S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE Divisional Forest Officer, kaghaznagar, Adilabad District and the commissioner, Municipal Council, kaghaznagar, Adilabad District, have filed this Writ Appeal being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 20-4-2000 made in Writ Petition no. 20959/99. ( 2 ) THE respondent-saw mill filed the writ petition questioning the legality of the proceedings R. C. No. 9154/98/s4, dated 9-7-1999 issued by the Divisional Forest officer, Kaghaznagar, Adilabad District, the 1st respondent in the writ petition, rejecting the application of the petitioner to shift the saw mill from the existing place to a new location at Survey No. 85/2 of Chintaguda village in Kaghaznagar Mandal, which, admittedly, falls within 5 kilometre-radius of reserve forest boundary. The Divisional forest Officer rejected the application on the ground that if the petitioner was permitted to shift the location of the saw mill to Survey no. 85/2 of Chintaguda village, it would be contrary to the provisions of Rule 3 (2) of a. P. Saw Mills (Regulation) Rules, 1969 (for short "the Rules" ). Being aggrieved by the said order, the writ petition was filed contending that the Divisional Forest Officer was not justified in applying the bar contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the rules, inasmuch as that sub-rule is applicable only to the setting-up of fresh saw mills and not the existing saw mills. The above contention was found favour with the learned Single Judge. Hence, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned order passed by the divisional Forest Officer, Kaghaznagar. Hence, this Writ Appeal by the State authorities. ( 3 ) THE learned Government Pleader for Forest appearing for the appellant contended that the bar contained in sub- rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules applies also to the shifting of existing saw mill and not necessarily setting up of fresh saw mills and in that view of the matter, the order made by the Divisional Forest Officer impugned in the writ petition was in order and in accordance with law. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-saw mill supported the order of the learned Single Judge. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned Government Pleader for Forests is not acceptable to us. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-saw mill supported the order of the learned Single Judge. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned Government Pleader for Forests is not acceptable to us. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the rules reads as follows," (2) No licence for setting up fresh saw mills within a distance of 5 Kms. from the boundary of any Forest under the control of the Forest Department whether notified or not shall be granted, except when it is required for departmental use. "sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the Rules reads as follows," (4) In case the saw mill premises is to be changed, or when the machinery is to be shifted from one place to another within same forest division, such changes should not be done without prior approval of licensing authority. "undoubtedly, an existing saw mill could be shifted to another location within the same forest division but only after prior approval of the licensing authority - in the instant case, the Divisional Forest Officer, under rule 5 (4) of the Rules. The bar contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 applies only for setting up fresh saw mills. If the argument of the learned Government Pleader for Forests is accepted that the bar contained in sub- rule (2) of Rule 3 would also apply to the shifting of the existing saw mills, then, we are of the considered opinion that the word "fresh" occurring in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules would be rendered redundant and surplusage. It is well settled principle of construction of statute that no such interpretation can be placed to render any word or expression used in a Statute waste or surplusage. The rule making authority, in its wisdom, with clear intendment has specified that the bar contained in Rule 3 (2) is applicable only to the setting up of fresh saw mills and, therefore, that bar cannot be applied to the shifting of the existing saw mills. In Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. The rule making authority, in its wisdom, with clear intendment has specified that the bar contained in Rule 3 (2) is applicable only to the setting up of fresh saw mills and, therefore, that bar cannot be applied to the shifting of the existing saw mills. In Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Mohammad alikhan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse it is held that the intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. Further in Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna municipal Corporation, Management, Shahara (Delhi) Sahranpur Light Ely. Co. Ltd. v. S. S. Rly. Workers Union, S. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam, Union of India v. Sankalchand, A. R. Antuley v. Ramdas Srinivas nayak Mohammad Aliklian v. Commissioner of wealth Tax, Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, the Apex Court held that "a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. From this it follows that the Courts attempt should be to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, Patanjali Shastry, C. J. , said that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. , jagannadhadas, J. , said, "it is incumbent on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application". In j. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. , Das Gupta, J. , speaking for the Supreme Court observed , "in the interpretation of Statutes, the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. In j. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. , Das Gupta, J. , speaking for the Supreme Court observed , "in the interpretation of Statutes, the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. " The Privy Council in quebec Railway, Light, Heat and Power Co v. Vandry held that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. In hill v. Williams Hill (Park Lane) Ltd. , referred to in Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas maiya and Umed v. Rajsingh Viscount simon observed,"though a Parliamentary enactment (like Parliamentary eloquence) is capable of saying the same thing twice over without adding anything to what has already been said once, this repetition in the case of any Act of parliament is not to be assumed. When the Legislature enacts a particular phrase in a statute the presumption is that it is saying something which has not been said immediately before. The rule that a meaning should, if possible, be given to every word in the statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the contrary, the words and something which would not be there if the words were left out". In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, in construing Section 6 (4) of the Bombay Land requisition Act, 1948, which provides that the State Government may requisition the premises for the purpose of a State or any other public purpose , the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the words any other public purpose are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State and said, "if the words any other public purpose in the statute in question have been used only to mean a State purpose, they would become mere surplusage; Court should lean against such a construction as far as possible. " ( 5 ) IN the premise of the above noticed well settled principles of construction of statutes, the contention of the learned government Pleader for Forests is not acceptable to us. In that view of the matter, we do not have any reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. " ( 5 ) IN the premise of the above noticed well settled principles of construction of statutes, the contention of the learned government Pleader for Forests is not acceptable to us. In that view of the matter, we do not have any reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. The writ Appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.