Judgment 1. The chequered history of this case is almost 32 years old. On 6.1.1970 vide Resolution No. 14/70 the appellant Patna Regional Development Authority (in short the PRDA) resolved to settle certain parts of land abutting the houses mentioned therein with the lessees/owners of the houses. The land in dispute admeasuring 0.83 katha situate by the side of House No. M-3/23. On 3.3.1970 Rewati Mohan Mishra, the father of the petitioners, a lessee of the above referred house was offered the land for Rs. 2463 @ Rs. 3760 per katha. It appears that the petitioners father was reluctant because the land was under encroachment and delivery of actual physical possession was not possible, However, the said Rewati Mohan Mishra moved this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1393 of 1982 which was disposed of in terms of a consent order. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under: (1) The Patna Regional Development Authority be directed to have all the encroachments removed over the disputed piece/parcel of land measuring about 0.83 katha equivalent to 1130 sq. ft. adjacent to Flat No. M-3/23 in Mohalla Shrikrishnapuri (Patna) by whom so ever the encroachments may have been made, either by the petitioner or respondents 5, 6, and 7 of any other party, as it is the legal duty of the interest of the public at large and, especially the petitioner, who is the adjacent flat-holder; (2) The Authority must take steps and have such encroachments removed within a period of three months from today whatever the nature of encroachments; be that safety tanks, structures, barbed wire fencing of anything; and (3) It will be open to the petitioner or any other party then to apply, in accordance with law, to the Authority to have the vacant plot aforementioned settled with him/her, which shall be disposed of in accordance with law. 2. The said petition was disposed of on 16.8.1988. From the said observations it would appear that the PRDA was required to remove the encroachment whatever type it was and said Rewati Mohan Mishra was given liberty to apply to the authority in accordance with law to have the vacant plot settled with him and the authority was required to dispose of the same in accordance with law. 3. From Annexure-3 it would appear that between 12.6.1989 to 29.6.1989 proposal for construction for the road was considered. 3. From Annexure-3 it would appear that between 12.6.1989 to 29.6.1989 proposal for construction for the road was considered. The authority was of the opinion that the lay out did not provide for a road but, however, if the road is required to be constructed then the land may be got vacated. The different departments were of the opinion that the road construction was not possible. Thereafter the Vice Chairman, PRDA informed the Secretary, Urban Development Department that construction of the road on the land in dispute was not expedient or in public interest. The question was also raised on the August floor of the Assembly. The Minister Incharge and the Secretary of the Department also endorsed the said opinion. 4. It appears that in the meantime the petitioners father again came to this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1862 of 1991. The Counsel for the PRDA informed the Court that after the land is freed from encroachment a road would be constructed. The Counsel for the petitioner submitted in the said matter that the feasibility of construction of road was examined by the authorities and according to the report submitted by them, the construction of the road was not feasible. A Division Bench of this Court while disposing of the said C.W.J.C. No. 1862/91 vide its judgment dated 15.4.1991 observed that the land was lying unused for almost about 25 years to advantage of none. The High Court directed the PRDA that if it wants to make a road then it must complete the construction within six months from the date of the judgment and in case it is not so done within one month thereafter the PRDA shall settle the land on the current price in favour of the petitioner. It appears that despite directions of this Court the road was not constructed nor the land was settled in favour of the petitioners father, therefore, he filed C.W.J.C. No. 5199/91 and also filed contempt petitions being M.J.C. No. 693/91 and M.J.C. No. 971/91. All the three matters came up for analogous hearing and were disposed of with a consent order by the parties on 23.7.1998. The High Court observed as under: The PRDA is directed to complete the construction of pucca road within three months from today in accordance with Rule, if permissible. All the three matters came up for analogous hearing and were disposed of with a consent order by the parties on 23.7.1998. The High Court observed as under: The PRDA is directed to complete the construction of pucca road within three months from today in accordance with Rule, if permissible. In case the said road is not constructed within the aforesaid time, the petitioners will be entitled to get the settlement of the land in question in their favour which the PRDA shall complete within a month on petitioners depositing current price of the land as per direction given in paragraph 3 of the order dated 16.8.1988 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1393 of 1982. 5. It would be worth noting that the order was made on 23.7.1998 and three months time was given to the PRDA but petitioners father, made a representation on 6.8.1998 along with a cheque for Rs. 37350 representing the current price of the land in terms of the Courts order. The said cheque was returned on 3.9.1998 saying that the decision with respect to the land was pending. The present petitioners thereafter moved this Court in M.J.C. No. 3139/1998. By the order, dated 16.11.1998 this Court observed that the earlier order dated 23.7.1998 was quite clear and did not require any clarification. The High Court, however, observed that if the PRDA has not acted in accordance with the Rules in constructing the road, as alleged on behalf of the petitioners, which has been seriously disputed by Counsel appearing for the PRDA, the petitioners may seek appropriate relief in appropriate proceedings. It appears that the petitioners thereafter filed the present writ application. The petitioners say that the road was to be constructed within a period of three months in accordance with the Rules, if permissible but as the Rules provide that there shall be no road of width less than 7 metres (22 feet) the PRDA was not justified in constructing the road of 10 feet width only. They submitted that the manner in which the PRDA and its officers have acted and have exhibited their high-handedness would clearly show that they, have scant, nay, no regards for the Rule of law or to the authoritative pronouncements of this Court. They submitted that the manner in which the PRDA and its officers have acted and have exhibited their high-handedness would clearly show that they, have scant, nay, no regards for the Rule of law or to the authoritative pronouncements of this Court. By the writ application the petitioners prayed that in accordance with the earlier judgments of this Court a direction be issued to the PRDA to settle the said road in favour of the petitioners. The respondent-PRDA in its counter has submitted that the total land was 1130 sq. ft. It was proposed to be settled with the father of the petitioners, the said offer was not accepted and thereafter the road came under encroachment. According to them the road was constructed well within time and as 22 feet or more width was not available, standing to their words and to honour the same, they had constructed 10 feet wide road. They have submitted that the petitioners were somehow or the other creating nuisance and problem in construction of the road and wanted to take advantage of their own wrong. It has also been submitted by them that after construction of the road for which the authority has spent a good fortune the petitioners were not entitled to any relief. 6. The learned single Judge after hearing the parties observed that the PRDA was to remove the encroachments within the time frame and the predecessor of the petitioners was given liberty to apply for settlement of the said land in his favour. The learned single Judge also found that under another order by this Court the PRDA was required to construct the road within a period of six months. Placing reliance upon the judgment dated 15.4.1991 the learned single Judge observed that if the road was not constructed within six months, within one month thereafter the land was to be settled with the said petitioner. The learned single Judge also found that in accordance with the final directions of this Court, the road was to be constructed within three months from 23.7.1998 and the same was to be constructed in accordance with Rules, if permissible. The learned single Judge also found that in accordance with the final directions of this Court, the road was to be constructed within three months from 23.7.1998 and the same was to be constructed in accordance with Rules, if permissible. The learned single Judge took an exception to the act of the PRDA in returning the cheque, dated 6.8.1998 observing that the petitioner was entitled to make the application as in case of non-construction of the road the petitioners were entitled to take me settlement. The learned single Judge also recorded the opinion that some persons, who did into want the land to be settled with the petitioners father, raised objections both in the Court as well outside on the floor of the Assembly. The learned single Judge also observed that the road having not been constructed within the time frame allowed by this Court in two successive orders, a right accrued in favour of the petitioners father and as such the petitioners are entitled for the settlement in their favour. The learned single Judge also observed that barring a bald statement that road has been constructed no corroborating fact has been brought to the notice of the Court. For these observations the learned single Judge relied upon the PRDAs letter dated 3.9.1998 (Annexure-18) and further observed that upto 3.9.1998 the decision was pending. In accordance with the said findings the writ application was allowed and the PRDA was directed to settle the land in question in terms of the directions of this Court in favour of the petitioners on payment of current market price. The PRDA being aggrieved by the findings recorded and the directions issued by the learned single Judge have filed L.P.A. under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 7. Sri Sidheshwari Prasad, learned Senior Counsel submitted before this Court that the findings recorded by the learned single Judge are based on surmises and conjectures. He submits that there was positive statement of the fact that the road was constructed in time and the same was the stand of the PRDA before this Court, on earlier occasions on strength of which the order, dated 23.7.1998 was passed in C.W.J.C. No. 32139/98. He submits that this Court in the said matter dismissed the contempt petitions observing that the road was already constructed. He submits that this Court in the said matter dismissed the contempt petitions observing that the road was already constructed. According to him if prior to 16.11.1998 the road was constructed, there was no occasion for the learned single Judge to hold that the road was not constructed within the time frame fixed by this Court. He further submits that the learned single Judge did not look into the pleadings of the petitioner raised in paragraph 22 onwards. According to him anticipating a settlement the petitioners made encroachment on the land and when the officers of the appellant wanted to remove the encroachment, the law and order situation was created and false report was made by the petitioners. He further submits that the road was constructed in accordance with the Rules and within the time frame, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 8. Sri J.P. Shukla, learned Senior Counsel placing his strong reliance upon the Modified Building Bye-laws as approved by Resolution No. 84/93, dated 15.10.1993 submitted that a service road cannot be of less than 7 metres width and as the present constructed road is about three metre wide, the construction of the road cannot be said to be in accordance with the Bye-laws or the Rules or the terms. He submits that the road was not constructed in time and in accordance with the earlier directions of this Court, the petitioner is entitled to a settlement in his favour. He further submits that the learned single Judge was absolutely justified in observing that the road was not constructed in time and in accordance with the Rules. Learned Counsel for the PRDA replying the said argument submitted that Bye-Law No. 33.2.1 which relates to roads issues a mandate in relation to width of different types of the roads. According to him if the sufficient width is available then a road is to be constructed in accordance with the Bye-law but the Bye-law does nowhere say that in absence of availability of a proper width no road can be constructed despite a felt necessity. Placing reliance upon certain judgments of the Apex Court he submitted that the learned single Judge has required the authority to act contrary to law and as the directions issued by the learned single Judge run contrary to the earlier judgments of this Court, the directions deserve to be quashed. 9. Placing reliance upon certain judgments of the Apex Court he submitted that the learned single Judge has required the authority to act contrary to law and as the directions issued by the learned single Judge run contrary to the earlier judgments of this Court, the directions deserve to be quashed. 9. For proper appreciation of the dispute it would be necessary to refer to paragraph 22 and subsequent paragraphs thereafter of the writ application. It is not in dispute before us that the petitioner was informed that the question of construction of the road was under consideration. It is also in dispute before us that the judgment was delivered by this Court on 23.7.1998 and the PRDA was granted three months time to construct the road. The said period was to expire on 23.10.1998. If on 3.9.1998 under Annexure-10 to the authority informed the petitioners that the decision in the matter was pending, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the matter was under consideration or it was not consciously considered. The authorities were required to construct the road latest by 23.10.1998 and on their failure to settle the same in favour of the petitioners. Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of the writ application are relevant. A juxtapose reading of these three paragraphs would show that on 21.9.1998 when the petitioner was absent the officials of PRDA came upon the land in question and started conducting measurement and fixed Khultas on land of the petitioner and informed them that the road was to be constructed. The officials of the PRDA were resisted by the petitioners men. Thereafter some fight ensued. On 25.9.1998 at about 5 p.m. the officials of PRDA came upon the land in dispute and with the aid of an excavator/bulldozer started levelling the road and uprooted a 40 feet high Jamun tree. In paragraphs 22 and 23 the petitioner raises a grievance that without any notice to the petitioners the PRDA entered upon the land in dispute. The petitioner does not realise that on 21.9.1998 or 25.9.1998 he had no right, title or interest in the plot but could enquire the same only after 23.10.1998 i.e. on failure of the PRDA to build the road. The petitioner does not realise that on 21.9.1998 or 25.9.1998 he had no right, title or interest in the plot but could enquire the same only after 23.10.1998 i.e. on failure of the PRDA to build the road. The petitioner further says that the officials of PRDA informed him that they were removing the encroachment made by the petitioners and were to construct a road on the land even if the width was less than 10 feet. According to the petitioner he inquired from the said officials about the justifiability of their action on which he was informed that the officials were implementing the orders of Hon ble High Court. From these paragraphs it would clearly appear that somehow or the other the petitioner anticipated and developed a strong feeling that no road was to be constructed on or before 23.10.1998, he would get the land settled in his favour and for this only reason he made encroachment on the said land in dispute and resisted the officials of the authority from carrying out the directions issued by this Court. It would further be seen that the petitioner says that he made an application to the police authorities about the high-handed action of the officers of the PRDA. A copy of the F.I.R. dated 3.10.1998 is available on the records at Annexure-13. In the said F.I.R. the petitioner had made a clear statement that on the southern side of the petitioners flat or plot the PRDA was raising a construction of 10 ft. width and 90 ft. length and the said construction was going on. It appears that effect and impact of Annexure-13 was not taken into consideration by the learned single Judge in observing that the PRDA was making a self-serving statement that the road was constructed within the scheduled time. If on 3.10.1998 according to the petitioners F.I.R. the road was under construction then by no stretch of imagination it could be observed that the PRDA was not making true its words and was not raising any construction. The findings recorded by the learned single Judge that the road was not constructed within the time frame runs contrary to the evidence available on record and the said finding cannot be approved. 10. The findings recorded by the learned single Judge that the road was not constructed within the time frame runs contrary to the evidence available on record and the said finding cannot be approved. 10. So far as the objection of the respondents/writ petitioners counsel in relation to the width of the road is concerned, it would be necessary to look to Bye-law No. 33.2.1. which is reproduced as under: 33.2.1. Roads.-The residential streets shall be divided into three categories based on their use and proposed traffic requirements: (1) Service roads; (2) Collector roads; (3) Other roads either proposed in the Regional Plan, Master Plan, Zonal Development Plan and Development Plan or required due to local requirements. The planning requirements for the above are given below: (i) Service Roads- (a) The minimum width of a service road shall be 7 m. The service road can serve upto a length of 300 m. This will be measured from one wider street to another wider street. If the 7 m. road ends as a dead end road it must have a turn around at the end. The width and depth of the turn around should be of 15 m. or an equivalent area in another form permitting turn around. No turn around is required if the number of plots served by such road is less than three. (b) A road which is longer than 300m, or serves upto 100 plots/houses or extendable to new areas shall be of 12m. width. Such road can be 400m. in length. (c) All junctions of service roads shall have sufficient weaving angle. In no case it shall be less than the space arrived at drawing a quadrant of a circle of 4.5 m. radius at the edge of the actual road lines leaving the width of pedestrian walks (foot path) and the plot boundaries shall be rounded of by drawing a quadrant of the circle of 2. 7 m. radius at the edge of plot boundaries (See figure). It can also be provided but cut in place of rounded corners is to be determined by the Authority. (iii) Other roads-The widths of Master Plan roads shall be followed as per the Master Plan. (iv) Service Lane-In row type of houses and in such areas where sewerage system does not exist a service lane of 3.5 m. width shall be provided. (iii) Other roads-The widths of Master Plan roads shall be followed as per the Master Plan. (iv) Service Lane-In row type of houses and in such areas where sewerage system does not exist a service lane of 3.5 m. width shall be provided. The length of such service lane shall be not more than 300 m. 11. According to the Bye-law the residential, street shall be divided into three categories based on their use and proposed structure requirements. The classifications are (i) Service roads; (ii) Collector roads (iii) Other roads either proposed in the Regional Plan etc. A service road would have the minimum width of 7 metre. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioners places his strong reliance on the language of the Bye-law when it says that the minimum Width of a Service road shall be 7 metres. According to him a road of lesser width was constructed and, as the High Court required the PRDA to construct the road in accordance with law/rules, if permissible then there was no scope for the PRDA to raise or develop a road having the width of Jess than 7 metres. We are unable to accept the said argument. According to Bye-law the width of the Service road should be 7 metres but we are required to read in the said Bye-law that such width shall be provided if the land of more than the said width is available. In a given case if the available width is less than 7 metres then non-construction of the road would lead to number of problems and construction of a lesser width of road would serve the public purpose. The minimum width can be adhered to if the land is available. It the land at all is not available, no authority can say that it would not construct a service road because the constructed road would be less than 7 metres width. The law is to be understood in its true perspective. It has to be harmoniously construed. If the language of the Act or a part of law leads to absurdity then the Court is obliged to interpret the same in a manner which subserves the cause of justice and the public interest. If in a given case the available width is less than 7 metres then non-construction of the road would lead to a chaotic condition. If the language of the Act or a part of law leads to absurdity then the Court is obliged to interpret the same in a manner which subserves the cause of justice and the public interest. If in a given case the available width is less than 7 metres then non-construction of the road would lead to a chaotic condition. If any lesser width road is constructed then the availability of lesser width of the road would be better in comparison to no road. In the present case we are unable to hold that the phrase the minimum width of a service road shall be 7 metres would mean that no road can be constructed if the width would be less than 7 metres. We are of the opinion that this provision is required to be read to mean that if the land of a particular or more width is available then 7 metres width road would be constructed but if the available width is less than 7 metres then a road of lesser width can also be constructed. The submission raised by the respondents deserves to and is accordingly rejected. 13. It is also be seen from the records that a proposal for construction of the road was made and a sum of Rs. 58400 was approved. The road was constructed and the required amount was paid to the construction agency. From the facts it would clearly appear that the road was constructed well in time, the construction was not in violation of Bye-law No. 33.2.1 and for construction of the road, the appellant PRDA has spent a good fortune. At this stage any interference by the High Court would be unjustifiable and the money spent for raising the construction would go down the drain. 14. At this stage we would refer to the judgments on which reliance has been placed upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In the matter of AP. Christians Medical Educational Society V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh - the Supreme Court observed that the Court cannot by its fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself. The Supreme Court further observed that there is nothing more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to disobey the laws. 15. The Supreme Court further observed that there is nothing more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to disobey the laws. 15. In the matter of State of Bihar V/s. Ramdeo Yadav - the Supreme Court observed that no mandamus can be issued directing the Government to disobey the law. 16. In the matter of Union of India V/s. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. JT 1996 (5) 26, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court cannot issue directions to the authorities not to reject the refund claim of the respondent even though it was time-barred. 17. From the above three judgments it would simply appear that no Court in the country can issue a direction to the authority. Corporation or the Government that disobey the law, rules or regulations. In the present case the learned single Judge has observed that the road was not constructed and the same was not in accordance with law. In view of the discussions aforesaid, the findings recorded by the learned single Judge cannot be approved. The facts clearly prove that the road was constructed within the time frame fixed by this Court; a good fortune, was spent by the PRDA and looking to the availability of the land the PRDA was justified in constructing 10 feet wide road. 18. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussions the appeal deserves to and is accordingly allowed. The judgment passed by the learned single Judge deserves to and is accordingly set aside. There shall, however, be no order as to costs throughout.