common variety of rice and wheat to the BPL people of the State, the Government had decided to implement the Targeted Public Distribution System in the State at considerably reduced price. By that notification the Government fixed the selling rates of the food-grains. According to those rates the M.R. Distributors were to purchase common variety rice from the Government agencies at the ex-godown wholesale rate of Rs.376.62 per quintal and were to sell the same to the assigned M.R. dealers at the rate of Rs.384.41 per quintal; similarly, for wheat the purchase price was fixed at Rs.279.10 per quintal and the selling price was fixed at Rs.286.07 per quintal. 12. On 21st July, 1997 the District Magistrate, Nadia directed the District Controller (F & S), Nadia to take legal action against the respondent for alleged irregularities and illegalities committed by him while acting as M.R Distributor. The District Magistrate's such direction was challenged by the respondent by filing yet another writ petition [W.P. No.15723(W) of 1997]. By an order dated 11th August, 1997 the District Magistrate's said memo dated 21st July, 1997 was stayed. This writ petition was also claimed to be pending decision as on 22nd April, 1999. 13. In the meanwhile, trial of the said E.C. Case No.29 of 1990 proceeded. Finally by the judgment and order dated 10th February, 1999, passed in that case, the respondent was acquitted. The finding of the Special Court was the stock displayed on the stock-board and found on physical verification in the godown, stood at variance to the extent of 51 quintals 65 kgs. Finally by the judgment and order dated 10th February, 1999, passed in that case, the respondent was acquitted. The finding of the Special Court was the stock displayed on the stock-board and found on physical verification in the godown, stood at variance to the extent of 51 quintals 65 kgs. for the simple reason that the stock-board written at the time of opening the godown-in the absence of regular rectification-did not reflect the sale effected 26th September, 1990 up to 3 p.m. when the godown was sealed by the enforcement officers; therefore, there was no real unexplained shortage in the stock of food-grains in the respondent's specified godown, 14. However, complaints against the respondent continued to pour in. On the basis of reports from various sources regarding the respondent's alleged persistent illegal activities involving the food-grains and articles supplied to him by the Food & Supplies Department, the District Controller(F & S), Nadia ultimately formed a squad consisting of four Chief Inspectors(F & S) for raiding the respondent's godown, 15. Accordingly, on 22nd April, 1999 at 11 a.m the squad raided the respondent's godown. The raid led to the lodging of the impugned F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999 with the Nabadwip Police Station, The F.I.R reads as follows: ''To The I/C, Nabadwip Police Station, Nabadwip, Nadia. Sub:-FIR Sir, As per instruction of competent authority a special squad of Food Officials of this District launched an inspection in the M.R. Distributor's godown of Sri Susanta Kumar Saha at Char Swarupganj P.O, Swarupganj P.S. Nabadwip. It appears from the Stock Book that the opening balance of Rice BPL, Wheat BPL as on 22.4.99 were Rice BPL 239 Bags = 226.40,000 Wheat BPL 557 Bags = 408.96.256 But on physical counting of Bags containing the above item when there was no sale or other type of deliveries the actual stocks stands(sic) as Rice BPL 174 Bags. Wheat BPL 254 Bags. As such there are clear misappropriation of 65 Bags and 303 Bags containing Wheat BPL. It is further noted that the M.R. Distributor subsequent(sic) disappears(sic) while 35 Bags of Wheat BPL and some quantity of Sugar were delivered. As a result the deliveries in P.D. System was stopped and the squad party did not get any co-operation from the M.R. Distributor in the matter of physical weighment of entire stock of BPL Rice & Wheat as on 22.4.99. As a result the deliveries in P.D. System was stopped and the squad party did not get any co-operation from the M.R. Distributor in the matter of physical weighment of entire stock of BPL Rice & Wheat as on 22.4.99. In view of the above, the undersigned requests to please accept this as a(sic) F.I.R. and action maybe taken accordings (sic) in the light of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 or any other lawful order against such kind of misappropriation of rationed articles. Yours faithfully, 22/4/99 Lakshmindar Dasgupta Chief Inspector, Food & Supplies Krishnanagar." 16. In the aforesaid circumstances the writ petition affirmed on 281h April, 1999 [W.P.No.9111(W) of 1999]-out of which the present appeal arises-was filed by the respondent, praying for quashing of the said F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999 and other consequential reliefs. 17. The appellant Nos.1 to 12(who were respondent Nos. 1 to 12 in the writ petition) contested the said writ petition by jointly filing an affidavit-in-opposition date 1st July, 1999 which was affirmed by the said Shri Lakshmindar Dasgupta. In their said opposition the appellants denied the allegations that the F.I.R had been lodged mala fide. They contended that the F.I.R. had been lodged alleging misappropriation of rationed articles; which had been allotted to the respondent for supplying to the dealers who, in turn, were to supply the highly subsidized food-grains to the B.P.L. ration card holders only. 18. In the aforesaid circumstances, after hearing the parties, the learned single Judge allowed the said writ petition by the impugned judgment and order; the relevant portions whereof are quoted below:- “............................:.............Unit it is alleged that there had been an unauthorized transfer or despatch or movement of such rice or wheat, that would not tantamount to either the violation of the agreement or of the 1.icence. In the F.I.R. in question there is no such allegation. In the F.I.R. in question there is no such allegation. Merely because on inspection a few bags of wheat and rice were found short than those recorded in the Register, maintained by the petitioner, there was neither any violation of the agreement or of the licensing order." "Clause 7 of the agreement obliges the petitioner to maintain a Register of daily stocks and sales and to make the same up-to-date at the end of each day, therefore, if physical shortage was detected than the stock as registered that would be a violation of the obligation of the petitioner under the agreement, which may entail suspension and ultimate termination of the distributorship of the petitioner, but that would not entail any offence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955." "........................................................................ Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, as narrated above, it would not be proper to supplement the F.I.R. by the contents of the seizure list in question. The result of that would be two-fold, namely, there is no prima facie evidence that the petitioner caused shortage of either BPL rice or BPL wheat and the F.I.R. is bad as the shortage was not quantified. As a result thereof neither any action can be initiated against the petitioner on the basis of the agreement, nor the F.I.R. can be proceeded with." "......................................................lodgment of the subject F.I.R. and subsequent preparation of the seizure list to supplement the same in the absence of the petitioner and with the aid and assistance of the persons on whose complaint the search and seizure took place, shocks the very conscience of the society. I, therefore, quash the F.I.R. and all proceedings initiated on the basis thereof. I declare that the seizure was illegal, the confiscation was bad and all proceedings initiated on the basis of the subject seizure are bad and accordingly quash the same. As a consequence I direct the respondents to return to the petitioner the goods as shown to have been seized in the seizure list within 15 days from the date hereof or the value of the same to the petitioner within the self-same period as well as all books and documents of the petitioner as seized. As a consequence I direct the respondents to return to the petitioner the goods as shown to have been seized in the seizure list within 15 days from the date hereof or the value of the same to the petitioner within the self-same period as well as all books and documents of the petitioner as seized. In regard to the rest of the goods which the petitioner claimed to have been stolen by the raiding party and for which the petitioner has lodged F.I.R., I direct the concerned Police Station to forthwith register a case on the basis of such complaint, and to complete the investigation within six months hereof and to file an appropriate charge sheet before the appropriate Court within a period of six months from today." 19. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellants has made the following submissions: In the facts and circumstances of the case the learned single Judge should not have quashed the F.I.R. On the basis of the F.I.R., the Police authorities after making investigation submitted charge sheet and the learned Judge of the Special Court by an order dated 25th August, 1999 had already taken cognizance of the offences; therefore, at such stage the F.I.R. was no longer open to challenge. It cannot be said that the F.I.R. did not disclose any offence, as alleged by the respondent, or that it was lodged mala fide. 20. In support of his contentions the learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the following decisions:- 21. M.N. Rishbud & Anr. vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 ; Abhinandan Jha & Ors. vs. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 ; Khandu Sonu Dhabi & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 958 ; State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 ; Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 259 ; and Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1999) 9 SCC 525 . 22. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended as follows: 23. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 ; Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 259 ; and Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1999) 9 SCC 525 . 22. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended as follows: 23. The Chief Inspectors who conducted the raid although had jurisdiction and competence to make the search and seizure, the search and seizure conducted in the respondent's godown on 22nd April, 1999, having not been conducted following the procedure prescribed in the Manual, was totally illegal; therefore, it is not necessary to look into the F.I.R. for ascertaining whether it disclosed any offence or not, because once the illegal search and seizure, the basis of the F.I.R., goes; the F.I.R. does not exist at all. The attending facts and circumstances lead to the irresistible conclusion that the search and seizure was conducted and the F.I.R., was lodged by Shri Lakshmindar Dasgupta, Chief Inspector (F&S) mala fide and with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the respondent. In any event, the F.I.R. did not disclose any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The F.I.R. also did not disclose any offence punishable under any provision of the I.P.S. Shortage in the stocks in the respondent's godown, if there was any, could not and did not amount to commission of an offence of misappropriation or criminal breach of trust; because, having purchased the food-grains with his own money, the respondent became the absolute owner thereof; and there was no question of entrustment of such food-grains by the appellants with the respondent. The respondent was neither a servant nor an agent of the Government; the relationship was one of principal versus principal. 24. In support of his contentions the learned counsel for the respondent has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court given in Bhajanlal's case(supra). He has further placed reliance on the following cases: 25. State of Gujarat vs. Jaswantlal Nathala; AIR 1968 SC 700 ; Motibhai Fulabhai Patel & Co. vs. R. Prasad, Collector of Central Excise, Baroda & Ors., AIR 1972 SC 829; State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Rajindra Sareen, AIR 1972 SC 1004 ; M. V. Kupp uswami vs. Taluk Supply Officer, Sriperumbudur & Anr., AIR 1975 Madras 395; State of Punjab & Anr. vs. R. Prasad, Collector of Central Excise, Baroda & Ors., AIR 1972 SC 829; State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Rajindra Sareen, AIR 1972 SC 1004 ; M. V. Kupp uswami vs. Taluk Supply Officer, Sriperumbudur & Anr., AIR 1975 Madras 395; State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Gurdial Singh & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 319 ; and Navinchandra N.Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 . 26. On the facts of the case and in view of the contentions raised by the parties the questions which arise for our consideration are the following: What was the relationship between the Government and the respondent? On the existing relationship, if the allegations made in the F.I.R. disclosed commission of any cognizable offence by the respondent? Assuming that the search and seizure-on the basis where of the F.I.R. was lodged-was illegal; if that rendered the F.I.R., not an F.I.R. in the eye of law? Was the F.I.R. lodged mala fide? Was the F .I.R. open to challenge for quashing after submission of charge sheet and taking cognizance? 27. To ascertain the relationship we have to look into the terms and conditions of the agreement. Was the F.I.R. lodged mala fide? Was the F .I.R. open to challenge for quashing after submission of charge sheet and taking cognizance? 27. To ascertain the relationship we have to look into the terms and conditions of the agreement. We find (a) that the respondent was appointed by the Government; (b) that he was appointed to act as a 'Distributor' in food-stuffs under the scheme framed by the Government; (c) that as per Government's direction he was to purchase the food-stuffs at the approved rates; (d) that he was to preserve the food-stuffs in the specified godown; (e) that he was responsible for the shortage, if any, in transit; CD that he was to enter the quantities in the prescribed stock registers immediately on receipt of the food-stuffs; (g) that he was not to make any unauthorized transfer, despatch or movement of food-stuffs or part thereof anywhere outside the specified godown; (h) he was to sell the food-stuffs only according to directions given by the Government; at the price fixed by the Government; and only to the retailers as assigned to his by the Government; (i) that as per clause 10 the stocks in the respondent's godown were to remain the Government's property; (j) that the Government was entitled to inspect "their stocks" and respondent's books of accounts; and (k) that the respondent was to receive monetary benefits in the shape of the reimbursements; and the margin between the purchase and the selling prices: both fixed unilaterally by the Government. 28. In the aforesaid context of the relationship between the Government and the respondent, we may usefully refer to paragraphs (10) and (11) of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son, Ltd. vs. Government of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 364 which read as follows:- "(10) The distinction between a servant and an agent is thus indicated in Powell's Law of Agency at page 16: '(a) Generally a master can tell his servant what to do and how to do it. (b) Generally a principal cannot tell his agent how to carry out his instructions. (c) A servant is under more complete control than an agent.' and also at page 20:- '(a) Generally, a servant is a person who not only receives instructions from his master but is subject to his master's right to control the manner in which he carries out those instructions. (c) A servant is under more complete control than an agent.' and also at page 20:- '(a) Generally, a servant is a person who not only receives instructions from his master but is subject to his master's right to control the manner in which he carries out those instructions. An agent receives his principal's instructions but is generally free to carry out those instructions according to his own discretion. (b) Generally, a servant, qua servant, has no authority to make contracts on behalf of his master. Generally, the purpose of employing an agent is to authorize him to make contracts on behalf of his principal. (c) Generally, an agent is paid by commission upon effecting the result which he has been instructed by his principal to achieve. Generally, a servant is paid by wages or salary.' (11) The statement of the law contained in Halsbury's Laws of England Hailsham Edition-Vol.22, page 113, Para 192 may be referred to in this connection: 'The difference between the relations of master and servant and of principal and agent may be said to be this: a principal has the right to direct what the agent has to do but a master has the further right to direct how the work is to be done. The position is further clarified in Halsbury's Laws of England-Hailsham Edition-Vol. 1, at page 193, Art. 345 where the positions of an agent, a servant and independent contractor are thus distinguished An agent is to be distinguished on the one hand from a servant, and on the other from an independent contractor. A servant acts under the direct control and supervision of his master, and is bound to conform to all reasonable orders given him in the course of his work; an independent contractor, on the other hand, is entirely independent of any control or interference and merely undertakes to produce a specified result, employing his own means to produce that result. An agent though bound to exercise his authority in accordance with all lawful instructions which may be given to him from time to time by his principal, is not subject in its exercise to the direct control or supervision of the principal. An agent, as such is not a servant, but a servant is generally for some purposes his master's implied agent, the extent of the agency depending upon the duties or position of the servant." 29. An agent, as such is not a servant, but a servant is generally for some purposes his master's implied agent, the extent of the agency depending upon the duties or position of the servant." 29. On the question of relationship and entrustment, the learned counsel for the respondent has, however, placed strong reliance on the decision of Jaswantlal(supra). We find that the said decision does not help the respondent's case in view of the specific terms and conditions of the agreement by which he was appointed distributor by the Government. In Jaswantlal's case the sale of the controlled cement by the Government to its contractor for construction of a bridge was found to be a mere sale transaction; the conclusion was drawn by Their Lordships, because the conditions under which the Government had given the construction work were not brought on record of the Court; and the Court proceeded on the basis that the contract was one of those usual contracts under which it was for the contractor to secure the necessary material for the construction work. In the present case we have already seen that the respondent had no liberty or right to purchase the rationed articles i.e. the food-stuffs in question. 30. In the instant case, we find that the agreement provided as to what the respondent was required to do; and how he was required to do that specified work; and that he was to do the work under direct control and supervision of the Government. The words 'their stocks' mentioned in clause 10 of the agreement unambiguously show that the food-stuffs stocked in the respondent's godown were always to remain the Government's property. The respondent was not entitled to take out even a single grain out of the godown without Government's permission. He was entitled only to certain monetary benefits for doing the work. 31. Accordingly, we have no hesitation to hold that the relationship between the Government and the respondent was one of 'master and servant'. The contentions raised by his learned counsel that on purchase the respondent became the absolute owner of the food-stuffs in question; that the relationship was one of principal versus principal; and that he had not been entrusted with the food-stuffs-are totally devoid of any merit; and those are hereby rejected. 32. The contentions raised by his learned counsel that on purchase the respondent became the absolute owner of the food-stuffs in question; that the relationship was one of principal versus principal; and that he had not been entrusted with the food-stuffs-are totally devoid of any merit; and those are hereby rejected. 32. The respondent's relationship with the Government being as indicated above, for any dishonest misappropriation of any portion of the B.P.L. foodgrains supplied to him by the Government, the respondent can, certainly, be prosecuted under sections 408/406/403 I.P.S. 33. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that even assuming that he could be prosecuted under sections 403/406 I.P.S.; on the basis of the F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999 he could not be so prosecuted, as no such offence was disclosed by the allegations made therein. . 34. We find that although the F.I.R. had been registered, inter alia, under sections 403/406 I.P.S.; the learned single Judge did not examine the question whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. constituted any offence under any of those sections. The learned single Judge proceeded on the basis that any breach of the terms and conditions of the agreement could only entail actions provided therein; but not one of launching a criminal prosecution. The learned single Judge, however, held that on the allegations made, the F.I.R. could not be proceeded with; as the allegation of shortage was not supported by prima facie evidence of the quantity of shortage. 35. However, before dwelling on the contention, we propose to refer, very briefly, to the position of law regarding the relevant aspects of an F.I.R. 36. On an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence received in terms of section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; an officer-in-charge of a police station may investigate the case in terms of section 156(1) thereof. In this context, we may refer to para 12 of the case of State of H.P. vs. Pirthi Chand & Anr., (1996) 2 SCC 37 ; wherein the Supreme Court observed: "F.I.R. is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence." 37. In the context as to what an F.I.R. should contain: the Supreme Court in the case of Pedda Narayana & Ors. In the context as to what an F.I.R. should contain: the Supreme Court in the case of Pedda Narayana & Ors. vs. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153 (para 9) said:- "It is neither customary nor necessary to mention every minute detail in the F.I.R." 38. Reference can also be made to the case of Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 259 (para 9)-where the Supreme Court held:- "It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR(a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence." 39. Regarding the quashing of F.I.R. in very many cases the Supreme Court has sounded caution. In the case of State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp(l) SCC 335 (para 103) the Supreme Court said:- "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 40. In the case of Rupan Deal Bajaj & Anr. In the case of Rupan Deal Bajaj & Anr. vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr., (1995) 6 SCC 194 (para 23) the Supreme Court observed:- "..............at the stage of quashing an FIR or complaint the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein". 41. We have seen from the F.I.R. that the necessary allegations for constituting an offence under sections 408/406/403 I.P.S. were made by the Chief Inspector who lodged the F.I.R. It was stated in the F.I.R. that the respondent, who was an M.R Distributor, was having in his godown substantially lesser quantity of B.P.L. food-grains than the quantity which was supposed to be in the godown according to respondent's own stock-register. The complainant alleged that the shortage was the result of misappropriation of B.P.L. food-grains by the respondent. We are of the view that although the allegations made in the F.I.R. were not detail in nature, it cannot be said that the information given thereby to the police was totally bereft even of the basic facts which were absolutely necessary for making out an investigable case of commission of an offence punishable under sections 403/406 I.P.S. . 42. The allegations made in the F.I.R. cannot be said to be absurd, nor do they suffer from a transparent falsehood. The mere mentioning in the F.I.R. of the fact that the respondent was an M.R. Distributor, and substantial quantity of B.P.L. food-grains were detected to be missing from his specified godown, was enough for the concerned police authority to initiate an investigation by registering a case under sections 403/406 I.P.S. The police authority was not supposed to go by the suggestions made by the complainant that the respondent's alleged activities amounted to commission of an offence of mere mis-appropriation or of one punishable under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. As competent investigating agency, duly authorized and empowered by law, the concerned police authority was free to form his initial opinion as to under what provision of law the case was to be registered for investigation. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that no prima facie case was made out against the respondent for registering the F.I.R. and initiating an investigation. 43. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that no prima facie case was made out against the respondent for registering the F.I.R. and initiating an investigation. 43. We also note that after making an investigation the investigating officer found a prima facie case against the respondent also under sections 465/ 467/468/471 I.P.S. A charge-sheet No.79 of 1999 dated 10th August, 1999 was submitted by the investigating officer before the learned Judge, Special Court (E.C. Act), Nadia; before whom E.C. Case No.38 of 1999 was instituted in connection with the incident. Admittedly, by an order dated 25th August, 1999 the learned Judge of the Special Court took cognizance under sections 403/406/ 463/465/467/468/471 I.P.S and section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 44. We find from the impugned judgment and order that the learned single Judge by orders dated 6th January, 2000 and 11th January, 2000 directed the learned Judge of the Special Court to produce the entire case file; accordingly, the entire case file was produced before him. But from the impugned judgment and order it appears that the learned single Judge has completely overlooked the fact of registration of the case against the respondent under provisions of the I.P.S. as well as the fact of taking cognizance of the offences, under several sections of the I.P.S., by the learned Judge of the Special Court on the basis of the charge sheet. In our considered view, these facts were very vital for the purpose of examining the question: as to whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999 did make out any cognizable offence against the respondent. 45. In view of our above discussion, we hold that the case initiated and registered against the respondent by the police authority, on receipt of information as contained in the said F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999, under sections 403/406 I.P.S and section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; was not one of the rarest of the rare cases where the F.I.R. was required to be quashed by the Writ Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 46. 46. We have already found that by taking the allegations made in the F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999 at their face value the concerned police authority was justified in registering a case against the respondent under sections 403/406 I.P.S. Hence, we do not propose to go into the question as to whether the alleged shortage in the stock of B.P.L. food-stuffs in the respondent's godown would have amounted to commission of offence also under section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; for the F.I.R. can be sustained under the provisions of the I.P.S. alone. We have not entered into the question of commission of any offence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; because, in our view, the materials on record are not sufficient to come to a conclusion at this stage as to whether the alleged shortage, if found to be correct, would have amounted to commission of violation of any of the Control Orders framed or issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 47. As regards the question of validity and legality of the search and seizure conducted by the inspecting squad on the said 22nd April, 1999: suffice it to say that even if the search and seizure is found to be illegal, that makes no difference in the case. 48. It has been strenuously argued, before us, by the learned counsel for the respondent that the search and seizure having not been conducted according to the procedure, it was totally illegal, and consequently, the F.I.R. which was based on such search and seizure was no F.I.R. in the eye of law. The learned single Judge also, it appears, attached great weight to the alleged breach and non-observance of various aspects of the procedure of search and seizure by the inspecting squad. 49. In our opinion, the aspect of search and seizure, conducted by the inspecting squad, was absolutely irrelevant for initiating the investigation by the police on the basis of the information given in the F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999; as also for examining the question whether allegations made in the F.I.R. did constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. 49. In our opinion, the aspect of search and seizure, conducted by the inspecting squad, was absolutely irrelevant for initiating the investigation by the police on the basis of the information given in the F.I.R. dated 22nd April, 1999; as also for examining the question whether allegations made in the F.I.R. did constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Even assuming that the information had been obtained by the inspecting squad as a result of an illegal search and seizure, then also such information could not be overlooked by the police authority for the purpose of registering the case and initiating the investigation. In this context we may once again refer to the decision of Pirthi Chand (supra); in para 4 whereof the Supreme Court said:"....... unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure is not liable to be shut out." 50. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention that the inspecting squad having not conducted the search and seizure in strict compliance with the guidelines laid down in the Manual, the F.I.R. based on such search and seizure was no F.I.R. in the eye of law. The decisions cited on this point are totally misplaced. 51. Although the foundational facts, pleaded in the writ petition, were laid to bring home the contention that the F.I.R. had been lodged mala fide and with a view to wreaking vengeance on the respondent, it appears that the writ petition was not allowed by the learned single Judge on such ground. The point has, however, been argued before us with great force. This is the reason why we have narrated hereinbefore the facts regarding the previous proceedings between the parties. 52. In support of the contention, besides relying on Rajindra Sareen's case (supra), strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on illustration 7 given in para 102 of Bhajan Lal's case (supra); it reads as follows: "(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 53. We think, before proceeding further on this question the observations of the Supreme Court in para 108 of Bhajan Lal's case should be noticed there the Supreme Court said:- ".............. ..Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagwati, C.J. in Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar may be referred to: (SCC p.318 para 16) 'It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become . vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant.' Beyond the above, we do not wish to add anything more." 54. The fact remains that allegation of mala fides was made only against one member of the inspecting squad. The F.I.R. was the result of a surprise search conducted by the squad of as many as four Chief Inspectors (F & S) who were selected for the job by the District Controller (F & S). The police conducted an independent investigation, and found materials to charge sheet the respondent with commission of offences under several sections of the I.P.S. Above all, the competent criminal Court, after considering all materials, took cognizance of the offences. On these facts; in our view, Rajindra Sareen's case has no manner of application to this case; also, we do not feel persuaded at all into accepting the contention that the F.I.R. was lodged mala fide. Hence, we reject the contention. 55. It has, however, been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that once the charge sheet is filed and cognizance is taken by a competent Court, the F.I.R. looses its identity and it can no longer be interfered with for quashing. Excepting Bhajan Lal's case, the other decisions have been cited by him to support his such contention. 56. We are unable to agree with such a blanket proposition. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, (Cr. Excepting Bhajan Lal's case, the other decisions have been cited by him to support his such contention. 56. We are unable to agree with such a blanket proposition. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, (Cr. A. No.66 of 1996, decided on 18th January, 1996) [referred to in para 12 of the case of State of U.P. vs. O.P.Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 ]: "So far as the order of cognizance by a Magistrate is concerned, the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the first information report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged: At that stage it is not open for the court either to shift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out." 57. Therefore, the position is that even after filing of the charge sheet and taking the cognizance, the F.I.R. can still be examined for the purpose of quashing; however, once the cognizance is taken the question should be examined not only by looking into the F.I.R., but also into the other materials collected during the investigation; and all those materials are to be taken at their face value. In our view, the fact of taking cognizance not only strengthens the F.I.R. but also negates the allegations of mala fides in lodging the same. 58. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained; and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with costs. 59. Accordingly, we allow the present appeal. The impugned judgment and order dated 14th July, 2000 passed by the learned single Judge on respondent's writ petition [W.P. No. 9111(W) of 1999] is hereby set aside. The writ petition [W.P. No.9111(W) of 1999] is dismissed with cost ofRs.10,000.00 to be paid by the respondent to the State within a month from date. Ashok Kumar Mathur, CJ.: I agree. Appeal allowed. 19.9.2002 Later on. Request for stay, as prayed for by the learned counsel for the respondent, is considered and rejected. Let urgent xerox certified copies of this order, if applied for by the parties, be delivered to them. Prayer for rejected.