Judgment :- K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. First revision petitioner is a partnership firm and others are its partners. The firm is doing business on commission basis in the sale and export of spices. Respondent herein is a company owning a double storied building in Jew Town, Mattancherry. They purchased the building in 1972. Revision petitioners were in occupation of the tenanted premises prior to that. A portion of the ground floor as well as the first floor of the building belongs to and is in the possession of the respondent company. Earlier R.C.P. 177/81 was preferred by the landlord for eviction of the revision petitioners which was later compromised. The claim for eviction was abandoned on the revision petitioners agreeing to pay enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month and on agreeing to surrender a part of the backyard of the building occupied by them in exchange for being given another portion of the backyard by the landlord. A fresh rent deed was executed between the parties on 22.12.1982 incorporating the terms of the fresh tenancy. Respondent-landlord has now preferred the present Rent Control Petition under Ss.11(3) and 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Rent Control Court dismissed the petition on both the grounds. Matter was taken up by the landlord before the Appellate Authority. Appellate Authority allowed the appeal on both the grounds. Aggrieved by the same this revision petition has been preferred by the tenants. 2. When the matter came up for hearing counsel appearing for the revision petitioners submitted that the Appellate Authority has not properly appreciated the terms of lease deed AT Counsel submitted term of the lease is liable to be extended every three years at the option of the tenant and such option has been exercised by the tenant continuously till date and even thereafter during the pendency of the present proceedings. In order to establish this contention reference was made by the counsel to the decision of the Apex Court in Laxmidas Babudas, Darbar v. Rudravea,. 2001 (3) KLT 324. Counsel further submitted the Appellate Authority failed to consider the spirit and import of S.11(9) of the Act. Further it was contended that the need alleged in the Rent Control Petition is not at all for their own occupation, i.e., for the occupation of their defendants or for the requirement of additional accommodation for their personal use. Counsel further submitted the Appellate Authority failed to consider the spirit and import of S.11(9) of the Act. Further it was contended that the need alleged in the Rent Control Petition is not at all for their own occupation, i.e., for the occupation of their defendants or for the requirement of additional accommodation for their personal use. Consequently, Rent Control Appellate Authority ought not have ordered eviction on the grounds under Ss.11 (3) or 11 (8) of the Act. We have perused the terms of Ext. A7 agreement. We may extract the clause on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the tenant as stated herein. "That the tenant agrees the new tenancy agreement aforesaid shall be for a period of three years from 1.1.1983. Further it is agreed in case the Tenant wants to continue, they can continue on condition that they give an increase of 10% in the monthly rental amount every three years." Counsel submitted in view of the above mentioned clause tenant could continue in occupation of the tenanted premises indefinitely provided they give an increase of 10% in the monthly rental amount every three years. Counsel submitted the landlord cannot seek eviction on any of the grounds in the-Rent Control Act in view of the above mentioned clause. 3. Rent Control Act is a self contained statute and the rights and liabilities of the landlord and tenant are to be governed by its provisions. As held by the Apex Court in Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, AIR 1978 SC 22 the provisions in the Rent Control Act would prevail over the general law of the landlord and tenant. Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation and is meant mainly to protect the tenants from frivolous eviction. At the same time,-in order to do justice to the landlords certain statutory provisions have been made by the legislature which give relief to the landlord as well. The Apex Court in Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of UP, AIR 1974 SC 1924 held that an agreement in the lease deed providing that the parties would never claim the benefit of the Act and that the provisions of the Act would not be applicable to the lease deed is illegal. The protection given to the tenant is based on public policy. The benefit of the Act cannot be waived by agreement. The protection given to the tenant is based on public policy. The benefit of the Act cannot be waived by agreement. An agreement between a tenant and a landlord by which the tenant undertook to remove the building occupied by him on the expiry of the lease period of 3 years, was held not opposed to public policy or the protection given to a tenant under the Act. 4. We are of the view that a tenant or landlord cannot contract out of the provisions in the Rent Control Act if the building lies within the purview of the Rent Control Act. It is true that they can lay down a contractual fixed term of lease and during the pendency of the term of lease eviction cannot be ordered. But indefinite continuance of the tenant even after the landlord has satisfied the ingredients of S.11 of the Act, in our view, would be defeating the object and purpose of rent control legislation. That will defeat the spirit and object of the Rent Control Act. The decision in Laxmidas Babudas's case cited by the counsel for the revision petitioners, in our view, it is not applicable to the facts of this case. In that case there was a contractual fixed term lease. In the instant case there is no fixed term lease, but the lease deed has only given ah option to the tenant to continue on condition on an increase of 10% in the monthly rental amount every three years. We are of the view that clause as such do not take away the statutory right of the landlord under the Rent Control Act. 5.We are of the view landlord has made out sufficient grounds in the petition under S.11(3) of the Act. Landlord is a non trading company constituted by Oil Merchants-in the Cochin area. It controls the trade. It is an occupant of the building adjacent to the petition schedule building. Landlord has been directed by the Forward Markets Commission to improve the infrastructural facilities, failing which the recognition was liable to be withdrawn. In order to satisfy the infrastructural facilities insisted by the Forward Markets Commission landlord requires additional space. They are in need of trading hall. We are not prepared to say such a claim lacks bonafide. Landlord has been directed by the Forward Markets Commission to improve the infrastructural facilities, failing which the recognition was liable to be withdrawn. In order to satisfy the infrastructural facilities insisted by the Forward Markets Commission landlord requires additional space. They are in need of trading hall. We are not prepared to say such a claim lacks bonafide. We are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, landlord has established the bonafide need for own occupation under S.11(3) as well as under S.11(8). We find no reason to disturb the said finding. Revision lacks merits and the same is dismissed in limine.